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The contributions to this book examine the two main asymmetries of the Euro Area as they have intensified during the second decade of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU): the first between monetary union (more supranational governance) versus ‘economic’ union (less centralised governance); the second between those Euro Area member states of the so-called ‘core’ and those of the ‘periphery’. EMU stands as one of the European Union’s (EU) flagship integration achievements. Set up in 1999, with the large majority of EU member states at the time, EMU was described as ‘asymmetrical’ even prior to its start. From the outset, it involved asymmetrical integration in monetary and ‘economic’ union. Although a major element of the blueprint that paved the way for the final stage of EMU, the concept of ‘economic’ union was insufficiently developed. The second decade of the single currency gave rise to a second asymmetry, namely one between those Euro Area member states of the ‘core’ and those of the ‘periphery’. The ten contributions to this volume speak to one or both of these asymmetries, covering the major political, political economy and policy dimensions of EMU and the ongoing debates about necessary policy and institutional reforms to overcome these asymmetries and bolster Euro Area stability. The outbreak of the Coronavirus (Covid-19) Crisis in 2020 created unprecedented socio-economic challenges for Euro Area member states, heightening the perceived urgency of reform.

This contribution discusses the two main asymmetries of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) as they developed over the past two decades since the launch of the Single Currency. From the outset, EMU involved asymmetric degrees of integration in the area of ‘economic’ union (less centralised governance) versus ‘monetary’ union (more supranational governance). With the outbreak of the Sovereign Debt Crisis in 2010, the regime-shaping relevance of a second asymmetry emerged: one roughly between the member states of the Euro Area ‘core’ and those in the ‘periphery’. Each of the two asymmetries have created a range of challenges—institutional, policy and political — that undermine the stability and sustainability of the EMU project.

This bibliography maps the development of Susan Strange’s approach to International Political Economy through work she published in the 50 years from 1949 to 1999. In a few cases, book reviews have been included where the content has some relevance to the development of her perspective. Her extensive work as a journalist has not been included; this bibliography only attempts to record her broadly ‘academic’ work (while recognizing this is not a distinction that she would have necessarily been happy with). From 1947 to 1955, Susan Strange also reported on both economic and sociological aspect of international relations for the Yearbook o f W orld A ffairs. These shorter notes have not been included and the bibliography commences with the substantial pieces she started to write in 1949.

How can we explain the politics of euro adoption in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland? How did the euro crisis influence their positions regarding euro adoption? This article builds on the domestic politics literature and argues: (i) countries that had joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism-2 early had an easier time adopting the euro compared with those that did not; (ii) having a pro-euro government is a necessary but not sufficient condition to adopt the euro; (iii) the political ideology of the ruling elites is important; (iv) the existence of veto points in the domestic political system influences the entire process; (v) although the three countries have made central banks technically independent, the appointment process remains highly political and complex, which has led to conflicts between the central banks and the governments – negatively influencing euro adoption policies; and (vi) the issue does not have much salience in public opinion and thus does not usually feature high on the agenda of the political elites in the three countries. These three countries to date have not adopted the euro for various domestic political reasons. They have at different times been laggards by default or laggards by choice.

There has been a rise and fall in interest in federalism in the context of European integration. This article assesses the federal nature of the EU. It draws in particular on the work of Michael Burgess who has been one of the key thinkers on this issue. Because there are many types of ‘federalisms’ available across the globe, it is helpful to make a comparison with another political system to offer a base line. In this article I explore to what extent the EU already has federal features. With the help of the work of Burgess I seek to look beyond the specific characteristics of the EU and reflect on how a comparison with this other polity can offer us insights into what is going on within the EU political system. Drawing on the comparison with Canada, I seek to identify the characteristics of the EU that are already those of a federation. Therefore, the guiding question of this article is: compared to Canada, what particular features does the EU have that reminds us of a federation and what features is it still lacking? It finds that the EU has a considerable amount of federal features (federation), but that a federal tradition, a federal ideology and advocacy to a federal goal (federalism) are mostly absent. (author's abstract)

The wide-ranging Varieties of Capitalism literature rests on a particular conception of banks and banking, which, we argue, no longer reflects the reality of modern financial systems. We take advantage of the greater information regarding bank activities revealed by the financial crisis to consider the reality, across eight of the world’s largest developed economies, of the ‘financial power’ of banks to act as bulwarks against market forces. This article offers a ‘market-based banking’ framework that transcends the bank-based/capital market-based dichotomy that dominates Comparative Political Economy’s (CPE’s) consideration of financial systems, and argues for a future CPE research focus on the activities of banks. By demonstrating how market-based banking increases market influences on the supply of credit, we highlight an under-appreciated source of financial market pressure on non-financial companies (NFCs) that has potential impact across the range of issues that the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature has seen as differentiating national systems, with implications in areas such as labor, welfare, innovation and flexibility.

