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This article addresses the question of why the public provision of objective, nonpartisan policy information has become increasingly conflicted and difficult. The nature of a public‐policy information system is first described. An examination of the changing mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture provides a perspective on the challenges one faces today in providing information and advice for policymakers in agriculture, food, natural resource use, and the environment. Then an attempt is made to identify the many forces influencing today's difficult policy environment. The conclusion presents lessons from experience or principles that need to be observed if a public agency is to be a success over time in providing objective information for policy decisions. The profession's stake in this matter is discussed.

Economists play several distinct but necessary roles in the process of translating economic knowledge from the discipline to use in policy decisions. Economists engaged in disciplinary research might legitimately deal with more simplified abstractions of economic problems in conducting their research, whereas those engaged in providing policy analysis and advice to policy makers might face different constraints on the types of analysis that can be used by policy makers. In the role of policy analyst or adviser, economists face a number of challenges and risks. Those preparing to engage in such roles should understand (a) the constraints that will be faced in using and communicating economic analysis to policy makers, (b) the limitations of economic theory in addressing policy issues faced by decision makers, and (c) the risks inherent in participating in the policy-making process. The economist entering the policy process must be prepared to present economic advice in a manner that is easily understood and communicated and be prepared to address dimensions of policy problems that might not comply with the standard assumptions of neoclassical theory. The policy adviser must also be prepared to deal with databases that are often inadequate for decision-making purposes, time constraints that preclude the completion of a thorough analysis, value dimensions of policy issues that might overrule the results of economic analysis, and the fundamentally different roles of the policy maker and the economic adviser in the decision-making process.

Economists play several distinct but necessary roles in the process of translating economic knowledge from the discipline to use in policy decisions. Economists engaged in disciplinary research might legitimately deal with more simplified abstractions of economic problems in conducting their research, whereas those engaged in providing policy analysis and advice to policy makers might face different constraints on the types of analysis that can be used by policy makers. In the role of policy analyst or adviser, economists face a number of challenges and risks. Those preparing to engage in such roles should understand (a) the constraints that will be faced in using and communicating economic analysis to policy makers, (b) the limitations of economic theory in addressing policy issues faced by decision makers, and (c) the risks inherent in participating in the policy‐making process. The economist entering the policy process must be prepared to present economic advice in a manner that is easily understood and communicated and be prepared to address dimensions of policy problems that might not comply with the standard assumptions of neoclassical theory. The policy adviser must also be prepared to deal with databases that are often inadequate for decision‐making purposes, time constraints that preclude the completion of a thorough analysis, value dimensions of policy issues that might overrule the results of economic analysis, and the fundamentally different roles of the policy maker and the economic adviser in the decision‐making process.

The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) of 1996 continues direct subsidies on feed grains, wheat, cotton, and rice, replacing target prices with declining but fixed annual income transfers and eliminating all production controls. Tobacco, sugar, and peanut quota‐based programs were continued with minor changes. Major changes were made in dairy policy including elimination of price supports and reduction of the number of marketing orders. Associated with the Act were hearings and media rhetoric some of which suggested that direct budget subsidies would or should end when the Act expires in 2002. The permanent 1949 legislation would, of course, have to be repealed for this to occur. Several interesting responses followed passage of the 1996 Act. Some general and agricultural economists, who have been consistent critics of the farm programs, celebrated with expressions implying that, now freed of distortions, agriculture would roll through the next millennium in an ideal state of grace (equilibrium?) apparently devoid of any necessity for national policy attention. Indeed, some express the belief that the 1930s farm legislation was an epic error from the start—a view common among general economists. A few agricultural economists have lamented that agricultural policy analysts would have little or nothing to do after 2002! However, especially cynical policy types noted that the 1949 permanent legislation had not been repealed and, as usual, commodity interests would use it as a club in 2002 to negotiate new and even more ingenious subsidies for politically deserving commodities. Some cynics were unkind enough to observe that, given then expected market conditions, the 1996 Act provided larger expenditures for farm subsidies than would have a simple extension of the 1990 Act. All of this leaves one wondering if anyone truly understands where we are in policy for agriculture.

This article addresses the question of why the public provision of objective, nonpartisan policy information has become increasingly conflicted and difficult. The nature of a public-policy information system is first described. An examination of the changing mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture provides a perspective on the challenges one faces today in providing information and advice for policymakers in agriculture, food, natural resource use, and the environment. Then an attempt is made to identify the many forces influencing todays difficult policy environment. The conclusion presents lessons from experience or principles that need to be observed if a public agency is to be a success over time in providing objective information for policy decisions. The professions stake in this matter is discussed.

The Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (FAIR) of 1996 continues direct subsidies on feed grains, wheat, cotton, and rice, replacing target prices with declining but fixed annual income transfers and eliminating all production controls. Tobacco, sugar, and peanut quota-based programs were continued with minor changes. Major changes were made in dairy policy including elimination of price supports and reduction of the number of marketing orders. Associated with the Act were hearings and media rhetoric some of which suggested that direct budget subsidies would or should end when the Act expires in 2002. The permanent 1949 legislation would, of course, have to be repealed for this to occur. Several interesting responses followed passage of the 1996 Act. Some general and agricultural economists, who have been consistent critics of the farm programs, celebrated with expressions implying that, now freed of distortions, agriculture would roll through the next millennium in an ideal state of grace (equilibrium?) apparently devoid of any necessity for national policy attention. Indeed, some express the belief that the 1930s farm legislation was an epic error from the start—a view common among general economists. A few agricultural economists have lamented that agricultural policy analysts would have little or nothing to do after 2002! However, especially cynical policy types noted that the 1949 permanent legislation had not been repealed and, as usual, commodity interests would use it as a club in 2002 to negotiate new and even more ingenious subsidies for politically deserving commodities. Some cynics were unkind enough to observe that, given then expected market conditions, the 1996 Act provided larger expenditures for farm subsidies than would have a simple extension of the 1990 Act. All of this leaves one wondering if anyone truly understands where we are in policy for agriculture.