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This study examines whether the pacifying effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on territorial disputes between adversarial dyads is conditional upon the dyads' past experience of military cooperation. I built a political economy model and conducted a logistic regression analysis on the newly coded bilateral FDI data between adversarial dyads and the existing dataset by merging the rivalry data established by Thompson [51] and the territorial disputes data collected by Lee and Mitchell [42]. I found that when bilateral FDI flows between adversarial dyads reach a certain level the pacifying effect of FDI is stronger for adversarial dyads with past military cooperation. I also found that while past military cooperation has a pacifying effect in general, past military cooperation that occurred more recently has a stronger pacifying effect than those that occurred a while ago. Moreover, based upon the theoretical model and empirical findings in this paper, I investigated the political implications for Tsai Ing-wen's "New Southbound Policy" and Taiwan's approach to the territorial dispute issues in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explore the new dynamics of U.S.-Vietnam security relations from 2011 to 2017. It begins with a review of the attempts before 2011 to establish a foundation for a normal security relationship between the United States and Vietnam, and progresses in the scope and pace of the bilateral relationship in this field. The paper then examines the process of a deepening security relationship between the two countries from 2011 to 2017, focusing on the motivations for increased security cooperation and the developments in five main areas of cooperation, namely maritime security, high-level dialogues, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations. Finally, this paper looks at the potential and limits of the U.S.-Vietnam security relationship, analyzing the possibilities for building a more balanced and effective security relationship and the limitations of U.S.-Vietnam security cooperation. In conclusion, the authors argue that the years from 2011 to 2017 witnessed new and positive moves in the U.S.-Vietnam security relationship. This is a highly significant development for Vietnam and the United States and an illustration of the fast geostrategic change underway in the Asia-Pacific region in the post-Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past five years, China's behaviour in the South China Sea (SCS) has been described as assertive, aggressive or even abrasive by many scholars. Certainly, the majority of scholars, both in the West and China, suggest a shift in China's behaviour in the region from that of the previous period in the aftermath of the 1995 Mischief Reef Incident. This paper aims to offer an explanation for China's behaviour in the SCS from a defensive realist perspective. The main proposition is that a situation of illusory incompatibility exists among claimants in the SCS that leads to a security dilemma. The security dilemma eventually leads to China's defection in the 2012 Scarborough Shoal occupation. Moreover, this paper also suggests that China possesses sufficient resources to mitigate the tension in the SCS. However, for a number of reasons, the country does little to initiate reassurance towards other claimants in the SCS. In the near future, tension will continue in the SCS, unless significant change takes place in the factors that render China reluctant to initiate reassurance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is often portrayed as benign and peaceful. Yet, its assertive disposition on the South China Sea territorial disputes appears to contradict the "peaceful rise" narrative. China's relentless quest in strengthening features under its control and turning them into artificial islands equipped with military facilities have stoke fear of expansionism among the Southeast Asian claimant states and threatened the maritime influence and interests of the US in the region. This paper focuses on China's strategic culture to explain its policy considerations and Malaysia's approach in responding to changing developments following the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Tribunal ruling. The paper argues that firstly, China's strategic stance is two-fold - to neutralize US's regional dominance and to dissuade Southeast Asian states from their reliance on the US; and secondly, Malaysia's preference for a nonconfrontational approach that gives precedence to dialogues and consultations are insufficient in defending its sovereign interests and must therefore be aptly backed up by a more emphatic strategic posture both on the ground and in its diplomatic language. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Future international relations in East Asia are likely to be largely shaped by the maritime strategies and policies of various actors. This paper examines China's policy and behavior in maritime cooperation in the East Asian region in recent years, a topic that has been insufficiently understood. I suggest that while it is necessary and useful to take into account China's naval power, more attention to Chinese intentions and policy on East Asian maritime issues is warranted to arrive at a more balanced, and arguably more accurate, understanding of China's role in East Asian maritime affairs. This paper takes stock of China's changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in maritime cooperation in the region. I describe China's new policy moves in the South China Sea and East China Sea. I also address some of the major Chinese concerns for further maritime cooperation in East Asia. I conclude that while a grand cooperative maritime regime is still not possible from a Chinese perspective, China is likely to agree