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This paper examines how international education (IE) as a tool of government foreign policy is challenged in an era of new geopolitics, where China's growing ambitions have increased rivalry with the West. It compares U.S. and Canada as cases first, by examining rationales and approaches to IE in both countries, second, IE relations with China before conflict and third, current controversies and government policy responses to IE relations with China. The paper concludes identifying contextual factors that shape each country's engagement with IE, but suggests that moving forward, the future of IE in a world of new geopolitics is likely to be far more complex and conflictual.

This paper describes the current criticisms of academic research collaboration between the US and China and proposes a university-led initiative to address those concerns. The article begins with the assertion that bilateral research collaboration has historically benefitted both countries, citing cooperation in virology as an example. The paper continues with a discussion of the criticisms leveled by several US government agencies against the Chinese government, especially with regard to the Thousand Talents Program (TTP). A close examination of publicly available appointment letters under the TTP suggests that Chinese universities are given wide discretion when it comes to defining the specific terms of scholarly collaboration. Along with additional supporting arguments, the paper concludes that the most significant violations of commonly accepted research norms are owing to the behavior of individual Chinese institutions and are not directed by the TTP or the Chinese national government. The paper then suggests several steps for addressing these issues at the university level, beginning with a convening of campus leaders from both countries.

One major report after another shows that the United States needs a large, innovative, and effective adult education and workforce skills system. It is essential to the national security, economic stability, and democratic way of life. To address this need fully a leadership agency focused on a singular national goal is required, one with a legislative mandate to perform strategic planning and other coordination functions between and among federal agencies and public and private sector groups. Such an agency can accomplish its mission only if it is supported by a strong governance structure. The Council for Advancement of Adult Literacy (CAAL) proposes that the National Institute for Literacy (NIFL) be reauthorized with a new and broader mission, mode of operation, and governance structure, and that these transformational elements be clearly set forth in the reauthorizing legislation. This will effectively create a new agency (with a new name, National Institute for Adult Learning, NIFAL) in place of the current National Institute for Literacy. NIFL, as chartered by the 1991 and 1998 Acts, might have been an important agency in the adult education field, but it was handicapped from the outset. Redeveloped as discussed in this paper, NIFAL will be able to take on the essential and far larger task of building an adult education and workforce skills system to meet the nation's 21st Century needs. About the Authors and NIFAL Working Group are appended. (Contains 7 notes.)

As of January 2012, more than 850,000 active foreign students were in the United States enrolled at over 10,000 U.S. schools. ICE, within DHS, is responsible for managing SEVP and certifying schools to accept foreign students. GAO was asked to review ICE's fraud prevention and detection procedures for SEVP. This report examines the extent to which ICE has (1) identified and assessed risks in SEVP and 2) developed and implemented policies and procedures to prevent and detect fraud during the initial school certification process and once schools begin accepting foreign students. GAO analyzed documents, such as ICE's SEVP procedures, and tested recordkeeping controls by selecting a random sample of 50 SEVP-certified schools and reviewing case files. GAO interviewed officials from SEVP, CTCEU, and 8 of 26 ICE field offices, selected based on a mix of factors, including school fraud investigations and referrals from CTCEU. While the results of the case file reviews and interviews cannot be generalized, they provided insights about SEVP. GAO recommends that ICE, among other things, identify and assess program risks; consistently implement procedures for ensuring schools' eligibility; address missing school case files; and establish target time frames for notifying flight schools that lack required FAA certification that they must re-obtain FAA certification. DHS concurred with the recommendations. Appended are: (1) Scope and Methodology; (2) Comments from the Department of Homeland Security; and (3) GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments. (Contains 1 table, 3 figures and 53 footnotes.)

Concentrating on executive powers presents a real opportunity for the Obama administration to turn its focus away from a divided Congress and the unappetizing process of making legislative sausage. Instead, the administration can focus on the president's ability to deliver results for the American people on the things that matter most to them. The Obama administration, of course, is already using the capacity of the presidency to drive change in the public and private sector. For example, it promoted the formation of Skills for America's Future, a new public-private initiative in support of the president's goal of 5 million more community college graduates and certificates by 2020. Similarly, President Obama's recent trip to India provided an opportunity for him to win agreements that will bring significant economic benefits to U.S. firms and American workers. There is much more the president can do. The list of ideas presented in this paper offers just some of the many possible actions the administration can take using existing authority to move the country forward. [Forward by John D. Podesta]

The Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Science is among the world's premier supporters of basic research. The Office of Science enables the U.S. to maintain its competitive edge by funding science that can transform its energy future, supports its national security and seeks to understand the fundamentals of matter and energy itself. To do this the Department of Energy, and the Nation as a whole, need extraordinary scientific and technical talent on a scale to match the competitor countries. However, the Nation's ability to create sufficient talent has eroded. The National Academy of Sciences' "Rising Above the Gathering Storm" report confirms the vital role that a highly skilled technical workforce plays in an innovation economy such as the United States', but warns that the U.S. has not done enough to prepare the next generation of technical workers for careers in the new global economy. The Office of Science is prepared to help address this challenge. Each year, hundreds of thousands of students of all ages--from kindergarten to mid-career scientists--have participated in the educational and workforce development programs sponsored at laboratories. These students could become the core of the Nation's future technical workforce. However, a coherent, overarching strategy is necessary to maximize the efficiency and impact of programs. The strategic plan presented in this document provides this overarching strategy. Four primary strategic areas have emerged from the planning process. Each area focuses on a different part of workforce development: educators, students, workers, and the building of program capacity. Individual sections contain footnotes. [This paper was created by the DOE's Office of Science.]

This essay examines Presidential rhetoric and popular culture practices in light of the stages of grief enumerated by Elisabeth Kubler-Ross. The authors find a consistent retrenchment of grief into the anger phase, where the pain of losing national invulnerability is transferred to externalized aggression. Reconciliation is suggested by means of enriching appreciation for formalized rituals associated with grief and loss.

In recent years, development has become a cornerstone of the U.S. national security strategy, along with defense and diplomacy. The challenge of development is broader and more multifaceted than it has ever been. It involves not only traditional development--the achievement of economic, social, and political progress--but the added challenges of strengthening fragile states, achieving progress in countries of special strategic interest, providing humanitarian relief, and addressing key global and transnational issues. This spotlight on development has illuminated the critical role of education. Not only is education one of the keys to economic growth and poverty reduction, but it is also increasingly evident that educational failure contributes to broader state instability. Expanded, high-quality education promotes stability and positive participation in the global community. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) thus includes education and training as part of its strategic efforts to promote economic prosperity and security; improve health, education, the environment, and other conditions for the global population; advance the growth of democracy and good governance; and minimize the human costs of displacement, conflict, and natural disaster. Recognition of the important role of education in development has prompted the United States and other donor nations to increase their support for education. This paper sets forth USAID's role in utilizing education as a powerful tool for development. (Contains 4 footnotes.)

As the Post-9/11 Veterans Education Assistance Act (popularly known as the Post-9/11 GI Bill or Chapter 33) begins its second academic year of operation, changes loom on the horizon. While this is no surprise to those who know the history of the original GI Bill, some of the changes will have considerable impact not only on veteran students, but on institutions and across sectors of higher education. This paper outlines current major potential changes to the Post-9/11 GI Bill (as originally introduced) and analyzes their possible effects. (Contains 5 resources.)

This paper investigates spillovers from foreign economies to the U.S. through changes in longterm Treasury yields. We document a decline in the contribution of U.S. domestic news to the variance of long-term Treasury yields and an increased importance of overnight yield changes|a rough proxy for the contribution of foreign shocks to U.S. yields|over the past decades. Using a model that identifies U.S., Euro area, and U.K. shocks that move global yields, we estimate that foreign (non-U.S.) shocks account for at least 20% of the daily variation in long-term U.S. yields in recent years. We argue that spillovers occur in large part through bond term premia by showing that a low level of foreign yields relative to U.S. yields predicts a decline in distant forward U.S. yields and higher returns on a strategy that is long on a long-term Treasury security and short on a long-term foreign bond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A country report for the U.S. is presented from publisher Country Watch Inc., with topics including government strategy, economic growth, and national security.

