Search

A Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) for steel making is a complex industrial process that is difficult to monitor due to the harsh environment, so the collected production data is very limited given the process complexity. Also, such production data has a low degree of variability. An accurate machine learning (ML) model for predicting production outcome requires both large and varied data, so utilising data from multiple BOFs will allow for more capable ML models, since both the amount and variability of data increases. Data collection setups for different BOFs are different, such that data sets are not compatible to directly join for ML training. Our approach is to let a neural network benefit from these collection differences in a joint training model. We present a neural network-based approach that simultaneously and jointly co-trains on several data sets. Our novelty is that the first network layer finds an internal representation of each individual BOF, while the other layers use this representation to concurrently learn a common BOF model. Our evaluation shows that the prediction accuracy of the common model increases compared to separate models trained on individual furnaces’ data sets. It is clear that multiple data sets can be utilised this way to increase model accuracy for better production prediction performance. For the industry, this means that the amount of available data for model training increases and thereby more capable ML models can be trained when having access to multiple data sets describing the same or similar manufacturing processes., First Online: 02 September 2021

An article dealt with the questions of training of pedagogical personnel for work in inclusive educational institutions. The actual direction in meeting the challenges for forming the readiness of pedagogical potential is determination of pedagogical conditions at the higher school, development of learning technologies, aimed at bridging the gap between theoretical knowledge and professional skills and abilities of the future primary school teacher. Also, there is determined a role of pedagogical conditions at realization of model for forming the readiness that will allow to carry out the training process effectively of future primary school teachers for joint training of children with special educational needs, El artículo trató las cuestiones de la formación de personal pedagógico para el trabajo en instituciones educativas inclusivas. La dirección real para enfrentar los desafíos para formar la preparación del potencial pedagógico es la determinación de las condiciones pedagógicas en la escuela superior, desarrollo de tecnologías de aprendizaje destinadas a cerrar la brecha entre el conocimiento teórico y las habilidades y destrezas profesionales del futuro maestro de escuela primaria. Además, se determinó el papel de las condiciones pedagógicas en la realización del modelo para formar la preparación que permitirá llevar a cabo el proceso de capacitación de los futuros maestros de escuela primaria para la capacitación conjunta de niños con necesidades educativas especiales.

In this dynamic, complex, and uncertain global environment, supporting and conducting joint military exercises and training will continue to remain vitally important for the United States to strengthen ties with allies and other nations, build partner capacity, maintain military proficiency, and ensure national security. However, projected funding and resource constraints suggest that it will be necessary to achieve efficiencies in military operations, exercises and engagements in order to maintain readiness. These efficiencies can be best achieved by leveraging a globally networked approach and an integrated framework that shares resources and coordinates activities. A recommended method is synchronizing joint military exercises and training with existing and ongoing military operations, such as presence and stability operations, theater security cooperation efforts, allied nation and coalition partner activities, and perhaps even campaigns and contingencies., The original document contains color images.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy states that organization is key to DoD success. We must unite our disparate capabilities to wield unified force to forge the Total Force into an information and knowledge-based enterprise. We must break down old barriers and transform our organizations. This will require an investment in people. The National Military Strategy 2011 specifies that joint forces will be networked organizations. The network is vital to this transformation. DoD is more than a net-centric organization; it is a networked organization. To meet the criteria outlined, the Services and joint community must have trained leaders who understand that the network is more than the sum of its parts, who know how to integrate and synthesize multiple network components into a joint network, and who understand how the network enables C2. This paper concludes that the Service communities must change individual paradigms and develop a joint professional networked force by expanding joint training and focusing efforts on joint operations. The operational commander will have a seamless, efficient, and effective C2 network with these joint trained communication leaders. The paper recommends additions to training for communicators assigned to JTF capable headquarters and modifications to current joint exercises, which include a communications/network operations focus., The original document contains color images.

The purpose of the Training Community Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Business Plan (TMSBP) is to provide linkages between the training functional stakeholders as represented in the Training Transformation (T2) Senior Advisory Group (SAG) and Executive Steering Committee (ESG) to the Department's larger M&S strategic vision and goals. Since needs and technology are constantly evolving, the TMSBP will continue to evolve as a living document. The 2008 Edition of the TMSBP is provided to inform the M&S Steering Committee (MS SC) project call for M&S projects, and to provide justification for major investments in training capabilities enabled by M&S in future Program Objective Memoranda (POM) submissions. It will also identify capabilities that the training community can contribute to greater interoperability, reuse and efficiencies among the cross-cutting community. The next update for this document (2009 Edition) will update needs/requirements and M&S training capabilities to respond to changing war fighting training needs., The original document contains color images. Task no. AK-2-2924.

