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Genetic technologies are revolutionizing human health. In parallel, geopolitical instability has prompted renewed discussions on the risks of DNA technology being weaponized in international conflict. With today’s changing security environment, we argue that risk assessments must be broadened from genetically targeted weapons to a series of new domains.

To predict and prevent future armed conflicts like Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022, there is more value in knowing how these wars occurred rather than why they occurred. The Russian Playbook is built from three distinct “plays” employed by Moscow and organised in the theoretical framework of Historical Institutionalism through Path Dependence modelling. This research focuses on Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova as cases for comparison by building on the Soviet legacy in each state which forms the antecedent historical conditions of the Playbook’s Path Dependence. Where Play 1 focuses on offensive and defensive influence seeking as a form of structural persistence, Play 2’s shaping and weaponisation acts to counter reactive sequences. Both Plays function within path dependency’s punctuated equilibrium and appear consistently throughout Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova following the collapse of the Soviet Union. When Play 1 and Play 2 are overpowered by reactive sequences that cannot be countered, Moscow deems the disequilibrium as irremediable and the path towards conflict begins. Play 3 refers to the start of lock-in effects towards conflict, beginning with “pre-crisis” conditions. Play 3’s Lock-in Effectsserve as the period in which a predictable conflict outcome is likely to occur, though lock-in refers to the path adherence in preparation for future conflict. This Play occurs in both Georgia and Ukraine at the time of this research, though its future employment within Moldova should not be excluded. These actions, in the form of the Russian Playbook and its Plays act as a guide for operationalising and implementing Russia’s grand strategy. This research goes beyond individual figureheads of Russia or specific institutions and instead focuses on patterns that exist throughout historical cases. These patterns show there is nothing particularly “new” in how Russia operates despite the vast number of newly coined phrases including “hybrid” leading p, Master's of Political Science with a Specialisation in International and European Relations.

Outer Space has been a contested domain since the Cold War but in the past few decades with the advancement of technology, it has become even more desirable. Outer space has become extremely important in our everyday lives from satellite telecommunications, television broadcasting, weather forecasting, and navigation. The many uses of satellites can also trigger a dual use for military purposes and the weaponization of outer space. In the field of militarization and weaponization of outer space, there is not a significant set of agreements, except for the Outer Space Treaty (1967). This thesis is exploring the Russian behavior in the scope of their judicial and practical decisions in the militarization and weaponization of outer space. Their judicial decisions are analyzed with the balance of power theory since it better explains why Russia maintains a collaborative and diplomatic behavior in this domain. Their practical behavior is analyzed using offensive realism to better understand why they had developed aggressive behavior and chose to develop weapons in the field of outer space.

To predict and prevent future armed conflicts like Russia’s war against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2022, there is more value in knowing how these wars occurred rather than why they occurred. The Russian Playbook is built from three distinct “plays” employed by Moscow and organised in the theoretical framework of Historical Institutionalism through Path Dependence modelling. This research focuses on Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova as cases for comparison by building on the Soviet legacy in each state which forms the antecedent historical conditions of the Playbook’s Path Dependence. Where Play 1 focuses on offensive and defensive influence seeking as a form of structural persistence, Play 2’s shaping and weaponisation acts to counter reactive sequences. Both Plays function within path dependency’s punctuated equilibrium and appear consistently throughout Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova following the collapse of the Soviet Union. When Play 1 and Play 2 are overpowered by reactive sequences that cannot be countered, Moscow deems the disequilibrium as irremediable and the path towards conflict begins. Play 3 refers to the start of lock-in effects towards conflict, beginning with “pre-crisis” conditions. Play 3’s Lock-in Effectsserve as the period in which a predictable conflict outcome is likely to occur, though lock-in refers to the path adherence in preparation for future conflict. This Play occurs in both Georgia and Ukraine at the time of this research, though its future employment within Moldova should not be excluded. These actions, in the form of the Russian Playbook and its Plays act as a guide for operationalising and implementing Russia’s grand strategy. This research goes beyond individual figureheads of Russia or specific institutions and instead focuses on patterns that exist throughout historical cases. These patterns show there is nothing particularly “new” in how Russia operates despite the vast number of newly coined phrases including “hybrid” leading p, Master's of Political Science with a Specialisation in International and European Relations.

