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We exploit an unanticipated labor market reform in 2012 Spain to estimate the effects of pro-cyclical changes in long-term unemployment assistance (UA). The reform raised the minimum age to receive unlimited-duration UA from 52 to 55. Using a difference-in-differences design, we document that shorter benefits caused (i) shorter non-employment duration, especially among younger workers; (ii) higher labor force exit and other programs' take-up, especially among older workers; (iii) lower re-employment wages. The reform induced moderate government savings. Our results highlight how considering the interplay with labor market conditions is crucial when designing long-term benefit schedules affecting workers close to retirement., info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Este trabajo estudia el papel que desempeñan las condiciones de acceso a la prestación por desempleo sobre la tasa de despidos. Para ello, se explota la variación cuasi experimental en los criterios de elegibilidad para el subsidio de desempleo en Italia, a través de una estimación de diferencias en diferencias. Los resultados destacan que la probabilidad de despido aumenta alrededor del 12 % en el momento en que los trabajadores alcanzan la elegibilidad para el subsidio de desempleo, y ese efecto persiste durante 16 semanas. Estos resultados se mantienen utilizando diferentes estrategias de estimación, y se explican, en gran parte, por las relaciones laborales que empezaron después de la Gran Recesión, en el sur de Italia y en empresas pequeñas. Razonamos que la principal fuerza impulsora de este efecto es el riesgo moral por parte de las empresas, We study how unemployment benefit eligibility affects the layoff exit rate by exploiting quasiexperimental variation in eligibility rules in Italy. By using a difference-indifferences estimator, we find an instantaneous increase of about 12% in the layoff probability when unemployment benefit eligibility is attained, which persists for about 16 weeks. These findings are robust to different identifying assumptions and are mostly driven by jobs started after the onset of the Great Recession, in the South and for small firms. We argue that the moral hazard from the employer’s side is the main force driving these layoffs

Artículo de revista, Según la Encuesta de Población Activa el empleo intensificó el ritmo de crecimiento en el cuarto trimestre de 2018, con un avance interanual del 3 %, cinco décimas por encima del ritmo alcanzado en el tercer trimestre. Esta evolución permitió elevar la tasa de ocupación hasta el 64 %. El repunte del empleo en el cuarto trimestre del año pasado reflejó el elevado dinamismo registrado por la ocupación en la construcción y, en menor medida, en los servicios de no mercado. Por tipo de contrato, la aceleración del empleo se trasladó a los asalariados temporales, que avanzaron un 3,9 %, por encima del crecimiento de los indefi nidos (3,1 %), lo que elevó la ratio de temporalidad hasta el 26,9 %. El ritmo de reducción de los desempleados se mantuvo elevado (-12,3 %), y la tasa de paro se situó en el 14,4 %, 2,1 puntos porcentuales inferior a la observada un año antes.

The paper intends to analyze the main labour market characteristics and factors for Romanian youth in the current market position. The analysis and forecast of the educational process and of graduates’ employment according to their differing educational levels on the Romanian labour market is realised based on Markovian techniques. By making use of the developed scenarios, the crisis effects can be quantified with respect to economic growth, labour market perspectives, as well as the employability and mobility of young labour force participants in the various economic sectors.

This paper analyses the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a labour market with dual employment protection. We develop a computationally tractable approach to compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at longer tenures, and another one with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialise the discussion of such choices to Spain, a country often considered as an epitome of a dual labour market. We show that a SOEC has the potential of bringing substantial improvements in equilibrium allocations and welfare. We provide estimates for the eligibility rule and tenure profile of the optimal SOEC, defined as the contract maximising the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour- market entrants. Finally, we use the model to identify winners and losers among younger and older workers in the transitional path of such a reform, and evaluate its political support.

This paper analyses the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a labour market with dual employment protection. We develop a computationally tractable approach to compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at longer tenures, and another one with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialise the discussion of such choices to Spain, a country often considered as an epitome of a dual labour market. We show that a SOEC has the potential of bringing substantial improvements in equilibrium allocations and welfare. We provide estimates for the eligibility rule and tenure profile of the optimal SOEC, defined as the contract maximising the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour- market entrants. Finally, we use the model to identify winners and losers among younger and older workers in the transitional path of such a reform, and evaluate its political support.

This paper analyses the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a labour market with dual employment protection. We develop a computationally tractable approach to compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at longer tenures, and another one with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialise the discussion of such choices to Spain, a country often considered as an epitome of a dual labour market. We show that a SOEC has the potential of bringing substantial improvements in equilibrium allocations and welfare. We provide estimates for the eligibility rule and tenure profile of the optimal SOEC, defined as the contract maximising the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour- market entrants. Finally, we use the model to identify winners and losers among younger and older workers in the transitional path of such a reform, and evaluate its political support.

This paper analyses the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a labour market with dual employment protection. We develop a computationally tractable approach to compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at longer tenures, and another one with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialise the discussion of such choices to Spain, a country often considered as an epitome of a dual labour market. We show that a SOEC has the potential of bringing substantial improvements in equilibrium allocations and welfare. We provide estimates for the eligibility rule and tenure profile of the optimal SOEC, defined as the contract maximising the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour- market entrants. Finally, we use the model to identify winners and losers among younger and older workers in the transitional path of such a reform, and evaluate its political support.

