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Recently, policy makers have shown renewed interest in the effect of declaring a national security doctrine. Conventional analysis holds that establishing the Bush Doctrine against global terrorism or a promise to retaliate against WMD attacks with nuclear weapons engages audience costs. Should US leaders not possess the reslove to follow through on these doctrines in Afghanistan or elsewhere, they supposedly will pay in terms of lost votes at home or in terms of more demanding challenges from abroad. This does not explain why leaders sometimes violate their doctrine, nor does it explain their capacity for spinning the circumstances of a crisis to escape damage to their credibility. Alternatively, special observable conditions relating to limited war capability occasionally enable declared doctrine to serve as a powerful coordinating device, almost like a traffic light, for states involved in a series of crises. The coordinating function of doctrine may be tested empirically. It also supports a more cautious declaratory policy for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous work on two level security, we have analyzed the consequences of the strategies states pursue when faced with multiple threats in light of resource and other constraints. To deal with the problems created by substitutability, we have conceptualized those strategies in a general way as either a [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]