While the arms industry has undertaken significant steps to globalize, NATO and ABCA (America, Britain, Canada, Australia) military force interoperability levels remain woefully inadequate. Over 60 years ago, NATO and the ABCA program sought to standardize the militaries of their member nations. Each member country agreed to take steps to ensure that interoperability among force elements was achieved. It is clear that a nexus should exist between globalized arms development and truly interoperable forces. This study examines the relationship between a globalized arms industry and interoperable armed forces within the context of NATO and the ABCA program. The primary vehicle it uses to do this is a case study of the development and procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The study concludes that four barriers bar the development of interoperable forces. First, defense spending has been significantly reduced for all members of NATO and ABCA, with the exception of the United States. Second, democratically elected leaders are unable to justify increased defense spending in financially constrained times. The absence of an identifiable external threat to the sovereignty of nation states is paramount in politician's minds. Third, the proliferation of defense technologies to third parties prevents the arms industry from achieving interoperability of systems. Finally, little emphasis is placed on the importance of nontechnical interoperability. The requirement of forces to train together and understand differing military cultures and doctrine is often overlooked. The absence of joint and combined training prior to conducting operations has limited the ability of international forces to operate together effectively. Wherever possible, NATO and ABCA forces must achieve both technical and nontechnical interoperability to remain effective within the contemporary operating environment., The original document contains color images.

The Training Community Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Business Plan (TMSBP) provides linkages between the training functional stakeholders as represented in the Training Transformation (T2) Senior Advisory Group (SAG) and Executive Steering Committee (ESG) to the Department's larger M&S strategic vision and goals. Since needs and technology are constantly evolving, the TMSBP will continue to evolve as a living document. The 2007 Edition of the TMSBP is provided to inform the M&S Steering Committee (MS SC) project call for near-term (FY 09) M&S projects, and to provide justification for major investments in training capabilities enabled by M&S in future Program Objective Memoranda (POM) submissions. It also identifies capabilities that the training community can contribute to greater interoperability, reuse, and efficiencies among the cross-cutting community. Volume I of the 2007 TMSBP provides an initial review of the models, simulations, and tools identified as part of the Training Capabilities Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) base case of capabilities. Volume II provides additional data and analysis details from a data call to the training community in the summer of 2007., Supersedes IDA Document NS D-3562, Vol I. Prepare in cooperation with Addx Corp. and General Dynamics. The original document contains color images. All DTIC reproductions will be in black and white.

The characteristics of the future operating environment will undoubtedly demand AFSOF's unique capabilities. The challenges involved in this future environment will make increased integration with general purpose forces (GPF) imperative for mission accomplishment and achieving the United State's tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. This paper establishes the context for AFSOF and GPF integration, the analysis starts by looking at the future strategic landscape. Next it describes AFSOF's expected roles and missions, showing the SOF niche in this landscape. It then examines the integration imperative in two cases encompassing the challenges set forth in the NDS and QDR. Subsequently, the paper covers current training to reveal deficiencies towards fulfilling the integration imperative. Ultimately, this study provides recommendations to improve AFSOF integration training. AFSOF must institute formal changes to current training to improve integration; both with GPF, and internal to SOF, to enable unified action and thus increase success in their full spectrum of missions., The original document contains color images.

As a result of the Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986 -- also known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act -- the United States Military operates jointly to an extent never before seen. However, loopholes in the legislation remain which continue to prevent the services from realizing the full extent of the efficiencies envisioned by Goldwater-Nichols. U.S. Military victories from Desert Storm to Operation Iraqi Freedom have masked the fact that the U.S. Military is still steeped in parochialism. There is no truly "joint force"; the services still pursue individual service priorities, redundant capabilities persist throughout, and turf wars frequently arise in new mission areas. It is time for an update to Goldwater-Nichols to address the loopholes that prevent the U.S. Military from exploiting the synergies of increased jointness. This is especially critical in this "era of persistent conflict," which is coupled with flat-lined budgets and the need to replace worn out and expended equipment., USAWC Strategy Research Project.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld first asked Congress to consider authorizing another round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) in testimony before the House Appropriations Committee in July 2001. Previous BRAC rounds had focused almost exclusively on cost savings via the elimination of excess real property. BRAC 2005 was conceived by Mr Rumsfeld as a vehicle to support Defense transformation and the re-basing of significant US troops from overseas bases to bases in the United States as well as to conserve resources. However, the strategic environment and challenges facing the United States have continued to change and develop since the original BRAC 2005 recommendations were formed beginning in mid-2001. The war on terror continues with no end in sight to our ongoing involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Congress approved an increase of 65,000 Soldiers in the active duty end strength of the Army. BRAC 2005 implementation costs continue to rise, surpassing estimated costs in some cases. Can the BRAC process be adjusted or improved to allow for needed changes? One thing is for sure, BRAC 2005 directives are in the full execution stage with completion mandated not later than September 2011.

Hypothesis: Training at the Operational level is less beneficial when live forces vice synthetic are used. Live forces can be used but, at the Operational level due to the complexity of the scenarios required to train these staffs, a synthetic environment is more cost effective and provides a much greater ROI. The Research Objective: To develop, test, validate, and deliver a methodology which provides a repeatable and reliable means to portray ROI to Operational Level Commanders. The methodology should provide the ability for Operational level staffs to assess performance, costs, and value of training either for routine reporting or in support of certification, regardless of training environment., See also ADM202526. Presented at the Military Operations Research Society Symposium (75th) held in Annapolis, Maryland on 12-14 June 2007. The original document contains color images.

T2 is a Key Enabler of the Capabilities-based Transformation of DoD. * Supporting the mission to better enable integrated operations: Align joint education and training with combatant command needs - Achieve unity of effort from a diversity of means - Develop individuals and organizations that think joint intuitively * Supporting the mission to enable the continuous capabilities-based transformation of DoD: Prepared forces for new warfighting concepts - Develop individuals and organizations that improvise and adapt to emerging crises., See also ADM202526. Presented at the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) Symposium (75th), held in Annapolis, MD, on 12-14 June 2007. Document includes BRIEFING CHARTS ONLY. The original document contains color images.

