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Since the end of the Cold War, modern Russian and Chinese relations have been characterized by strategic defense, economic, and diplomatic cooperation. This strategic cooperation has become increasingly coordinated, with the motives behind Russo-Sino cooperation increasingly becoming the focus of academic debate. While both states declare that it is not an “alliance,” other terms have been used, such as “alignment”. This concept has only recently gained greater academic attention. This paper presents a theoretical framework on alignment as a process and its constituent mechanisms. Drawing on neo-classical realism and alliance theory, this paper bridges theoretical IR concepts to empirical data, employing a case study methodology that utilizes congruence analysis. It highlights that alignment is a present feature of modern Russian-Chinese relations and it is driven by their perceptions of threat and the global and regional balances of power.

Since the end of the Cold War, modern Russian and Chinese relations have been characterized by strategic defense, economic, and diplomatic cooperation. This strategic cooperation has become increasingly coordinated, with the motives behind Russo-Sino cooperation increasingly becoming the focus of academic debate. While both states declare that it is not an “alliance,” other terms have been used, such as “alignment”. This concept has only recently gained greater academic attention. This paper presents a theoretical framework on alignment as a process and its constituent mechanisms. Drawing on neo-classical realism and alliance theory, this paper bridges theoretical IR concepts to empirical data, employing a case study methodology that utilizes congruence analysis. It highlights that alignment is a present feature of modern Russian-Chinese relations and it is driven by their perceptions of threat and the global and regional balances of power.

Based on a case study and media content analysis, we rely on insights from the advocacy coalition framework and from the narrative policy framework to conduct a congruence analysis of the French politics of hydraulic fracturing (2010-2017). Despite the lobbying of a resourceful coalition of pro-fracturing policy actors and their strategy of active participation in various professional forums, hydraulic fracturing was partially banned in 2011 and completely prohibited in 2017. Our results relate this ban to the stronger repetition of a simpler framing of the policy problem by the members of the anti-fracturing coalition. In other words, coalition members willing to transform their policy beliefs into concrete decisions should frame them into loud and simple policy narratives. These findings call for further articulation between the narrative policy framework and the advocacy coalition framework to account for narratives as the essence of strategies that advocacy coalitions develop for influencing policy processes.

Why do small states contribute to great power led wars even though they lack the capabilities to determine the success of the war and there are no clear interests to gain? The peaceable states of the Nordic countries could have opted for a free-riding strategy instead of being active participants. Still, the Nordic countries were in relation to their size, some of the top military contributors in Afghanistan. In recent small state literature, it has been suggested that small states use military contributions as means to increase their international status position. There are however two competing and sometimes overlapping arguments of whether status is a means for increasing political influence or securing protection. This thesis contributes to this literature by differentiating the concept of status in two categories - influence and security. This distinction enabled a cross case comparative congruence test which reveals that the Nordic states had different status motivations in their decision to contribute to the Afghanistan war. Denmark and Sweden had a clear preference of seeking status seeking as means for influence while Norway used status mainly as means for enhancing security. This thesis shows that small states are not only dependent security consumers. It suggests that the decision-making processes in the small states were guided by independent preferences of enhancing status, which ultimately transformed into military contributions. However, rather than considering status as the main objective, the potential gains of enhancing the status position were the central ambition. The Nordic states’ preferences of status gains differed more than what previous research has suggested.

Why do small states contribute to great power led wars even though they lack the capabilities to determine the success of the war and there are no clear interests to gain? The peaceable states of the Nordic countries could have opted for a free-riding strategy instead of being active participants. Still, the Nordic countries were in relation to their size, some of the top military contributors in Afghanistan. In recent small state literature, it has been suggested that small states use military contributions as means to increase their international status position. There are however two competing and sometimes overlapping arguments of whether status is a means for increasing political influence or securing protection. This thesis contributes to this literature by differentiating the concept of status in two categories - influence and security. This distinction enabled a cross case comparative congruence test which reveals that the Nordic states had different status motivations in their decision to contribute to the Afghanistan war. Denmark and Sweden had a clear preference of seeking status seeking as means for influence while Norway used status mainly as means for enhancing security. This thesis shows that small states are not only dependent security consumers. It suggests that the decision-making processes in the small states were guided by independent preferences of enhancing status, which ultimately transformed into military contributions. However, rather than considering status as the main objective, the potential gains of enhancing the status position were the central ambition. The Nordic states’ preferences of status gains differed more than what previous research has suggested.