to more extensive and substantive maritime cooperation in many functional areas, most notably in the non-traditional security arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been made over the past few years of China'vs ambitions of regaining control of its irredentist claims in the East and South China Seas. While some of this speculation focuses on the massive amounts of money the People's Republic of China (PRC) has funneled into its naval modernization program, other analysts are more interested in the drivers behind the increasingly popular sentiment that the country must “reclaim” its lost territories. The Chinese Communist Party can ill afford to ignore the voice of an already disenchanted population if it hopes to stay in power, particularly in regard to matters of national pride. As a result, in dealing with China's irredentist claims, nationalism in particular can be a powerful ideological factor in shaping the nation's foreign policies. This is especially apparent in the case of irredentism, where nationalism can often override diplomatic and strategic imperatives. This paper addresses the question of how does the nationalist discourse vary between two territorial disputes, the East and South China Seas. It uses discourse analysis to examine developing trends among online social media and news sites. This in turn allows for the construction of a framework of how nationalism develops among both elite and grassroots audiences. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper seeks to enrich the discussion of China's power by critically engaging with existing literature on the topic, presenting a conceptual analysis of power, and suggesting a framework for future research. Firstly, it is shown that only a few scholarly publications approach China's power in a more comprehensive and conceptually rigorous way, and even these still contain spaces for improvement. It is argued that the main fault of the existing literature on China's power is confusion surrounding the concept of power. For this reason, secondly, the article presents a conceptual analysis of power and it puts forward a comprehensive framework suitable for analytical use in international relations. In this place, the article argues that an exhaustive assessment of state power should contain an analysis of state's intentions, its sources of power on (at least) three analytical levels, and outcomes of interactions. Thirdly, an analysis of Chinese policies in the South China Sea is offered as an example of applying the framework to a concrete issue. Finally, the article identifies further directions for researching China's power and foreign policy using the presented model of power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has a strong interest in pursuing a smart power strategy towards Southeast Asia and has worked laboriously to engage with regional countries economically, socially, and politically. But China has been only partially successful in achieving its goals in the region. This paper argues that China’s security policy towards Southeast Asia significantly contradicts many other objectives that Beijing wishes to accomplish. Given the deep-seated, narrowly-defined national interests of the Chinese military in the South China Sea disputes, it is likely that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will continue to pose the main obstacle to the effective implementation of a Chinese smart strategy in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

On 8 March 2009, five Chinese vessels shadowed and aggressively maneuvered in close proximity to the US Naval Ship (USNS) Impeccable. This paper seeks to explain the incident and its aftermath in the context of Chinese coercive diplomacy. China's strategy, designed to motivate the US to cease surveillance operations near its militarily sensitive areas in the South China Sea, included three components: (1) the use of military provocation, (2) a coordinated media campaign, and (3) a challenge to US interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). This study goes beyond traditional research on Chinese use of force to explain why China's coercive diplomatic campaign took the form it did. Only by understanding the nature and factors affecting Chinese coercive diplomacy can the US design the effective counter strategy needed to protect US regional and global interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on the decision of the internal arbitral tribunal in the case brought against China by the Philippines. He cites several arbitration cases including that of Argentina and Uruguay relating to a pulp and paper mill, the Rainbow Warrior case between France and New Zealand, and the Russian Federation and China's dispute settlement. Other topics discussed include China's reasons for not honoring the tribunal's claim for jurisdiction and opposing interests in the South China Sea.

The origins and role of the concepts of peaceful coexistence and active defense in Chinese foreign policy are investigated and applied to China’s policy toward the Diaoyu/Senkakus. The dominant moderate conceptual strategic thinking encourages Beijing to aim for the establishment of amodus vivendiwith Washington and Tokyo that involves ade factopresence of China alongside both the US and Japan. However, Beijing’s signaling is complicated by radical voices that undercut coexistence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A reprint of the document "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China on the Award of 12 July 2016 of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the Republic of Philippines," which appeared on the Website of the Foreign MInistry of China on July 12, 2016, is presented. Topics discussed include events leading to the awarding to the arbitration, and the reasons for the non-acceptance and non-recognition by China.

