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Attitudes towards risk are measured for households in Northern Zambia using an experimental gambling approach with real payoffs that at maximum were equal to 30% of average total annual income [...]

This study examines the hypothesis that changes to high-powered incentive regulations have a positive efficiency and productivity growth effects in a regulated electricity distribution industry. We estimate an input distance function using the stochastic frontier analysis method to compute technical efficiency scores for 121 Norwegian utilities over the period 2004-2012. We explore sources of productivity growth by parametrically decomposing the Malmquist productivity index into efficiency change, technical change, and scale change. Unlike previous studies, we examine the difference in performance across two regulatory regimes: yardstick competition (2007-2012) and RPI-X incentive regulation (2004-2006). Results show significant efficiency and productivity growth improvements with embodied technical change as the main driver.

Electricity propels economic development through improvement in the quality of life. Even though government's strategy to increase power generation and supply exists, Uganda experiences regular power outages and has one of the lowest electrification rates in the world. This study employs a systematic review approach and extends securitisation theory to the electricity sector to characterise electricity security and assess its barriers in Uganda. In this context, five dimensions of electricity security are identified and compared. Based on this set of dimensions, results show that Uganda is electricity “insecure.” Further, six (6) barriers to electricity security in Uganda are identified, and each of them is assessed as either existential, potential, or both. Thus, interventions that alleviate or mitigate these barriers can improve Uganda's electricity security. A quantitative empirical analysis using longitudinal data could offer superior evidence and conclusion on electricity security in Uganda.

In this paper, we test whether producers in the southern Norway price zone utilize information on available transmission capacity to induce transmission congestion in their price zone to exercise market power or not. Endogeneity results for import congestion suggest that congestion is endogenous during late night and morning hours implying that producers in southern Norway restrict their output to induce transmission congestion into their price zone. We find an average markup of about 19.5 percent above the marginal cost during these hours. These results point that NordPool’s policy of making transmission capacity information public to ensure market transparency is not welfare maximizing as strategic producers can use this information to anticipate and induce transmission congestion into their price zone for driving prices away from the competitive levels.

In this paper, we test whether producers in the southern Norway price zone utilize information on available transmission capacity to induce transmission congestion in their price zone to exercise market power or not. Endogeneity results for import congestion suggest that congestion is endogenous during late night and morning hours implying that producers in southern Norway restrict their output to induce transmission congestion into their price zone. We find an average markup of about 19.5 percent above the marginal cost during these hours. These results point that NordPool’s policy of making transmission capacity information public to ensure market transparency is not welfare maximizing as strategic producers can use this information to anticipate and induce transmission congestion into their price zone for driving prices away from the competitive levels.