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Previous work has shown that England's pre-industrial elites had more surviving off-spring than their lower-class counterparts. This evidence was used to argue that the spread of upper-class values via downward social mobility helped England grow rich. We contest this view, showing that the lower classes outperformed the rich in terms of reproduction once singleness and childlessness are accounted for. Indeed, Merchants, Professionals and Gentry married less, and their marriages were more often childless. Many died without descendants (decessit sine prole). We also establish that the most prosperous socio-economic group in terms of reproduction was the middle class, which we argue was instrumental to England's economic success because most of its new industrialists originated from middle-class families.

We build a model of conflict in which two groups contest a resource and must decide on the optimal allocation of labor between fighting and productive activities. In this setting, a diaspora emanating from one of the two groups can get actively involved in the conflict by transferring financial resources to its origin country. We find that the diaspora influences the war outcome and, above a certain size, contributes to the escalation of violence. Given the characteristics of the conflict equilibrium, the two groups of residents prefer to negotiate a peaceful settlement if there exists a sharing rule that makes both of them better off than war. We then identify the characteristics of the economy such that the diaspora acts as a peace-wrecking force or triggers a transition towards peace. A dynamic version of the model with an endogenous diaspora allows us to analyze the joint evolution of migration and conflict in the home country, discuss the role of openness to migration and the possibility of multiple equilibria, and draw some policy implications.

China’s importance for India as a trading partner has increased tremendously over the recent years. At the same time, China has become the main target of Indian antidumping measures with a number of measures that is unprecedented worldwide. This paper provides a detailed analysis of trade flows between the two emerging economies and investigates on which type of products and in which sectors the Indian government applies antidumping measures against China. Then this paper estimates the trade impact of those measures that were imposed during the Great Recession, using monthly data on exports from China to India. The use of monthly data is relatively new to the literature and allows a detailed examination of the trade impact of antidumping measures and its dynamics. This paper finds that antidumping measures decrease the Chinese export value and quantity to India immediately and to a significant extent. The impact is quite stable over time.

This paper investigates whether on-the-job training has an effect on the employability of workers. Using data from the Netherlands we disentangle the true effect of training incidence from the spurious one determined by unobserved individual heterogeneity. We also take into account that there might be feedback from shocks in the employment status to future propensity of receiving firm-provided training. We find that firm-provided training significantly increases future employment prospects. This finding is robust to a number of robustness checks. It also holds for older workers, suggesting that firm-provided training may be an important instrument to retain older workers at work.

This paper evaluates the European Union’s antidumping (AD) policy from 1995-2009 with a special focus on the 2008-9 crisis. Combining product-level data on AD cases with detailed import data, we fail to find clear signs of a major trade policy change since the outbreak of the crisis. Our findings suggest that the EU largely remained on its pre-crisis path of AD policy with an increasing share of products and more industries covered by AD measures. Moreover, EU AD policy has increasingly focused on China and other lower middle income countries as targets. Further findings suggest that the EU is more likely to impose protection against countries and country-industries that are similar in their product mix. Country-product combinations subject to a preferential tariff are also more likely to be targeted. In terms of product characteristics, we observe that especially the shares of consumer goods and differentiated goods covered by EU AD measures have increased rapidly, remaining at a relatively high level also during the crisis. The patterns we reveal do not appear to be driven by a few outlying countries but are also similar when considering imports of individual EU member states.

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Recent human capital theories predict that labor market frictions and product market competition influence firm-sponsored training. Using matched worker-firm data from Dutch manufacturing, our paper empirically assesses the validity of these predictions. We find that a decrease in labor market frictions significantly reduces firms’ training expenditures. Instead, product market competition does not have an effect on firm-sponsored training. We conclude that increasing competition through international integration and globalization does not pose a threat to investments in on-the-job training. An increase in labor market flexibility may reduce incentives of firms to invest in training, but the magnitude of this effect is small.

