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This thesis concerns the plausibility of arguments that certain normative ethical theories converge on the answer to the practical question of normative ethics (e.g., What (morally) ought I to do?) and the explanatory question of normative ethics (e.g., What explains why certain actions are permissible, required, or forbidden?). I explore different strategies for arguing that normative ethical theories converge on the answer to these questions. I then turn to the prospects of convergence between certain normative ethical theories in environmental ethics and animal ethics. In environmental ethics, I consider the prospects of convergence between Anthropocentrism (i.e., human-centred ethics) and Non-Anthropocentrism. I argue that Bryan Norton's influential convergence argument fails to show that there is convergence between these two views. I then propose my own version of Anthropocentrism (i.e., "Broad Anthropocentrism") and argue that it exhibits some degree of convergence with NonAnthropocentrism on the answer to both the practical and the explanatory question of normative ethics. In animal ethics, I consider the prospects of convergence between Utilitarianism and a moral rights-based approach. I argue that a prominent attempt to argue for convergence between these theories fails because it relies on implausible or incomplete versions of a moral rights theory. Finally, I shift focus from convergence on the answer to the practical and explanatory questions to convergence on the question of whether one ought to care about nature and animals. I argue that there is a large amount of convergence between Broad Anthropocentrism and Non-Anthropocentrism on the answer to the questions of "Should one finally care about nature?" and "Why should one finally care about nature?" I also argue that there is a fair amount of convergence between Utilitarianism and a plausible moral rights view on the answer to the questions, "Should I care about animals?" and "Why should I care about animals?"