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Purpose: Government reforms have seen shifts from rules-based to principles-based risk regulatory governance. This paper examines the effects of principles-based risk regulatory reforms on public sector risk management (RM) and management control practices in public sector organizations (PSOs). Design/methodology/approach: The principles-based regulation focuses on providing autonomy to PSOs while maintaining control over their actions without direct intervention. This resonates with Foucault's notion of how modern forms of governments operate. The research is informed by Foucault's concept of governmentality. The authors conducted a qualitative field study of an Australian PSO, gathering and analysing data from interviews, focus groups, and archival documents. Findings: The findings show the capillary modes by which principles-based risk regulatory regime penetrates and works with management control practices in pursuit of regulatory goals within the PSO the authors studied. In addition, the authors find that the principles-based approach (focusing on autonomy) and rules-based approach (focusing on control) are not opposites in kind and effect but rather, autonomy should be understood as a central pillar of control. Furthermore, the findings show how cultural controls and formal controls are not in conflict but are interconnected in RM practices, with cultural controls providing control architecture for RM and formal control translating the control architecture into routines. Finally, the study provides insights into how enterprise risk management (ERM) provides capabilities for and routinizes RM practices in a PSO and the management control systems (MCS) that enabled this to occur. Originality/value: The paper provides novel insights into how MCS are infiltrated, mobilized and deployed to enact principles-based risk regulatory reforms. These insights are useful for regulators, practitioners and researchers.

To purchase or authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2007.00215.x Byline: Mandy M. Cheng (a), Peter F. Luckett (a), Habib Mahama (a) Keywords: Goal conflict; Goal difficulty; Multiple goals; Performance measurement systems Abstract: Abstract Contemporary performance measurement systems, such as the balanced scorecard, often advocate the use of an array of financial and non-financial measures. Despite many claimed advantages for these systems, recent research shows that the inclusion of multiple performance measures sometimes has undesirable effects. The present study examines one of the potential problems of implementing these systems; namely, the impact of perceived goal conflict on task performance. Using survey data from employees working in multiple call centres in a telecommunication company, we find that perceived goal difficulty increases perceived goal conflict. Additionally, perceived goal difficulty also has a negative, indirect effect of task performance, through the mediating role of perceived goal conflict. Our results have important implications for both the research literature and the designers of performance measurement systems. Author Affiliation: (a)School of Accounting, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2052, Australia Article History: Received 29 August 2005; accepted 2 October 2006 by Gary Monroe (Deputy Editor).

A study was conducted to analyze how certain events in the banking and financial services industry become constructed and how risk is managed. Findings suggest the social and institutional mechanisms, which inherit the construction of risk.

Past literature has highlighted the importance of using reviewers in the evaluation of investment proposals. This study examines whether and how the decisions of these reviewers are influenced by a proposal’s conformance with company guidelines and practices, and the incentives facing the proposal preparer. Our experiment shows that, holding the proposal’s content constant, the reviewers’ evaluation decision is less favourable if the proposal does not follow the company guidelines. Further, we find that the preparer’s incentive to persist in a project negatively affects the proposal reviewers’ decisions only when the proposal deviates from company guidelines but not when it is compliant. This result suggests that company guidelines may lower the willingness of reviewers to make independent decisions.

This paper outlines claims and evidence concerning the balanced scorecard (BSC) from the research literature, integrating current thinking about its substantive content and assumptions, strategic alignment, implementation issues, judgment and decision‐making, organisational performance, compensation plans, and comparisons to other performance‐measurement practices. In doing so, diverse localisations of the BSC are brought into view, as well as difficulties accompanying the practice of the BSC. Future directions for practitioners and researchers are indicated.