This paper analyzes empirically the effect of spatial agglomeration of activities on plant-level productivity, using French firm and plant-level data from 1996 to 2004. We exploit short-run variations of variables by making use of GMM estimation. This allows us to control for endogeneity biases that the estimation of agglomeration economies typically encounters. This means that our paper focuses on a subset of agglomeration economies, the short-run ones. Our results show that French plants benefit from localization economies, but we find very little – if any – evidence of urbanization economies. We also show that those localization benefits are relatively well internalized by firms in their location choice: we find very little difference between the geography that would maximize productivity gains in the short-run and the geography actually observed.

New empirical and theoretical work has highlighted the importance of multi-product firms in international tradeflows. We examine multi-product exporters in the small open economy of Belgium, considering their importance and the relationship between the margins of trade and firm productivity, both across firms and within firms over time. In addition, we employ proxies for trade costs to quantify the extensive and intensive margin adjustments of trade. Linking production and export data at the firm-product level, we discover new and, heretofore, unknown facts about multi-product manufacturing exporters. The large majority of Belgian manufacturing firms export products that they do not produce. More than three quarters of the exported products and more than one quarter of export value from Belgian manufacturers are in goods that are not produced by the firm, so-called Carry-Along Trade (CAT). CAT exports are concentrated in the largest and most productive firms and the value of CAT exports responds differently to variation in firm productivity and trade costs than does the export value of goods that the firm produces.

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

We compile the list of articles published in major refereed economics journals during the last 35 years that have received more than 500 citations. We document major shifts in the mode of contribution and in the importance of different sub-fields: Theory loses out to empirical work, and micro and macro give way to growth and development in the 1990s. While we do not witness any decline in the primacy of production in the United States over the period, the concentration of institutions within the U.S. hosting and training authors of the highly-cited articles has declined substantially.

We study the location-specific component in research productivity of economics and finance faculty who have ever been affiliated with the top 25 universities in the last three decades. We find that there was a positive effect of being affiliated with an elite university in the 1970s; this effect weakened in the 1980s and disappeared in the 1990s. We decompose this university fixed effect and find that its decline is due to the reduced importance of physical access to productive research colleagues. We also find that salaries increased the most where the estimated externality dropped the most, consistent with the hypothesis that the de-localization of this externality makes it more difficult for universities to appropriate any rent. Our results shed some light on the potential effects of the internet revolution on knowledge-based industries.

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

This paper tests whether Antidumping (AD) protection affects the market power of import-competing domestic firms. We use panel data of about 4000 EU producers that were involved in AD cases to estimate markups before and after the filing of a case. Our findings indicate that AD protection has positive and significant effects on domestic markups, except in cases where import diversion after protection is strong, like in ‘seamless steel tubes’. Our results control for potential endogeneity of AD filings. A randomly drawn control group of firms not subject to AD policy did not have rising markups during the same period.

Special issue in honor of Prpfessor Michihiro Ohyama, Jurisdictional boundaries have retained greater economic significance under autocratic than democratic regimes. The different forms taken by rents under democracy and autocracy underlie willingness to diminish the significance of jurisdictional boundaries as economic barriers to trade and investment. The differences in the forms of rents also underlie incentives for creation of new jurisdictional boundaries., Tokyo

The Byrd amendment to US anti-dumping law distributes the revenue from anti-dumping duties imposed on foreign firms to the domestic firms that lodged the complaint of dumping. This Paper shows that the presence of the Byrd Amendment can yield lower duties and greater welfare than in its absence. This result holds when the US government puts a sufficient weight on the profits of the domestic industry in the welfare function. A sufficient condition for this result is that the market share of the domestic industry exceeds 50%, which applies in most US anti-dumping cases.

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

We investigate to what extent firm investment in transition countries is sensitive to internal finance. We find that firms in Bulgaria and Romania are less sensitive to internal financing constraints, in contrast to firms in Poland and the Czech Republic. A likely explanation is that Bulgaria and Romania experience a stronger persistence of soft budget constraints than the other two more advanced countries.