Current Army National land use strategy seeks to protect current training/testing areas, and address shortcomings with computer simulation, a strategy insufficient to completely meet future training and testing needs. The transformation of the U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD) will incorporate new weapons and tactics requiring more training land and more frequent joint-Service training than current fenced installations containing tracts of contiguous land can accommodate. This document investigates the need for a joint, distributed, and regional land use strategy that will facilitate the Army and DoD's ability to develop training/testing areas and large multi-service exercises within increasingly populated areas and regions. It examines capabilities that will be required to adopt this strategy and specifies the scope of research and development efforts, analyses, and studies required to fill capability gaps. The study team determined that Army requirements were not sufficiently documented at the time of the study to recommend creation of a dedicated Joint Distributed Regional Training work package using Army applied research (6.2) funds. This team recommends that ERDC use these results as a basis to work with the Army Environmental Requirements and Technology Assessments (AERTA) process to develop validated requirements upon which to base more focused work packages., Work Unit 33143. Project No. ILIR. The original document contains color images.

Partial contents: JFQ DIALOGUE -- Joint Doctrine Update; Strategic Communication and National Security, by James G. Stavridis; "Deconfusing" Lethal and Kinetic Terms, by Karl E. Wingenbach and Donald G. Lisenbee, Jr.; FORUM -- Executive Summary of this issue; Law Enforcement Technology, Intelligence, and the War on Terror, by M. E. Bowman; Technology, Intelligence, and Trust, by James R. Howcroft; Eyes on Target: Intelligence Support to an Effects-based Approach, by James B. Ellsworth; Applying Law Enforcement Technology to Counterinsurgency Operations, by Giles Kyser, Matt Keegan, and Samuel A. Musa; China's ASAT Test: Motivations and Implications, by Phillip C. Saunders and Charles D. Lutes. SPECIAL FEATURE -- An Interview with James E. "Hoss" Cartwright; Global and Theater Operations Integration, by Robert J. Elder, Jr.; Joint Functional Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, by James L. Denton; Warfighting in Cyberspace, by Keith B. Alexander; Space Operations, by William L. Shelton; Integrated Missile Defense, by Kevin T. Campbell; A New Era in Combating WMD, by James A. Tegnelia; Guarding Cyberspace: Global Network Operations, by Charles E. Croom, Jr.; Contesting the Information Battlespace, by John C. Koziol; The Global Innovation and Strategy Center, by Kevin Williams. COMMENTARY -- The George C. Marshall European Center: Proven Model or Irrelevant Prototype? by Timothy C. Shea; American Military Culture and Strategy, by Phillip S. Meilinger; On the Nature of Strategic Communications, by Carnes Lord. FEATURES -- Effects-based Operations and the Problem of Causality: Simple and Complex, by Zoltan Jobbagy; Military Officer Attitudes toward UAV Adoption: Exploring Institutional Impediments to Innovation, by James R. FitzSimonds and Thomas G. Mahnken; Shaping the Nuclear Landscape, by Paul I. Bernstein, et al.; A JTF Training Dilemma: Component Rigor versus Joint Realism, by Thomas E. Ward II.

This selected bibliography lists references for readings on Jointness, an enduring theme of the U.S. Army War College. A revised and updated version of the library's earlier bibliographies on jointness, it focuses on aspects of the United States Armed Forces such as joint operations, joint logistics, interservice cooperation, interservice rivalry, joint communications, joint training, and the Goldwater-Nichols Act. With the exception of some important older titles, most of the books, documents, journal articles, and online resources cited are dated 2004 to the present. All items are available in the U.S. Army War College Library. For users' convenience, at the end of the citations, the author added Library call numbers, Internet addresses, or database links. Web sites were accessed during July 2007.

The requirement for the Marine Corps to conduct mechanized operations is higher now than at any other time in the history of the Corps. While the infantry and amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) team continues to get the job done, all is not well. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) revealed shortcomings in the current ad-hoc nature of Marine mechanized infantry, especially between infantry companies and AAV platoons. While the Marine Corps has sought to alleviate dissension over the employment of AAVs, no amount of doctrine will completely eliminate the potential for friction that exists between infantry company commanders and AAV platoon commanders. The root of this problem is a lack of familiarity between infantry and AAV units that can only be solved with a new approach to training for mechanized operations. The USMC must provide mechanized operations training for infantry company officers who will operate with AAVs, and standardized collective training standards for mechanized infantry companies.

The Army and Marines have a long and proud history of aiding each other in the defense of the nation. In the continuing Global War against Terrorism, they will continue to fight and work together at a lower tactical level than ever before. However, certain preconditions must exist to make this successful. The two services need to coordinate their logistics and acquisition procedures. They also need to use joint training and joint billets to increase their understanding of one another. These institutional changes will not only make life easier for the tactical commander, but also will increase combat power, and that increases the chances for victory.

