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As various institutions compete to fill more roles in the educational process, they should ask themselves exactly what kind of clientele they wish to serve and what kinds of outcomes they wish to attain. Only then is it reasonable to consider strategies for using technology to support these goals. Educational institutions should plan future operations to serve the needs of their clients, realizing that new client markets can be opened through astute applications of technology. For instance, a university can erect a satellite earth station on its campus and use it not only to receive educational transmissions but for several other purposes as well: faculty and students can participate in teleconferences; the campus can enable local members of national organizations to attend their own teleconferences, and can perhaps provide them with educational services as well; and the campus can use its hookup to provide its own locally-generated information to a national audience. To be successful in the new educational market, institutions must speed up the development of media literacy, change the decision-making environment, become more entrepreneurial, and become more interactive with other educational providers in the community. (Author/PGD)

Following the 2011 overthrow of Ben Ali, highly publicized conflicts involving the role of Islam in public life dominated the Tunisian landscape and threatened to disrupt the democratic transition. This paper illustrates how Islam in Tunisia, especially in political life, has been affected by the democratization process, focusing on the 2014 Presidential and Legislative Elections. In particular, it focuses not on macro-level changes in laws and institutions, but on cultural processes of meaning making to illustrate how religion is understood by actors through a focus on discourse, interpretation of key events, and the use of symbols in a dynamic and contested process. Drawing on data collected from participant observation and electoral documents, this paper examines how a variety of political actors utilized Islam and (anti-) Islamist discourses during the 2014 campaigns. It finds that there was an inversion in how "secular" and "Islamist" labels mapped onto the actual discourse in the elections between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes, the purported "Islamist" and "secular" parties, with the later making concerted efforts to highlight its religious credentials during the electoral campaigns and the former deemphasizing its Islamist character when compared to the 2011 elections. I argue that this shift in rhetoric points to the normalization of a particular type of religious discourse in Tunisia and a narrowing of opportunities for religious pluralism that seemed present immediately following the revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]