1. Managerial incentives and corporate leverage: evidence from the United Kingdom
- Author
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Florackis, Chrisostomos and Ozkan, Aydin
- Subjects
Corporate governance -- Analysis ,Leverage (Finance) -- Analysis ,Banking, finance and accounting industries ,Business - Abstract
To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-629X.2009.00296.x Byline: Chrisostomos Florackis (a), Aydin Ozkan (b) Keywords: Capital structure; Managerial incentives; Corporate governance mechanisms Abstract: Abstract This paper investigates the effect of managerial incentives and corporate governance on capital structure using a large sample of UK firms during the period 1999-2004. The analysis revolves around the view that managerial incentives are important in determining a firm's leverage. However, we argue that the exact impact of these incentives on leverage is likely to be determined by firm-specific governance characteristics. To conduct our investigation, we construct a simple corporate governance measure using detailed ownership and governance information. We present evidence of a significant non-monotonic relationship between executive ownership and leverage. There is also strong evidence suggesting that corporate governance practices have a significant impact on leverage. More importantly, the results reveal that the nature of the relation between executive ownership and leverage depends on the firm's corporate governance structure. Author Affiliation: (a)Management School, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZH, UK (b)Hull University Business School, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, UK Article History: Received 28 March 2008; accepted 18 December 2008 by Robert Faff (Editor).
- Published
- 2009