As the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force General David L Goldfein put it at the Air Force Association's Air, Space and Cyber Conference in 2018, 'We usually have the dialogue about the Air Force we can afford. Source: Author analysis based on IISS, I The Military Balance 2019 i ; John Venable, "US Air Force: An Assessment of US Military Power", Heritage Foundation, 4 October 2018; Boston et al., I Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe i ; author interviews with NATO and US Air Force commanders, London, 2019; Washington, DC, 2019; Berlin, 2019. The E-3 Sentry has set the global standard for AWACS aircraft since its introduction in the early 1970s by the US Air Force and subsequent acquisition by the Royal Air Force, French Air Force, NATO AWACS Force, and Royal Saudi Air Force. It is important to remember, however, that even if the US Air Force manages to secure the funding it has requested from Congress to cover 72 new fighters a year for the foreseeable future to allow expansion above the rate of old airframe retirement, and even if all 72 were to be F-35As, then the US Air Force fighter fleet would still be composed of 50% legacy fourth-generation platforms like the F-15 and F-16 in 2030.[43] In fact, the latest US Air Force budget estimates plan instead on 48 F-35s per year from 2020, augmented with eight new F-15EX fighters in the 2020 financial year, rising to 18 per year from 2021-24.[44] Eventually, the US Air Force may purchase as many as 144 F-15EXs to replace ageing F-15Cs in the air superiority and air defence roles by the mid-late 2020s, which will further reduce the ratio of fifth-generation fighters in the force.[45]. [Extracted from the article]

This article reports on a paper written by Mark Lloyd, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, calling for U.S. federal investment in wireless broadband. Citing communications failures during the September 11 terrorist attacks and Hurricane Katrina, Lloyd believes that the government needs to adopt wireless broadband to ensure its ability to respond rapidly and effectively to homeland security threats and natural disasters.

