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The article discusses the nature of the U.S. security officers and their duties and responsibilities. The author states that some of the U.S. security officers are lawyers who have experience with military intelligence service, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or with other law enforcement agencies. He asserts that there are second-rate security officers who use their position for their own advantage. He explains that the security officer is the one responsible for safeguarding the government's military, technical, and other secrets. He stresses that the security officer does not have the power to investigate.

The article reports that the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has denied security clearance for nuclear physicists J. Robert Oppenheimer. It is reported that Oppenheimer has full access including some vital secrets in the possession of the U.S. However, the Personnel Security Board has denied any clearance to the nuclear physicist on the grounds of the Atomic Act of 1946. Some pertinent papers and records from the board, military intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation presented to the Commission have suggested that Oppenheimer should not be reinstated for the concern of national security.

There seems to be no reason to suppose that the crime statistics published by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.) are an accurate measure of crime incidence. First, the crimes must be reported to the police. Whether people report crimes against property must be affected by their expectations that the police will recover their losses. Second, the crimes must be reported to the F.B.I. by the police. The degree of reporting is a convenient device available to a police administration to misrepresent the extent of criminal activity. For crimes against property there is an independent measure of the risk of crime; this is the premium rates on the various sublines of burglary insurance. A test of the accuracy of the statistics for crimes against property can be made by cross-sectional comparisons with the premium rates of insurance coverages. This paper reports the method and results of such a test; it considers some difficulties of the test and attempts to evaluate their importance.

The article explores on the military-financial agreement between the U.S. and Ecuador which allow the U.S. military to use the air and naval bases at Salinas and the Galápagos islands for the defense of the Panama Canal. It highlights the struggle of the U.S. Navy to abandon its bombing range that lead to the closure of the military facilities in the island. It also history of global campaigns against foreign military bases wherein the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents were engaged in counterintelligence surveillance in Ecuador.

In this article, we present a simple back-of-the-envelope approach for evaluating whether counterterrorism security measures reduce risk sufficiently to justify their costs. The approach uses only four variables: the consequences of a successful attack, the likelihood of a successful attack, the degree to which the security measure reduces risk, and the cost of the security measure. After measuring the cost of a counterterrorism measure, we explore a range of outcomes for the costs of terrorist attacks and a range of possible estimates for how much risk might be reduced by the measure. Then working from this mix of information and assumptions, we can calculate how many terrorist attacks (and of what size) would need to be averted to justify the cost of the counterterrorism measure in narrow cost-benefit terms. To illustrate this approach, we first apply it to the overall increases in domestic counterterrorism expenditures that have taken place since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and alternatively we apply it to just the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. We then evaluate evidence on the number and size of terrorist attacks that have actually been averted or might have been averted since 9/11. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the September 11th attacks, local law enforcement agencies in major metropolitan areas have become increasingly involved in counterterrorism and intelligence activities. Unfortunately, this development has not yet spurred a comparable increase in intelligence oversight. Indeed, at the local level, intelligence activities are conducted largely in a "formal governance vacuum." This situation is unsustainable. Local formal oversight mechanisms are desperately needed. Whether local actors are actually up to the intelligence oversight task is another question. And it is a question that has yet to be answered in a satisfactory manner. Skeptics have written off local overseers with little explanation, while advocates of local intelligence oversight have endorsed local overseers without apparent consideration of their viability. This Note seeks to provide a comprehensive answer. Drawing upon lessons from oversight of the federal intelligence community, this Note demonstrates that the federal intelligence oversight apparatus is a workable model for the local context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the study which discusses the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) new agent training for evaluating injury rates and injury risk factors. It states that the investigation leads to a result that lower fitness and self-reported pain limiting activity were associated with higher injury risk among FBI new agents.

Fingerprint friction ridge details are generally described in a hierarchical order at three different levels, namely, Level 1 (pattern), Level 2 (minutia points), and Level 3 (pores and ridge contours). Although latent print examiners frequently take advantage of Level 3 features to assist in identification, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) currently rely only on Level 1 and Level 2 features. In fact, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) standard of fingerprint resolution for AFIS is 500 pixels per inch (ppi), which is inadequate for capturing Level 3 features, such as pores. With the advances in fingerprint sensing technology, many sensors are now equipped with dual resolution (500 ppi/1,000 ppi) scanning capability. However, increasing the scan resolution alone does not necessarily provide any performance improvement in fingerprint matching, unless an extended feature set is utilized. As a result, a systematic study to determine how much performance gain one can achieve by introducing Level 3 features in AFIS is highly desired. We propose a hierarchical matching system that utilizes features at all the three levels extracted from 1,000 ppi fingerprint scans. Level 3 features, including pores and ridge contours, are automatically extracted using Gabor filters and wavelet transform and are locally matched using the Iterative Closest Point (ICP) algorithm. Our experiments show that Level 3 features carry significant discriminatory information. There is a relative reduction of 20 percent in the equal error rate (EER) of the matching system when Level 3 features are employed in combination with Level 1 and 2 features. This significant performance gain is consistently observed across various quality fingerprint images. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]