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This article weighs up the costs and benefits of the expansion of renewable energy technologies for electricity generation in Germany. According to calculations of the German Ministry of Economic Affairs, this expansion has cost electricity consumers almost 300 billion euros since the introduction of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) in 2000. Moreover, payment obligations of a similar magnitude are already in place for the next two decades. However, with the accelerated expansion of renewables following Russia’s attack on Ukraine, politicians are accepting costs well in excess of this approximately 600 billion. Given the costs already incurred, a cost-benefit analysis is imperative, not least because further costs in the three-digit billion range are not included in the 600 billion figure, such as the costs for grid expansion, which would not be necessary to the same extent without the expansion of renewables. Against this backdrop, strict attention should be paid to cost discipline in the further expansion of renewables by ensuring that the Federal Network Agency only issues technology-neutral rather than technology-specific tenders for the expansion of renewables in future. This means that only the most cost-efficient renewable technologies will be installed. Consequently, there will be budgetary scope for future investments that could boost the growth potential of the German economy more than the expansion of renewable energies. Contrasting with the high costs, the benefits of expanding renewable energies are modest. For example, the share of renewables in primary energy consumption in 2022 was only around 17 %. With such a low share, achieving greenhouse gas neutrality in 2045 with renewables alone appears to be a tremendous challenge.

The proliferation of instruments targeted at combatting climate change necessitates evidence-based evaluation to identify strategies that are not only effective and cost-efficient, but also supported by the population. In Germany, the data needed to support such analysis is scarce, however. A rare exception is Green SÖP, a panel data set that was established within the project Eval-MAP funded by the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). Green SÖP encompasses household data collected by the survey institute forsa over four years, spanning 2012–2015. The BMBF-funded project Eval-MAP 2 extended the Green SÖP panel data set by two additional surveys conducted in 2020 and 2022, covering both mitigation and adaptation behavior.

ABSTRACT:Recent research suggests that households increase their electricity consumption after installing photovoltaic (PV) panels, a behavioral change commonly referred to as the solar rebound. Using panel data originating from the German Residential Energy Consumption Survey, we investigate the existence of a solar rebound effect. Our empirical results suggest that PV panel adoption does not change the amount of electricity that households take from the grid. As we derive theoretically, this implies a solar rebound bounded from above by about 50%, while back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest a lower bound of 12% and an average solar rebound of 35%.

Die jüngste Verschärfung der nationalen Klimaschutzziele erfordert die Ergreifung zusätzlicher umwelt- und klimapolitischer Maßnahmen sowie eventuelle Nachbesserungen bei den bestehenden Maßnahmen, etwa einen beschleunigten Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien. Dies führt unweigerlich zu höheren Lasten für die Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Damit einher gehen zahlreiche Fragen, etwa zu deren Präferenzen und Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen bezüglich dieser Maßnahmen. Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen wurde im Juni 2021 eine Erhebung unter rund 8000 Mitgliedern des forsa-Haushaltspanels durchgeführt. Die Erhebung beinhaltete ein randomisiertes Kontrollexperiment, um herauszufinden, welche von zwei Finanzierungsalternativen die Befragten beim Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien bevorzugen: die Finanzierung über die Stromrechnung oder durch den Staat, der dazu auf Steuereinnahmen zurückgreift. Das zentrale Ergebnis bezüglich der beiden zur Wahl gestellten Finanzierungsalternativen lautet: Die große Mehrheit der Befragten votiert dafür, dass der Ausbau der erneuerbaren Energien aus Steuermitteln des Staates finanziert wird. So halten 69,7 % der Befragten der Kontrollgruppe eine Finanzierung durch den Staat für die gerechtere Alternative. Mit der Abschaffung der EEG-Umlage zum 1. Juli 2022 und der gänzlichen Finanzierung der Kosten der Förderung der Erneuerbaren aus Steuermitteln hat die Politik den Präferenzen der Mehrheit der Befragten entsprochen. Allerdings konterkarieren die insbesondere aufgrund der explodierenden Erdgaspreise stark gestiegenen Stromerzeugungskosten die dämpfenden Effekte der Abschaffung der EEG-Umlage. Dadurch steigen die Strompreise für die Verbraucher aktuell massiv an, um 50 % und mehr gegenüber dem Jahr 2021. Deshalb sollte die Politik weitere Maßnahmen ergreifen, um die privaten Haushalte beim Strompreis substantiell zu entlasten, nicht zuletzt durch die Senkung der Stromsteuer auf den EU-Mindestsatz. Andernfalls könnten die stark gestiegenen Strompreise in Kombination mit den mit der Zeit wachsenden Belastungen durch die neu eingeführte CO2-Bepreisung fossiler Brenn- und Kraftstoffe eine hohe soziale Sprengkraft entfalten.