Does China have a strategy toward the South China Sea? I test three hypotheses about Chinese strategy—regional hegemony, gray-zone coercion, and bureaucratic politics—against seven major developments in Chinese policy between 2009 and 2016. None of these hypotheses offers an accurate or complete explanation of Chinese strategy. I argue that China has a dialectic and arduous strategy of balancing the goals of safeguarding rights and maintaining stability. But such a balance is inherently dynamic and frequently elusive. It was not until after 2016 that Beijing began to master the art of strategic balance and achieve an upper hand in the long struggle over the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the current discourses on China's diplomacy in the South China Sea disputes by asking: What does China want to achieve in the various negotiations? By comparing different versions of the multilateral Code of Conduct negotiations between 1992 and 2016, the authors find that the sovereignty issue has been shelved throughout the negotiations. We identify three factors that may account for this finding: the inconsistency of China's official claims over time, China's increased bargaining power, and the importance of the shelved sovereignty axiom since the era of Deng Xiaoping. The authors conclude that the normative game continues in the shadows of international norms represented by invalid sovereignty over the contested waters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China's use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—"killing the chicken to scare the monkey." These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states' coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is pressing ahead with the negotiation on a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea with remarkable resolve. The new COC-centred diplomacy was motivated to suppress the impact of the Philippines versus China arbitral ruling, de-escalate regional tension and promote cooperation, especially the Belt and Road Initiative. It also serves as a broad strategic goal, i.e. preserving stability by banishing the ruling and creating a new diplomatic process with China exercising some control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the South China Sea, China neither implements power-maximizing policy nor engages a peaceful approach. Instead, China implements both coercion and cooperation in pursuing its strategic interest in the disputed area. How can we explain China's paradoxical behavior? This article claims that the best way to explain China's policy in the South China Sea is to understand the character of dualism in China's strategic culture. Following constructivist theory that stresses culture, this article argues that Chinese duality approach in the South China Sea is rooted in the philosophy of Daoism. The symbol of Yin-Yang depicts Chinese assertive as well as cooperative behavior in dealing with the South China Sea dispute. Although from a normative perspective Daoism recognizes pacifism and non-violent behavior, the most important feature of Daoism is the assumption that reality consists of two opposing elements that are mutually embedded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's economy and its military capabilities have grown significantly in the last three decades, yet Southeast Asian countries responded differently to China's foreign policy. This article examines China's assurance and reassurance strategy toward Malaysia and the Philippines in the South China Sea territorial disputes. It points outs the 'assurance and entrapment' strategy that China and its neighbors deployed toward each other. China deploys different foreign discourses toward these two countries to address their concerns, and these countries also positively respond to Chinese rhetoric. However, when China was more assertive during 2010–13, they applied rhetorical strategies to constrain China's foreign behavior. Specifically, both Malaysia and the Philippines set up different traps to gauge China's intentions and highlight the inconsistency between China's previous commitment on the peaceful rise and its recent assertiveness. The comparative analysis shows how they employ legitimation strategy in the territorial disputes. It concludes with policy implications for US–China relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regardless of tremendous efforts from the involving countries, up to the present, the South China Sea (SCS) dispute between China and Philippines is regarded as the most complex and challenging maritime regional conflict in Asia. It has been two years since the date of arbitral awards for the case between Philippines and China, but the issue still raised the question of whether the award has set a good precedent for the dispute settlement mechanism under the UNCLOS 1982. And the award's impact on the dispute settlement and state relations in the region is also debated. After the award was made, many scholars criticized that the case exhibits various shortcomings of the UNCLOS 1982 and the consequences thereof deteriorates the main function of international law. This study discusses the dispute settlement mechanism of UNCLOS 1982 and its application in the case of the Philippines - China. The study is important for two specific reasons: (i) the use of negotiation among nations in the region has become a deadlock, the demand to use legal regime in international relations is increasingly supported by many scholars, and (ii) shortcomings of the UNCLOS 1982 will be discussed for future improvement. This study finds that the tenacious dispute in the South China Sea is due to two reasons. Firstly, it is the risk the inconsistent interpretation among state parties, especially the historical approach adopted by China despite the existence of UNCLOS 1982. Secondly, it is the lack in mechanism of the Convention to ensure the parties' compliance to the award, when China explicitly declared that it would unilaterally reject the arbitral awards. These two reasons are inarguably critical since it may degenerate the almighty goal of an international legal regime in maintaining the "internationality" and "unity" and become a chronic problem for all countries of the region. However, the situation after one year since the award was made has proved that the rule-of-law can be used as an effective tool to improve interstate co-operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

