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Few leaders worry about the status of their honor; they do worry, at times obsessively, about their credibility. The "credibility imperative" has occupied a central position in every major U.S. foreign policy debate in the last fifty years. It affects discourse and decisions in predictable - and deeply pathological - ways. This paper examines the continuing importance of honor in modern U.S. foreign policy. It first discusses the traditional importance of honor in international and interpersonal politics, and explains of the central role it plays in the construction of security in any system that lacks a central authority. Second, it describes the predictable, consistent effects that honor has on state behavior in general, and U.S. foreign policy in particular. Third, it argues that the lingering concern for honor is pathological, for a couple of reasons: There is no evidence that it helps states attain their goals, and it certainly has no relevance in those systems (like today's international) where no existential threats to member security exist. The paper then speculates about the genesis of the honor pathology, and why it continues to have such salience in the new century. Honor as a motivation for action seems as anachronistic today as horse-drawn carriages, alchemy and the duel. But it persists, if under different guises; and to the extent that it persists, it pathologizes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that dynamically developing border security policies of the European Union are influenced by transnational regulation originating from the United States. It shows that the process of transatlantic homeland security is increasingly taking place through network structures. The emergence of transatlantic networks and socialisation processes within them allowed for the US involvement in the EU policy-making. This is mostly due to growing personal relationships between policy makers, gradual substitution of formal legal instruments with psychological contracts, and informal understandings providing the contents for formal agreements. Consequently, the paper analyzes the implications of these developments, looks at still unresolved issues and proposes potential solutions. The empirical examples for this paper are derived in particular from the EU-U.S. cooperation on data protection in the context of homeland security. The networks under investigation include the High Level Political Dialogue on Border and Transportation Security and the High Level Dialogue on Data Protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Ungoverned spaces" are increasingly cited as a key threat to the U.S. government and its interests throughout the world. Often these spaces are seen as synonymous with failed states, or states that are unable to effectively exercise sovereignty. A key goal of U.S. defense strategy is now to improve "effective sovereignty" in such areas, in order to deny sanctuary to terrorists, WMD proliferators, narco-traffickers, and gangsters. According to the World Bank, in 2006 the number of states lacking effective sovereignty rose to 26, from 11 in 1996. The larger project that this paper is part of proposes to analyze the concept of ungoverned spaces and determine whether they really are ungoverned and constitute threats to states. The essential issue is not lack of governance, but rather who governs these spaces. This paper aims to develop a more accurate framework for understanding contemporary security threats in a world of softened sovereignty. An improved understanding of when and how alternative forms of governance shelter or encourage hostile non-state actors has important policy implications for how states, particularly the United States, prioritize their responses to emerging threats. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will historically and theoretically study conditions under which states develop bilateral versus multilateral security alliances. Specifically, the paper will discuss a question on why the United States built mainly bilateral alliances in the Asia-Pacific region while it established a multilateral alliance, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the early Cold War period.Understanding security alliances have been the subject of major research in international relations studies. However, there has been so far insufficient scholarly attention and rigorous archival research focusing on the question I proposed above. The findings of the proposed paper will not only be historical and theoretical, but will also attempt to provide insights on how future Asia-Pacific alliance policy can be managed.This paper argues that the difference between the German rearmament and the Japanese rearmament is a key for solving the puzzle. The nature of the German rearmament is very much different from that of the Japanese counterpart, because the Japanese rearmament was far modest and limited in its nature and scope. The large-scale German rearmament generated more complex interdependent interactions among the United States and its European allies, while the limited Japanese rearmament created less interdependent relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, the Atlantic alliance developed into NATO with multilateralism, while alliances in the Asia-Pacific remained bilateral in nature. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the process of gaining public consent about a security threat, or threat legitimation. Threats require legitimation because they are 'social facts' and not objective truths or subjective perceptions. Threat legitimation occurs in the public discourse through rhetoric. Political and social actors deploy rhetorical resources and strategies to construct, reproduce, and change narratives about a threat. Unlike previous rhetorical studies, this paper also argues that the influence and power of rhetoric depends on the media environment. The first section of the paper outlines threat legitimation and the role of rhetoric and the media environment. The second section investigates four cases within two different media environments, radio and television. Through these four cases, the paper demonstrates the importance of rhetorical strategies for threat legitimation in US foreign policy, and how the media environment affects the use of rhetoric. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the various impacts of contemporary globalization on national security, with special reference to the migration of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry to China and its security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper adheres to a sectoral approach to the study of globalization-security interconnections and adopts a broadly based definition of security pertaining to the case study in question that encompasses economic, technological and defense security. The analysis of the subject matter is grounded in evidence collected in more than 140 interviews with chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data. On sectoral migration, the paper argues that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the development of the indigenous Chinese chip industry. It has been discovered that some Taiwanese non-state chip actors have violated government regulations in the process of spearheading the migration, and some have even forged business ties with their PRC counterparts associated with the PLA. As for the ensuing security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved, although long-term strategic repercussions are paramount. The depth and scope of the continuous sectoral migration