ABSTRACT:Based on hypothetical responses from a large-scale survey among about 6,000 German households, this study investigates the discrepancy in willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates for green electricity across single-binary-choice and open-ended valuation formats. Recognizing that respondents self-select into two groups distinguished by their beliefs in their answers’ consequences for policy making, we use a switching regression model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of respondents’ beliefs in consequences and biases from sample selectivity. Contrasting with the received literature, we find that WTP bids tend to be higher among those respondents who received questions in the open-ended, rather than in the single-binary-choice format. (JEL C35)

Germany is a rather water-rich country. Nevertheless, climatic changes might make it necessary to use water resources carefully in the future, especially in times of drought. Against this background, this paper estimates the price elasticity of household water consumption, differentiating between households that have a rough knowledge of water prices and households that do not. Based on about 1,100 observations for households living in single-family houses and using the sum of cubic meter prices for water and wastewater as price measure, we find a moderate but statistically significantly non-zero price elasticity of -0.102. Households that have knowledge of water prices tend to exhibit a higher elasticity, while households without price knowledge do not show a statistically significant response in their water consumption. Prices can thus only be used to a limited extent as a means of controlling water consumption.

ABSTRACT:Based on a survey of more than 5,000 German households and a single- binary-choice experiment in which we randomly split the respondents into two groups, this article explores both households’ willingness to pay (WTP) for power supply security and their willingness to accept (WTA) compensation for a reduced security level. In accordance with numerous empirical studies, we find that the mean WTA value substantially exceeds the mean WTP value in our empirical example by a factor of 3.56. Yet, the WTA-WTP ratio decreases to 2.35 if respondents believe that the hypothetical valuation setting is likely to become true.

Der PKW-Verkehr dominiert auch heute noch das Verkehrsaufkommen in Deutschland. Ein häufig diskutierter Vorschlag, um dies zu ändern, lautet, den Öffentlichen Personennahverkehr (ÖPNV) kostenlos anzubieten. Auf Basis einer Erhebung aus dem Jahr 2018, bei der knapp 7000 Haushaltsvorstände des forsa-Haushalts-Panels Antworten zu ihrem Mobilitätsverhalten sowie zu ihrer Einstellung gegenüber vieldiskutierten Verkehrsmaßnahmen liefern, untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag die allgemeine Zustimmung zur kostenlosen Nutzung des ÖPNV sowie die möglichen Auswirkungen dieser Maßnahme auf das Mobilitätsverhalten. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine starke Befürwortung der Maßnahme: Rund 72 % der Antwortenden stimmten für die Einführung eines kostenlosen ÖPNVs. Eine mehrheitliche Zustimmung findet sich in jeder gesellschaftlichen Gruppe, gleich ob männlich oder weiblich, jung oder alt, arm oder reich, sowie in allen politischen Lagern. Nach Einführung eines kostenlosen ÖPNV in Deutschland würden die Befragten die Anzahl ihrer Fahrten mit dem ÖPNV nach eigenen Angaben durchschnittlich um ca. 230 % steigern. Wenngleich es sich um rein hypothetische Antworten handelt und die Ergebnisse daher mit einer gewissen Vorsicht betrachtet werden sollten, deuten diese auf einen relativ starken potenziellen Anstieg der ÖPNV-Nutzung hin. Abschließend diskutieren wir, warum es trotzdem nicht sinnvoll erscheint, den ÖPNV kostenlos anzubieten und welche alternativen Politiken erfolgsversprechender erscheinen.