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info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

In this paper we develop a dynamic two-period model of imperfect competition to analyse the effects of European antidumping duties on firm behaviour and domestic welfare. Our model is one of the first to complement the European empirical literature on antidumping policy and can usefully be compared with papers dealing with the effects of US antidumping policy. We arrive at three important conclusions: (a) the strategic behaviour of European firms under European antidumping rules may run in the opposite direction compared to the incentives for US firms provided under the US antidumping rules; (b) US antidumping rules perform better than European rules in terms of domestic welfare and in terms of protecting domestic value added and employment; (c) the Strategic Trade Policy argument for protection need not apply for antidumping duties because the level of protection is endogenously determined by the firms involved.

In this Paper we study the location behaviour of a foreign and a domestic footloose firm competing in output in the domestic product market. Both firms produce a homogenous good using a labour intensive technology. While the domestic country is unionized, the foreign country is not. Location equilibria are studied as a function of the foreign wage level, both under free trade and under an optimal domestic trade policy. We find that when foreign wage levels are relatively low, both firms agglomerate in the foreign market (North-South FDI) and the optimal government intervention by the North is a zero tariff on imports from the South. For intermediate wage levels abroad, both firms prefer to locate in their own market and the optimal domestic government intervention is a positive tariff on foreign imports. For relatively high foreign wage levels, the optimal tariff policy is such that both firms agglomerate in the domestic country (North-North FDI).

This paper studies empirically the effects of European antidumping cases on trade diversion from importers “named” in an antidumping investigation, to countries “not named” in the investigation. For this purpose we use a unique data set at the 8-digit product level. The amount of import diversion can be regarded as an indication of the effectiveness of antidumping policy. We find that trade diversion in the European Union caused by antidumping actions—in contrast to the United States—is limited, suggesting that the European Union's antidumping policy is more effective in keeping imports out. This result holds even after controlling for selection bias in the antidumping investigation procedure. A number of explanations for this difference in trade diversion as a result of antidumping policy between the European Union and United States are formulated.

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Europese kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen(KMO's) mogen hun jaarrekening publiceren volgens het verkort schema. In tegenstelling tot het volledig schema, dat van toepassing is op grote ondernemingen, is in het verkort schema van de resultatenrekening de vermeldingn van de omzet niet verplicht. In deze paper wordt de beslissing de omzet te publiceren onderzocht in een eenvoudig speltheoretisch model. We confronteren daarbij een gevestigde onderneming met een potentiële toetreder enerzijds en een leverancierseffect van disclosure anderzijds. Op die manier wordt meer inzicht verworven in de mogelijke incentieven voor de onderneming om de omzet al dan niet te vermelden. Onze resultaten tonen aan dat deze regelgeving weliswaar in het voordeel is van de gevestigde onderneming, maar dat dit niet altijd leidt tot een beslissing die ook welvaartseconomisch optimaal is. Onder bepaalde voorwaarden valt een verplichte publicatie (mandatory disclosure) in het algemeen belang zelfs te verkiezen boven een facultatieve (voluntary disclosure).

This paper studies the effects of EU antidumping policy when foreign firms have the possibility to 'jump' antidumping measures by engaging in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the EU. Using a multi-stage framework, we study the EU administration's choice between an antidumping duty and a price-undertaking, taking into account the effect of these measures on the location decision of the foreign firm and the subsequent price competition between local and foreign firms. Our findings suggest that the EU administration acting purely in the EU industry's interest prefers a price-undertaking to a duty, if the latter leads to 'duty jumping' FDI. FDI toughens price competition in the EU market and leaves local firms worse off. Antidumping jumping FDI will only occur if the EU administration has broader objectives than just protecting the profitability of EU industry, if fixed costs of FDI are not too high, and if the cost advantage of foreign firms are, at least partially, firm-specific and transferable abroad. If foreign firms are able to act strategically taking into account EU antidumping policy, the presence of antidumping law can also discourage FDI that would have taken place under free trade conditions.

