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A focal job of Westminster opposition, there is nevertheless a dearth of published analysis on the job of Shadow Chancellor. This article argues that the Shadow Chancellor is distinctive because of its strategic power over opposition policy and other shadow portfolios and offers a critique of the post for perhaps the first time. The article shows that: most Shadow Chancellors have leadership ambitions but demonstrates that their position is intertwined with that of leader; that they are unlikely to be reshuffled by the leader who appointed them; and, that new leaders usually appoint new Shadow Chancellors. Drawing on various data about the behaviour of post holders, it demonstrates that the Shadow Chancellor occupies a central coordinating role alongside the opposition leader and supports the 'Westminster Model' by acting as a combative critic of government and grounding leadership in the collegiality of Parliament. Nonetheless, it also shows that the Shadow Chancellor's profile is strongest outside Westminster, in projecting the economic credibility of an alternative government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking as its point of departure Matthews' (2011) ‘Constitutional stretching: Coalition governance and the Westminster model (Commonwealth & Comparative Politics,49(4), 486–509), this article draws on the experience of coalition government in Westminster to review, categorise and consider how power sharing has necessitated a rethink of what is the British constitution. Defining constitutional stretching as being about the sustained operation of two-party government within the Westminster model, it shows that traditional practices around manifestos, collective responsibility and the prerogative have been adjusted since 2010 in order to facilitate functioning administration. The article observes that some stretching is not entirely novel with precedents to be found in earlier single party administrations. It further argues that while conventions have been strained, the Cameron/Clegg government survived, suggesting a need to adjust our understanding of constitutional concepts. Given the likelihood of future hung parliaments, this could mean more permanent constitutional change and the article makes some modest suggestions for updating guidance. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the rejection of the House of Lords Reform Bill of Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg. History of smaller reforms undertaken from 1911 to 2012 is recounted. Key issues reviewed by the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Select Committee are explained individually.