Der Autoverkehr ist in vielen Städten zu einer hohen Belastung geworden. Um die Alternativen zum Autoverkehr zu stärken, kursiert eine Vielzahl von Vorschlägen, etwa der Ausbau von Fahrradwegen, wenn nötig auch auf Kosten des Autoverkehrs. Dieser Beitrag präsentiert die Ergebnisse einer Erhebung unter knapp 7000 Haushaltsvorständen aus dem Jahr 2018, mit der die Zustimmung zu derartigen Vorschlägen eruiert wurde. Die daraus resultierenden Ergebnisse sind zwiespältiger Natur. Einerseits stimmt beispielsweise die absolute Mehrheit von 69 % der Befragten für die Ausweisung von für Busse reservierter Fahrstreifen auf staubelasteten Straßen und knapp die Hälfte ist für Fahrverbote für Fahrzeuge, die Schadstoffgrenzwerte überschreiten. Andererseits ist die absolute Mehrheit von 57,3 % der Befragten gegen höhere Kosten für das Parken in Innenstädten und knapp die Hälfte lehnt ein Verbot von Fahrzeugen mit Verbrennungsmotor ab dem Jahr 2035 ab.

Numerous countries have introduced energy performance certificates to mitigate the information asymmetry with respect to the thermal quality of houses. Motivated by a stylized theoretical model and drawing on comprehensive data on real estate advertisements in the German housing market, this paper investigates the causal effect of disclosing energy information on the asking prices of houses. Employing within-variation from panel data, augmented by an instrumental variable approach to isolate effects among policy compliers, our analysis demonstrates the power of mandatory disclosure rules to increase market transparency and to align prices with the energy performance of the house. Among our key results, we find that house owners reduce offer prices in response to the disclosure of energy efficiency information. Furthermore, this effect is particularly pronounced for owners who would not disclose in the absence of the mandatory disclosure policy.

Empirical evidence on households’ awareness of electricity prices and potentially divergent demand responses to price changes conditional on price knowledge is scant. Using panel data originating from Germany’s Residential Energy Consumption Survey (GRECS), we fill this void by employing an instrumental-variable (IV) approach to cope with the endogeneity of the consumers’ tariff choice. By additionally exploiting information on the households’ knowledge about power prices, we combine the IV approach with an Endogenous Switching Regression Model to estimate price elasticities for two groups of households, finding that only those households that are informed about prices are sensitive to price changes, whereas the electricity demand of uninformed households is entirely price-inelastic. Based on these results, to curb the electricity consumption of the household sector and its environmental impact, we suggest implementing low-cost information measures on a large scale, such as improving the transparency of tariffs, thereby increasing the saliency of prices.

Russia's supply stop of natural gas has forced Europe to turn to LNG to meet its energy needs. Rather than locking into a decades-long import dependency on Qatar and the US, it would be more environmentally benign to exploit domestic resources. Germany's substantial reserves of shale gas could make it a major player in Europe's gas market if it were to drop its voluntary ban on shale gas exploitation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As of late 2008, the steady decline of U.S. crude oil production over the last decades was reversed by the increased adoption of the hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) technology. Adapting the supply-side model proposed by Kaufmann et al. (2004) to assess OPEC’s ability to influence real oil prices, this paper investigates the effect of the increase in U.S. oil production due to fracking on world oil prices. Among our key results obtained from (dynamic) OLS estimations, there is a statistically significant negative long-run relationship between increased U.S. oil production and oil prices.

Based on a survey among more than 5,000 German household heads, this article investigates their willingness to pay (WTP) for avoiding power outages using Contingent-Valuation-Methods (CVM). Alternatively, we ask respondents to estimate the WTP of a hypothetical household. This Inferred-Valuation-Method (IVM) is an approach introduced to reduce the hypothetical bias of stated WTP. Our empirical results indicate that, relative to the CVM, the IVM yields inflated WTP values, casting doubt on the validity of the IVM.