This paper analyses the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a labour market with dual employment protection. We develop a computationally tractable approach to compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at longer tenures, and another one with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialise the discussion of such choices to Spain, a country often considered as an epitome of a dual labour market. We show that a SOEC has the potential of bringing substantial improvements in equilibrium allocations and welfare. We provide estimates for the eligibility rule and tenure profile of the optimal SOEC, defined as the contract maximising the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour- market entrants. Finally, we use the model to identify winners and losers among younger and older workers in the transitional path of such a reform, and evaluate its political support.

This paper analyses the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a labour market with dual employment protection. We develop a computationally tractable approach to compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at longer tenures, and another one with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialise the discussion of such choices to Spain, a country often considered as an epitome of a dual labour market. We show that a SOEC has the potential of bringing substantial improvements in equilibrium allocations and welfare. We provide estimates for the eligibility rule and tenure profile of the optimal SOEC, defined as the contract maximising the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour- market entrants. Finally, we use the model to identify winners and losers among younger and older workers in the transitional path of such a reform, and evaluate its political support.

This paper analyses the optimal design of a single open-ended contract (SOEC) and studies the political economy of moving towards such a SOEC in a labour market with dual employment protection. We develop a computationally tractable approach to compare two economic environments: one with flexible entry-level jobs and high employment protection at longer tenures, and another one with a SOEC featuring employment protection levels that increase smoothly with tenure. For illustrative purposes, we specialise the discussion of such choices to Spain, a country often considered as an epitome of a dual labour market. We show that a SOEC has the potential of bringing substantial improvements in equilibrium allocations and welfare. We provide estimates for the eligibility rule and tenure profile of the optimal SOEC, defined as the contract maximising the steady-state lifetime utility of new labour- market entrants. Finally, we use the model to identify winners and losers among younger and older workers in the transitional path of such a reform, and evaluate its political support.

El artículo analiza si el actual modelo laboral es capaz de generar empleo suficiente y de la calidad necesaria para que las cotizaciones sociales puedan financiar las prestaciones contributivas del sistema de protección social. Parte de considerar que el modelo productivo y de crecimiento de la economía española ha mantenido altas tasas de desempleo y bajos niveles de calidad del empleo y productividad, y que las reformas laborales llevadas a cabo y especialmente la adoptada en 2012, se han dirigido a reducir los costes laborales en vez de fomentar el aumento de la productividad generando una continua espiral devaluadora. Se analizan los ciclos de creación y destrucción de empleo, vinculados a la evolución del crecimiento económico y la productividad, que son los principales condicionantes de los ingresos por cotizaciones, comparándolos con la evolución de los gastos en prestaciones contributivas a través de la información de las fuentes tributarias y de la Seguridad Social. De su análisis concluye que las características y tendencias del mercado de trabajo apuntan a un creciente desequilibrio entre cotizaciones y prestaciones contributivas que hacen insostenible el actual sistema de protección social.

El objetivo del artículo consiste en presentar los cambios normativos adoptados en las últimas reformas laborales relacionados con el procedimiento y con los incentivos para la utilización de medidas vinculadas a Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo (ERE) de suspensión de contratos y de reducción de jornada como alternativa a los despidos a la hora realizar ajustes en la utilización del factor trabajo. Además, dado que estos cambios fueron simultáneos a otros cuyo objeto era facilitar los procedimientos del despido y otros tipos de medidas de flexibilidad interna de las empresas, se trata de saber si dichas modificaciones normativas han podido tener algún impacto sobre la propensión de las empresas a utilizar dichas medidas de suspensión y de reducción en vez de los despidos y sus posibles efectos sobre el mantenimiento del empleo.

El objetivo del artículo consiste en presentar los cambios normativos adoptados en las últimas reformas laborales relacionados con el procedimiento y con los incentivos para la utilización de medidas vinculadas a Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo (ERE) de suspensión de contratos y de reducción de jornada como alternativa a los despidos a la hora realizar ajustes en la utilización del factor trabajo. Además, dado que estos cambios fueron simultáneos a otros cuyo objeto era facilitar los procedimientos del despido y otros tipos de medidas de flexibilidad interna de las empresas, se trata de saber si dichas modificaciones normativas han podido tener algún impacto sobre la propensión de las empresas a utilizar dichas medidas de suspensión y de reducción en vez de los despidos y sus posibles efectos sobre el mantenimiento del empleo.

El artículo analiza si el actual modelo laboral es capaz de generar empleo suficiente y de la calidad necesaria para que las cotizaciones sociales puedan financiar las prestaciones contributivas del sistema de protección social. Parte de considerar que el modelo productivo y de crecimiento de la economía española ha mantenido altas tasas de desempleo y bajos niveles de calidad del empleo y productividad, y que las reformas laborales llevadas a cabo y especialmente la adoptada en 2012, se han dirigido a reducir los costes laborales en vez de fomentar el aumento de la productividad generando una continua espiral devaluadora. Se analizan los ciclos de creación y destrucción de empleo, vinculados a la evolución del crecimiento económico y la productividad, que son los principales condicionantes de los ingresos por cotizaciones, comparándolos con la evolución de los gastos en prestaciones contributivas a través de la información de las fuentes tributarias y de la Seguridad Social. De su análisis concluye que las características y tendencias del mercado de trabajo apuntan a un creciente desequilibrio entre cotizaciones y prestaciones contributivas que hacen insostenible el actual sistema de protección social.