Outer Space has been a contested domain since the Cold War but in the past few decades with the advancement of technology, it has become even more desirable. Outer space has become extremely important in our everyday lives from satellite telecommunications, television broadcasting, weather forecasting, and navigation. The many uses of satellites can also trigger a dual use for military purposes and the weaponization of outer space. In the field of militarization and weaponization of outer space, there is not a significant set of agreements, except for the Outer Space Treaty (1967). This thesis is exploring the Russian behavior in the scope of their judicial and practical decisions in the militarization and weaponization of outer space. Their judicial decisions are analyzed with the balance of power theory since it better explains why Russia maintains a collaborative and diplomatic behavior in this domain. Their practical behavior is analyzed using offensive realism to better understand why they had developed aggressive behavior and chose to develop weapons in the field of outer space.

24 million people in war-torn Yemen were in 2019 in need of humanitarian aid. Delivery of aid has been hindered by parties to the conflict in what is best described as a strategic weaponization of food. The use of food as a weapon in Yemen requires thorough investigation, but there is a lack of research on the topic. Through a qualitative analysis of the single case of Yemen, this study identifies several aspects of the strategy used to target food security, including diversion of aid but also disruptions of markets and decreased agricultural production. As a possible perspective is also to see this alternative form of warfare as a characteristic of the changed nature of modern conflict, this study further discusses how weaponization of food relates to the dynamics of New Wars. The findings show that parties to the conflict intentionally cause hunger through hindering food availability and reducing people’s access to food, through physical as well as economic methods. The findings further indicate that the purpose for using this strategy relies in part on the logics of New Wars.

24 million people in war-torn Yemen were in 2019 in need of humanitarian aid. Delivery of aid has been hindered by parties to the conflict in what is best described as a strategic weaponization of food. The use of food as a weapon in Yemen requires thorough investigation, but there is a lack of research on the topic. Through a qualitative analysis of the single case of Yemen, this study identifies several aspects of the strategy used to target food security, including diversion of aid but also disruptions of markets and decreased agricultural production. As a possible perspective is also to see this alternative form of warfare as a characteristic of the changed nature of modern conflict, this study further discusses how weaponization of food relates to the dynamics of New Wars. The findings show that parties to the conflict intentionally cause hunger through hindering food availability and reducing people’s access to food, through physical as well as economic methods. The findings further indicate that the purpose for using this strategy relies in part on the logics of New Wars.

The politics of outer space has in recent years been given attention from political elites and scientist due to increasing usage and reliance on space based assets, and due to increasing numbers of actors trying to utilize the benefits of space. Concerns have been raised if the increasing military usage of space will lead to a future weaponization of space, making some political leaders and scholars claiming the inevitability of space weaponization. In this thesis I investigate why the United States of America this far has chosen not to weaponize space based on the strategical setting of outer space politics. The research question guiding this thesis reads: What strategic considerations explain the US decision not to weaponize outer space? In order to evaluate the strategic setting and US strategical considerations I apply Game Theory and Non-Formal Rational Choice Theory to highlight what is causing the greatest space faring nation not to weaponize space. I empirically base this study on official space policy documents and one report written by an official commission to asses US national security space management. Based on the strategic setting of outer space politics and US strategical considerations it is found that the US has not commenced a process leading to the weaponization of space since such development would not increase its national security, but rather in several ways decrease it. I conclude that a process of space weaponization is not likely to be initiated by the US in the current strategical setting.

The politics of outer space has in recent years been given attention from political elites and scientist due to increasing usage and reliance on space based assets, and due to increasing numbers of actors trying to utilize the benefits of space. Concerns have been raised if the increasing military usage of space will lead to a future weaponization of space, making some political leaders and scholars claiming the inevitability of space weaponization. In this thesis I investigate why the United States of America this far has chosen not to weaponize space based on the strategical setting of outer space politics. The research question guiding this thesis reads: What strategic considerations explain the US decision not to weaponize outer space? In order to evaluate the strategic setting and US strategical considerations I apply Game Theory and Non-Formal Rational Choice Theory to highlight what is causing the greatest space faring nation not to weaponize space. I empirically base this study on official space policy documents and one report written by an official commission to asses US national security space management. Based on the strategic setting of outer space politics and US strategical considerations it is found that the US has not commenced a process leading to the weaponization of space since such development would not increase its national security, but rather in several ways decrease it. I conclude that a process of space weaponization is not likely to be initiated by the US in the current strategical setting.