Seit dem Jahr 2000 haben sich die Strompreise für private Haushalte mehr als verdoppelt. Von steigenden Stromkosten sind Millionen von armutsgefährdeten Haushalten besonders betroffen, weil diese Kosten regressive Wirkungen haben: Arme Haushalte haben einen größeren Anteil ihres Einkommens zur Finanzierung ihres Energiebedarfs aufzuwenden als wohlhabende Haushalte. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag exemplarisch für einige Haushaltstypen mit geringem Einkommen, wie stark ihre Stromkostenbelastung in den Jahren 2006 bis 2016 relativ zu ihrem Einkommen zugenommen hat. Nach unseren Abschätzungen auf Basis empirischer Daten zum Energieverbrauch privater Haushalte mussten die von uns betrachteten armutsgefährdeten Haushaltstypen im Jahr 2016 allesamt mehr für Strom ausgeben als zur Deckung ihres Energiebedarfs zum Heizen und zur Warmwassererzeugung. Es muss davon ausgegangen werden, dass im Zuge der Energiewende der Strompreis auch in den kommenden Jahren weiter steigen wird. Dies gilt insbesondere angesichts der stark gestiegenen Preise für Emissionszertifikate, die sich in der Steigerung der Börsenstrompreise bemerkbar machen. Damit stellt sich immer drängender die Frage nach Maßnahmen zur Abschwächung von weiteren Strompreisanstiegen und zur sozialen Abfederung ihrer regressiven Wirkungen. Since the introduction of the Renewable Energy Act in 2000, the electricity prices of German households have doubled. This increase implies a particular burden for millions of poor households, as they have to spend a larger share of their income to cover their electricity cost than affluent households. For three types of low-income households, this article investigates the evolution of their electricity cost burden relative to their income. According to our estimations on the basis of empirical data on the energy consumption of German households, these types of households had to pay more for power in 2016 than for satisfying their energy demand for heating purposes. This stylized fact is all the more relevant as the electricity prices are most likely increasing further due to Germany’s energy transition. This prospect urgently calls for measures to dampen future electricity price increases and to reduce the regressive effects of former price rises.

The voluntary adoption of environmental management systems (EMSs), frequently certified by third-party audits following international standards, has become a vital supplement to mandatory environmental policies based on regulation and legislation. Although there is empirical evidence that both EMS adoption and certification can effectively improve firms’ environmental performance, the impact on their business performance is far from clear. Drawing upon an OECD survey including more than 4000 manufacturing facilities, this paper fills this void by estimating the impact of both EMS adoption and certification on facilities’ business performance using statistical matching techniques. While providing for a didactic summary of matching methods, our results indicate that the pure adoption of EMS without any certification does not enhance facilities’ business performance, the financial performance of certified facilities turns out to be significantly higher.

Die gesellschaftliche Zustimmung zu den politischen Zielen der Energiewende wird nicht unwesentlich von ihren finanziellen Verteilungswirkungen und den individuellen Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen der privaten Haushalte beeinflusst. Die empirische Untersuchung dieses Zusammenhangs bildet den Kern dieses Beitrags, welcher die Ergebnisse des vom Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) geförderten Forschungsprojektes AKZEPTANZ zusammenfasst. Die empirischen Einzelbefunde verweisen auf drei wesentliche Erkenntnisse hinsichtlich der Präferenzstruktur der privaten Haushalte bei der Gestaltung der energiewendebedingten Kostenbelastung. Erstens besteht grundsätzlich der Wunsch nach einer Anwendung des Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzips bei der Finanzierung der Ökostromförderung. Zweitens kann die Unsicherheit über die Kosten der Energiewende zu einer Abkehr vom Leistungsfähigkeitsprinzip führen und drittens können Anreize in Form von Subventionen für Investitionen in Energieeffizienz zu kontraproduktiven Nebeneffekten führen. Societal acceptance for the political goals of Germany’s Energiewende is heavily impacted by its distributional consequences as well as private households‘ individual conceptions of justice. The empirical investigation of this relationship is the main contribution of this article, which summarizes the results of the research project AKZEPTANZ financed by the German Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). From our empirical evidence we can draw three main conclusions regarding private households‘ preferences for distributing the cost of the Energiewende. First, there is a strong preference for the ability-to-pay principle in order to finance green electricity. Second, cost uncertainty makes the ability-to-pay principle less attractive. Third, subsidizing investments into energy efficiency may lead to counterproductive reactions.

Dieser Artikel untersucht auf Basis einer Befragung von mehr als 5.000 Haushaltsvorständen, wie viel sie für Versorgungssicherheit mit Strom zu zahlen bereit sind. Alternativ zur Zahlungsbereitschaft (willingness to pay, WTP) wird auch nach der Bereitschaft gefragt, gegen eine Entschädigungszahlung auf ein gewisses Maß an Versorgungssicherheit zu verzichten (willingness to accept, WTA). In Übereinstimmung mit zahlreichen empirischen Studien finden wir mittlere WTA-Werte, die deutlich über den mittleren WTP-Werten für die Vermeidung eines unangekündigten, vierstündigen Stromausfalls liegen. Den Grund für diese Diskrepanz sehen wir darin, dass die bekundeten Entschädigungsforderungen für den Verzicht auf Versorgungssicherheit tendenziell über dem tatsächlichen Wert liegen, der der Versorgungssicherheit mit Strom beigemessen wird, wohingegen die dafür bekundete Zahlungsbereitschaft tendenziell untertrieben wird.