Wie kann Lobbyingerfolg von Interessengruppen erklärt werden? Lange Zeit standen ausschließlich Ressourcen als Explanans für Lobbyingerfolg im Zentrum der theoretischen Auseinandersetzung. Später traten weitere unabhängige Variablen zur Erklärung von Lobbyingerfolg hinzu: Framing, Arenen, Issuetypen, Koalitionen und die politisch-ideologische Ausrichtung der Entscheidungsträger als intervenierende Variable. Die empirischen Beobachtungen am Beispiel der EU-Emissionspolitik zeigen, dass keine der genannten Variablen Lobbyingerfolg alleine erklären kann. Die Kongruenzanalyse wird belegen, dass die Erklärungs- und Prognosekraft der Variablen in den einzelnen Arenen variiert. Ressourcen sind ein guter Prädiktor für Lobbyingerfolg in der Arena der Kommission. In der Arena des Europäischen Parlaments ist vor allem das Lobbyingziel der einzelnen Interessengruppen entscheidend. In der Arena des Rats hängt der Lobbyingerfolg von einem komplexen Zusammenspiel aus Lobbyingziel, formellen Abstimmungsregeln und der Positionierung der Mitgliedstaaten ab, die wiederum von der Zusammensetzung der jeweiligen Regierungsexekutiven und der Ressourcenstärke einzelner Interessengruppen in den Mitgliedstaaten beeinflusst wird. In der Arena des Vermittlungsausschusses entscheidet die politisch-ideologische Position des Berichterstatters. Darüber hinaus kann gezeigt werden, dass sowohl in der Arena des Europäischen Parlaments als auch in der Arena des Rats bestimmte Framing-Strategien erfolgversprechend sind. Wohingegen die Zugehörigkeit eines Issues zu einem bestimmten Issuetypus von vornherein die Erfolgsaussichten mindert. Lobbyingerfolg am Ende des Mitentscheidungsverfahrens ist also das Resultat von Lobbyingerfolgen, die in den einzelnen Arenen auf unterschiedliche kausale Effekte zurückzuführen sind. Bemerkenswert ist, dass Lobbyingerfolg von einer Reihe von Faktoren abhängt, die von Interessengruppen selbst nicht unmittelbar beeinflussbar sind., How can lobbying success of interest groups be explained? For a long time, solely resources were at the centre of the theoretical debate. Later, other independent variables were added to explain lobbying success: framing, arenas, types of issues, coalitions and the political-ideological position of decision-makers as an intervening variable. Empirical observations using the example of the EU emissions policy however show that none of the above variables can explain lobbying success alone. A congruence analysis demonstrates that the explanatory and predictive power of the variables varies in different arenas. Resources are a potent predictor of lobbying success in the arena of the Commission. In the arena of the European Parliament, it is the lobbying goal of stakeholders, which determines success. In the arena of the Council, lobbying success is the result of a complex interplay of lobbying goal, formal voting rules and the political position of the Member States. The political position of Member States, in turn, is influenced by the political-ideological composition of the government executive and the resources of individual stakeholders in the Member States. In the arena of the Conciliation Committee, the political and ideological position of the rapporteur is pivotal. In addition, it can be shown that both in the arena of the European Parliament and of the Council certain framing strategies support lobbying success. In contrast, the nature of an issue can diminish the chances of lobbying success right from the outset. Thus, lobbying success at the end of the co-decision procedure is the result of the combination of lobbying successes in the co-decision arenas, which are due to different causal effects. It is noteworthy that lobbying success depends on a number of factors, which cannot be directly influenced by interest groups themselves.