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We study whether central bank independence (CBI) and monetary policy arrangements can jointly influence the likelihood of policymakers assigning banking supervision to central banks. Our empirical analysis shows that, assuming a benevolent government, a higher degree of central bank operational (economic) independence is associated with a lower probability of supervisory powers being entrusted to the monetary authority. We interpret this result as deriving from governments' fear of the risk of excessively discretionary monetary policy. However, there is evidence that - conditional on operational independence - central banks are more involved in supervision when they pursue tighter monetary policy goals (a specific aspect of political independence). Our interpretation is that the latter may represent a commitment to mitigate central banks' discretion in the monetization of financial distress. Our study suggests that CBI can be relevant, not only for its alleged effects on macroeconomic variables, but also in influencing policymakers' decisions on the allocation of banking supervisory powers. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.

We investigate the effect that exchange rate regimes have on the degree of central bank involvement in banking supervision. Using both de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes, we find that, conditional on several other factors affecting supervisory power allocation, policymakers are more willing to delegate this task to central banks when the latter are pegging their currency to some kind of parity. This evidence is confirmed when instrumental variables are added, in order to account for possible endogeneity. Results suggest that exchange rate regime features can mitigate the trade offs that political authorities face in evaluating the possibility of assigning supervision to monetary authorities.

The aim of this paper is to provide an extension of a technique recently introduced by Pyatt and Round (2006) to decompose each element of the ‘global multiplier matrix’ in ‘microscopic detail’ in order to capture the linkages between each household groups’ income and the exogenously injected income of other accounts. The methodology we propose allows dividing the impact of exogenous injections into four different effects: directdirect effect (D-D); direct-indirect effect (D-I); indirect-direct effect (I-D) and indirect-indirect effect (I-I). Results using the 2000 Vietnamese SAM show that the highest direct effects on the income of household groups are related to exogenous injections into the agricultural sector, while the highest indirect effects result from investing in other agriculture-related sectors such as, for example, food processing. Policy interventions focusing on the agricultural sector and on rural households will thus have the greatest effect on reducing the level of income inequality.