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The book "Thoughtful Images. Illustrating Philosophy Through Art" by Thomas E. Wartenberg explores the relationship between illustration and philosophical reflection. The author argues that illustration can complement philosophy by visually representing concepts and philosophical passages. The book analyzes different types of illustrations and their relationship with the sources that inspire them. It also examines historical examples of philosophical illustrations, from Greco-Roman manifestations to works by contemporary artists reflecting on the work of Wittgenstein. Additionally, the book explores the use of image and text in contemporary philosophical comics. Overall, the book offers a broad insight into the relationship between word, image, and philosophy throughout history. [Extracted from the article]

Justin Remhof defends a constructivist interpretation of Nietzsche's view regarding the metaphysics of material objects. First, I describe an attractive feature of Remhof's interpretation. Since Nietzsche seems to be a constructivist about whatever sort of value he accepts, a constructivist account of objects would fit into a nicely unified overall metaphysical theory. Second, I explore various options for developing the constructivist view of objects. Depending on how Nietzsche understood concepts, and whose concepts he saw as giving rise to objects, he could've had a variety of different constructivist accounts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Eagle has tried to present a balanced version of Freud's concepts, our version of Freud is somewhat different from what he presents. However, what we wish to highlight in this long interlude from Freud is that while Eagle is correct, there are many versions of Freud, as Freud had not yet brought together many of the beginning parts of a theory that he implicitly (at times explicitly) put forth. If one looked only at the extreme version of Freud one might be inclined to agree with Eagle's position and find the supporting evidence he cites compelling, but many analysts who value Freud have perhaps gone beyond that aspect of Freud's model. In the discussion of the unconscious we might recall that Eagle cites Lear and says, in effect, that Lear omits what Eagle concludes is the essential or more dominant aspect of Freud. [Extracted from the article]

Forster asserts that the "imputability problem" - the charge that Kant's theory of free will precludes the possibility of free immoral action and therewith the possibility of moral responsibility for immoral action - "turns out to be a mere pseudo-problem" (19). Krijnen remarks that while Kant conceives of the concept of cosmological freedom in terms of causality, for Hegel "what is primarily free turns out to be the concept" and is characterized by "being with itself in one's other" (180). Kloc-Konkolowicz argues that this is not inconsistent with Kant's position because for Kant human beings qua phenomena are embedded in social and cultural circumstances and this fact, which is emphasized by naturalist accounts, does not necessarily conflict with an intelligible capacity of the empirically situated human being. [Extracted from the article]

The article reviews the book "The Thought of Work," by Andi L. R. Lassiter.

In this review essay, I examine the theoretical assumptions required in order to reconstruct an understanding of another historical period. Stefanos Geroulanos has produced a masterful history of mid‐twentieth‐century French thought, and he argues for a significant difference between that period and our own based on the values and ideas associated with the concept of transparency. The book is innovative in both its method and interpretation of the period of 1945–1984. However, despite the suggestive theoretical framework announced at its start, Geroulanos prefers to explore the theoretical content of conceptual history more than to explain how one might go about identifying, understanding, and translating the concepts of a different epoch. In order to contribute to what is already a successful project, I endeavor to extend some of Geroulanos's theoretical sketches through a comparison with Reinhart Koselleck's theory of Begriffsgechichte. Despite some muted criticism of Koselleck from Geroulanos, I argue that the projects share similar commitments, although Geroulanos needs to develop his theoretical premises at greater length, both for a full comparison and in order to complete the critical project that Transparency appears to be undertaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this rather dense book, Lucas John Mix explores an important although overlooked concept in the history of the life sciences: the vegetable soul. While Aristotle was the first to define it, Mix traces the presence of a vegetable soul back to early Greek concepts of life and to Plato, who describes the vegetable life in terms of bodily hungers (29-41). According to Mix, Darwin buttressed the foundations of biology by means of natural selection with the concept of the vegetable soul, an outstanding interpretation (208). [Extracted from the article]

Therefore, the book "Computer simulation validation: fundamental concepts, methodological frameworks, and philosophical perspectives",edited by Claus Beisbart and Nicole Saam is of high relevance for JASSS readers. Finally, parts 8 and 9 widen the perspective by discussing challenges in 5 chapters of part 7and providing 7 chapters with philosophical reflections in part 8. Saam's chapter is onparticipatory modelling, in which modellers develop a simulation model together withpeople who are affected by a problem that should be solved (or managed) by the model. [Extracted from the article]

The article reviews the book "Social Capital: An Introduction to Managing Networks," by Kenneth W. Koput.

