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This article is concerned with the attack design problem of multisensor cyber‐physical systems. Compared with the existing results developed for the single‐sensor system, the attacker is limited to modify partial sensors. To avoid generating alarm for the given detect mechanism, the correlation influence between the attacked and normal sensors is eliminated in the designed stealthiness condition. Then the trace of error covariance is used to measure the attack effect and the coupling information between sensors is also involved. By using the design freedom of stealthiness condition, the detailed attack parameters design and attacked channels selection strategy are derived to achieve the optimal attack performance via a two‐stage method including backstepping and eigenvalue sorting techniques. Finally, numerical simulation examples are provided to verify the effectiveness and advantages of the proposed attack method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on designing sensor attacks to deteriorate the state estimation in cyber‐physical systems. The scenario that the malicious attack signals can be injected into different but limited number of sensor communication channels is considered. The state estimation error variations and innovation variations are adopted to measure attack performance and attack stealthiness, respectively. A switching attack strategy is proposed, under which the estimation error variations are driven to the predesigned target value and the norm of innovation variations remains at a small level. The switching attack design problem is formulated as a discrete switched optimal control problem which can be solved by dynamic programming, while the computational burden is heavy. To overcome this difficulty, by using pruning technique to remove the redundant matrices generated in dynamic programming, the quadratic optimization problem becomes numerically tractable. In this way, the suboptimal attack signal sequence and switching sequence can be acquired. Finally, a simulation example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed attack strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]