ARRAY(0x557fc4cef760) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and most Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) memberstates share a common bond in the South China Sea due to their geographical designation and contiguity as maritime nations and littoral states to this strategic waterway. Indeed, the significance of this semi-enclosed sea to their respective as well as mutual geo-strategic and geo-economic interests has made maritime cooperation a critical, if not compulsory agenda in the overall vision and framework of China-ASEAN engagements. Such importance has been underlined by the Chinese-sponsored Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century (MSR) agenda and its related programmes, which serve as the blueprint for enhanced China-ASEAN maritime cooperation especially in the South China Sea. However, sceptics/critics have pinpointed that these Chinese-driven agendas are not new, and that the maritime ASEAN states' responses have been somewhat lukewarm. Undeniably, Beijing's efforts have been largely hampered by its longstanding maritime-territorial disputes in the South China Sea vis-à-vis several ASEAN member-states, and perhaps even more so, by its growing assertiveness in handling the imbroglio. Not only has it created a "trust deficit", China's South China Sea policy has also encouraged the affected ASEAN claimant-states to "balance" or "hedge" against unpredictable Chinese strategic behaviour by rekindling security relations with and soliciting intervention from non-resident powers in the region. Such apparent "contradictions" pose political and even military challenges to maritime cooperation between China and ASEAN countries. This article addresses the South China Sea "problematique" by firstly providing an overview of China-ASEAN maritime cooperation, and by extension, China-ASEAN relations, as well as the South China Sea maritimeterritorial debacle, from both past and present vantage points. It then examines the mutual motivation and drivers behind the aforesaid initiatives to propel maritime cooperation, before deliberating on the contending issues and challenges in the disputed waters that could derail such an ambitious strategic vision. Lastly, it explores the way forward and prospects for the South China Sea to become a "sea of cooperation" that could facilitate the MSR agenda, and ultimately the realization of greater China-ASEAN maritime cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Western commentators often view the emergence of a modernizing Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) through the theoretical lens of Alfred Thayer Mahan, an influential 19th century American naval theorist who advocated an imperialistic brand of sea power modeled on the British example. This approach, however, risks painting a misleading picture of China's naval ambitions because it is based on a hegemonic theory of naval power that most regional powers cannot realistically follow. Instead, this article turns to the writings of Alfred von Tirpitz, the architect of the short-lived German battle fleet that unsuccessfully challenged British naval dominance during World War I. Applying his ideas about naval power and hegemony to East Asia's strategic context is a useful heuristic device for revealing key logics behind three facets of US-Chinese naval rivalry: (i) China's anxieties over access to markets; (ii) the importance of alliance value; and (iii) the fiscal, operational, and technological dynamics that shape naval arms races between a hegemon and its weaker regional contender. In all three cases, the application of non-hegemonic naval theory raises important questions about the sustainability and justice of current US naval strategy in the Western Pacific while simultaneously laying bare the major pitfalls of China's current trajectory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many international legal experts believe that thePhilippinesv.Chinaarbitration award of 12 July 2016 represents a game changer for South China Sea dispute settlements because the award has brought a breathtaking legal clarity to the complex disputes. This article argues that the sweeping nature of the award had a very paradoxical effect on Chinese policy. The arbitration ruling has led to the hardening of China’s claims, but it has also raised a new readiness among Chinese policymakers to renew negotiations. The sweepingness of the award makes it hard for the Philippines to reach a negotiated compromise with China on the basis of the award, but it also presents a surprising political opportunity in regional politics for the major actors involved to lower tensions and recalibrate policies. Although China’s new readiness to negotiate is welcome, the overall impact of the three-and-a-half-year-long arbitration is likely to create a deadlock in negotiations in the near future. Paradoxically, this may raise the importance of political and power-centred approaches to regional dispute settlements, as the legal approach embodied by arbitration continues to meet Chinese defiance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article looks at the South China Sea dispute and its impact in international relations. It analyses why the Southeast Asian states are highly sovereignty sensitive, and how such sensitivity has made non-intervention the bedrock of managing their foreign policies. China has long viewed the near seas as regions of geostrategic interest, and thus the SCS is not an exception. On the one hand it brings hope and prosperity, and on the other uncertainty and threat. At the end, the article argues whether China’s assertive position regarding other countries’ sovereignty claims in the Arctic might undermine its own position in contested areas like the SCS, and suggests that China will at least have to learn how toshare and bear(term coined by the author) as a member of the international community. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the court case filed by the Philippines against China concerning the dispute between the two countries over territory and maritime jurisdictions in the South China Sea (SCS). Topics discussed include an unanimous award handed down by an arbitration Tribunal registered under the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague related to the case, and the Tribunal's decision did not including aspects related to sovereignty and boundary delimitation between the parties.