There is no consensus among experts in and outside the U.S. government about the magnitude of the threat to U.S. national interests posed by the Al Qaeda organization. Virtually all experts agree that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers retain the intention to conduct major attacks in the United States, against U.S. interests abroad, and against Western countries. In assessing capabilities, many believe that the Al Qaeda organization and its leadership are no longer as relevant to assessing the global Islamic terrorist threat as they were on September 11, 2001. Some believe U.S. and allied counter efforts have weakened Al Qaeda's central leadership structure and capabilities to the point where Al Qaeda serves more as inspiration than as an actual terrorism planning and execution hub. According to this view, the threat from Al Qaeda has been replaced by a threat from a number of loosely affiliated cells and groups that subscribe to Al Qaeda's ideology but have little, if any, contact with remaining Al Qaeda leaders. Those who take this view believe that catastrophic attacks similar to those on September 11, 2001 are unlikely because terrorist operations on that scale require a high degree of coordination. An alternate view is that the remaining Al Qaeda leadership remains in contact with, and possibly even in control of numerous Islamic militant cells and groups that continue to commit acts of terrorism, such as the July 7, 2005 bombings of the London underground transportation system. According to those who subscribe to this view, Al Qaeda as an organization has not been weakened to the degree that some Administration officials assert, and the global effort against Islamic terrorism would benefit significantly from finding and capturing Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden and his top associate, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Subscribers to this view believe that a coordinated attack on the scale of September 11 should not be ruled out because the remaining Al Qaeda structure is sufficiently well-organized to conduct an effort of that magnitude. This paper will focus on the Al Qaeda organization and its major affiliates, but not the full spectrum of like-minded Islamist cells or groups that might exist. This report will be updated as warranted by developments. See also CRS Report RL32759, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. economic sanctions are imposed against North Korea for four primary reasons: (1) North Korea is seen as posing a threat to U.S. national security; (2) North Korea is designated by the Secretary of State as a state sponsor or supporter of international terrorism; (3) North Korea is a Marxist-Leninist state, with a Communist government; and (4) North Korea has been found by the State Department to have engaged in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In accordance with U.S. law, the United States limits some trade, denies trade in dual-use goods and services, limits foreign aid, and opposes entry into or support from international financial institutions. At the President's discretion, North Korea would also be subject to the economic sanctions pursuant to the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, under which the administration has identified North Korea as a "country of particular concern" since 2001, and pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, under which the administration has classified North Korea in the category of most severe offender (Tier 3) since 2003. In October 2002, after meetings between high-level U.S. and North Korean government officials, the United States reported that North Korea had confirmed suspicions that it had reactivated its nuclear weapons development program. An international crisis ensued, with North Korea expelling International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and declaring that it would withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Participants in the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) -- including United States, Japan, South Korea and European Union -- in turn suspended shipments of fuel oil. KEDO also suspended construction of the light-water reactors, the completion of which had been planned for 2003. North Korea officially withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on January 10, 2003 (effective three months hence), the first signatory country to do so. In August 2003, North Korea joined the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia in six-party talks. The six nations have met for three rounds; at the last, in June 2004, the United States offered to provide security guarantees and an easing of sanctions to make foreign aid available if North Korea dismantled its nuclear program. North Korea did not respond and there have been no further talks. The vacuum created by the absence of multilateral or bilateral talks in the past year has been filled with public pronouncements from North Korea about its progress: it declared in February 2005 that it had assembled a nuclear weapon; in May it announced it had harvested weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel rods from a power plant, thought to be enough to develop 6-to-10 additional weapons. The vacuum has also been filled with the other five nations strategizing among themselves, and each of the five meeting or exchanging messages with North Korea, about the urgency of returning to the six-party talks. This paper explains the U.S. economic sanctions currently in place, and summarizes recent events as they relate to the potential application of additional restrictions. It will be updated as necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A perceived lack of coordination in the federal government's warning notification process and inconsistent messages regarding threats to the homeland have led to an erosion of confidence in the information conveyed to the Nation. Congress is now considering legislation (H.R. 1817, The Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act for FY2006) to reform the Homeland Security Advisor System to allow for greater confidence in the threat information conveyed to the Nation. Since September 11, 2001, numerous federal government organizations have notified the public of threats to the Nation. At times, warnings have been issued in a government-wide coordinated manner; other times this has not been the case. In each situation that has led to increasing the threat level, a number of organizations have made public pronouncements regarding the nature of the threat prior to, during, or after the raising of the alert-level. The information conveyed to the public often has been inconsistent regarding the threat or the timing of a suspected attack. This lack of coordination and unity in message has led to a dilution in the American public's belief in the pronouncements and a questioning of the utility of the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS). The focus of this paper is the federal government's coordination efforts in publicly alerting the Nation of threats to the homeland. The report reviews past warnings and changes in the alert level, organizations that have made public statements regarding threats to the Nation, and examples of how this lack of unity might lead to confusion and misinterpretations of the threat level. Options for Congress are provided regarding delineation of roles and responsibilities and which government entity should be held accountable for warning the Nation of threats to the homeland . This paper may be updated based on future National threat notifications or changes in the notification system. For a discussion and options regarding the Homeland Security Advisory System's (HSAS) level of detail with respect to disseminated warnings, Department of Homeland Security's suggested protective measures, coordination of the HSAS with other current federal warning systems, or the costs associated with threat levels changes see CRS Report RL32023, Homeland Security Advisory System: Possible Issues for Congressional Oversight. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States is relying heavily in Iraq on private firms to supply a wide variety of services, including security. From the information available in published sources, this apparently is the first time that the United States has depended on contractors to provide such extensive security in a hostile environment, although it has previously contracted for more limited security services in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and elsewhere. In Iraq, private companies are currently providing security services such as the protection of individuals, non-military transport convoys, buildings and other economic infrastructure, as well as the training of Iraqi police and military personnel. U.S. contracts for these services are issued by, or on behalf of, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the U.S.-led entity that is currently exercising sovereign authority in Iraq. In a discussion paper issued recently, the CPA stated that it has direct contracts with eight companies for personal security, non-military site security, and non-military convoy security services that are "defensive in nature" and with a total value of $147 million, but it did not name the firms. Some eight firms have been identified in recent news accounts of firms providing protective services to or on behalf of the CPA, although these may not entirely overlap with the CPA list. These firms are Armor Group, Blackwater Security Consulting, Custer Battles, Erinys Iraq, Diligence LLC, Global Risk Strategies, Special Operations Consulting-Security Management Group, and the Steele Foundation. In addition, a State Department list cites another firm, ISI Iraq, as providing security to coalition facilities. Also, two companies have contracts to train the Iraqi security forces: DynCorp for the police and Vinnell Corporation for the military (although the work reportedly is being done by MPRI under a subcontract). The use of armed contractors raises several concerns for many Members, including transparency and accountability. Transparency issues include the lack of public information on the terms of their contracts, including their costs and the standards governing their performance, as well as the background and training of those hired under contract. The apparent lack of a practical means to hold contractors accountable under U.S. law for abuses and other transgressions, and the possibility that they could be prosecuted by foreign courts, is also a source of concern. Contractors working with the U.S. military (or with any of the coalition forces) in Iraq are non-combatants who have no combat immunity under international law if they engage in hostilities, and whose conduct may be attributable to the United States. Contractors are not likely to be subject to military law, but may be prosecuted under criminal statutes that apply extraterritorially or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or by means of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA). However, there is little precedent for trying contractor employees for crimes committed overseas. At least until June 30, 2004, when the CPA is scheduled to transfer sovereignty to Iraq and dissolve, Iraqi courts do not have jurisdiction to prosecute contractors without the permission of the CPA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Congress has long been concerned about challenges to U.S. security posed by the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles that could deliver them. Recipients of China's technology include Pakistan and countries that the State Department says support terrorism, like Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Policy issues have concerned summits, sanctions, and satellite exports. Since 1991, Beijing has taken steps to mollify concerns about its role in proliferation. Steps include the: 1991-1992 promise to abide by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); March 1992 accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT); January 1993 signing and subsequent ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); October 1994 statements on the MTCR and fissile material production; November 1995 white paper on arms control and disarmament; May 1996 reiteration on making only safeguarded nuclear transfers; July 1996 announcement of a moratorium on nuclear testing; signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in September 1996; October 1997 entry to the Zangger Committee; and November 2000 missile nonproliferation pledge. Nonetheless, as the Director of Central Intelligence reports, the PRC remains a "key supplier" of technology inconsistent with nonproliferation goals -- particularly missile or chemical technology transfers. China has aggravated trends that result in more ambiguous technical assistance, more indigenous capabilities, longer range missiles, and secondary (retransferred) proliferation. Some transfers raise questions about violations of the NPT and/or contradictions of the MTCR or U.S. laws, which may require sanctions. China is not in the MTCR, Nuclear Suppliers Group, nor Australia Group. Successive Administrations have pursued a policy of "engagement" with Beijing, while some have argued that the policy needs a tougher approach to advance non-proliferation interests. In 1998, President Clinton issued certifications to implement the 1985 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The Clinton Administration encouraged the PRC to join the MTCR and proposed to allow more PRC satellite launches. In November 2000, the State Department agreed to waive sanctions and consider new satellite exports in return for a missile non-proliferation pledge from China. Congress passed the Iran Non-proliferation Act (P.L. 106-178). Under this law, on June 14, 2001, January 16, and May 9, 2002, the Bush Administration imposed sanctions for PRC weapons proliferation in Iran. On September 1, 2001, the Administration imposed missile proliferation sanctions (denying satellite exports), after China apparently violated its November 2000 pledge and transferred technology to Pakistan. The 9/11 terrorist attacks added an urgent U.S. interest in weapons nonproliferation. New sanctions were imposed on July 9, 2002. See also CRS Report 96-767, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis; and CRS Report 98-485, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers From U.S. Satellite Export Policy - Actions and Chronology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the authors' insight on the importance of American global leadership to the Americans' freedom, security, and prosperity. Topics discussed include the commitment of the U.S. to international engagement and the responsibility of the country in providing security to its people, the factors of international engagement which are underapreciated such as diplomacy and foreign assistance, and the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