We utilize a mixed methods approach to provide three new, separate analyses as part of the development of the next aeromedical evacuation (MEDEVAC) platform of the Future of Vertical Lift (FVL) program. The research questions follow: RQ1) What are the optimal capabilities of a FVL MEDEVAC platform given an Afghanistan-like scenario and parameters associated with the treatment/ground evacuation capabilities in that theater?; RQ2) What are the MEDEVAC trade-off considerations associated with different aircraft engines operating under variable conditions?; RQ3) How does the additional weight of weaponizing the current MEDEVAC fleet affect range, coverage radius, and response time? We address RQ1 using discrete-event simulation based partially on qualitative assessments from the field, while RQ2 and RQ3 are based on deterministic analysis. Our results confirm previous findings that travel speeds in excess of 250 knots and ranges in excess of 300 nautical miles are advisable for the FVL platform design, thereby reducing the medical footprint in stability operations. We recommend a specific course of action regarding a potential engine bridging strategy based on deterministic analysis of endurance and altitude, and we suggest that the weaponization of the FVL MEDEVAC aircraft will have an adverse effect on coverage capability., Published in Military Medicine, v178 p321-329, March 2013. The original document contains color images.

The United States of America, Great Britain, France, Germany, India, the Russian Federation, Turkey, and China have all implemented policies to obtain reliable energy at a reasonable price. Overall, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the situations in which Turkey has encountered the use of energy as a "weapon," and to analyze Turkey's reaction in these situations from 1945 until the present day. The thesis will then predict the effects of energy issues on Turkey's national security strategy. The thesis finds that Turkey passed through a preparation phase during the 1960s and 1980s to balance her approach to both buyers and sellers. This period paved the way for the 1990s, when Turkey developed prospects for future energy supplies. Three general lessons emerge from this examination of Turkey's experience: (1) Turkey managed to balance her energy market by pursuing successful compromise policies; (2) domestic needs, rather than transit fees and international concerns, have an essential role in forming these policies; and (3) even though tanker wars harm Turkey's naval transportation, they are beneficial for Turkey's land transportation as the only outlet for both of her neighbor producer countries., The original document contains color images.

Since the advent of aviation, aircraft have migrated from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to weapons platforms. Balloons, airplanes, and UAVs all began as a means to observe the battlefield, but were later armed in order to attack the observed enemy. The DOD currently seeks stratospheric airships that could serve as persistent ISR platforms. However, the warfighter's desire to quickly attack observed targets make this concept a candidate for similar weaponization. Like their forerunners in other wars, stratospheric airships could become weaponized stratospheric airship (WSA). This paper argues the Air Force should pursue WSAs because they provide a persistent, survivable, and cost effective means of employing long-range munitions over a battlefield. This paper begins by conducting an environmental scan of stratospheric airships to determine likely qualities of persistence, cost effectiveness, survivability, and payload capacity based upon current and projected technology. It will also examine the status of small precision munitions as well as the potential WSA missions of close air support (CAS) and time-sensitive-targets (TST). The paper will then develop two WSA variants, the MZ-1 operating at 75,000 feet and the MZ-2 operating at 125,000 feet. As a thought experiment aimed at examining the strengths and weaknesses of the concept, the paper then applies these variants against two wartime scenarios: the low-intensity conflict of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the near-peer conventional conflict of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The paper will show that even though limited numbers of munitions, significant munitions replenishment time, and low CAS mission situational awareness hamper the WSA concept, it should still be pursued., The original document contains color images.

The issues surrounding the weaponization of outer space present difficult security and diplomatic challenges to the United States in its relationship with foreign states. Several features of space weaponization account for these difficulties. First, many space technologies have dual-use capacity, making it difficult for states to distinguish between defensive and offensive preparations or conventional and space weapons.1 Second, some defense analysts argue that space weapons are inherently better suited to offensive than defensive warfare since they are able to launch powerful attacks quickly but are vulnerable to attack.2 Third, due to insufficient situational awareness in space and poor "forensic" ability, the causes of satellite failures can be unclear, creating the potential for both anonymous attacks and groundless accusations of antisatellite (ASAT) attacks.3 Finally, as in many areas of foreign policy, states often send mixed signals regarding their true intentions in space., See also ADA477684. Published in Space Weaponization and US-China Relations, Stategic Studies Quarterly, v2 n1 p33-55, Spring 2008.

This Test Operations Procedure (TOP) provides an overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) testing. It spans the technologies and sizes of modern UAS. Areas of concentration include command and control, weapons and sensor integration, targeting and navigation., Test Operations Procedure (TOP). The original document contains color images.