This article utilizes the elements of leadership, political performance and national interests to understand China's foreign policy decision-making process. In contrast to a state-centred analysis, this article assumes that the supreme leadership's view of political performance is the most important factor when it comes to foreign policy decisionmaking. It contends that so-called national interests are often manipulated to serve particular political agendas. Specifically, this article explores whether the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative or advancing China's interests in the South China Sea can be better utilized to improve Chinese President Xi Jinping's political performance. The comparison between the two issues incorporates the dimensions of feasibility, significance and morality. In the final analysis, this article finds that the OBOR is likely to be better utilized to enhance Xi's political performance, which yields some salient implications for future trends in China's foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sheds light on developing a hybrid analytical construct by combining Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) theory and modifications tailored to the case of China. It employs the bureaucratic politics model to China’s decision making during the China–Vietnam standoff in 2014 and adjusts the traditional model with intervening variable – the party ranking system and Democratic Centralism doctrine. I argue that the bargaining game among different actors who have diverse agendas led to the shift in China’s strategy. It would concurrently advance FPA studies while developing a future avenue for research on foreign policy formulation of China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses China's growing assertiveness and its strategic interest in the South China Sea as well as focuses on its strained relationships with the U.S. as well as other Asian states such as Japan and India.

The article discusses a possible revision to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in light of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Topics include the notion of sovereignty in relation to disputes over rocks and islands in the South China Sea, dispute resolution provisions under the UNCLOS in light of competing territorial claims by China and the Philippines, and UNCLOS treatment of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in relation to artificial islands.

China's expanding presence in the South China Sea is now a major source of escalating tensions leading to a spiral of confrontation with the United States and the littoral states of east Asia. Under these conditions, conventional analysis suggests that serious conflict is almost inevitable. This article provides an alternative perspective by situating China's growing ambition within the broader transformation of maritime order in the contemporary era. On the basis of a new interpretation of maritime order, the study provides a deeper examination of China's motivations in relation to the maritime disputes, US-China strategic competition, and Xi Jinping's new strategy to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The analysis of the legal, strategic and political dimensions of China's positioning in the South China Sea suggests that maritime nationalism rather than the quest for maritime hegemony is a central motivation driving Chinese actions. A second important insight is that the current approach is strengthening China's control, but undermining its legitimacy in the eyes of other major powers and stakeholders. By focusing on legitimacy as an organizing principle in maritime affairs, it becomes clear that the Chinese leadership stands to gain from integrating its ambition more fully into the evolving maritime order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Philippines Arbitration Tribunal separately dealing with the jurisdiction over the South China Sea dispute is the continuance of the set practice by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's Annex VII arbitral tribunals of bifurcation of proceedings, and was the best option for it to deal with China's objections to its jurisdiction in the circumstance of China's non-acceptance of and non-participation in the arbitral proceedings. Such a measure has potentially important implications for the tribunal itself and for China. The tribunal's decision to have jurisdiction over some parts of the Philippines’ submissions resumed the merits proceedings of the dispute. This development of the proceedings would force China to reconsider its current policy of non-participation. Participation in the subsequent merits proceedings might be the right choice for China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In early 2013, pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) treaty, the Philippines initiated compulsory arbitration against China in an attempt to finally settle their South China Sea disputes. Tired after years of futile negotiating and what it views as belligerent Chinese actions in the Sea, the Philippines hopes that a UN tribunal will reject China's nine-dash line and its claims of sovereignty over much of the Sea. International legal