JADE, or Joint Air Defence Training Simulation, was an experiment conducted in Norway in March 2006 to explore whether connecting existing training simulators and operational systems is a suitable tool for joint tactical training. The embedded training capability of a Control and Reporting Centre, a naval tactical trainer and game-based fighter simulators located at three different sites were connected over a secure wide area network. Additionally, JADE was a test case for a simulation infrastructure in support of training and experimentation developed by FFI. An overview of the joint tactical training prototype capability established for JADE is given. It consists of three main parts; a distributed simulation system, a command and control system and tactical data links, and a voice communication system. A brief outline of the experimental training event is given, and both operational and technical experiences are discussed., Presented at the NATO RTO Modelling and Simulation Conference on "Transforming Training and Experimentation through Modelling and Simulation" held in Rome, Italy on 5-6 Oct 2006, and Koblenz, Germany on 7-8 Oct 2006. Published in RTO-MP-MSG-045, Paper no. 18. Briefing charts included. See also ADM002053. The original document contains color images.

ELECTRONIC FILE CHARACTERISTICS: 61 files; Adobe Acrobat (.PDF), MS PowerPoint (.PPS), video files (.WMV) and HTML. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: 1 CD-ROM; 4 3/4 in.; 128 MB. ABSTRACT: The importance of Modelling and Simulation (M&S) and the effect it has on training and experimentation in NATO and nations is the focus of the papers prepared for the NATO M&S Group (MSG) 2006 Symposium (MSG-045) on "Transforming Training and Experimentation through Modelling and Simulation". Advances In low cost, high power computers, graphics and telecommunications/networking are some of the key technologies that have provided opportunities and enabled M&S applications to become powerful tools that can assist in many ways towards the Allied Command for Transformation (ACT) mission and its commitment to the transformation of NATO's military capabilities. The symposium was conducted in Rome, Italy from 5 to 6 October 2006. All sessions of the Symposium were unclassified. The keynote speeches and papers presented covered NATO efforts as well as efforts of the nations, including Invited Partnership for Peace efforts. The three tracks emphasized Transforming Experimentation, Interoperability issues and Transforming Training, Education and Decision Support., Presented at the NATO RTO Modelling and Simulation Conference held in Rome, Italy on 5-6 Oct 2006, and Koblenz, Germany on 7-8 Oct 2006. ISBN 92-837-0075-9 and ISBN 978-92-837-0075-3

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 revamped joint officer management policies to improve the quality of officers serving on joint staffs, the advice given to the Secretary of Defense, and the effectiveness of military operations. Joint officer management was one of the most contentious parts of that seminal legislation, but it established the educational, training, and operational basis for developing joint warfighting professionals who are adept at leveraging the capabilities of the entire force to accomplish missions and tasks across the spectrum of conflict. Indeed, the professional skills that emerged are largely responsible for recent military successes and portend continued excellence and vitality within the joint profession. Troops who fought together during Iraqi Freedom are now training together to further enhance their joint capabilities at the point of the spear. The services are modularizing their forces, making them more dependent on the capabilities of the other services to create operational effects that directly contribute to achieving objectives. Also, combatant commands are reviewing strategic war plans, and the Joint Staff is revamping weapons procurement processes to improve strategic capabilities. Joint operations are here to stay, and while the joint officer management system and joint organizations are not perfect, they do not require the major changes some have argued for. This article is divided into the following sections: The Joint Profession, Status of the Joint Profession, Emerging Joint Culture, Joint Organizations, Education and Training, Joint Assignments, Quality Controls, Improvements Needed, Joint Doctrine and Capabilities Center, and Standing Joint Headquarters., Published in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), n38 p92-99, 4th quarter 2005.

The U.S. military does not have a system in place to institutionalize, direct, or even require regular joint tactical training. When I discuss this deficiency with senior military officers and civilian analysts, they point to the Goldwater-Nichols Act as testament to our jointness. We believe that the Goldwater-Nichols Act cured most of our ills and pronounced it good enough. But it is not good enough, and there is ample evidence. We need to develop a management system to ensure effective training at the joint tactical level., Published in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), n38 p14-19, 2005.

In speech recognition, fusion of multiple systems often results in improved recognition accuracy or robustness. All the previously suggested system fusions mainly focused on the recognition process. Training, on the other hand, are performed independently across different systems. In this paper, we investigated the combination of a Mel frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) based acoustic feature (ACF) system and an articulatory feature (AF) based system. In addition to proposing an asynchronous combination during the recognition process that makes the state combination more flexible during recognition, we proposed an efficient combination approach during the model training stage. We show that combining the models during training not only improved performance but also simplified fusion process during recognition. Because fusion during training removes inconsistency between the individual models, such as in state or phoneme alignments, it is particularly useful for highly constrained recognition fusion such as synchronous models combination. Comparing fusion of separately trained AF and ACF systems, fusion of jointly trained AF and ACF models resulted in more than 3% absolute phoneme recognition error reduction on the TIMIT corpus for synchronous and 1% for asynchronous combination. © 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