CEMP-ES CECW-EP-S CEPR-P DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Washington D.C. 20314-1000 EC 715-1-87 Circular No. 715-1-87 1 July 1994 EXPIRES 30 June 1996 Procurement NEGOTIATION OF ARCHITECT-ENGINEER SERVICES 1. Purpose. This circular provides guidance and procedures for the negotiation of firm-fixed- price (FFP) and indefinite-delivery type (ID) contracts for architect-engineer (A-E) services, including surveying and mapping. It is intended to promote fair, efficient and consistent practices for A-E contract negotiations throughout USACE. This circular covers the primary elements of negotiation. It should not be used as a substitute for the current acquisition regulations which provide policy. If there is a conflict between this circular and the FAR system (FAR, DFARS, AFARS and EFARS), the FAR system governs. Comments on this circular are encouraged and should be sent to CEMP-ES. 2. Applicability. This circular applies to HOUSACE elements, major subordinate commands, districts, laboratories, and field operating activities. 3. References. a. Public Law 92-582 (Brooks Architect-Engineer Act), as amended; 40 U.S.C. 541-544. b. FAR Parts 9, 15, 19, 22, 30, 31, 36 and 43. c. DFARS Parts 215 and 236. d. AFARS Parts 15 and 36. e. EFARS Parts 15 and 36. f. AR 215-4, Nonappropriated Fund Contracting. g. Armed Services Pricing Manual. h. ER 715-1-15, Time Standards for the Architect-Engineer Acquisition Process. i. ER 1110-1-12, Engineering and Design Quality Management. j. Memorandum. CEMP-ES/CEPR-ZA, 25 June 1992, subject: DAWIA Transition Memorandum No. 2: Architect-Engineer Contract Procedures. k. PARC Instruction Letter 92-4, CEPR-ZA, 18 December 1992. 4. Responsibilities. Commanders will ensure that personnel who negotiate A-E services are properly trained (reference 3.j), and comply with the applicable laws and regulations and this circular.EC 715-1-87 1 Jul 94 5. General Procedures. a. Negotiation Team. A-E contract negotiation is a team effort amon

U.S. Army Corn f HEC . .,..s 0 Engineers SA Library-Casey Build' 7701 Telegraph Road 1119 Alexandria, VA 22315 ~ CEPR-P Circular No. 25-1-208 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. Army Corps of Engineers washington, D.C. 20314-1000 EXPIRES 30 SEPTEMBER 1995 Procurement Management RESCISSION EC 25-1-208 1 AUGUST 1994 1. Purpose. This circular disseminates a rescission notice. 2. Applicability. This circular is applicable to all U. S. Army Corps of Engineers elements having contracting responsibility. 3. Rescission. ER 715-1-14, Procurement Official Contract Files, 1 April 1989, is rescinded. The requirement will be incorporated into the new EFARS. FOR THE COMMANDER: 7~~D.ri~t- KENNETH J. LdftHR principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting ) UBRARY COpy..

CEMP-ES CECW-EP-S CEPR-P DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Washington, D. C. 20314-1000 EC 715-1-85 Engineer Circular No. 715-1-85 30 January 1993 EXPIRES 31 MARCH 1994 Procurement SELECTION OF ARCHITECT-ENGINEER CONTRACTORS 1. Purpose. This circular provides guidance and procedures for publicly announcing requirements for architect-engineer (A-E) services and selecting A-E contractors in accordance with the Brooks Act (Public Law 92-582) and the acquisition regulations referenced below. This circular also delegates authority for approving A-E selections. Comments are encouraged and should be submitted to CEMP-ES. 2. Applicability. This circular applies to HQUSACE elements, major subordinate commands (MSC), districts and laboratories. 3. Reference. a. Public Law 92-582, as amended; 40 U.S.C. 541-544. b. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Parts 3, 5, 6, 15, 19, and 36. c. Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) Parts 205, 219, and 236. d. Army FAR Supplement (AFARS) Parts 19 and 36. e. Engineer FAR Supplement (EFARS) Parts 19 and 36. f. AR 215-4, Nonappropriated Fund Contracting. g. ER 715-1-8, Architect-Engineer Contract Administration Support System. h. ER 715-1-15, Time Standards for the Architect-Engineer Acquisition Process. i. ER 1110-345-721, Architect-Engineer Selection and Design Procedures for Medical Facilities. j. EP 715-1-4, Architect-Engineer Contracts.EC 715-1-85 30 Jan 93 4. General. a. Definition of A-E Services. A-E services, including surveying and mapping, are defined in FAR 36.102. EFARS 36.102 provides examples of surveying and mapping services which should be procured as A-E services. The performance of surveying and mapping services will not be limited to A-E firms, but may include surveying and mapping professionals such as licensed surveyors, geodesists, and cartographers. FAR 36.601-3 and -4 provide guidance on determining the application of FAR Part 36 procedures for a particular contract. b. A-E Selection Process. As described