Ein Erratum zu dieser Publikation wurde veröffentlicht: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41025-020-00207-y

Zum Schutz des Klimas ergreift die Politik in Deutschland und Europa eine Vielzahl an Maßnahmen. So wird der europäische Emissionshandel durch zahlreiche Maßnahmen zur Innovations- und Investitionsförderung ergänzt, aber auch durch Informationsbereitstellung und Regulierungsmaßnahmen zur Nutzung neuer Technologien. Dieser Politikmix wirft die Frage auf, welche Politikinstrumente benötigt werden und nach welchen Kriterien diese bewertet werden sollten. Dieser Beitrag geht dieser Frage nach und präsentiert als Resultat der Begleitaktivitäten des Förderschwerpunkts „Ökonomie des Klimawandels“ des Bundesforschungsministeriums (BMBF) einen Konsens über grundsätzliche Handlungsempfehlungen für die konkrete Ausgestaltung von Klimaschutzpolitik. Es herrscht insbesondere Einigkeit darüber, dass ein Politikmix notwendig ist, um die klimapolitischen Ziele zu erreichen. Allerdings sollte nicht jedes Instrument vorbehaltlos zum Einsatz kommen. Vielmehr sollte ein jedes Instrument in Bezug auf Effektivität, Effizienz, aber auch politische und institutionelle Umsetzbarkeit bewertet, durch ein zeitnahes Monitoring überprüft und gegebenenfalls auch abgeschafft werden. Diesbezüglich ist zu kritisieren, dass moderne Evaluationsmethoden in Deutschland bislang kaum angewandt werden, obwohl die Wissenschaft in den vergangenen Jahren erhebliche Fortschritte bei der Evaluierung von Politikmaßnahmen erzielt hat. Es wäre daher wichtig, dass zukünftig ein besonderes Augenmerk auf die empirische Evaluation von Klimaschutzmaßnahmen auf Basis umfangreicher, auf die jeweilige Maßnahme speziell zugeschnittener Datenerhebungen gelegt würde. Policy makers in Germany and Europe have availed a variety of instruments to protect the climate. A centerpiece is the European Emission Trading System, which has been accompanied by several additional measures to foster innovation and investment, as well as to improve the provision of information and to regulate the application of new technologies. The resulting policy mix raises the question as to which policy measures are needed and by which criteria should they be evaluated. This article addresses these questions by presenting a consensus of recommendations emerging from the project “Ökonomie des Klimawandels (Economics of Climate Change)”, funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Although consensus prevails that no single policy is sufficient to reach the multitude of climate policy goals, it is also recognized that each instrument should be evaluated on its own terms. Effectiveness, efficiency and political as well as institutional feasibility are among the key evaluation criteria. Moreover, instruments should be regularly monitored and, if necessary, removed. In this regard, it is regrettable that modern evaluation methods are rarely applied in Germany to date, although there has been considerable methodological progress in the recent past. Moving forward, it will be crucial to employ such methods, ideally drawing on comprehensive data sets tailored for the evaluation of the particular climate policy instrument in question.

Öffentlichkeit und Politik müssen häufig den Eindruck gewinnen, dass Wirtschaftswissenschaftler bei zentralen wirtschaftspolitischen Fragen keine Einigkeit erzielen können. Dies gilt nicht zuletzt für die Umsetzung der Energiewende. Dieser Beitrag nutzt die öffentlich zugänglichen Stellungnahmen einschlägiger Forschungsinstitute, um durch die Identifikation von Bereichen des Konsens und Dissens unter Energieökonomen einen Kontrapunkt zu setzen. Wider Erwarten wird offenbar, dass auf wesentlichen Handlungsfeldern weitgehende Einigkeit besteht und somit klare Handlungsempfehlungen ausgesprochen werden können. Politicians as well as the public often have the impression that economists fail to reach consensus on key economic issues. One such area of perceived controversy regards the implementation of Germany’s energy transition. This article uses publicly available statements of research institutes to set a counterpoint through the identification of areas of consensus and dissent among energy economists. Contrary to expectations, a general agreement on essential issues is revealed and thus clear recommendations can be articulated.