During the dark days (1950s) of naval aviation safety, approximately 800 aircraft were lost annually to accidents. The concept of a Replacement Air Group (RAG), more recently known as a Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS), was introduced to enhance safety and standardization. One squadron per airframe is responsible for all initial training of aircrews, ensuring standardization for that aircraft. Following the introduction of the KC-130J in 2005, this practice will be curtailed and the KC-130 FRS will be retired. After the retirement of the FRS, the Air Force will stand up the Joint Maintenance and Aircrew Training System (JMATS) for joint C-130J training. However, the retirement of the KC-130 FRS will compromise the standardization and safety along with the combat readiness of the KC-130 community's aircrews. The training departments of KC-130 squadrons are already struggling to accomplish their current missions. If the FRS is retired and the responsibility for the training and standardization of replacement aircrews is dispersed to the KC-130 fleet squadrons, real decreases in safety and readiness will certainly be manifested. Moreover, because the FRS is being retired in 2005 and full introduction of the KC-130J is not anticipated until 2015, shortfalls and deficiencies in replacement pilot training will exist for over a decade for both legacy KC-130 and KC-130J aircraft. Although the JMATS program contains fiscally sound ideas, the losses in safety and standardization along with combat readiness preclude logical justification. Aircrew safety combined with the decrease in combat readiness provided to the MAGTF is reason enough not to retire the KC-130 FRS., EWS Contemporary Issues Paper.

Prior to World War II, the Japanese imperial army and navy lived a cat-and-dog existence. They individually reported to the emperor and there was no organization to coordinate their efforts. Their perceived threats and strategies were also different. The army had traditionally looked north toward Russia while the navy focused on America, especially after the Russo-Japanese War. Both services maneuvered for larger shares of the budget. Even war did not bring them closer together. The navy never informed the army of its crushing defeat at Midway, and the army was preparing to build its own submarines by the end of the war because it did not trust the navy. After the conflict, Japan drew from experience and established the Self Defense Force (SDF). The National Defense Academy, established in 1953, adopted a joint education system. The joint staff council coordinated ground, maritime, and air staff offices. Joint training included command post exercises, maritime transportation of ground forces, and maritime and air exercises. A central procurement office managed acquisition for Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces. Not all the lessons of the interwar period and World War II were thoroughly learned. Jointness among the services was not fully developed. Threat perceptions and strategies still differed. The Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) continued to primarily look north, while the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) tended to focus on sea lines of communication, extending southeast and southwest from Japan. Each service built its own communication system, target symbols, and message formats. As a result, they could not communicate among themselves on common secure voice devices. Recent efforts to improve jointness in the Japanese Self Defense Forces offer an opportunity to look ahead and identify ways that these initiatives can contribute to combined operations., Published in Joint Force Quarterly, p57-60, Winter 2000-2001.

One of the more controversial operations during the Vietnam War did not involve defoliants or bombing remote hamlets; rather it was an attempt to rescue 54 Americans held captive in the north. Operation Kingpin was the raid to retrieve prisoners of war (POWs) from a camp located near Hanoi at a place called Son Tay. This effort is best remembered because the captives had been moved prior to the raid and the camp was found to be empty. But despite failing to accomplish the objective, this mission offers some valuable lessons in jointness. Kingpin proved that a joint mission could be well planned, trained, and executed--lessons forgotten ten years later in Eagle Claw, the aborted mission to rescue American captives from Iran. The raid on Son Tay demonstrated that service rivalries could be effectively overcome to organize an appropriate force, sort out equipment interoperability problems, conduct proper training, and complete contingency planning to execute a mission despite the inevitable friction of war., Published in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), p120-124, Spring 1997.

On September 18, 1994, U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) set in motion Operation Uphold Democracy, an airborne, amphibious, and special operations invasion of Haiti. A few hours after the invasion started the Carter agreement was signed in Port au Prince, abruptly halting the kick-in-the-door operation and initiating a dramatic transition to a soft-landing option. This was flawlessly executed the next day as the 10th Mountain Division lifted off USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and alit at Port au Prince International Airport. A few days later Marines launched an amphibious landing at Cap Haitien from USS Wasp. The striking success of this operation was based on joint training, which contributed to the readiness and flexibility of our forces, and adaptive joint force packaging, which facilitated the overall plan. It was also due to robust joint intelligence support, which dramatically demonstrated the progress of the intelligence community in meeting the needs of joint task force (JTF) commanders and components. Much will appear in JFQ and other journals on joint force packaging for Haiti. This article focuses on lessons from the Persian Gulf War and Somalia, and how those lessons improved intelligence support for the joint warfighter. Specifically, it outlines how ACOM and its Atlantic Intelligence Command used training support, technology, and common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to support four JTF commanders in various Haiti contingencies., Published in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), n7 p54-59, Spring 1995.

