A number of behavioral explanations have been identified to account for the empirical observation that individuals tend to inefficiently shy away from making certain decisions. We introduce a new bias, "Definitivity Avoidance" (DA), that induces individuals to avoid choices that involve a final judgment. This bias denotes situations in which an agent prefers to avoid making definitive decisions (i.e., those that involve a final judgment). This kind of behavior may play an essential role in several applications in economics and finance. For instance, a bank's choice of rolling over debt for a poorly performing firm involves postponing a final decision instead of forcing the firm to file for bankruptcy. Indeed, numerous finance papers (e.g., Bernanke, 1989; Carey et al., 2012) have identified inefficiently high rates of debt rollover, thus suggesting that these decisions could be subject to systematic biases. Similarly, closing an investment position even in the presence of noisy signals definitively precludes capturing a possible upside, and this option could appear less attractive than leaving the position open, with the idea of eventually closing it when uncertainty declines.6 Also, in judicial systems with 'double jeopardy' provisions, acquittals are more definitive as they cannot be appealed. Indeed, anecdotal evidence by legal scholars (e.g., Leipold, 2005) highlights surprisingly high conviction rates in jury trials. Along these lines, Westman (1991) has highlighted the social costs of the puzzling length of foster care for children, arguing that this is due to the reluctance of court officials to make "definitive decisions ". After having modeled the effects of DA, we show that the introduction of a decision review system that allows a third party to review the correctness of decisions significantly affects decision makers' propensity to make definitive choices, if and only if they are characterized by this bias. More precisely, we exploit a unique natural experiment - the introduction of a technology-assisted review system in professional tennis - to test the model implications and confirm the relevance of this behavioral bias in a competitive setting. The results of the empirical analysis subsequently permit us to derive welfare implications. In particular, we show that a review system that increases the share of definitive decisions always leads to a welfare improvement, unless it more than offsets a decision maker's initial DA by inducing her to become excessively definitivity loving (i.e., having a strict preference for definitive decisions over nondefinitive ones). Even in this latter case, welfare can improve as long as the precision of the information received by the agents that are affected by the decision is sufficiently high, and the cost of invoking a challenge is sufficiently low in relation to the accuracy of the review technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]