CEPR ... O Circular No. 25-1-145 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers HECSA Library-Casey Building 7701 T eiegraph Road Alexandria, VA 22315 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Washington, D.C 20314-1000 EXPIRES 30 JUNE 1992 Information Management RESCISSION EC 25-1-145 31 January 1992 1. Purpose. This Circular disseminates a rescission notice. 2. Applicability. This circular is applicable to all HQUSACE/OCE elements, Major Subordinate Commands, District Commands, Laboratories and Separate Field Operating Activities (FOA) . 3. Rescission. ER 715-1-11, 21 March 1988, Contract Administration and Procurement Management System (CAPM) is hereby rescinded. This regulation is obsolete and no longer required as the CAPM System is no longer utilized by the Corps of Engineers. FOR THE COMMANDER: Io~~~ DIANE S. SISSON Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting

':" CEPR-O u.s. Army Corps of Engineers HECSA library-Casey Building 7701 Telegraph Road /' .. ' Alexandria, VA 22315 Ji)~ DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Washington, D.C. 20314-1000 Circular No. 25-1-175 EXPIRES 31 MARCH 1993 Information Management RESCISSION EC 25-1-175 6 October 1992 1. Purpose. This circular disseminates a rescission notice. 2. Applicability. This circular is applicable to all HQUSACEjOCE elements and to HECSA. 3. Rescission. Office Memorandum 715-1-4, dated 10 November 1983, titled "Requisitioning of Supplies, Equipment and Services" is hereby rescinded. Policies and procedures governing the initiation and approval of DA Form 3953, "Purchase Request and Commitment," are adequately covered in ER 700-1-1, dated 1 February 1992. FOR THE COMMANDER: ~zf~ DIANE S. SISSON Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting UBRARYCOP-Y

i~. CEPR-P Circular No. 25-1-169 :l.E.S. Army Corps of Engineers , ;:~CSA Library-Casey Buildin9j . :'01 Telegraph Road 'andria, VA 22315 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Washington, D.C. 20314-1000 EXPIRES 30 SEPTEMBER 1993 Information Management RESCISSION EC 25-1-169 30 September 1992 1. Purpose. This circular disseminates a rescission notice. 2. Applicability. This circular is applicable to all HQUSACE/OCE elements, major subordinate commands, districts, laboratories, and field operating activities. 3. Rescission. Engineer Regulation 1180-1-2, dated 20 October 1967, titled Contracts Official Contract Files, is hereby rescinded. The establishment of the requirement for use of ENG Forms 3726, 3726-1 and 3726-2, official contract files checklist, is contained in ER 715-1-14, dated 1 October 1989. FOR THE COMMANDER: DIANE S. SISSON Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting ,If--- ~ UBRARY COpy