This thesis explores the concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packaging (AJFP). Provided first is an overview of the concept itself, including the factors behind its development, the manner and scope of its implementation, and the benefits proponents claim it will bring. Also reviewed are the various concerns and criticisms that AJFP has created within the defense establishment. Among those are reservations about the concept's impact on unit integrity and doctrine, the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff; training budgets; and traditional combat capability. Operation to AJFP also involves perceptions that it will create an additional layer of bureaucracy, will conflict with other, uncoordinated, force packaging initiatives, will limit force-employment options to a fixed 'menu,' and, finally, will never come to fruition. The discussion of pros and cons on both sides of the AJFP debate is followed by an overall analysis and evaluation. It is concluded that, on balance, the AJFP concept has considerable potential for helping the U.S. military adapt to the post-Cold War international security environment and smaller force structure. In particular, AJFP promises to bring a greater degree of effectiveness to U.S. military operations at the lower-end of the conflict spectrum, and allows the peacetime forward presence mission to be addressed by a full range of joint forces., http://archive.org/details/adaptivejointfor1094539661, Lieutenant, United States Navy, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Exercise Acid Test III was an Alaskan Command (ALCOM) directed exercise in support of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Memorandum SM 270-70, 1 April 1970. ALCOM's Exercise Directive, Acid Test III, designated the Commanding General, United States Army, Alaska (USARAL), as exercise director. The exercise was conducted in compliance with USARAL Circular 350-33, Acid Test III. Exercise Punch Card XII (a JCS coordinated exercise of tactical fighter, tactical reconnaissance and air refueling force deployment of United States Air Force STRIKE (USAFSTRIKE) units to Alaska), was conducted in conjunction with Acid Test III. The concept of the exercise was to integrate the operations of assigned ALCOM forces, attached Canadian forces, United States STRIKE Command (USSTRICOM) air augmentation forces and Military Airlift Command (MAC) air and ground support forces. The exercise was conducted on the Fort Greely Military Reservation during the period 30 November through 14 December 1970.

Strategic competition presents Special Operation Forces (SOF) with a new challenge to remain a formidable tool for the United States. During the last two decades, SOF's operations centered on the execution of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations leaving a question as to how SOF should prepare for strategic competition. This monograph analyzes special operations conducted during the Cold War to identify what types of missions supported the US's operational and strategic level success as well as the capabilities required to enable them. The Cold War case studies provided a comparable strategic competition data set, revealing investments in crisis response, foreign internal defense, strategic intelligence collection, exercises, and support to other government agencies. While SOF must maintain a significant focus on counterterrorism operations, strategic competition requires a reapportionment of mission sets, core competencies, and forces. With a rebalanced operational approach, Special Operations Command presents the US with a force ready to maintain a marked advantage in strategic competition.

To record and discuss the activities undertaken by the Umpire Group from its formation on 17 May 1973 through the completion of the FTX Certain Charge on 16 October 1973. This report consists of a cover letter and two volumes. Volume II includes copies of all key documents published by the Umpire Control Group.

To record and discuss the activities undertaken by the Umpire Group from its formation on 17 May 1973 through the completion of the FTX Certain Charge on 16 October 1973. This report consists of a cover letter and two volumes. This cover letter discusses, in detail, actions taken by the Umpire Group. Volume I includes reports from the Umpire Headquarters Staff and the Division Chief Umpires.

This study investigates the feasibility of consolidating the three different Department of Defense helicopter flight training programs that are currently in place between two different facilities; Naval Air Station Whiting Field near Pensacola, Florida and Fort Rucker, Alabama. While the Air Force and Army currently share a facility, they conduct separate training in this same location. The core skills developed in all three of the separate helicopter training programs are similar (Contacts, Instruments, Formation, and Tactics). Future defense spending cuts may demand training consolidation among the different services. Helicopter training is a prime candidate for this proposed consolidation. This study answers if consolidation is possible for helicopter flight training. All of the Services flight syllabi were analyzed during this study to include the helicopter portion as well as the fixed wing portion of training. Analyzing the syllabi was critical in deciding if consolidation was possible; currently the Air Force and Navy use the fixed wing portion of the flight training program as a precursor to the helicopter training. Fixed wing training is currently not being provided to Army helicopter pilot candidates. There have been a number of studies completed over the years beginning in the late seventies that have tried to consolidate all of the flight training pipelines. There have been a number of consolidations or joint partnerships between the Air Force and the Navy, but have been limited to fixed-wing primary and advanced multi-engine training not helicopters. This study concludes that consolidation will need further study by the GAO and will be a long-term endeavor. Near-term recommendations include a personnel exchange program, both student and instructor. In light of the current economic realities, the Department of Defense is going to have to find a way to cut costs. Having three different helicopter flight schools to include Army, Air Force and Navy, The Dep

This monograph examines whether or not the United States Armed Forces should be unified in order to ensure jointness. Unlike the unification compromise of 1947, this proposal eliminates the separateness of the services. The impetus for developing the monograph came from instances of apparent interservice rivalry, even after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1986. This act is supposed to significantly enhance jointness and increase the power of the commanders-in-chief of the unified and specified commands while decreasing the power of the service chiefs--the principal sources of service parochialism. The monograph's hypothesis is that perhaps Goldwater-Nichols did not go far enough; instead, perhaps the answer is to eliminate the autonomy of the separate services through unification. The significance of this monograph is that unlike DESERT STORM, future battlefields will probably require effective joint warfighting skills immediately upon deployment of the forces. The radical step of unification might be the only way to guarantee that on-call effectiveness.