In Elucidating Social Science Concepts: An Interpretivist Guide, Frederic Charles Schaffer makes the case for an interpretivist approach to social science and the concepts used by social scientists. Schaffer adopts an approach to concepts that he calls ‘elucidation’, and the approach involves relating social science concepts to their everyday use by laypersons. The reviewers in this Book Review Symposium - Joe Soss, Douglas C. Dow and Ahmed Khanani - are all sympathetic to the interpretivist approach to social science concepts, but challenge Schaffer on important points. Above all, they focus on three broad questions: how does the researcher gain a critical distance from what she studies, and what does this mean for the concepts she is using? What is the nature of concepts, that is, what is the concept of ‘concept’ we use? And, what is the relationship between concepts and visual signs such as paintings? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reviews the book "Decrecimiento: 10 preguntas para comprenderlo y debatirlo/Ten Questions on Degrowth: Conceptual Basis for a Social, Economic and Environmental Discussion" by D. Bayon, F. Flipo, and F. Schneider.

The article reviews the book "Doing Without Concepts," by Edouard Machery.

Javier Fernández Sebastián's edited collections of essays, Political Concepts and Time, is both a critical homage to the monumental work of Reinhart Koselleck (1923-2006) and an important contribution to the methodology of history-writing. Centered on the polysemic nature of concepts, which are read as ''vehicles for thought'' studied in their pragmatic and communicative applications in society, Political Concepts and Time provides a stimulating analysis of the role, weight, and future of conceptual history. Its thirteen essays offer an account of problems, questions, and debates on the interplay of words and concepts, meaning and historical change, context and discourse. They endeavor to clarify the complicated and perennially unresolved relationship between theory and practice. In order to do so, Fernández Sebastián has assembled a scholarly composite and broadly international group of specialists from a variety of disciplines and research fields. With the intellectual legacy of Koselleck's Begriffsgeschichte looming large, this book rethinks the ways in which not just historians but also social scientists and philosophers study the past as the expression of contingent, ever-changing, and revocable semantic units shaping the culturally plural worlds we inhabit. Informed by the idea that history is porous, Political Concepts and Time also deals with the perhaps obvious but no less challenging issue of our approach to time as everyday experience and through its representation(s). Together with exploring the volume's specific historical topics, this essay will highlight some of its limitations and, above all, will respond to its criticism of intellectual history. The following pages will thus argue the case for the latter methodological perspective by reflecting on the type of historian it delineates. Claiming that in their investigation of past meanings intellectual historians make use of creative imagination, the essay will suggest that this model of history-writing leads to a better understanding of multiple sources and that it might ultimately help overcome some of the inconsistencies and often simplistic divisions between various branches of the historiographical tree. In particular, a small proposal to reconcile conceptual and intellectual history will be advanced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reviews the book "The Origin of Concepts," by Susan Carey.

The article reviews the book "Trauma: Contemporary Directions in Theory, Practice, and Research," edited by S. Ringel and J. R. Brandell.

The article reviews the book "Doing Without Concepts," by Edouard Machery.

The article reviews the book "Doing Without Concepts," by Edouard Machery.

As the title “Doing without Concepts” suggests Edouard Machery argues that psychologists should stop using the notion of concept because: (1) the only interesting generalizations about concepts can be drawn at the level of types of concepts (prototypes, exemplars and theories) and not the level of concept in general; and (2) competences such as categorization or induction can rely on these different types of concepts (there is not a one to one correspondence between type of concept and competence). I try to make the point that these two elements are not wholly compatible. If several types of concepts are used to perform a given competence (point (2)), then they have to be well regulated (e.g. which type is activated when, which type wins in case of conflict). These regulatory mechanisms can then be the basis for interesting generalizations (against point (1)). On the other hand, it is possible that point (1) applies to competences as well: that there are no interesting generalizations to be drawn about categorization in general. In which case different types of categorization are likely to be underlain by different types of concepts (against point (2)). Even though the arguments laid out in the book are forceful and well supported by empirical evidence, a more positive thesis might have been both more successful rhetorically and more interesting scientifically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reviews the book "Wandering Significance: An Essay on Conceptual Behavior," by Mark Wilson.

The article reviews the book "Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis," by Jesse J. Prinz.

Books Reviewed: Ruth Garrett Millikan [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reviews the book 'Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong,' by Jerry Fodor.