The article offers the authors' insight on the challenge posed to the U.S. in combating the terrorist groups Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS), which have created a caliphate and expanded control in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Topics discussed include the misconception of American leaders of the groups' threat to security, suggesting to avoid defeatism, and the growth in the terrorists' military capacity.

The article examines U.S. President Barack Obama's approach to Cuba in view of the normalization of diplomatic relationship between the two countries. Topics discussed include the challenge of U.S. Senate's consent to U.S.-Cuba relations, U.S. security concerns, U.S. policies on the Castro dictatorship, and obstacles to normal trade between the two countries. Also discussed are the economic and political implications of Obama's unilateral concessions with Cuba.

The article offers information related to economic stabilization of Central America. Topics discussed include the economic impact of illegal immigrants in the country, the importance of budget allocation to secure national borders and patrol agents to combat illegal immigration problems, and the importance of the effort of the government to resolve issues related to drug trafficking, criminal organizations, and public official corruption.

The article discusses the national security policy of the U.S. government as of April 2014 and its effects in preventing the advancement of the terrorist group al Qaeda and its affiliates in the Muslim-majority world. It tackles such topics as the extremist version of shari'a, counterterrorism, and counterinsurgency. It features such personalities as the late terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, U.S. President Barack Obama and former U.S. president George W. Bush.

