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This paper tests three democratic peace theory hypotheses for East Asian political cooperation and a fourth commercial exchange hypothesis. H1 suggests that like regimes will have excellent bilateral relations, H2 suggests that unlike regimes will have poor bilateral relations, and H3 draws on Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder to say that democracies will have poor bilateral relations with nondemocracies. Finally, H4 suggests that there is a positive correlation between two regimes' economic ties and their bilateral relations. A robust test of the respective hypotheses (using a pool of nineteen bi-national East Asian dyads that includes China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) provides the most durable support for H4. Economic linkages are defined via a mathematical formula that incorporates the volume of cross-national trade and the base 10 logarithm of each regime’s GDP. Political contestation is defined via a score that incorporates Polity IV data and a measure of Internet openness from the OpenNet Initiative. This test finds H4 is the most convincing explanation for the variation in bilateral relations among the dyads; in addition, the relationship is considerably more robust when the China-Taiwan dyad is excluded. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent year, there have been significant developments in the peace and stability in cross-Strait relations, which is critical to the international relations in East Asia. In addition, the interaction among mainland China, US, and Taiwan is increasing as they are becoming more active in regional multilateral institutions. This situation raises the puzzle that whether institutions, economic interdependence can facilitate peace and stability among China, Taiwan and the United States. If the answer is yes, what are these causal mechanisms? Liberal theories of international relations emphasize the role of international institutions on fostering cooperation by reducing obstacles. such as uncertainty and transaction costs.. that stand in the way of mutually beneficial agreements between states. In addition, they also hold that interdependence decreases the incentives for conflict and war because states become reluctant to disrupt or jeopardize the welfare benefits of open economic exchange. This paper unifies these theoretical insights to explore the role of economic interdependence, institutions on the stability and cooperation between mainland China, Taiwan, and the U.S. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]