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In reality, complicated situations usually include multiple game scenarios, which cannot be effectively described by a single game model. Hence, how to model and reveal the cooperative behaviors in complex multiple game environments is a meaningful topic. In this article, by using switching control, a spatial multigame model with reciprocal reward and reputation mechanism is proposed, where a specific game scenario at each time step is determined by current individuals' behaviors and the game type. Besides, the allocation of limited resources is co-evolved with the evolution of cooperation, which can be regarded as the results of the game and meanwhile affect the while game processes. The evolution dynamics of the proposed model is detailly discussed and the mutual influence of reputation mechanism, reward reciprocity and resource allocation on cooperative behaviors is quantitatively studied. Finally, in order to illustrate the robustness of the analyzed results, its impact on the cooperative behaviors in single PD and SD games are comparatively discussed. • Spatial multigame using switching control. • Reciprocal reward and reputation mechanism in multigame. • Co-evolution of multigame combined with limited resource allocation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to reveal the underlying mechanism of aspiration on cooperation with resource allocation, in this article, an aspiration-based game model on interdependent networks is proposed, where the risk-averse voluntary players are introduced into the game model. Each player has a self-adaptive aspiration tuned by the obtained payoff, which will be evolving with cooperation. In reality, limited resources are always related to games. The allocation of resources is generally decided by the results of games and in turn affects the choice of game strategies. Here, limited resources as a co-evolutionary factor is also involved in the proposed model, which exerts influence on the aspiration of players. Based on the prisoner's dilemma, the evolutionary dynamics of the proposed model is discussed in detail. As the results, the self-adaptive aspiration mechanism can significantly improve the level of cooperation. Meanwhile, both the strength of interdependence and the quantity of resources owned by players have great influence on the choice of game strategies. Interestingly, players with higher resources and aspirations are mostly located in the centers of cooperator (loner) strategy clusters. Moreover, based on the proposed game model, public good game and snow game are also implemented to verify the robustness of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, the co-evolution of cooperation and limited resources in spatial evolutionary game is studied, where memory ability is involved in the evolutionary process. Competition for resources exists widely in nature and human society. Therefore, the allocation of limited resources is always accompanied with various kinds of games. The acquisition of resources depends on the results of the game and the number of resources owned by the players would in turn affect the choice of game strategies. Memory, or so-called experience, usually plays an important role in guiding human behaviors in the real world, which is vital to individual rational decision-making. In order to better simulate the memory ability in real life, memory mechanism with attenuation factor is introduced into the co-evolution of prisoner's dilemma game. Moreover, in order to protect the vulnerable groups, we have introduced the mechanism of minimum guarantee of resources, which simulates the social security system in reality such that the extreme polarization can be alleviated. By using strategy-independent rules, memory ability can effectively raise the level of cooperation, where both the memory length and attenuation factor would affect the co-evolutionary results. Furthermore, limited resources have fast aggregation effect and players with cooperative behaviors have easier access to resources. Meanwhile, the minimum resources guarantee mechanism can considerably affect the cooperation level. Besides, as to the complex dynamical behaviors of co-evolution, quantitative and qualitative discussions are implemented. In order to illustrate the robustness of the obtained results, the cooperative behaviors of systems in public goods game and snow game are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]