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How should we understand the place of the mind in the natural world? Can the relationship between the contents of consciousness and the underlying mechanisms be identified? This thesis approaches the question of consciousness and the self through the framework of active inference. According to predictive processing approaches to brain function, brains are essentially prediction machines. On this view, perception and action are underpinned by inferential mechanisms that implement a hierarchical generative model, constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with topdown predictions or expectations. Predictive processing is thought to offer a first glimpse of a unified theory of the mind-uniting perception, action, and cognition under a single theoretical framework. In particular, active inference, under the free energy principle, has emerged as the most explanatorily powerful approach in predictive processing. In this thesis, I develop a conceptual framework within active inference for understanding consciousness and phenomenal selfhood (broadly, the 'sense of being a self') in terms of an "allostatic control model". I made the case that phenomenal selfhood arises from a hierarchically deep inference about endogenous control of 'selfevidencing' (survival-relevant) sensory outcomes. I apply this account to develop a new understanding of the relationship between self-consciousness and consciousness. Based on the allostatic control model, I posit a novel theoretical model of how psychedelic drugs can lead to 'selfless' experiences. I then apply the allostatic control model to characterise the contrastingly dysphoric and euphoric selfless experiences that can arise in depersonalisation disorder and meditation practice. Based on these accounts, I consider the possibility of a theory of consciousness within this active inference, analysing whether selfless experiences pose a threat to an active inference theory of consciousness understood in terms of selfmodelling mechanisms. I argue that selfless experiences do not pose a threat to an active inference theory of consciousness, rather selfless states can be informative as to how consciousness should be understood in active inference. Consciousness emerges as fundamentally affective on this view, where (in normal experience) hierarchically deep self-modelling mechanisms function to 'tune' organisms to opportunities for adaptive action across multiple interlocking timescales.

In this thesis, we explore and apply methods inspired by the free energy principle to two important areas in machine learning and neuroscience. The free energy principle is a general mathematical theory of the necessary information-theoretic behaviours of systems which maintain a separation from their environment. A core postulate of the theory is that complex systems can be seen as performing variational Bayesian inference and minimizing an information-theoretic quantity called the variational free energy. The free energy principle originated in, and has been extremely influential in theoretical neuroscience, having spawned a number of neurophysiologically realistic process theories, and maintaining close links with Bayesian Brain viewpoints. The thesis is split into three main parts where we apply methods and insights from the free energy principle to understand questions first in perception, then action, and finally learning. Specifically, in the first section, we focus on the theory of predictive coding, a neurobiologically plausible process theory derived from the free energy principle under certain assumptions, which argues that the primary function of the brain is to minimize prediction errors. We focus on scaling up predictive coding architectures and simulate large-scale predictive coding networks for perception on machine learning benchmarks; we investigate predictive coding's relationship to other classical filtering algorithms, and we demonstrate that many biologically implausible aspects of current models of predictive coding can be relaxed without unduly harming the performance of predictive coding models which allows for a potentially more literal translation of predictive coding theory into cortical microcircuits. In the second part of the thesis, we focus on the application of methods deriving from the free energy principle to action. We study the extension of methods of 'active inference', a neurobiologically grounded account of action through variational message passing, to utilize deep artificial neural networks, allowing these methods to 'scale up' to be competitive with state of the art deep reinforcement learning methods. Additionally, we show that these active inference inspired methods can bring conceptual clarity and novel perspectives to deep reinforcement learning. We show how active inference reveals the importance of deep generative models and model-based planning for adaptive action, as well as information-seeking exploration which arises under a unified mathematical framework from active inference. Finally, we provide a unified mathematically principled framework for understanding and deriving many information-seeking exploration objectives through the lens of a dichotomy between 'evidence' and 'divergence' objectives. We show that this distinction is crucial for understanding and relating the many exploratory objectives in both the reinforcement learning, active inference, and cognitive science communities and that this provides a general mathematical framework for specifying the objectives underlying intelligent, adaptive behaviour. Finally, we focus on applications of the free energy principle to questions of learning where we attempt to understand how credit assignment can take place in the brain. First, we demonstrate that, under certain conditions, the predictive coding algorithm can closely approximate the backpropagation of error algorithm along arbitrary computation graphs, which underlies the training of essentially all contemporary machine learning architectures, thus indicating a potential path to the direct implementation of machine learning algorithms in neural circuitry. Finally, we explore other algorithms for biologically plausible credit assignment in the brain, and present Activation Relaxation, a novel algorithm which can approximate backprop using only local learning rules which are substantially simpler than those necessary for predictive coding. We additionally show that the some relaxations that apply to predictive coding, also work for the activation relaxation algorithm, thus producing an extremely elegant and effective algorithm for local approximations to backprop in the brain. In sum, we believe we have demonstrated the theoretical utility of the free energy principle, by demonstrating how methods inspired by it can interface productively with other fields, specifically neuroscience and machine learning, to develop and improve existing methods, as well as inspire novel advances, in all three areas of perception, action, and learning. Moreover, throughout this thesis, we demonstrate implicitly, the theoretical benefit brought about by the FEPs unified treatment of these seemingly disparate processes, under the rubric of free energy minimization.

With the rising use of autonomous agents within robotic and software settings, agents may be required to cooperate in teams while having little or no information regarding the capabilities of their teammates. In these ad hoc settings, teams must collaborate on the fly, having no prior opportunity for coordination. Prior research in this area commonly either assumes that communication between agents is impossible given their heterogeneous design or has left communication as an open problem. Typically, to accurately predict a teammate's behavior at a future point in time, ad hoc agents leverage models learned from past experience and attempt to infer a teammate's intended strategy through observing its current course of action. However, these approaches can fail to arrive at accurate policy predictions, leaving the coordinating agent uncertain and unable to adapt to its teammates' plans. We introduce the problem of communicating minimal sets of teammate policies in order to provide information for collaboration in such ad hoc environments. We demonstrate how an agent may determine what information it should solicit from its peers but further illustrate how optimal solutions to such a problem have intractable computational requirements. Nonetheless, through the characterization of this difficulty, we identify strategies that permit approximate or heuristic approaches, allowing the practical application of this capacity in ad hoc teams.