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This article brings a philosophical perspective to bear on issues of research ethics governance as it is practiced and organized in Canada. Insofar as the processes and procedures that constitute research oversight are meant to ensure the ethical conduct of research, they are based on ideas or beliefs about what ethical research entails and about which processes will ensure the ethical conduct of research. These ideas and beliefs make up an epistemic infrastructure underlying Canada's system of research ethics governance, but, we argue, extensive efforts by community members to fill gaps in that system suggest that these ideas may be deficient. Our aim is to make these deficiencies explicit through critical analysis by briefly introducing the philosophical literature on epistemic injustice and ignorance, and by drawing on this literature and empirical evidence to examine how injustice and ignorance show up across three levels of research ethics governance: research ethics boards, regulations, and training. Following this critique, and drawing on insights from the same philosophical tradition, we highlight the work that communities across Canada have done to rewrite and rework how research ethics as a site of epistemic resistance is practiced.