CEPR-ZA Circular No. 25-1-92 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers HECSA Ubrary~Casey Building 7701 Telegraph Road AJexandria, VA 22315 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Washington, D.C. 20314-1000 EXPIRES 31 DECEMBER 1989 Information Management EC 25-1-92 14 July 1989 RESCISSION AND USE OF ENGINEER FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATIONS SUPPLEMENT FOHMS 1. Purpose. To rescind Engineer Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (EFARS) forms and provide instruction on the continued use of other forms prescribed by the 1984 Edition of the EFARS that will not be part of the 1989 Edition of the EFARS. 2. Applicability. This circular is applicable to all HQUSACE elements and field operating activities. 3. Rescission. The following forms are rescinded effective 31 July 1989. ENG FOHM-1511b Abstract of Bids - Construction ENG FOHM-15lld Abstract of Bids - Construction (Civil Works) ENG FORM-21BO Record of Contract Negotiations ENG FOHM-2180a Contractor Data ENG FORM-2459 Pre-Award Survey Architect-Engineer and Construction Contracts ENG FORM-3938 Contract Modification Proposal and Acceptance ENG FORM-3938-A Notice to Contractor on Use of ENG Form 3938 ENG FORM-3938-B Contract Modification Proposal and Acceptance (Contracting Officer's copy) 4. The following listed forms may be used as currently prescribed in the 1984 Edition of the EFARS until such time as the instructions r- - , UBRARY COpy ""- EC 25-1-92 14 Jul 89 and/or forms are superseded or confirmed by a forthcoming directive (EP 715 Series) to be issued by CEPR-ZA. ENG FORM 908 Option for Cemetery Site ENG FORM-2454 Construction Progress Chart ENG FORM-2695 Comparison and Computation Sheet ENG FORM-2696 - Recapi tulation and Summary Sheet ENG FORM-3l80 Contractor Payroll Record ENG FORM-3452 Contract Number Register ENG FORM-3453 Contract and Modification Record ENG FORM-3454 Contract Modification Register ENG FORM-3455 Purchase Order Number Register ENG FORM-3456 Invitation for Bids Register ENG FORM-3627 Prequa

CEPR-P CirCular No. EC ~l_-99 U.S. Army Corps -.r E • HECS . "'' ngmeers A ltbrary-Casey Build" 7701 Telegraph Road tng Alexandria, VA 22315 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Washington, D.C. 20314-1000 EC 25-l-99 EXPIRES 30 SEPTEMBER 1990 Information Management RESCISSION 29 September 1989 I. Purpose: To disseminate a rescission notice and to provide guidance. 2. 4Pplicability. This circular is applicable to HQUSACE elements and all field operating activities. 3. Rescission. a. ER UB0-345-102, 1 July 1968, "Insurance", is rescinded effective l October 1989. Also rescinded are the following forms required by the ER. EC 25-1-99 29 Sep 89 ENG 3892-24-R, 1 Jan 66 ENG 3892-25-R, 1 Jan 66 ENG 3892-26-R, 1 Jan 66 ENG 3892-27-R, 1 Jan 66 ENG 3892-28-R, 1 Jan 66 ENG 3892-29-R, 1 Jan 66 b. Subpart 28.3 of FAR, DFARS and AFARS addresses the various requirements for insurance and which clauses in Subpart 52 are required. c. The insurance clauses advise the contractor that prior to commencing work under the contract, he shall provide proof of the contractually required insurance to the Contracting Officer. d. Contracting officers shall ensure that appropriate insurance clauses are in the contract. FOR THE COt+IA.NDER: Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting

CEPR Circular No. 310-1-569 DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Washington, D.C. 20314-1000 EXPIRES 31 DECEMBER 1987 Military Publications RECISSION EC 310-1-569 27 October 1987 1. Purpose. This circular disseminates a recission notice. 2. Applicability. This circular is applicable to all HQ USACE/OCE elements and field operating activities (FOA). 3. Recission. ER 715-1-12, 20 August 1984, Procurement SYSTEM FOR FOLLOW-UP ON CONTRACT AUDIT REPORTS is rescinded. This regulation has been superceded by AFARS 15.890-5, reference EFARS Acquisition Letter (EAL) 87-10. FOR THE COMMANDER: " X~\ (()'{\,L C",---)- ./ G~I\SCHMANN Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting