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This thesis examines how ownership concentration and type, influences stock liquidity in the context of a transition economy. Vietnam's capital market is characterized by poor informational transparency, highly concentrated state ownership and poor governance. The research found evidence supporting the agency cost argument with controlling owners, belongs to the state or family decreasing stock liquidity, whilst institutional (foreign) ownership enhances liquidity. However, the researcher found no evidence that a more independent board promotes stock liquidity in the Vietnamese market. Additional tests show that in the environment of highly concentrated ownership, duality impairs stock liquidity, whilst Big 4 auditors enhance stock liquidity.

Conglomerates, multinational corporations and business groups are non-exclusive forms of complex firms. Often organized as corporate networks, complex firms control a myriad of firms connected through ownership links. We investigate whether parent-subsidiary links within corporate networks enhance transparency because the investors in a listed parent company and in its listed subsidiary now receive information about these two firms from each these firms. Alternatively, the corporate network complexity could bring about more opacity when investors are unable to detect the connections between the corporate entities. We examine the share price reactions to information releases by various entities of the corporate network. We find that parent’s investors benefit from enhanced transparency in case the parent announces surprise earnings first, whereas subsidiaries’ investors seem mostly unaware of ownership links and are myopic.

Cílem práce je analyzovat problematiku korupce v ČR s akcentem na její důsledky plynoucí z neprůhlednosti vlastnických struktur společností (firem), analyzovat tyto důsledky v souvislosti s daňovými úniky (odliv zisků právnických osob do daňových rájů). V této souvislosti analyzovat nástroje domácí hospodářské politiky v kontextu doporučení institucí OECD a EU a analyzovat proces implementace projektu "taxparency" v podmínkách ČR., The aim is to analyze the problems of corruption in the Czech Republic with accent to the consequences resulting from lack of transparency of ownership structures of companies, to analyze these consequences in connection with tax evasion (outflow of corporate profits to tax havens). In this context analyze the tools of the domestic economic policies in the context of the recommendations of the OECD and EU institutions and analyze the implementation process of the project "taxparency" in the Czech Republic., Fakulta ekonomicko-správní, Studentka seznámila komisi se svojí diplomovou prací. Cílem práce bylo analyzovat problematiku korupce v ČR s akcentem na její důsledky plynoucí z neprůhlednosti vlastnických struktur společností (firem), analyzovat tyto důsledky v souvislosti s daňovými úniky (odliv zisků právnických osob do daňových rájů), v této souvislosti analyzovat nástroje domácí hospodářské politiky v kontextu doporučení institucí OECD a EU, analyzovat proces implementace projektu "taxparency" v podmínkách ČR. Při obhajobě diplomové práce doporučuji, aby se diplomantka vyjádřila k tvrzení na str. 35, kde v prvním odstavci uvádí, že "mezi nástroje hospodářské politiky, které úzce souvisí s potíráním zločinu ...... patří rozpočtová politika, mezinárodní politika či ochrana hospodářské soutěže." Jaký je vztah mezi hospodářskou politikou státu a uvedenými typy politik? Jaké konkrétní nástroje využívá ČR v rámci rozpočtové politiky, mezinárodní politiky a ochrany hospodářské soutěže při potírání "zločinu proti státu"? Jaké jsou typy korupce podle počtu společnost a trh poškozujících subjektů, pojmy korupce v užším či širším smyslu? Jak je možné kvantifikačně analyzovat časové řady?, Dokončená práce s úspěšnou obhajobou

Land exchange can be a major factor driving land-use change in regions with high pressure on land, but is generally not incorporated in land-use change models. Here we present an agent-based model to simulate land-use change arising from land exchange between multiple agent types representing farmers, nature organizations, and estate owners.The RULEX model (Rural Land EXchange) was calibrated and applied to a 300 km(2) case study area in the east of the Netherlands. Decision rules about which actor will sell and buy land, as well as which specific land to buy or sell are based on historical observations, interviews, and choice experiments.A reconstruction of land-use change for the period 2001-2009 demonstrates that RULEX reproduces most observed land-use trends and patterns. Given that RULEX simulates only one mechanism of land-use change, i.e. land exchange, it is conservative in simulating change.With this model, we demonstrate the potential of incorporating land market processes in an agent-based, land-use change model. This supports understanding of land-use change that is brought about by ownership change, which is an important process in areas where pressure on land is high. The soundness of the process representation was corroborated by stakeholders within the study area. Land exchange models can be used to assess the impact of changes in climate, markets, and policy on land use change, and help to increase effectiveness of alternative land purchasing strategies by stakeholders or spatial planning policy.

The 2003 Italian corporate law reform, which established one-tier and two-tier boards for listed and unlisted joint stock companies, introduced alternative corporate governance systems. In addition to the traditional model, which, at least in its basic features, continues to be used by the Italian legislator, the two “alternative” models of corporate governance generated by the 2003 reform differ in terms of their methods of appointment of managing and controlling bodies. Taking into account the surprisingly limited adoption of the new systems introduced by the reform after five years, this work implements regression analysis in order to compare the choice of corporate governance system in Italian unlisted firms: the corporations with best performances in terms of return of assets have continued to use the traditional system; moreover, firms with less concentrated ownership structure and the lowest proportion of individual shareholders have adopted a two-tier model. These findings support the preference of a two-tier board system for pyramidal structured companies hold by family groups.

Analyses of the nature of debt relying on the theory of rational expectations conclude that the burden of public debt need not fall on future generations if the present generation anticipates the higher taxes needed in the future for debt servicing. However, there have been many instances where increases in budget deficits have been followed by a decrease in the savings propensity of the private sector. Foreign exchange earnings also have to be set aside. It appears that the main problem for countries in an early stage of economic development, is that often the borrowings have not been productively employed so that a national debt crises results. Foreign lenders become increasingly reluctant to lend further amounts to a country, which has been a net capital importer. This paper puts forward a methodology of testing a new theory of economic growth using Indonesia as a case study, as it represents a case of faltering economic growth and financial instability resulting in a huge increase in foreign debt, a depreciating currency and a dramatic increase in the percentage of population below the poverty line. The theory emphasises key factors determining the success or failure of policies that change underlying economic structures, and hence would lead to an intrinsic monitoring of “overborrowing”.JEL classification: L33; O11; O38; O47; P11; P52

This paper examines the association between ownership and director interlocks in Swedish big business during the period 1990-2005. By analyses of the 3-mode network of owners, firms, and directors, multiple director assignments are shown to be highly dependent on owner interlocks. The findings provide a new understanding of the mechanisms behind the formation of director interlocks. Furthermore, the association between the interlock types suggests that the ownership network may potentially (co-)produce some of the phenomena that have been attributed to the director network. Future analyses of director interlocks have to bring the owners back in., 1

Tato bakalářská práce se zabývá analýzou majetku společnosti Strojírny Třinec, a. s. Práce je rozdělena na dvě stěžejní části, teoretickou a praktickou. Teoretická část je zaměřena na definování základních pojmů týkajících se majetku podniku a jeho struktury. V praktické části je charakterizována společnost Strojírny Třinec, a. s., dále je provedena analýza struktury a analýza využití strojů a zařízení za loňský rok 2010. Závěr se zabývá shrnutím celé analýzy majetku a navržením změn a možných opatření pro lepší fungování společnosti., This thesis deals with analysis of property of company Strojírny Třinec, a.s. This work is devided into two crucial parts, theorectical and practical. Theoretical part is focused on definition of basic concept regarding to business asset and its structure. In practical part is characterization of company Strojírny Třinec a.s. Also there is analysis of utilization of machinery and equipment for last year 2010. Conclusion summarize whole analysis of property and propose ganges and possible actions for better functioning of company., Ústav ekonomiky a managementu, Studentka seznámila s cílem bakalářské práce - podrobněšjší charakteristika a zhodnocení majetkové struktury za rok 2010 společnosti Strojírny Třinec a.s. Analyzován byl dlouhodobý hmotný majetek podle věkového složení, struktura technické úrovně strojů. Došlo ke zjištění, že ve společnosti nesledují intenzivní využití dlouhodobého hmotného majetku. komise byla seznámena se závěry analýzy dlouhodobého majetku., Dokončená práce s úspěšnou obhajobou

There is a growing literature in economics on whose interests should count in corporate decision-making. The aim of my thesis is to compare the merits of the two centrai approaches sharehoider value and stakeholder view - in a theoretical framewörk. The work builds on the model by Roberts and Van den Steen (2000). There are two parties, an investor and an empioyee. The investor owns a firm. lnitially the empioyee's firm-specific human capitai is necessary for there to be any output. lt is assumed that the employee is credit constrained, and that enforceable contracts cannot be written either on investments or output. Since investing in human capital is costly for the employee, the question then arises, how can the empioyee be motivated to acquire valuable firm-specific human capitai? The answer is that the investor gives the employee a fraction of the votes on the board, which has to agree on how the returns are divided before the production takes piace and the returns are realised. To move beyond the basie hoid-up problem described above 1 add a second period into the model. Now, in the beginning of the second period there emerges with a positive probability a new production technology that the investor would like to adopt. The production technology is such that, if adopted, it makes the employee's firm-specific human capital valueless. Hence, the empioyee cannot any longer bargain a return on his investment. As a result, there emerges an interest conflict between the parties over the production technology. The key question then is, who should have control over whether this new technology is adopted? The idea is that the investor faces a trade-off between short-run investment incentives and long-run flexibility: by giving up his unilateral right to choose the production technology, the investor enhances the empioyee's investment incentives but simuitaneously loses his ability to flexibly make changes. Then, the investor is willing to commit (give the employee a vet, Endast sammandrag. Inbundna avhandlingar kan sökas i Helka-databasen (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Elektroniska kopior av avhandlingar finns antingen öppet på nätet eller endast tillgängliga i bibliotekets avhandlingsterminaler., Only abstract. Paper copies of master’s theses are listed in the Helka database (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Electronic copies of master’s theses are either available as open access or only on thesis terminals in the Helsinki University Library., Vain tiivistelmä. Sidottujen gradujen saatavuuden voit tarkistaa Helka-tietokannasta (http://www.helsinki.fi/helka). Digitaaliset gradut voivat olla luettavissa avoimesti verkossa tai rajoitetusti kirjaston opinnäytekioskeilla.

Jos Bijman (1959) is senior researcher at the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI), The Hague, The Netherlands. He studied political science at the University of Amsterdam. After his graduation in 1988 he worked two years as a researcher at the Department of International Relations and International Public Law, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Amsterdam. Next, he worked for one year as a teacher at the Faculty of Philosophy and Technical Social Sciences, Delft Technical University. In September 1991 he joined the LEI, where his research initially focused on technology assessment and socio-economic impacts of agricultural biotechnology. In recent years he has extended his expertise to internationalisation of agribusiness and the organisation of (international) agrifood chains. The author has written many reports and articles on the impact of agricultural biotechnology, recently in the (electronic) journals AgBioForum (www.agbioforum.org), Biotechnology and Development Monitor, International Journal of Biotechnology and Food Policy. Articles on internationalisation, co-operatives and the organisation of the agrifood chain have appeared in Dutch journals, such as Co?peratie, Spil, TSL, Maandschrift voor Accountancy en Bedrijfseconomie, and in English journals such as American Journal of Agricultural Economics, and the European Review of Agricultural Economics., This thesis studies the efficiency of the marketing co-operative for carrying out transactions with farm products. A co-operative is a special type of governance structure, characterised by collective ownership and forward vertical integration. These characteristics influence investment decisions by farmers and other firms in the agrifood chain. As vertical co-ordination has become more important in agrifood markets, investments in production and marketing become co-specialised. The main question is whether the farmerowned co-operative induces optimal incentives for complementary investments in two (or more) stages of the chain. The empirical research focuses on the Dutch fruit and vegetable industry.

This paper investigates whether voting coalitions are formed by shareholders in order to discipline incumbent management. Shapley values capturing the relative power of shareholder coalitions by category of owner, outperform models with percentage ownership stakes and models measuring the relative voting power of individual owners. There is evidence of successful executive director resistance to board restructuring if these executive directors can combine their ownership stakes to a substantial block of voting power. Non-executive directors seem to support incumbent management, but poor performance is penalised by industrial and commercial companies with large relative voting power. The voting power of insurance companies is positively related to executive director turnover, but this voting power is used for remove management for reasons of other than performance, which may be of strategic nature. Investment/pension funds and funds managed by banks do not play a role in the management substitution process. A large number of share blocks change hands, and new shareholders-industrial companies, individuals and families-are related to increased executive director turnover. Still, these changes in share stakes do not constitute a market in (partial) control since there is no systematic evidence that these changes are triggered by poor performance with the notable exception of industrial companies. There is little evidence that adjusting the board composition to allow for more independence for non-executive directors leads to higher managerial removal. In contrast, high gearing facilitates substitution of executive directors, especially if the company needs to be refinanced.

This paper examines how corporate control is exerted in companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange. There are several alternative corporate governance mechanisms which may play a role in disciplining poorly performing management: blockholders (holding companies, industrial companies, families and institutions), the market for partial control, debt policy, and board composition. Even if there is redundancy of substitute forms of discipline, some mechanisms may dominate. We find that top managerial turnover is strongly related to poor performance measured by stock returns, accounting earnings in relation to industry peers and dividend cuts and omissions. Tobit models reveal that there is little relation between ownership and managerial replacement, although industrial companies resort to disciplinary actions when performance is poor. When industrial companies increase their share stake or acquire a new stake in a poorly performing company, there is evidence of an increase in executive board turnover, which suggest a partial market for control. There is little relation between changes in ownership concentration held by institutions and holding companies, and disciplining. Still, high leverage and decreasing solvency and liquidity variables are also followed by increased disciplining, as are a high proportion of nonexecutive directors and the separation of the functions of CEO and chairman.

Purpose – The purpose of this dissertation to analyze the level and motive of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure for large listed companies in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), and investigates the impacts of corporate governance (CG) characteristics and financial performance (CPF) factors on CSR disclosures, evidence-based on Thailand. Design/methodology/approach – the CSR disclosure index is collected from Bloomberg database using environmental, social and governance (ESG) score as a proxy for CSR disclosure for the period 2014-2017. Financial data, female on board and foreign ownership also collected from Bloomberg. While managerial ownership is conducted manually from SETSMART database and company’s website. Besides, panel data analysis is used to exam the relationship which random effect (RE) estimator is selected as a more appropriate method to use in this dissertation. Findings – The research results indicate that the proportion of female on board of directors and foreign ownership has a significant positive effect on CSR disclosure level. While managerial ownership has no influence on the extent of CSR disclosure. Additionally, the results show that profitability and firm size also have a significant positive association with the level of CSR disclosure. In contrast, the results reveal that ROA and financial leverage have a negative correlation with CSR disclosure. These results suggest that companies with foreign investors or shareholder and high level of female directors tend to have a better quality of CSR disclosure and information. Originality/value – The dissertation contribute proof on the association between the extend of CSR, corporate governance and financial performance in the context of developing country, base on Thailand, reflecting the South East Asia region. Corporate social responsibility, Corporate governance characteristics, gender diversity, Ownership structures, Corporate financial performance Paper type Dissertation pa