The Navy's aircraft carrier battle groups have historically been the first to arrive in troubled areas around the world, and will strive to do so in the future. As a result of this commitment, Navy CAS has played a role in the close fight for Army and Marine Corps ground units in every major conflict since World War II. In Korea, Navy CAS proved extremely valuable, both in forced entry operations, such as Inchon, and in evacuation operations, such as the retreat from the Yalu. Likewise, in Vietnam, Navy CAS proved critical in battles such as Khe Sanh. Despite the great success of Air Force assets in Desert Storm, history and geography reveal that the availability of air fields in the vicinity of the front may not always follow the user friendly environment of Saudi Arabia. Often, the air field environment of Korea or Vietnam may more accurately template the war of the future, especially in the entry and exit phases of an operation. For this reason, it is essential that the combat power of Navy CAS not be forgotten. Yet today, parochial arguments persist which claim that one service can do the job better than all the others. Contrary to the notion that one service is in fact 'best,' this monograph addresses the synergistic question relating to CAS: Are there operational benefits to be obtained through Army and Navy CAS cooperation? In researching this question, an examination of CAS from the current U.S. perspective on air power theory in general will set the stage for further analysis. Once a theoretical foundation has been laid, a discussion on the historic role of Navy CAS in support of joint and combined operations since WWII will be presented. This will be followed by a presentation of current arguments against fixed wing CAS and Naval Aviation in general, both from the aspects of fleet vulnerability and excessive costs. These broad based arguments against carrier air in general must be addressed, since it must be deduced that if one believes aircraft carriers t

Operation Desert Storm was fought with an immature counter-TBM weapons system, without joint or service AMD doctrine, and without the benefit of joint training. Twelve years later Army AMD forces took to the battlefield once again as part of a joint and coalition force, this time exercising within a JTAMD architecture, possessing a significantly enhanced PAC-3 missile capability, utilizing an evolving doctrine and benefiting from limited joint training. Despite the successful engagements of nine of nine inbound TBM missiles, there were two fratricide aircraft engagements, and one Air Force engagement of a US Patriot unit. Successful execution of an Early Warning net, the establishment of the Tactical Information Datalink (TADIL), and the successful integration of coalition forces, specifically Kuwaiti forces, into the JTAMD architecture were largely the result of intensive training exercises, and the implementation of a combined Operational Readiness Evaluation (ORE) team specific to that region, and focused on the specific threat associated with Iraq and its WMD capability. The purpose of this paper was to investigate the “success” of Army AMD as part of a JTAMD system in order to determine to what degree “jointness” was successful, and whether this success was the result of a focused effort, specific to this region, or truly representative of a joint approach to develop a Joint TAMD capability. An assessment of the Army AMD as an element of the JTAMD served to reveal issues specific to a service component as it related to the joint system and further necessitated an appreciation for the interaction of numerous variables within a complex environment. Dietrich Doerner’s model for understanding complex systems served as useful framework in assessing the Army AMD system. My conclusion is that “jointness” remains little understood I have also concluded that primacy of technological research and development efforts during the 12 years between Operation Desert Storm and

The fundamental assumptions the U.S. Army makes between the most likely (small-scale contingency/stability and support operations) and most dangerous (high intensity/major theater war) contingencies drive all subsequent decisions over apportioning limited resources, force structure, training and equipment in an organization where division and corps commanders serve two masters. The two masters are manifested in the dilemma of resourcing and doctrine to support the divergence of requirements to operate as organic division and corps headquarters conducting traditional missions in a major theater war (MTW) or operate as an Army Forces (ARFOR), Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) or Joint Task Force (JTF) conducting small-scale contingency operations. An examination of National Command Authority (NCA) guidance, recent U.S. military operations, contingency plans for the warfighting CinCs and Army and joint doctrine shows that Army divisions and corps are expected to operate as joint headquarters. Without examining the question of whether these divisions and corps are organized and equipped to operate at that level, this monograph offers an answer to the research question; does the current training model for divisions and corps support employment as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF? The answer is no. The war time focus of Army training doctrine, lack of authoritative joint doctrine for peacetime training as well as the lack of doctrine at the operational level for the JFLCC represent significant gaps in providing the direction necessary to ensure success when operating as a headquarters within this very complex environment. When coupled with the changing strategic environment outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) and the expectation for divisions and corps from contingency plans and recent operations, it is the assertion of this author, that these headquarters are not given the tools to train in the division and corps level sta

This study first examines the postulated characteristics of the modern battlefield and then proposes several close air support skill and knowledge requirements based upon the expected battlefield characteristics. The study next investigates the training requirements established in the current USAF close air support training program, TACM 51-50. A comparison between the close air support battlefield requirements and the current program reveals a lack of emphasis on joint training. The study also highlights several factors inhibiting unit accomplishment of the training programs. Mitigation of these factors is possible through centralized management of training program execution. Currently existing supervisory agencies are capable of assuming the execution management function.

Air superiority will continue to be a prerequisite to military operations in future battle. Air superiority includes not only dominance over manned vehicles (fixed-wing and rotary aircraft), but unmanned threats as well (Theater Ballistic Missiles (TBMs), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and cruise missiles). As in past conflicts, defending a joint force against a full array of potential threats will require the services of both Air Force fighter aircraft and Army surface-to-air missiles, working alongside joint C4 ISR assets. With enemy airpower becoming more diverse and lethal, Army and Air Force counterair units must become more interoperable, if they expect success in the next conflict. Current counterair forces suffer from interoperability challenges relating to systems integration and joint training difficulties. Cooperation among DCA systems within the Army and Air Force is hampered by different doctrine, priorities, and even visions concerning counterair. Better interoperability will be necessary in the future, if DCA forces are to maximize their weapons capabilities, while reducing the possibility of a fratricide incident.