The article reflects on the implications of the government-defence industry relationship in three countries including the U.S., Germany and Great Britain. It informs that the Defence and Security Organisation (DSO) promotes the export of British goods and services. It mentions that the defense industry should be responsive towards national-security threats and there is a need of integration between civil and military technologies.

The article focuses on a study which concludes that nuclear disarmament exist but is far behind from practice. It mentions that if the U.S. and Russia reduce their deployed strategic arsenals by 50 per cent by 2020, they would still have nuclear arsenals for their security. It mentions that the Great Britain and France have no plans to increase their nuclear weapons in future. It informs that most states gave up nuclear-weapons programmes due to the international non-proliferation norms.

The article focuses on mutual nuclear restraint by creating a stateof affairs in which all seven nuclear-armed states will decide that whether their nuclear arms are sufficient for their own security. It mentions that if the U.S. and Russia will start disarmament then smaller countries will follow them. It informs that further restrain will be on long range ballistic missiles and on warheads that possess risk of mutual vulnerability.

The article presents the paper "The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)" by James K. Jackson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance at the U.S. Congressional Research Service. Topics include the planned acquisition of the commercial operations of U.S. ports by Dubai Ports World in 2006, the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA) of 2007, and the concept of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).

The article focuses on the Section 301 investigation initiated by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) regarding China's maritime, shipbuilding, and logistics policies, which aim to establish global dominance in these sectors. It details how this investigation follows a petition from U.S. labor unions, highlighting concerns that China's practices undermine U.S. economic and national security interests.

The article discusses the security cooperation of New Zealand with the U.S. It cites several organizations that help promote bilateral ties between the U.S. and New Zealand, including the United States-New Zealand Council in Washington, D.C. During Prime Minister John Key's visit to Washington in July 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama described New Zealand as an outstanding partner. Information on the Wellington Declaration of November 2010 is offered.