El artículo analiza si el actual modelo laboral es capaz de generar empleo suficiente y de la calidad necesaria para que las cotizaciones sociales puedan financiar las prestaciones contributivas del sistema de protección social. Parte de considerar que el modelo productivo y de crecimiento de la economía española ha mantenido altas tasas de desempleo y bajos niveles de calidad del empleo y productividad, y que las reformas laborales llevadas a cabo y especialmente la adoptada en 2012, se han dirigido a reducir los costes laborales en vez de fomentar el aumento de la productividad generando una continua espiral devaluadora. Se analizan los ciclos de creación y destrucción de empleo, vinculados a la evolución del crecimiento económico y la productividad, que son los principales condicionantes de los ingresos por cotizaciones, comparándolos con la evolución de los gastos en prestaciones contributivas a través de la información de las fuentes tributarias y de la Seguridad Social. De su análisis concluye que las características y tendencias del mercado de trabajo apuntan a un creciente desequilibrio entre cotizaciones y prestaciones contributivas que hacen insostenible el actual sistema de protección social.

El objetivo del artículo consiste en presentar los cambios normativos adoptados en las últimas reformas laborales relacionados con el procedimiento y con los incentivos para la utilización de medidas vinculadas a Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo (ERE) de suspensión de contratos y de reducción de jornada como alternativa a los despidos a la hora realizar ajustes en la utilización del factor trabajo. Además, dado que estos cambios fueron simultáneos a otros cuyo objeto era facilitar los procedimientos del despido y otros tipos de medidas de flexibilidad interna de las empresas, se trata de saber si dichas modificaciones normativas han podido tener algún impacto sobre la propensión de las empresas a utilizar dichas medidas de suspensión y de reducción en vez de los despidos y sus posibles efectos sobre el mantenimiento del empleo.

El objetivo del artículo consiste en presentar los cambios normativos adoptados en las últimas reformas laborales relacionados con el procedimiento y con los incentivos para la utilización de medidas vinculadas a Expedientes de Regulación de Empleo (ERE) de suspensión de contratos y de reducción de jornada como alternativa a los despidos a la hora realizar ajustes en la utilización del factor trabajo. Además, dado que estos cambios fueron simultáneos a otros cuyo objeto era facilitar los procedimientos del despido y otros tipos de medidas de flexibilidad interna de las empresas, se trata de saber si dichas modificaciones normativas han podido tener algún impacto sobre la propensión de las empresas a utilizar dichas medidas de suspensión y de reducción en vez de los despidos y sus posibles efectos sobre el mantenimiento del empleo.

El artículo analiza si el actual modelo laboral es capaz de generar empleo suficiente y de la calidad necesaria para que las cotizaciones sociales puedan financiar las prestaciones contributivas del sistema de protección social. Parte de considerar que el modelo productivo y de crecimiento de la economía española ha mantenido altas tasas de desempleo y bajos niveles de calidad del empleo y productividad, y que las reformas laborales llevadas a cabo y especialmente la adoptada en 2012, se han dirigido a reducir los costes laborales en vez de fomentar el aumento de la productividad generando una continua espiral devaluadora. Se analizan los ciclos de creación y destrucción de empleo, vinculados a la evolución del crecimiento económico y la productividad, que son los principales condicionantes de los ingresos por cotizaciones, comparándolos con la evolución de los gastos en prestaciones contributivas a través de la información de las fuentes tributarias y de la Seguridad Social. De su análisis concluye que las características y tendencias del mercado de trabajo apuntan a un creciente desequilibrio entre cotizaciones y prestaciones contributivas que hacen insostenible el actual sistema de protección social.

El desempleo en Europa no solo es «demasiado alto», también es muy diferente entre países que pertenecen a una unión monetaria. En este trabajo, i) se documenta esta creciente heterogeneidad, ii) se trata de explicarla, y iii) se extraen algunas conclusiones acerca del conjunto de políticas adecuado para reducir el desempleo y las disparidades del mercado de trabajo. Este análisis sugiere que la divergencia en los resultados del mercado de trabajo en toda Europa es el subproducto de las interacciones entre, por una parte, las perturbaciones económicas de diferente tamaño y naturaleza y, por otra, instituciones del mercado de trabajo específicas de cada país. Se argumenta que la coordinación política de la UE y la condicionalidad durante la Gran Recesión y la crisis de la deuda en la zona del euro no tomaron en cuenta adecuadamente estas interacciones. Por ello, se propone un cambio en el enfoque de la política europea de lucha contra el desempleo, Unemployment in Europe is not only “too high”, it is also too different across countries that belong to a monetary union. In this paper we i) document this increasing heterogeneity, ii) try to explain it and iii) draw from our diagnosis indications as to the appropriate set of policies to reduce unemployment and labour market disparities. Our analysis suggests that the divergence in labour market outcomes across Europe is the by-product of interactions between, on the one hand, shocks of varying size and nature, and, on the other hand, country-specific labour market institutions. We argue that EU policy coordination and conditionality during the Great Recession and the euro area debt crisis did not properly take into account these interactions. We also propose a change in the European policy approach for fighting unemployment

Unemployment insurance systems include the monitoring of unemployed workers and punitive sanctions if job search requirements are violated. We analyze the causal effect of sanctions on the ensuing job quality, notably on wages and occupational level. We use Swedish data and estimate duration models dealing with selection on unobservables. We also develop a theoretical job search model that monitors job offer rejection versus job search effort. The empirical results show that, after a sanction, the wage rate is lower and individuals move more often to a part-time job and a lower occupational level, incurring human capital losses.

Löhne und gesetzliche Rentenansprüche sind über das Sozialversicherungssystem direkt miteinander verbunden. In dieser Dissertationsschrift werden zunächst Lohnrisiken analysiert, um dann das Altersarmutsrisiko in Deutschland aufzuzeigen. Nach einer Einführung werden in Kapitel 2 die Einflüsse des Einkommens- und Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos auf die individuellen Löhne untersucht. Aufbauend auf ein Portfoliomodell am Arbeitsmarkt, werden die Effekte für Männer und Frauen in Ostdeutschland und Westdeutschland empirisch untersucht. Bei simultaner Betrachtung beider Risiken zeigen sich positive Risikokompensationen, aber auch ein negativer Interaktionseffekt. Der marginale Effekt des Einkommensrisikos auf den Lohn ist positiv. Der marginale Effekt des Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos hingegen ist negativ. Kapitel 3 beschäftigt sich mit der Wirkung der Absenkung der Arbeitslosenunterstützung im Zuge der Hartz-Reformen auf die individuellen Löhne. Für Männer und Frauen in Ostdeutschland und Westdeutschland findet sich ein lohndämpfender Effekt. In Westdeutschland zeigt sich zudem ein Anstieg des Effektes mit dem Qualifikationsniveau. In Kapitel 4 wird das Altersarmutsrisiko in Deutschland untersucht. In einem Mikrosimulationsmodell werden die gesetzlichen Rentenansprüche der Kohorte 1939-1941 mit denen der Kohorte 1955-1957 verglichen. Die jüngere Kohorte weist in beiden Landesteilen ein höheres Altersarmutsrisiko auf. Der Anstieg geschieht schneller in Ostdeutschland, allerdings liegt dort auch zukünftig das Niveau noch unter dem in Westdeutschland. Das Altersarmutsrisiko sinkt mit dem Qualifikationsniveau. Durch die gegenseitige Absicherung weisen Ehepaare und Witwen ein geringeres Altersarmutsrisiko auf. Den Abschluss der Arbeit bildet ein zusammenfassendes Fazit.

This paper aims to study the implementation of a tool for protection against unemployment in Mar del Plata, Argentina. It examines through an adaptation of liberal egalitarian framework, and then, basis of Roemer's proposal, we analyze the statistical significance of the types defined in relation to educational attainment. Finally, using a binomial logit model, we calculate the probability of finding work. The results demonstrate the importance of personal circumstances in defining the types, and that the probability of finding work is higher for males and growing over the type discussed., En este artículo se pretende estudiar la implementación de una herramienta de protección contra el desempleo en Mar del Plata, Argentina. Se lo examina a través de una adaptación del marco liberal igualitario y, después, con base en la propuesta de Roemer, se analiza la significatividad estadística de los tipos definidos en relación a los logros educativos. Finalmente, mediante un modelo logit binomial, se calcula la probabilidad de conseguir trabajo. Los resultados demuestran la importancia de las circunstancias personales en la definición de los tipos, y que la probabilidad de trabajar es mayor para los varones y creciente respecto al tipo analizado., Neste artigo, pretende-se estudar a implementação de uma ferramenta de proteção contra o desemprego em Mar del Plata, Argentina. É examinado através de uma adaptação do marco liberal igualitário e, depois, com base na proposta de Roemer, é analisada a significatividade estatística dos tipos definidos com relação às conquistas educativas. Finalmente, mediante um modelo logit binomial, é calculada a probabilidade de conseguir trabalho. Os resultados demonstram a importância das circunstâncias pessoais na definição dos tipos e que a probabilidade de trabalhar é maior para os homens e é crescente com relação ao tipo analisado.

We identify the causal effect of lump-sum severance payments on non-employment duration in Norway by exploiting a discontinuity in eligibility at age 50. We find that a severance payment worth 1.2 months’ earnings at the median lowers the fraction re-employed after a year by seven percentage points. Data on household wealth enable us to verify that the effect is decreasing in prior wealth, which favors an interpretation as liquidity constraints over the alternative of mental accounting. Finding liquidity constraints in Norway, despite its equitable wealth distribution and generous welfare state, means they are likely to exist also in other countries.

We identify the causal effect of lump-sum severance payments on non-employment duration in Norway by exploiting a discontinuity in eligibility at age 50. We find that a severance payment worth 1.2 months’ earnings at the median lowers the fraction re-employed after a year by seven percentage points. Data on household wealth enable us to verify that the effect is decreasing in prior wealth, which favors an interpretation as liquidity constraints over the alternative of mental accounting. Finding liquidity constraints in Norway, despite its equitable wealth distribution and generous welfare state, means they are likely to exist also in other countries.