Using detailed data originating from several hundred households of the German Residential Energy Survey (GRECS), this paper empirically investigates the returns on investment in photovoltaic (PV) installations. We find that these returns were particularly high in the years 2009 to 2011, when large subsidies for solar electricity coincided with plummeting module prices. While our empirical analysis demonstrates that such investments also incur substantial risks, there is evidence that, above all, wealthy households tend to benefit from the solar subsidies, whereas the costs of financing these subsidies are borne by electricity consumers at large, not least poverty-endangered households. The resulting redistribution of financial resources raises the question of whether the burden-sharing of Germany’s transition to an alternative energy system is fair.

In Europe’s Emission Trading System (ETS), prices for emission permits have remained low for many years now. This fact gave rise to controversies on whether there is a need for fundamentally reforming the ETS. Potential reform proposals include the introduction of a minimum price for certificates and a market stability reserve (MSR). This is a rule-based mechanism to steering the volume of permits in the market. While preparing the introduction of this instrument, the European Commission hopes to be able to increase and stabilize certificate prices in the medium- and long-term. In this article, we recommend retaining the ETS as it is, rather than supplementing it by introducing a minimum price floor or a market stability reserve. Instead, mistakes from the past should be corrected by a single intervention: the final elimination of those 900 million permits that were taken out of the market in 2014, but would again emerge in the market in 2019 and 2020 (backloading).

Germany’s energy transition has been accompanied by a near doubling of power prices for private households since the outset of the new millennium. Millions of poor households and those that are close to the poverty threshold are likely to suffer from the increase in electricity cost. Focusing on low-income households, this paper illustrates the distributional implications of Germany’s energy transition by investigating their electricity cost burden between 2006 and 2012, using data from the German Residential Energy Consumption Survey (GRECS). Our estimates suggest that in 2012, on average, households at poverty risk allocated 5.5% of their income to power and, hence, paid nearly as much for covering their electricity consumption as for heating purposes. Given Germany’s ambitious targets to expand the share of costly renewable technologies in electricity consumption, which has broad support among the electorate, it is to be expected that households’ expenditure for power will increase in the upcoming years. This raises the urgent question of how to mitigate the regressive impact of further increasing electricity prices on poor households. Direct cash transfers are suggested here as a non-distortionary instrument for easing the burden of high prices, one that is directly targeted at those endangered by energy poverty.

Seit dem Jahr 2000 haben sich die Strompreise für private Haushalte praktisch verdoppelt. Von steigenden Stromkosten sind nicht zuletzt Millionen von armutsgefährdeten Haushalten betroffen. Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht der vorliegende Beitrag exemplarisch für einige Haushaltstypen mit geringem Einkommen, wie stark ihre Stromkostenbelastung in den vergangenen Jahren relativ zum Einkommen zugenommen hat und in welchem Maße diese Belastung künftig weiter steigen könnte. Nach unseren Abschätzungen auf Basis stilisierter Fakten musste beispielsweise der von uns betrachtete armutsgefährdete, alleinstehende Rentner im Jahr 2013 etwa gleich viel für Strom ausgeben wie zur Deckung seines Energiebedarfs zum Heizen und zur Warmwassererzeugung. Es muss davon ausgegangen werden, dass aufgrund des Ausbaus der erneuerbaren Energien die Stromkostenbelastung auch in den nächsten Jahren weiter steigen wird. Damit stellt sich immer drängender die Frage nach Maßnahmen zur Abschwächung von weiteren Strompreisanstiegen und zur sozialen Abfederung ihrer regressiven Wirkungen. In Germany, power prices for private households have virtually doubled since the outset of the new millennium. Millions of poor households and those that are close to the poverty threshold are likely to suffer from these increases in electricity costs. This article investigates the resulting burden for a few types of low-income households, such as that of a poor single pensioner. Besides sketching the development of past cost shares in household income, we provide scenarios about future energy cost shares of these household types. In 2013, our estimates on the basis of stylized facts suggest that our single-pensioner household had to pay nearly as much for covering the electricity demand as for heating purposes. Given the continuing strong increase in the share of costly renewable technologies in electricity consumption, it is to be expected that electricity cost shares will increase in the upcoming years. This raises the urgent question of how to mitigate the regressive impact of further increasing electricity prices on poor households and those that are endangered by poverty.