This study is an analysis of Joint Special Operations Forces (SOF) basic or common skills training. The study uses the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS) as a basis of evaluation of the effectiveness of the Department of Defense (DOD) inter service training process. This study evaluates and suggests solutions for the future of joint core basic and advanced skill training and proponency. This study concludes that the basic entry level of joint special operations training is, even with recent improvements, an individual service system. Similar basic and advanced skills have varied techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTP) which leads to a flawed training system and difficult assimilation of joint training exercises and mission accomplishment. This study provides suggestions on improving the design and implementation of special operations joint training for basic and advanced skills. The study also provides suggestions on improving design, testing and fielding of special operations equipment to assist in viable joint initial entry training and compatibility of future joint operations. The study provides recommendations on how to redesign the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) training development base to incorporate each SOF components need. Each SOF component must align mission analysis, equipment mission need statements, design, development, and procurement to coordinate training resources and objectives.

This study investigates the feasibility of combining the daily training schedules of United States Air Force units and Republic of Korea Air Force units. The combined Air Component Command's plan for future hostilities in the Korean theater call for both air forces to work together in combined operations on the very first day of the campaign. The training each air force does to prepare for this eventuality is similar in many respects, but because of long standing beliefs the two have, they rarely trained together. The two training syllabi were compared to highlight the similarities and differences. Staff interviews were conducted to provide service and cultural related perceptions to clarify research questions. This study concludes that near-term combined training is feasible, however, only on a limited basis. In-depth, long-term training programs can be developed as the cultural barriers are broken down, which is what this study promotes.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the Army acquires enablers to conduct Joint Training at the Brigade level during a Combat Training Center rotation at the National Training Center. This study is a qualitative research project, which analyzes the procedures that must be followed by an Army Brigade Combat Team (BCT) to insure requested joint enablers are allocated for the BCT's training at the National Training Center. This research project examines joint doctrine and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) manuals to determine the origins of Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) developed at the combatant commander level. It further uses service doctrine and manuals to link joint doctrine and the combatant commander JMETL to the brigade combat team as it submits its mission letter for a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) at the National Training Center (NTC). This thesis will then examine the duties and responsibilities of Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Forces Command (FORSCOM), and Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in supporting the BCT joint enabler request for a MRE. Finally, recommended options based on the analysis will be presented in order to improve allocation of Joint enabler participation for the BCT's training at the National Training Center. Additionally, Army and Joint publications could be updated to correct identified deficiencies and address the Joint Training procedures in applicable TRADOC and FORSCOM publications.

This study investigates the Army's role in Naval gunfire support in light of current force reductions and changing military missions. The discussion focuses upon Naval gunfire training and predeployment planning and coordination for Naval gunfire support of contingency operations. During the initial stages of a contingency operation, the Army relies upon other services for fire support until sufficient Army field artillery and aviation attack assets are available. Fixed-wing air support and Naval gunfire provide this initial support. Naval gunfire for the Army was not coordinated during predeployment planning for operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, or Desert Shield. This study explains the Army's dependence upon the Marine Corps for the planning and coordination of Naval gunfire support. It promotes methods to decrease this dependence by improving the field artillery community's Naval gunfire training and awareness. The analysis addresses institutional training in the Army and Navy; Naval gunfire training at Army Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and in the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP); Army-Marine Corps Joint Naval gunfire training: and Joint cooperation in developing Army operations plans requiring Naval gunfire support.

The U.S. Armed Forces operate two separate undergraduate helicopter pilot training (UHPT) programs: the Army Initial Entry Rotary Wing (IERW) Training course and the Navy Undergraduate Helicopter Pilot Training program. For over twenty years, proposals have been made to consolidate the programs to eliminate redundancy and increase efficiency within the Department of Defense. Consolidation could be implemented in various forms, ranging from collocated, independently operated programs, to a completely consolidated joint program. A decision beyond simple collocation of separate programs would establish the need for a consolidated syllabus. This study examines the formulation of a consolidated UHPT syllabus from the syllabi of the current programs. Past proposals and studies have highlighted difficulties that might be encountered in formulating a consolidated syllabus. This study considered the formulation of a consolidated syllabus by exploring the nature of the instruction in the current programs. The programs were evaluated and compared against selected criteria to identify common elements. The study concluded that sufficient commonality exists between the two programs around which to form a consolidated core syllabus. Recommendations include proposals for syllabi with cores containing varying degrees of common instruction, and proposals for tailoring additional instruction to meet the individual services' needs.

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has been the Army’s primary trainer for contingency forces since 1987, providing exceptionally realistic and relevant training to prepare units and develop leaders for the challenge of combat operations. However, changes at the JRTC may be in order to adjust to the Army’s training requirements as the Army transforms its combat formations into the Future Force. The thesis’ purpose is to initiate a discussion on how the JRTC can assist the Army in training the Future Force brigade combat teams as the Army transitions to meet the threats of the contemporary operational environment. This study is a qualitative research project, which analyzes what changes are necessary for the JRTC to remain an important US Army training tool. The thesis examines several areas within the JRTC that may require modification including operations group manning, battlespace requirements, rotation types, live-fire exercises, and situational training exercises. Finally, the thesis recommends specific changes to the JRTC, so that it continues to fulfill the US Army’s training needs.

This document describes the Army Training and Doctrine Command, including information on the origins, operations, force design, development of a new generation of weapons, doctrinal renaissance, training revolution, TRADOC in the joint service arena, international activities, organizational structure, adjusting to radical change in the threat, and TRADOC in war and peace.