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Drawing conceptions from the fiscal-military model of state formation in which wars make states, I explore what made the historical experiences of Taiwan different from early Europe and contemporary Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that properly applying Charles Tilly's analysis of coercion and capital of European state formation to the case of Taiwan in the Cold-War era entails a revised notion of the military. That the military was mainly composed of "refugee-soldiers" rather than "citizen-soldiers" is a factor setting Taiwan's state-building process apart. Exiled Mainland soldiers defeated in the Chinese civil war were the main body of the military. Moreover, I suggest that foreign aid and domestic resources were the two sources of capital in non-European state making. Unlike its Latin American and African counterparts that relied heavily on foreign aid, the state in Taiwan balanced the two sources. While it had to negotiate with the society to extract resources, foreign aid exempted it from taking too much. Establishing negotiating mechanisms with the society that didn't burden it too much, the state in Taiwan became more capable and effective. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents information on the Chinese Nationalism in Taiwan from the 1950s to the 1970s. The formation and change of nationalist thought in the non-western world is the process of selectively adopting and rejecting western thought. To pursue a complete understanding of non-western nationalism, one cannot afford to neglect its nationalist thoughts and discourses. It can not be denied that the Nationalist regime in Taiwan was anti-Communist and an ally of the United States. More importantly, Chinese nationalism in Taiwan emerged in the context of Chinese civil war. This study is purposed to explore the content of Chinese nationalist ideologies in Taiwan as well as how they were spread.