We identify the causal effect of lump-sum severance payments on non-employment duration in Norway by exploiting a discontinuity in eligibility at age 50. We find that a severance payment worth 1.2 months’ earnings at the median lowers the fraction re-employed after a year by seven percentage points. Data on household wealth enable us to verify that the effect is decreasing in prior wealth, which favors an interpretation as liquidity constraints over the alternative of mental accounting. Finding liquidity constraints in Norway, despite its equitable wealth distribution and generous welfare state, means they are likely to exist also in other countries.

This paper examines whether or not a prolonged unemployment period can raise the quality of job matching after unemployment. We focus on job tenure as an indicator of a good quality job match after unemployment. We match two sets of Japanese administrative data compiled by the public employment security offices: one includes information about the circumstances of job seekers receiving unemployment insurance, and the other includes information about job seekers applying for jobs. We first show a negative relationship between unemployment duration and the subsequent job duration. Restricting the sample to job seekers who changed search behaviors in the final 59 days before expiration of unemployment insurance, we secondly show an even greater negative effect of unemployment duration on the following job duration. The importance lies not only in the duration of unemployment. If job seekers keep a high reservation wage and a low search intensity because of the benefits of unemployment insurance, and change them in response to the expiration of insurance, prolonged unemployment will result in short job duration after unemployment.

Der Forschungsbericht befasst sich mit der Neuausrichtung der arbeitsmarktpolitischen Instrumente, die zum 1. Januar 2009 in Kraft getreten ist. Der Gesetzgeber verfolgte mit dieser Reform das Ziel, das Portfolio an Instrumenten zu straffen und damit transparenter und übersichtlicher zu gestalten. Darüber hinaus sollten im Bereich der Arbeitsvermittlung Gestaltungsspielräume für Agenturen und Vermittler vor Ort erhöht werden. Die Autoren gehen vor allem den Fragen nach, ob es gelungen ist, diese Handlungsspielräume zu schaffen und welche Umsetzungscharakteristika dabei von Bedeutung sind. Dazu wurden an 14 Standorten - d.h. bei sechs Agenturen für Arbeit, sechs ARGEn und zwei zugelassenen kommunalen Trägern - Experteninterviews mit Vermittlerinnen und Vermittlern, Teamleiterinnen und Teamleitern sowie Mitgliedern der Geschäftsführung geführt. Auf der Basis des methodischen Konzepts des wissenschaftlichen Quellentextes wurden die Experteninterviews anschließend analysiert. Empirisch zeigt sich dabei, dass die Neuausrichtung keine gravierenden Veränderungen bewirkt hat, was die arbeitsmarktpolitischen Maßnahmen betrifft; das sog. Vermittlungsbudget nach § 45 stellt hingegen eine Neuerung dar. Als schwierig erweist sich im konkreten Arbeitsalltag besonders der Zielkonflikt zwischen Regelorientierung und einem hohen Maß an autonomer Entscheidung auf den unteren Ebenen. Dabei spielen sog. Ermessenslenkende Weisungen eine wichtige Rolle, weil sie oft Regelungen beinhalten, die bereits vor der Instrumentenreform galten. Abschließend ist bemerkenswert, dass die sog. Freie Förderung nach §16f SGB II offenbar eine weit geringere Rolle als zuvor spielt., This paper deals with the strategic reorientation concerning the instruments of active labor market policy in Germany which came into force at January 1st 2009. The main objective of this reform was to streamline the portfolio of existing instruments and make it more transparent and clearly structured. Moreover, caseworkers in local job offices are to be granted more discretion and flexibility than prior to the reforms. The authors address the question whether the implementation of more discretionary power was successful, and which of the implementation's characteristics prove to be crucial for attaining this goal. To this purpose, expert interviews with caseworkers, their superior officers (team leaders) and members of the board were conducted in 14 local job offices. The study is based on the methodological concept of the socalled scientific source text (wissenschaftlicher Quellentext) which was used to analyze and interpret the interviews. Empirically, the authors find that the reform did not induce fundamental changes concerning the instruments of active labor market policy while the special budget for the support of job search activities (Vermittlungsbudget) according to § 45 SGB III can be regarded as an innovation. Caseworkers especially stress the conflict between compliance to the rules and the considerable autonomy involved in the everyday practice of street-level bureaucrats. Rules aimed at structuring discretional leeway in the local job offices (so-called Ermessenslenkende Weisungen) help define the relative concept of discretion, because they include instructions already valid before the reforms. Finally, it is remarkable to note that § 16f SGB II does not play an important role after the reform.

In this paper, we incorporate home production into a quantitative model of unemployment and show that realistic levels of home production have a significant impact on the optimal unemployment insurance rate. Motivated by recently documented empirical facts, we augment an incomplete markets model of unemployment with a home production technology, which allows unemployed workers to use their extra non-market time as partial insurance against the drop in income due to unemployment. In the benchmark model, we find that the optimal replacement rate in the presence of home production is roughly 40% of wages, which is 40% lower than the no home production model’s optimal replacement rate of 65%. The 40% optimal rate is also close to the estimated rate in practice. The fact that home production makes a significant difference in the optimal unemployment insurance rate is robust to a variety of parameterizations and alternative model environments.

In this paper, we incorporate home production into a quantitative model of unemployment and show that realistic levels of home production have a significant impact on the optimal unemployment insurance rate. Motivated by recently documented empirical facts, we augment an incomplete markets model of unemployment with a home production technology, which allows unemployed workers to use their extra non-market time as partial insurance against the drop in income due to unemployment. In the benchmark model, we find that the optimal replacement rate in the presence of home production is roughly 40% of wages, which is 40% lower than the no home production model’s optimal replacement rate of 65%. The 40% optimal rate is also close to the estimated rate in practice. The fact that home production makes a significant difference in the optimal unemployment insurance rate is robust to a variety of parameterizations and alternative model environments.

In this paper, we incorporate home production into a quantitative model of unemployment and show that realistic levels of home production have a significant impact on the optimal unemployment insurance rate. Motivated by recently documented empirical facts, we augment an incomplete markets model of unemployment with a home production technology, which allows unemployed workers to use their extra non-market time as partial insurance against the drop in income due to unemployment. In the benchmark model, we find that the optimal replacement rate in the presence of home production is roughly 40% of wages, which is 40% lower than the no home production model’s optimal replacement rate of 65%. The 40% optimal rate is also close to the estimated rate in practice. The fact that home production makes a significant difference in the optimal unemployment insurance rate is robust to a variety of parameterizations and alternative model environments.

In this paper, we incorporate home production into a quantitative model of unemployment and show that realistic levels of home production have a significant impact on the optimal unemployment insurance rate. Motivated by recently documented empirical facts, we augment an incomplete markets model of unemployment with a home production technology, which allows unemployed workers to use their extra non-market time as partial insurance against the drop in income due to unemployment. In the benchmark model, we find that the optimal replacement rate in the presence of home production is roughly 40% of wages, which is 40% lower than the no home production model’s optimal replacement rate of 65%. The 40% optimal rate is also close to the estimated rate in practice. The fact that home production makes a significant difference in the optimal unemployment insurance rate is robust to a variety of parameterizations and alternative model environments.

In this paper, we incorporate home production into a quantitative model of unemployment and show that realistic levels of home production have a significant impact on the optimal unemployment insurance rate. Motivated by recently documented empirical facts, we augment an incomplete markets model of unemployment with a home production technology, which allows unemployed workers to use their extra non-market time as partial insurance against the drop in income due to unemployment. In the benchmark model, we find that the optimal replacement rate in the presence of home production is roughly 40% of wages, which is 40% lower than the no home production model’s optimal replacement rate of 65%. The 40% optimal rate is also close to the estimated rate in practice. The fact that home production makes a significant difference in the optimal unemployment insurance rate is robust to a variety of parameterizations and alternative model environments.

Using a unique dataset for Germany that links individual longitudinal data from the GSOEP to regional data from the federal employment agency and data of real estate prices, we evaluate the impact of neighborhood unemployment on individual employment propects. The panel setup and richness of the data allows us to overcome some of the identifi cation problems which are present in this strand of literature. The empirical results indicate that there is a signifi cant negative impact of neighborhood unemployment on the individual employment probability., Im Rahmen des SOEP Neighborhood Projekts wurden dem GSOEP prozessproduzierte Daten der Bundesagentur für Arbeit und Immobilienpreisdaten zugespielt. Mithilfe dieses Datensatzes identifizieren wir den Einfluss von Nachbarschaftsarbeitslosigkeit auf die individuelle Beschäftigungswahrscheinlichkeit. Die Kombination der Datensätze ermöglicht uns - unter bestimmten Annahmen - eine Identifikation kausaler Effekte von Nachbarschaftscharakteristika auf individuelles Verhalten. Wir finden einen signifikant negativen Einfluss von Arbeitslosigkeit in der Nachbarschaft auf die individuelle Beschäftigungswahrscheinlichkeit.

Mit der Einführung des SGB II im Jahr 2005 hat der Gesetzgeber den Grundsicherungsstellen vor Ort große Spielräume bei der Umsetzung des SGB II und der konkreten Ausgestaltung der Organisation zentraler Leistungsprozesse eingeräumt. Das SGB II hat somit nicht nur zu einem Wettbewerb zwischen ARGEn und zugelassenen kommunalen Trägern geführt, sondern auch vor Ort sehr unterschiedliche Organisationsphilosophien und -formen der Kundenbetreuung entstehen lassen. Es liegt nahe, dass unterschiedliche Prägungen durch die Organisationsstrukturen der Bundesagentur für Arbeit einerseits sowie die kommunalen Sozialverwaltungen und das von ihnen praktizierte Case-Management andererseits einen wesentlichen Einfluss auf die Ausgestaltung der Organisationsmodelle hatten. Zudem könnte man erwarten, dass auch die örtlichen Rahmenbedingungen und die Größe der regionalen Einheit die Wahl von Organisationsmodellen beeinflussen. Da gerade das Vorgehen bei der Kundenbetreuung sehr maßgeblich für den Erfolg der Arbeit in den Grundsicherungsstellen sein kann, gleichzeitig jedoch bislang keinerlei flächendeckenden Informationen über die gewählten Organisationsmodelle vor Ort vorlagen, ist es unerlässlich, Licht in die 'black box' der organisatorischen Umsetzung der Kundenbetreuung zu bringen. Der vorliegende Beitrag verfolgt daher das Ziel, auf der Grundlage einer aufwändigen standardisierten Panelbefragung aller Grundsicherungsstellen in Deutschland, die im Rahmen der §6c SGB II-Evaluation durchgeführt wurde, zu analysieren, in welchem Maße Fallmanagement, Vermittlung und materielle Leistungen als die zentralen Elemente des Leistungsprozesses in den Grundsicherungsstellen spezialisiert oder integriert erfolgen, und worin jeweils Stärken und Schwächen des alternativen Vorgehens gesehen werden.

In light of the huge cross-country differences in job losses during the recent crisis, we study how labor market duality - meaning the coexistence of "temporary" contracts with low firing costs and "permanent" contracts with high firing costs - affects labor market volatility. In a model of job creation and destruction based on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), we show that a labor market with these two contract types is more volatile than an otherwise-identical economy with a single contract type. Calibrating our model to Spain, we find that unemployment fluctuates 21% more under duality than it would in a unified economy with the same average firing cost, and 33% more than it would in a unified economy with the same average unemployment rate. In our setup, employment grows gradually in booms, due to matching frictions, whereas the onset of a recession causes a burst of firing of "fragile" low-productivity jobs. Unlike permanent jobs, some newly-created temporary jobs are already near the firing margin, which makes temporary jobs more likely to be fragile and means they play a disproportionate role in employment fluctuations

This paper analyses how and to which degree the Danish flexicurity concept and its various elements achieve the renowned Danish miracle by evaluating their unemployment and inequality effects and their complementarities. We develop a microfounded model of searching workers and firms, calibrate it to Germany and perform the policy experiment of implementing the full Danish flexicurity set of policies (low employment protection, high unemployment benefits and workfare). Our results show that implementing the Danish flexicurity concept in Germany would reduce unemployment and earnings inequality substantially. Furthermore our analysis illustrates that the Danish flexicurity policies have some apparent complementarities in Germany - the reduction of unemployment effect is nearly 40% greater when the policies are implemented in conjunction than in isolation.

European nations substitute between employment protection regulations and labor market expenditures (e.g. unemployment insurance benefits) for providing worker insurance. Employment regulations more directly tax firms making frequent labor adjustments than other labor insurance mechanisms. Venture capital and private equity investors are especially sensitive to these labor adjustment costs. Nations favoring labor expenditures as the mechanism for providing worker insurance developed stronger private equity markets in high volatility sectors over 1990-2004. These patterns are further evident in US investments into Europe. In this context, policy mechanisms are more important than the overall insurance level provided., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

European nations substitute between employment protection regulations and labor market expenditures (e.g. unemployment insurance benefits) for providing worker insurance. Employment regulations more directly tax firms making frequent labor adjustments than other labor insurance mechanisms. Venture capital and private equity investors are especially sensitive to these labor adjustment costs. Nations favoring labor expenditures as the mechanism for providing worker insurance developed stronger private equity markets in high volatility sectors over 1990-2004. These patterns are further evident in US investments into Europe. In this context, policy mechanisms are more important than the overall insurance level provided., info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Standard models of temporary contracts are either inconclusive, or fail to ac- count for the positive correlation between temporary contracts and the employ- ment rate, and for the high transition rates into permanent employment measured in Europe. This paper shows that a matching model in which rms use temporary contracts to screen workers for permanent positions can successfully ful ll this task. When the model is calibrated to the Italian economy, it accounts for salient statistics including the worker turnover rate, the transition rates into permanent employment, and the drop in the unemployment rate following the reforms im- plemented in the late 1990s. When temporary contracts are used as a screening device, they can increase both productivity and welfare. Their quantitative impact crucially hinges on dismissal costs and minimum wages.

Standard models of temporary contracts are either inconclusive, or fail to ac- count for the positive correlation between temporary contracts and the employ- ment rate, and for the high transition rates into permanent employment measured in Europe. This paper shows that a matching model in which rms use temporary contracts to screen workers for permanent positions can successfully ful ll this task. When the model is calibrated to the Italian economy, it accounts for salient statistics including the worker turnover rate, the transition rates into permanent employment, and the drop in the unemployment rate following the reforms im- plemented in the late 1990s. When temporary contracts are used as a screening device, they can increase both productivity and welfare. Their quantitative impact crucially hinges on dismissal costs and minimum wages.

Standard models of temporary contracts are either inconclusive, or fail to ac- count for the positive correlation between temporary contracts and the employ- ment rate, and for the high transition rates into permanent employment measured in Europe. This paper shows that a matching model in which rms use temporary contracts to screen workers for permanent positions can successfully ful ll this task. When the model is calibrated to the Italian economy, it accounts for salient statistics including the worker turnover rate, the transition rates into permanent employment, and the drop in the unemployment rate following the reforms im- plemented in the late 1990s. When temporary contracts are used as a screening device, they can increase both productivity and welfare. Their quantitative impact crucially hinges on dismissal costs and minimum wages.