Rebound effects measure the behaviorally induced offset in the reduction of energy consumption following efficiency improvements. Using panel estimation methods and household travel diary data collected in Germany between 1997 and 2009, this study identifies the rebound effect in private transport by allowing for the possibility that fuel price elasticities—from which rebound effects can be derived—are asymmetric. This approach rests on empirical evidence suggesting that the response in individual travel demand to price increases is stronger than to decreases. We argue that such an asymmetric response would require referencing price elasticities derived from price decreases in order to identify the rebound effect, as it represents the response to a decrease in unit cost for car travel due to improved fuel efficiency. Failing to reject the null hypothesis of a symmetric price response, we alternatively estimate a reversible specification and obtain a rebound estimate for single-vehicle households being in the range of 46 to 70%, which is in line with an earlier German study by Frondel, Peters, and Vance (2008).

Dieser Artikel aktualisiert die Analyse der Kosten und Wirkungen der Förderung von Photovoltaik (PV) in Deutschland von Frondel, Ritterund Schmidt(2008). Unsere aktuelle Schätzung von real rund 82 Mrd. € an Subventionen für alle in den Jahren 2000 bis 2010 installierten PV-Anlagen liegt beinahe beim Dreifachen der zuvor erwarteten Kosten. Die Ursache dieser Kostenexplosion war das in den Jahren 2008 bis 2010 nahezu exponentiell verlaufende Wachstum des jährlichen Leistungszubaus, das von stark fallenden Modulpreisen infolge weltweiter Überkapazitäten und hohen Einspeisevergütungen für Solarstrom befeuert wurde. Der bis Ende 2012 auf knapp 110 Mrd. € angestiegenen Kostenbelastung der Stromverbraucher stehen bedauerlicherweise allenfalls geringe Umweltwirkungen gegenüber, während die zahlreichen Insolvenzen der vergangenen Jahre verdeutlicht haben, dass der durch diese Förderung ausgelöste (Brutto-)Beschäftigungseffekt in keiner Weise nachhaltig war. Umso unverständlicher ist der Beschluss der Politik vom Sommer 2012, die Solarstromerzeugung noch bis zu einer Kapazitätsobergrenze von 52.000 MW fördern zu wollen. Damit würde noch einmal etwas mehr als dieselbe PV-Kapazität gefördert, die am Ende des Jahres 2011 in Deutschland installiert war. This article updates the analysis of Frondel, Ritterand Schmidt(2008) on the costs and effects of the promotion of photovoltaics (PV) in Germany. Our current estimate of approximately € 82 bn in subsidies for all PV systems installed in Germany from 2000 to 2010 is almost three times higher than the costs previously forecasted. The reason for this cost explosion was the almost exponential annual growth of PV capacity, which was fueled by sharply falling module prices due to a global glut and the sustained high feed-in tariffs for solar power. The continued rise in costs, which reached almost € 110 bn by the end of 2012, was regrettably accompanied by negligible environmental impacts and punctuated by a series of bankruptcies in recent years, testifying to the scheme’s short-lived effects on employment creation. Perhaps most puzzling is the policy decision taken in the summer of 2012 to promote PV until an upper-bound capacity of 52,000 MW is reached, which would result in more than a doubling of the capacity that was installed until the end of 2011.

Interaction effects capture the impact of one explanatory variable on the marginal effect of another explanatory variable. To explore interaction effects, so-called interaction terms are typically included in estimation specifications. While in linear models the effect of a marginal change in the interaction term is equal to the interaction effect, this equality generally does not hold in non-linear specifications (Ai/Norton 2003). This paper provides for a general derivation of interaction effects in both linear and non-linear models and calculates the formulae of the interaction effects resulting from Heckman’s sample selection model as well as the Two- Part Model, two regression models commonly applied to data with a large fraction of either missing or zero values in the dependent variable. Drawing on a survey of automobile use from Germany, we argue that while it is important to test for the significance of interaction effects, their size conveys limited substantive content. More meaningful, and also more easy to grasp, are the conditional marginal effects pertaining to two variables that are assumed to interact.