"Das Papier analysiert die grundlegenden Bedingungen für das Zustandekommen des Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakts (SGP) und seiner Entwicklung in den Folgejahren. Es werden ökonomische und politische Faktoren untersucht, insbesondere die Rolle wirtschaftspolitischer Vorstellungen und den Einfluss von Experten, Politikern, institutioneller Regelungen im Maastricht Vertrag, innenpolitischer Vorgänge und die Sonderstellung Deutschlands im Bereich der Europäischen Währungsunion. Die gemeinschaftlichen wirtschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen werden als notwendige Bedingung für die Schaffung des Paktes aufgefasst, und ihr Zusammentreffen mit einer entsprechenden machtpolitischen Spielkonstellation wird als dessen hinreichende Erklärung verstanden." [Autorenreferat], "This paper aims to review the economic literature on the Maastricht deficit rule and the Stability and Growth Pact. The author tries to expose the contradictions and inconclusiveness of the debate, highlighting both the criticism and the defense of the fiscal policy regime in EMU. The paper is non-technical and seeks to provide an overview for a readership outside the economics profession. The concluding judgment is that the pact can be criticized on a number of grounds, but that the lack of a politically feasible alternative makes it a second best solution that should not be undermined in the present crisis." [author´s abstract]

Strange Power contains a broad range of first-rate essays by wellwn authors that are inspired by the far-ranging scholarship of Susan Strange. This book is a fitting posthumous tribute to one of the intellectual leaders in the field of international political economy.

Cet article pose la question de savoir si les préoccupations françaises concernant une UEM sans gouvernement économique sont justifiées. En raison de la nature asymétrique de l'UEM, avec une union monétaire pleinement développée et centralisée, même si la gouvernance économique demeure la responsabilité des Etats Membres, certaines questions peuvent ne pas être traitées correctement avec des outils politiques macro-économiques nationaux et individuels. On pourrait avoir un policy mix défaillant entre politiques monétaires et politiques fiscales auxquelles s'ajoutent les défis posés à la coordination des politiques macroéconomiques nationales. Face à ces enjeux, les Français ont avancé des propositions de gouvernement économique. Certains prétendent que les Français n'ont fait cela que dans le but de contrôler la banque Centrale Européenne (BCE) et par voie de conséquence, la politique monétaire. Cependant, les interprétations de ce que la notion de gouvernement économique peut recouvrir sont nombreuses. Le présent article examine pourquoi les Français soutenaient l'idée d'un gouvernement économique et comment ils espéraient lui voir jouer un rôle dans le processus de l'UEM. Il cherche aussi à voir comment l'Eurogroupe, et dans une moindre mesure, le Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance sont des institutions inspirées par les propositions françaises de gouvernement économique. La dernière partie conclut que les préoccupations françaises sont justifiées : une UEM asymétrique constitue un problème. Il est cependant vraisemblable que le problème sera progressivement traité à travers le processus d'intégration et d'évolution des politiques publiques. La coordination des politiques économiques exige qu'une attention spéciale soit portée aux besoins spécifiques des pays. Il faudra néanmoins du temps pour régler ces questions.

Cet article pose la question de savoir si les préoccupations françaises concernant une UEM sans gouvernement économique sont justifiées. En raison de la nature asymétrique de l'UEM, avec une union monétaire pleinement développée et centralisée, même si la gouvernance économique demeure la responsabilité des Etats Membres, certaines questions peuvent ne pas être traitées correctement avec des outils politiques macro-économiques nationaux et individuels. On pourrait avoir un policy mix défaillant entre politiques monétaires et politiques fiscales auxquelles s'ajoutent les défis posés à la coordination des politiques macroéconomiques nationales. Face à ces enjeux, les Français ont avancé des propositions de gouvernement économique. Certains prétendent que les Français n'ont fait cela que dans le but de contrôler la banque Centrale Européenne (BCE) et par voie de conséquence, la politique monétaire. Cependant, les interprétations de ce que la notion de gouvernement économique peut recouvrir sont nombreuses. Le présent article examine pourquoi les Français soutenaient l'idée d'un gouvernement économique et comment ils espéraient lui voir jouer un rôle dans le processus de l'UEM. Il cherche aussi à voir comment l'Eurogroupe, et dans une moindre mesure, le Pacte de Stabilité et de Croissance sont des institutions inspirées par les propositions françaises de gouvernement économique. La dernière partie conclut que les préoccupations françaises sont justifiées : une UEM asymétrique constitue un problème. Il est cependant vraisemblable que le problème sera progressivement traité à travers le processus d'intégration et d'évolution des politiques publiques. La coordination des politiques économiques exige qu'une attention spéciale soit portée aux besoins spécifiques des pays. Il faudra néanmoins du temps pour régler ces questions.