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Compared to global lobbying hubs like the USA and the European Union and to its neighboring countries, Switzerland hardly regulates legislative lobbying, i.e., lobbying that targets the legislative branch. Only three types of legal provisions apply to lobbying in the Swiss legislature: First, legislators must disclose their ties to interest groups. Second, access to the parliamentary building is limited and granted at the discretion of each legislator, who may give an entry pass to two individuals of his or her choice. Third, legislative lobbying is illegal if it violates the criminal law provisions on bribery. Proposals to enact more comprehensive regulation have failed, often after several years of legislative debate. Pursuant to the classification proposed by Chari et al. (Regulating Lobbying: A Global Comparison, 2nd ed., Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2019), the Swiss legal framework governing legislative lobbying qualifies as a ‘low-robustness’ regime at best. Yet, Switzerland ranks high in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (6/180 in 2023). Is more extensive regulation superfluous or overdue in Switzerland? While the Swiss legal and political order is exceptional in some respects, these characteristics do not justify ‘Swiss exceptionalism’ with regard to the regulation of legislative lobbying, as some of these specificities pose distinctive threats that the law needs to tackle.

ABSTRACTJurisprudential theories have rarely taken international law into account, yet can provide insights into how domestic courts can and should conceptualise their interpretative activity. This paper relies on the works of HLA Hart and Duncan Kennedy to show that the domestic judicial interpretation of international law should be conceptualised as analogous to a hinge. The hinge analogy highlights the connecting role of domestic courts between international and domestic law, their dynamic, law-creating powers in both the domestic and the international legal order, and the legal frame they need to observe when interpreting international law. Moreover, like a good hinge that is robust and well-oiled and, therefore, fulfils its purpose, the interpretative reasoning of domestic courts must display specific characteristics in order to fulfil its role. To illustrate the different prongs of the analogy, I rely on the case law of Swiss courts.