The allure of an environmentally benign, abundant, and cost-effective energy source has led an increasing number of industrialized countries to back public financing of renewable energies. Germany’s experience with renewable energy promotion is often cited as a model to be replicated elsewhere, being based on a combination of far-reaching energy and environmental laws that stretch back nearly two decades. This paper critically reviews the centerpiece of this effort, the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG), focusing on its costs and the associated implications for job creation and climate protection. We argue that German renewable energy policy, and in particular the adopted feed-in-tariff scheme, has failed to harness the market incentives needed to ensure a viable and cost-effective introduction of renewable energies into the country’s energy portfolio. To the contrary, the government’s support mechanisms have in many respects subverted these incentives, resulting in massive expenditures that show little long-term promise for stimulating the economy and protecting the environment.

Using a panel of household travel diary data collected in Germany between 1997 and 2005, this study assesses the effectiveness of fuel efficiency improvements by estimating the rebound effect, which measures the extent to which higher efficiency causes additional travel. Following a theoretical discussion outlining three alternative definitions of the rebound effect, the econometric analysis generates corresponding estimates using panel methods to control for the effects of unobservables that could otherwise produce spurious results. Our results, which range between 57% and 67%, indicate a rebound that is substantially larger than obtained in other studies, calling into question the efficacy of policies targeted at reducing energy consumption via technological efficiency.

Dieser Beitrag zeigt, dass die derzeitige Förderregelung für Photovoltaik zu einem Subventionstatbestand zu werden droht, welcher dem der Steinkohlensubventionierung nahekommt. Dies ist umso bedenklicher, als bei der seit 2005 herrschenden Koexistenz des Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetzes (EEG) und des Emissionshandels durch das EEG keine CO2-Emissionseinsparung erzielt wird, die über das bereits durch den Emissionshandel allein bewirkte Maß hinausgeht. Darüber hinaus sollten die Beschäftigungswirkungen, für die der Verbraucher aufgrund der im EEG getroffenen Regelungen durch die Umlegung der Einspeisevergütungen noch über zwei Jahrzehnte die Kosten zu tragen hat, netto betrachtet gering, wenn nicht gar negativ ausfallen. Die konsequente wirtschaftspolitische Schlussfolgerung ist somit die umgehende Reduzierung der Einspeisevergütungen für Solarstrom, vor allem, weil dies die bei weitem teuerste Variante ist, um Klimaschutz zu betreiben. Schließlich ist auch technologiepolitisch eine deutlich stärkere jährliche Senkung der durch das EEG gewährten Einspeisevergütungen angezeigt, als durch die gegenwärtige Degression der Vergütungen von 5% vorgegeben ist. This article demonstrates that the feed-in tariffs currently guaranteed for photovoltaics constitute a subsidization regime that, if prolonged until 2020, threatens to reach a level comparable to that of German hard coal production. Yet, as a consequence of the coexistence of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG) and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), the increased use of renewable energy technologies such as photovoltaics triggers no additional emissions reductions beyond those already achieved by ETS alone. Similarly disappointing is the net employment balance, which is likely to be negative if one takes account of the opportunity cost of the photovoltaics support. In line with the InternationalEnergyAgency, we therefore recommend the immediate and drastic reduction of the magnitude of the feed-in tariffs granted for photovoltaics. Ultimately, producing electricity on this basis is among the most expensive greenhouse gas abatement options.

This article seeks to appraise the potential innovation impacts that may be triggered by the European emission trading system starting on 1 January 2005. To this end, our paper provides a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the potential innovation effects triggered by the pioneering US emission trading schemes (ETS). Our review's basic empirical results are that the innovation effects were initially limited, partially because of lenient or even non‐constraining targets in the first years, but there is empirical evidence on a vast range of low‐cost compliance strategies. Yet, the substantial body of theoretical literature provides no consensus on the issue of whether or not emission trading generally triggers more innovation than other policy instruments, such as regulation standards. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.

Any serious empirical study of factor substitutability has to allow the data to display complementarity as well as substitutability. The standard approach reflecting this idea is a translog specification—this is also the approach used by the majority of studies analyzing the substitutability of energy and capital. Yet, the substitutability between capital and energy and the source of discrepancies in the results still remain controversial. This paper offers a straightforward explanation for at least the divergent results provided by the translog studies: Using a translog approach reduces the issue of factor substitutability to a question of cost shares. Our review of translog studies demonstrates that this argument is empirically far more relevant than the distinction between time-series and panel studies being favored in the literature. More generally, we provide ample empirical evidence for our argument that the magnitudes of cross-price elasticity estimates of two factors gleaned from static approaches like the translog functional form are mainly driven by the cost shares of these factors.