We investigate whether the costs of job displacement differ between blue collar and white collar workers. In the short run earnings and employment losses are substantial for both groups but stronger for white collar workes. In the long run, there are only weak effects for blue collar workers but strong and persistent effects for white collars. This is consistent with the idea that firm-specific human capital and internal labor markets are more important in white-collar than in blue collar jobs.

This paper studies a model of optimal redistribution policies in which agents face unemployment risk and in which savings may provide partial self-insurance. Moral hazard arises as job search effort is unobservable. The optimal redistribution policies provide new insights into how an unemployment insurance scheme should be designed: First, the unemployment insurance policy is recursive in an agent's wealth level, and thus independent of the duration of the unemployment spell. Second, the level of benefit payments is negatively related to the agent's asset position. The reason behind the latter result is twofold; in addition to the first-order insurance effect of wealth, an increase in non-labor income (wealth) amplifies the opportunity cost of employment and thus reduces the agent's incentive to search for a job. During unemployment the agent decumulates assets and the sequence of benefit payments is observationally increasing - a result that stands in sharp contrast with previous studies.

Involuntary job loss in administrative data is commonly identified by focusing on mass-layoffs or plant closures. However, such events usually do not happen without prior knowledge, which potentially leads to selection in the labor turnover of distressed firms. We find that workers separating from closing plants up to 2 quarters before closure are associated with significantly lower displacement costs and on average significantly higher pre-closure earnings levels as opposed to ultimately displaced workers. Furthermore, our results indicate that displaced workers with high pre-closure earnings experience significantly lower reductions in future employment probabilities. These findings suggest that compositional differences cause estimated displacement costs to differ between early leavers and ultimately displaced workers. Focusing exclusively on the latter group would lead to an overestimation of displacement costs.

Involuntary job loss in administrative data is commonly identified by focusing on mass-layoffs or plant closures. However, such events usually do not happen without prior knowledge, which potentially leads to selection in the labor turnover of distressed firms. We find that workers separating from closing plants up to 2 quarters before closure are associated with significantly lower displacement costs and on average significantly higher pre-closure earnings levels as opposed to ultimately displaced workers. Furthermore, our results indicate that displaced workers with high pre-closure earnings experience significantly lower reductions in future employment probabilities. These findings suggest that compositional differences cause estimated displacement costs to differ between early leavers and ultimately displaced workers. Focusing exclusively on the latter group would lead to an overestimation of displacement costs.

This paper studies a model of optimal redistribution policies in which agents face unemployment risk and in which savings may provide partial self-insurance. Moral hazard arises as job search effort is unobservable. The optimal redistribution policies provide new insights into how an unemployment insurance scheme should be designed: First, the unemployment insurance policy is recursive in an agent's wealth level, and thus independent of the duration of the unemployment spell. Second, the level of benefit payments is negatively related to the agent's asset position. The reason behind the latter result is twofold; in addition to the first-order insurance effect of wealth, an increase in non-labor income (wealth) amplifies the opportunity cost of employment and thus reduces the agent's incentive to search for a job. During unemployment the agent decumulates assets and the sequence of benefit payments is observationally increasing - a result that stands in sharp contrast with previous studies.

Involuntary job loss in administrative data is commonly identified by focusing on mass-layoffs or plant closures. However, such events usually do not happen without prior knowledge, which potentially leads to selection in the labor turnover of distressed firms. We find that workers separating from closing plants up to 2 quarters before closure are associated with significantly lower displacement costs and on average significantly higher pre-closure earnings levels as opposed to ultimately displaced workers. Furthermore, our results indicate that displaced workers with high pre-closure earnings experience significantly lower reductions in future employment probabilities. These findings suggest that compositional differences cause estimated displacement costs to differ between early leavers and ultimately displaced workers. Focusing exclusively on the latter group would lead to an overestimation of displacement costs.

This paper studies a model of optimal redistribution policies in which agents face unemployment risk and in which savings may provide partial self-insurance. Moral hazard arises as job search effort is unobservable. The optimal redistribution policies provide new insights into how an unemployment insurance scheme should be designed: First, the unemployment insurance policy is recursive in an agent's wealth level, and thus independent of the duration of the unemployment spell. Second, the level of benefit payments is negatively related to the agent's asset position. The reason behind the latter result is twofold; in addition to the first-order insurance effect of wealth, an increase in non-labor income (wealth) amplifies the opportunity cost of employment and thus reduces the agent's incentive to search for a job. During unemployment the agent decumulates assets and the sequence of benefit payments is observationally increasing - a result that stands in sharp contrast with previous studies.

This paper addresses the question to what extent social protection systems in different European countries do succeed in coping with the risks arising from non-standard forms of employment. Focusing on the examples of part-time and temporary employment, the paper will examine ex-clusionary transitions and the access to unemployment insurance benefits of workers concerned by these forms of employment. The European Community Household Panel Data (ECHP) will be used. The general hypothesis is that the adaptability of unemployment insurance systems varies between welfare regimes. Therefore, four countries will be compared: Denmark, Ger-many, Spain and the United Kingdom., info:eu-repo/semantics/published