In October 2005, the Defense Safety Oversight Council (DSOC), Acquisition and Technology Programs Task Force (ATP TF) established an initiative to help ensure the safety of unmanned systems (UMS). This initiative was established in response to the proliferation of UMS within the Department of Defense (DoD), and a concern for safety when these systems, primarily unmanned air vehicles, were operated over populated areas, or in proximity to other aircraft, both military and civilian, and when configured with weapons or ordnance items. This paper discusses the process that was followed in developing the UMS safety precepts and the associated DoD UMS safety guidelines document. It will also discuss the environment in which UMS are currently employed, the safety concerns with those operational environments and designs, UMS guide objectives, and conclude with an example of a Command and Control/Situational Awareness precept., Prepared in collaboration with the Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity, Indian Head, MD; Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN; Lockheed Martin, Syracuse, NY; and SAIC, Waldorf, MD. Presented at the International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposia (13th), ICCRTS 2008, Seattle, WA on 17-19 Jun 2008. The original document contains color images.

The advent of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has changed the nature of warfare. Their persistence, economy, and utility have made them indispensable on the battlefield. What started as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) in 1994 with the UAV that became the RQ-1 Predator has evolved into the armed-Predator (MQ-1), with more weaponized UAVs on the way. Soon the U.S. Army will field the extended-range/multi-purpose (ER/MP) Warrior unmanned aircraft system (UAS) and the U.S. Air Force will field the MQ-9 Reaper, both weaponized and lethal. As UAVs evolved from the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)-only platform to one that can find, fix, and target, much debate has emerged over their best employment. Within the Air Force, the natural fit for the MQ-1 into the armed reconnaissance role is not seamless. The way ISR and ground attack assets are doctrinally resourced, tasked, and flown in support of requirements are at odds with each other. Between the services, the mission of fixed-wing reconnaissance and ground attack creates a debate over traditional roles and missions. Additionally, the command and control structure of the Theater Air Control System/Army Air-Ground System (TACS/AAGS) is not optimized to support the integration of UAV operations required in tomorrow's battlespace. The purpose of this paper is to examine the issues of weaponized UAV integration into the future battlespace from the standpoint of doctrine, operational concepts, and roles and missions and to make recommendations on how best to employ this capability in the future. Chapter 2 provides background information on the evolution and employment of weaponized UAVs and reviews relevant joint and service doctrine. Chapter 3 analyzes the issues associated with command and control of weaponized UAVs, discusses the service programs and points of view, and looks at emerging doctrine. Chapter 4 provides recommendations based on the current issues.

The world may be on the verge of a new era of warfare, one where battles are not fought only within the biosphere of the Earth, but also in the space surrounding it. Recent conflicts have shown the tremendous advantages conferred upon those who have the advantage of space-based assets, helping forces navigate, communicate and spy upon their enemies. Some argue that fighting in space itself is inevitable, while others hold that space should be maintained as a sanctuary, free of weapons. In discussing the expanding role of the military in space, the term weaponization implies an increase in the capability to conduct warfare in, from, or through space. It is appropriate to use the term weaponization, rather than militarization, because both the United States and Russia have already militarized space. Since man's earliest days in space, intelligence and communications satellites have had military missions. What space has not been, at least to this point, is weaponized. The purpose of this paper is to explore the arguments for and against the weaponization of space, and the political implications involved. The methodology of this paper will be to summarized both sides of this argument and present the key political challenges at the strategic level. I hope to convince the reader that after consideration of both arguments, it seems to be in the best interest of the United States to advocate a treaty banning space-based weapons entirely. Given the current international climate of antipathy toward weaponizing space, such a treaty is entirely plausible. Admittedly, space-based weapons are probably inevitable in the long term, however their eventual deployment can probably be delayed for decades, If not longer, with a carefully written treaty.

In today's interconnected world, international migration continues to grow as migrants come from all around the globe in search of better lives for themselves and their families. While many migrants seek to improve social and economic status, others come in search of asylum due to conflict, political repression, or fear of persecution in their country of origin. As globalization steadily diffuses international power and blurs the line between war and peace, human migration is becoming a viable weapon in the arsenal of many state and non-state actors pursuing unconventional means to increase regional influence and to achieve objectives. This thesis examines different means in which state and non-state actors make use of human migration to achieve political, economic, or military objectives while also analyzing the conditions necessary to achieve these desired objectives. The ability to map these trends and identify underlying conditions that are the precursors to weaponizing migration will enable military and other interagency elements to better develop strategies and to mitigate potential vulnerabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels., http://archive.org/details/theweaponization1094556815, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.