regimes are systems of choice, and China must calculate if it is in its national interest to comply with an adverse award. As an aspiring power, the political, economic, and military costs of ignoring a UN tribunal to China are high. Yet, China's strict adherence to a historic right to the Sea's waters and islands may preclude it from seeing the wisdom in complying with a UN award. Thus, the solution to peace in the South China Sea may sit outside of UNCLOS and may necessitate a freeing from UNCLOS obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the genesis, usage, and meaning of the People’s Republic of China’s and the Republic of China’s U-shaped line claim in the South China Sea territorial dispute from 1946 to 1974. The Republic of China (ROC) officially created the line in 1947, which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) then adopted in 1949. Although the PRC claims sovereignty over all of the disputed islands and features, it remains silent on what specific waters the line claims. Based on ROC national archival files on the line, which remain virtually unused by scholars on the dispute, this article argues that the line was an “islands attribution” boundary until at least 1974. It claimed only the islands, features, and any adjacent waters consistent with contemporary conceptions of international maritime law. The article concludes with the present-day significance of this history and suggestions for future avenues of scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Surveying China in 2015, this article focuses on how the Xi leadership dealt with several of the most complex economic and security challenges it faced during the year, in particular: sustaining economic growth; responding to social unrest; confronting environmental problems; managing foreign relations in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea; reforming and modernizing the People's Liberation Army; and managing cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically analyses an intuitive and influential conceptual framework by which to understand state strategy in territorial conflicts. According to this framework, a state in a territorial dispute can pursue one of three general strategies: threaten or use force; offer territorial concessions; or delay. This article argues that it is problematic to regard these three candidate strategies as mutually exclusive. It is argued that not only can a strategy of escalation be compatible with one of delay, but many uses of force can be employed instrumentally in service of delaying. The framework, this article contends, does not so much capture "strategy" as it does certain aspects--or outcomes--of strategy, which while appropriate for certain analytical tasks is less so for others. The 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident is examined and China's strategy during the event is scrutinized with a view towards assessing the strengths and weaknesses of applying the framework to an analysis of narrower scope. Lastly, it is argued that a framework for conceptualizing state strategy in territorial disputes should not be confined to three alternatives; it should be more broadly constructed, allowing for more nuance and taking seriously all the domains of statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U-shaped line in the South China Sea has been recently challenged in the international community and this challenge reached its climax when the Philippines presented China with a Notification and Statement of Claim under Article 287 and Annex VII of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea (LOSConvention) on 22 January 2013. In its Statement of Claim, the Philippines requests the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal to adjudge and declare that China's maritime claims based on the U-shaped line are contrary to the LOS Convention and invalid. Against this background, this article will analyze the issues concerning the related submissions of the Philippines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interlocking of the maritime basin network that took place with the development of the Maritime Silk Roads by the late first millennium bc led to major cultural transfers. This research investigates Southeast Asia's cultural integration and takes into consideration what I call a South China Sea network culture, a result of long-established and extensive connectivity of its populations. The assumption is that this cultural matrix also laid the ground for socio-political practices hypothesized to be at the core of identity building and cultural transfers. These issues are investigated through the technological analysis of hybrid ornament industries in a recently excavated early city-port of the South China Sea which developed with the Maritime Silk Roads that thrived from the fourth to the first centuries bc. This enclosed cosmopolitan settlement hosting populations from various Asian horizons was structured by socio-professional quarters. This node concentrated various craft centres where artisans of different origins made culturally hybrid products with what were then the most advanced technologies. The chronological sequence allows characterization of the evolution of these industries along with the socio-political strategies which they may have served and how otherness was handled in the construction of social identity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the role of fisheries in the East China Sea and the South China Sea as an aspect of China's food security policy. Topics include the notion of wild fish as a strategic natural resource in light of fishery depletion, a 1974 conflict between China and South Vietnam regarding fishing rights in the Paracel Islands area, and maritime boundary disputes with the Philippines, Japan, and Indonesia. Also addressed are problems with Chinese maritime security interagency cooperation, possible international cooperation in resolving fisheries disputes, and efforts to avoid international conflict over fisheries.