Enacted in 1966 after 11 years of investigation, legislative development, and deliberation in the House and half as many years of such consideration in the Senate, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) displaced the ineffective public information section of the Administrative Procedure Act. The FOIA was designed to enable any person b individual or corporate, regardless of citizenship b to request, without explanation or justification, presumptive access to existing, identifiable, unpublished, executive branch agency records on any topic. The statute specified nine categories of information that may be permissibly exempted from the rule of disclosure. Disputes over the accessibility of requested records could be ultimately settled in court. Not supported as legislation or enthusiastically received as law by the executive branch, the FOIA was subsequently refined with direct amendments in 1974, 1976, 1986, and 1996. The statute has become a somewhat popular tool of inquiry and information gathering for various quarters of American society b the press, business, scholars, attorneys, consumers, and environmentalists, among others b as well as some foreign interests. The response to a request may involve a few sheets of paper, several linear feet of records, or perhaps information in an electronic format. Such responses require staff time, search and duplication efforts, and other resource commitments. Agency information management professionals must efficiently and economically service FOIA requests, doing so, of late, in the sensitized homeland security milieu. Requesters must be satisfied through timely supply, brokerage, or explanation. Simultaneously, agency FOIA costs must be kept reasonable. The perception that these conditions are not operative can result in proposed new corrective amendments to the statute. Legislation offered in this regard in the 109th Congress includes S. 394, the OPEN Government Act, introduced by Senator John Cornyn with Senator Patrick Leahy, and H.R. 867, the House companion, introduced by Representative Lamar Smith. Of related interest is S. 589, sponsored by Senator Cornyn with Senator Leahy, which would create a temporary commission to examine, and make recommendations concerning, FOIA request processing delays. The companion bill, H.R. 1620, was offered by Representative Brad Sherman. Another related bill offered by Senator Leahy, S. 622, would amend the Homeland Security Act to modify the limitations on the release of voluntarily furnished critical infrastructure information pursuant to the FOIA. In mid-May, Representative Henry Waxman introduced H.R. 2331, a comprehensive bill addressing several aspects of information access and disclosure. This report examines efforts to amend the FOI Act, and will be updated as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, subsequent anthrax incidents, and occasional warnings of terrorist reprisals in response to U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, federal policymakers have given renewed attention to continuity of operations (COOP) issues. COOP planning is a segment of federal government contingency planning that refers to the internal effort of an organization, such as a branch of government, department, or office, to assure that the capability exists to continue essential operations in the aftermath of a comprehensive array of potential operational interruptions. It is related to continuity of government (COG) planning. COG plans are designed to ensure survival of a constitutional form of government and the continuity of essential federal functions. This report does not discuss COG planning beyond any direct relationship to COOP planning. Government-wide, COOP planning is critical because much of the recovery from an incident, which might include the maintenance of civil authority, and infrastructure repair, among other recovery activities, presumes the existence of an ongoing, functional government to fund, support, and oversee actions taken. In the executive branch, COOP planning can be viewed as a continuation of basic emergency preparedness planning, and a bridge between that planning and efforts to maintain continuity of government in the event of a significant disruption to government activity or institutions. Because the number and types of potential interruptions are unknown, effective COOP planning must provide, in advance of an incident, a variety of means to assure contingent operations. This report discusses the background of COOP planning, discusses elements of an effective COOP plan, and reviews the current policies governing COOP planning in the executive branch. The final two sections address issues and policy questions, including, among other matters, the status of agency preparedness, maintaining COOP preparedness, congressional committee oversight of COOP activity, and funding for contingency planning. This report is one of several CRS products related to government contingency planning, and will be updated as events warrant. COOP planning in Congress is [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To navigate the Internet requires using addresses (and corresponding names) that identify the location of individual computers. As the Internet grew, the method for allocating and designating those domain names became controversial. The Administration issued a White Paper in June 1998 endorsing the creation of a new notfor-profit corporation of private sector Internet stakeholders to administer policy for the Internet name and address system. On November 25, 1998, the Department of Commerce (DOC) formally approved a new corporation, called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). A Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and DOC has been extended through September 2003. During this transition period, government obligations will be terminated as most DNS responsibilities are transferred to the private sector. Issues in the 108th Congress include the appropriate federal role in overseeing the DNS, the creation of new top level domains (TLDs), how ICANN will be governed and funded, and the resolution of trademark disputes. This report will be updated periodically as events warrant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region's future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. The seven other Arctic states are Canada, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark (by virtue of Greenland), and Russia. The Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (Title I of P.L. 98-373 of July 31, 1984) "provide[s] for a comprehensive national policy dealing with national research needs and objectives in the Arctic." The National Science Foundation (NSF) is the lead federal agency for implementing Arctic research policy. The Arctic Council, created in 1996, is the leading international forum for addressing issues relating to the Arctic. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets forth a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world's oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS. Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security. The geopolitical environment for the Arctic has been substantially affected by the renewal of great power competition. Although there continues to be significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly viewed as an arena for geopolitical competition among the United States, Russia, and China. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard are devoting increased attention to the Arctic in their planning and operations. Whether DOD and the Coast Guard are devoting sufficient resources to the Arctic and taking sufficient actions for defending U.S. interests in the region has emerged as a topic of congressional oversight. The Coast Guard has two operational polar icebreakers and has received funding for the procurement of two of at least three planned new polar icebreakers. The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes--the Northern Sea Route close to Russia, and the Northwest Passage close to Alaska and through the Canadian archipelago--though the rate of increase in the use of these routes might not be as great as sometimes anticipated in press accounts. International guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters have been recently updated. Changes to the Arctic brought about by warming temperatures will likely allow more exploration for oil, gas, and minerals. Warming that causes permafrost to melt could pose challenges to onshore exploration activities. Increased oil and gas exploration and tourism (cruise ships) in the Arctic increase the risk of pollution in the region. Cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters will be more difficult than in other areas, primarily because effective strategies for cleaning up oil spills in ice-covered waters have yet to be developed. Large commercial fisheries exist in the Arctic. The United States is working with other countries regarding the management of Arctic fish stocks. Changes in the Arctic could affect threatened and endangered species, and could result in migration of fish stocks to new waters. Under the Endangered Species Act, the polar bear was listed as threatened on May 15, 2008. Arctic climate change is also expected to affect the economies, health, and cultures of Arctic indigenous peoples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the trade laws, regulations and policies adopted by China since 2020 that are of interest to the U.S. Congress. The aim of the trade measures is to improve Chinese control over commercial activity and reach economic and national security-related policies of the U.S. and other countries. The use of market restrictions is said to be manifested in the measures. Among the issues to be considered by Congress are state control, market restrictions and anti-competitive practices.