China is the least disadvantaged major economy in the current era of global economic uncertainty. Thus it is becoming the focus of attention of its neighbours and is achieving a prominence in the world political economy unparalleled in its modern history. To a great extent, China's success is the result of 'good neighbour diplomacy' such as 'win-win' and the policies of reform and openness of the past thirty years. However, despite continuity in policy, China's 'peaceful leap forward' since 2008 has changed the context of its external relationships. The increasing asymmetries between China and its neighbours, as well as decreasing asymmetry with the United States, require an adjustment of win-win values beyond mutual benefit to credible reassurance. As China's neighbours become more dependent, they also become more anxious concerning their interests. Meanwhile, China's relative gain on the US requires a different kind of confidence-building diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Asian Studies Review is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

China's new assertiveness in the South China Sea has arisen from the growth of its military power, its ‘triumphalism’ in the wake of the Western financial crisis and its heightened nationalism. The other littoral states of the South China Sea have been troubled by the opacity of Chinese politics and of the process of military decision-making amid a proliferation of apparently separately controlled maritime forces. The more active role being played by the United States in the region, in part as a response to Chinese activism, has troubled Beijing. While most of the ASEAN states have welcomed America as a hedge against growing Chinese power, their economies have become increasingly dependent upon China and they don't want to be a party to any potential conflict between these two giants. The problem is that there is no apparent resolution to what the Chinese call, in effect, these ‘indisputable disputes’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author discusses the arbitral proceeding filed by the Philippines against China under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC) challenging the validity of the latter's claims in the South China Sea. It discusses the Notification and Statement of Claim (Notification) by the Philippines, which challenges the nine-dash line claim of China.

Competition and conflict in the South China Sea involves many nations due to its resources and vital sea lanes. However, it is China which increasingly serves as a common denominator of intensifying anxiety for its South China Sea maritime neighbours due to the aggressive scope of its claims to the sea and its islands. Among those states, Vietnam is most affected as it is first in the path of Chinese ambitions -- ambitions which authorities fear would give China significant tactical military and economic advantage. For China, there are similar fears over threats to the sea lanes and sea bed resources. Leaders of both states also perceive their diplomatic and martial actions in the sea in historical terms as well. However, enforcement actions taken by either state may lead to a worsening security dilemma in which reactive security strategies could dangerously destabilise relations. This article discusses the motivations and strategies of both states as well as the consequences of such and applies realism, its tenets of defensive and offensive realism, and neoliberalism to examine their security concerns and perceptions. The article further proposes that the most valuable insights can be provided by defensive realism and neoliberalism, which together can encourage security, cooperation and conciliation in order to best promote the improvement of relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses conflict in the South China Sea and its Islands, focusing on a lack of resolution of disputes over sovereignty and control involving China and ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. The author highlights international, regional, and bilateral strategies for resolving conflict in the South China Sea, including discussions of a lack of involvement by the United Nations (U.N.), Track-2 (nongovernmental) diplomacy efforts, and foreign relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam. It is suggested that balancing strategies involving outside countries such as the U.S. may preserve the status quo in the South China Sea region.

The author offers perspective on the challenges facing India in staging a presence in the South China Sea. He explains Milan Vego's concepts of interior and exterior lines to the sea. He suggests that India should remain mindful of the dynamics of naval suasion. He compares India and China in terms of material indices, military and economic. He suggests that India can augment its influence by building a fleet crewed by skilled mariners or courting strategic partners in South East Asia.