in years to come will determine the level of economic security risks faced by the US and Taiwan. Long-term technological and defense security repercussions need to take into account two important elements at play: technological change in the sector (increasing commercial-to-military spin-on and dual-use nature of the chip technology), and the PRC dual-track (economic and defense) grand strategy behind its resolve to upgrade its indigenous chip capability. Four pertinent aspects are analyzed: (a) concerns over the PRC chip industrial base, its contribution to the PLA modernization and the ensuing shift in the balance of power in Beijing's favour; (b) technology-related misgivings over the trustworthy supplies of chips for the US and Taiwanese military end uses, as well as the shrinking "chip gap"; (c) fear of denial of chip supply due to foreign dependency; (d) dubious implementation of export control policies at the unilateral and the multilateral level that exacerbate some of the above security repercussions. The concluding section elucidates how the case study helps to show the impact of globalization on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. To sum up, the study offers a fresh look at the complex security repercussions of the globalization of a strategic industry that occurs in a politically sensitive region in world politics today. It not only helps us disentangle an important policy issue, but also advances our theoretical understanding of the globalization-security interconnections in international relations today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the extent to which there has been a discursive shift in the debate over U.S. immigration policy from a right-based framework to a security-based framework. In addition to examining the discourse shaping the debate over U.S. immigration policy, the paper considers the extent to which norms that shape the debate over U.S. immigration policy have been effectively translated into legislation or implemented at the bureaucratic level. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004) involved an extensive dispute over the meaning of presidential war powers and national security as these were explained and defended in The Federalist. Various opinions in Hamdi cited numerous Federalist numbers in support of the justices' own interpretation of presidential war powers regarding questions of national security. Yet the opinions of the justices obviously conflicted. Using the Hamdi decision as a springboard, this paper proposes to examine The Federalist in order to outline the political philosophy underlying the Constitution's executive war powers and their relationship to questions of national security. Since most of the Federalist numbers cited by the justices in Hamdi were written by Alexander Hamilton, I propose to examine additional writings of Hamilton's in order to more fully develop the presidential war powers and national security theory outlined by Publius in The Federalist. My paper will involve an interdisciplinary approach to the question of presidential war powers, combining the disciplines of law, political philosophy, history, and strategic studies to examine one of the most important constitutional issues confronting Americans today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human Trafficking, Human Security and the BalkansHuman trafficking in the Western Balkan region has been addressed in numerous multilateral and regional forums, reflecting, in part, the concerns of the United States and the European Union with the spillover effects of instability and organized crime. The paper argues that despite efforts at greater exploration and dialogue between governments, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations, the region continues to reveal deep seated challenges to resolving the problem. Anti-trafficking efforts have lost sight of broader issues of human security, focusing on narrow rule-of-law approaches of criminalization and enhanced border control while downplaying the socioeconomic dynamics that place vulnerable populations at risk for trafficking. The paper also reveals how the absence of consensus on trafficking definitions and how best to address the trafficking problem has resulted in steps geared more towards the goal of EU accession and policy practice mired in contradictions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advocates of a related series of ideas termed as "network centric warfare," "rapid decisive operations," and "effects based operations," see the combination of long-range precision strike, information dominance, and networked information technologies as elements changing the nature of war, from a series of sequenced battles and campaigns towards a continuous battle of shock and dislocation. However, this emphasis on the importance of time and speediness ignores the reality that time is a culturally dependent conception that has differing implications for different cultures. This paper explores cultural interpretations of time and their influence on military strategy. Analyzing national security strategy and military doctrine, this paper suggests that the U.S. conception of time leads to an overly offensive national strategy. This paper offers a vignette from the Cuban Missile Crisis to demonstrate how to escape the offensively oriented time conception. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the role of the UN Charter's prohibition of force in legitimating the exercise of power and in creating a likelihood of resistance against major powers that violate it. The paper includes large-n tests that assess the level of dissent within the Security Council and the responses of other major powers following a major power's use of armed force. It also includes a brief case study examining US legal argument and their impact on decision-making processes and outcomes during the Cuban Missile Crisis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a consideration of what, at its core, is a state-building question: is the United States adept at creating highly centralized internal security bureaucracies such as the DHS? After the attacks of 9/11, the resurrection of a national civilian defense program, under the moniker "homeland security," has become a crucial domestic policy of the federal government. Disaster planning and civilian defense, subjects that had been relegated to the academic sub-discipline of security studies, are now the daily grist of newspapers and television news channels. There has always been a tension among the general public, state and local government, and the federal government regarding civilian defense policy and its expected outcomes. One area that is worth closer analysis is how expectations are dealt with in a large nation that is, by constitutional design, a federal republic. This essay examines the fate of the DHS in light of its place within a federal republic and the conflicting types of civilian defense that its organizational structure produces. The paper is organized in two sections. The first section outlines a conceptual problem related to civilian defense and its objective. The second section outlines how DHS organizational development perpetuates the conditions necessary for the flaws summarized in the first section of the essay. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops four main arguments designed to clarify the nature and purpose of ESDP. First, it engages specifically with the American IR literature which detects in ESDP signs of balancing against US power. The paper argues that such an analysis is flawed. Secondly, it argues that the true drivers behind ESDP have been the recent shifts in the tectonic plates both of history and of geo-politics. Thirdly, it analyses the recent European Security Strategy document, which it presents as a new normative approach to security policy. Finally, it argues that the distinctiveness of ESDP also derives from the peculiarities of institutional interplay within the European Union - that the policy has been generated by years of complex negotiations and compromise between and within EU institutions. Given this institutional labyrinth, any form of "heroic" strategic ambition vis-à-vis the United States would be impossible to articulate. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how presidents were constrained by their predecessors in developing national security strategies during the Cold War. It focuses on the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition and the Carter-Reagan transition, given the change in political party and subsequent desire to craft a new foreign-affairs legacy in each case. The paper finds that although national security policies do create a general framework within which consecutive administrations operate, new presidents still have a window of opportunity to mark a new direction in foreign policy from their immediate predecessor. Perhaps the greatest consistency in foreign policy across these cases was in policy making at the United Nations, where differences in the role of the president's chief adviser at the U.N. were more stylistic than substantive. In conclusion, while the "inherited presidency" does present constraints for new presidents, the Cold War era illustrates that they nevertheless have the political flexibility to move beyond those constraints, at least in foreign affairs. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because power defines relations among individuals and political communities, it is an important concept in the social sciences. If we accept Max Weber's suggestion that politics is essentially about allocation and distribution of power, then power is the concept of Political Science and International Relations discipline. But is power found in resources or in relationships? Is it located in structure or agency? In discussing the social nature of power, the paper will advance a conception of power based on the writings of Hannah Arendt. Understanding the nature of power in contemporary world affairs is crucially important both for the U.S. and the future of international order. The development of post-Cold War international relations, the process of European integration, and the inability of the United States to translate its material strength into desired political outcomes have put into question any conception of power based entirely on quantifiable material resources, whether military, economic, or technological. Although power is a 'contested concept', it had been absent from scholarly debate in International Relations for some time. This paper is a critical reflection of the paradox of American power and its implications for American security and global order. It focuses on the neo-conservative conception of American power that informs the foreign and defense policies of George W. Bush's Administration. According to this conception, U.S.' material preponderance coupled with America's universal values, give Washington the means and right to reshape world order. The paper argues that this view of power is deeply mistaken and can only lead to dysfunctional policies and practices. Material resources are not irrelevant to power but do not automatically produce political influence. Effective influence depends on more than military coercion. It depends on the degree to which a state's policies and practices are accepted as legitimate by other states and by international public opinion. The failure of neo-conservative policy-makers to grasp the social nature of power threatens to undermine the effective pursuit of American interests and national security, while gradually weakens the international society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the relationship between the federal government and the state and local governments in the time period 2001 - 2005 using the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina as endpoints. The paper shows that some of the poor fedreal response to Hurricane Katrina could have been predicted by information in the ICMA Homeland Security Survey conducted in spring 2005. The paper concludes with a series of propositions about the current state of federalism in the field of homeland security police. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will use the mass media theory of framing to assess three major Japanese newspapers-Yomiuri, Asahi and Mainichi -editorials (694) concerning Japan’s homeland security from 9/11/01-2/29/04. Based on the kinds of topics addressed by the editorials surveyed, I utilized five frames - national interest, cost/consequence, threat, responsibility and human interest. This period was selected because it includes 9/11, the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, new Japanese legislation related to homeland security and anti-terrorism, PM Koizumi’s historic visit to North Korea, the killing of two Japanese diplomats in Iraq and finally the dispatch of more than 1000 ground, air, maritime SDF forces to Iraq for humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The paper concludes by discussing the significance of this data for future Japanese homeland security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the applicability of the democratic peace (DP) thesis to a rapidly changing global security environment and, more specifically, to examine the motivation of the United States, the most prominent democratic power, to use force for the promotion of peace through the spread of democracy. In this paper, we distinguish between traditionally accepted instrumental, normative, and institutional use-of-force motivators that apply to democracies and non-democracies alike, but we also add a discussion of contextual use-of-force motivators which are unique to democracies. The basic assumption underlying the DP argument is that democratic states are less prone to wage wars than non-democratic states. But, if democracy makes states more peaceful, why do democratic states still use force? Illustrating each motivator in light of contemporary U.S. national security decisions shows that the DP thesis can provide valuable insight into the reasons why democracies may continue to use force and, in the extreme, wage war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the preferences of major political factions are likely to influence policy choice on security issues, the origins of these preferences remains unclear compared to those on foreign economic policy. This paper examines efforts to explain preferences on security issues using data on congressional roll call voting. A large body of quantitative research in this area concludes that ideology drives these preferences, and that constituency economic interests have little or no effect. Unfortunately, this literature conceives of economic interests in an unrealistically narrow way, and does not consider the possibility that these interests may shape the ideology of members of congress. Using data on Senate voting on foreign policy from 1947 through 2000, this paper presents evidence that Senators’ home states’ stake in the international economic order, as well as their stake in military spending, played an important role in shaping foreign and defense policy. Although liberal-conservative "ideology" also matters, its effects are more consistent with an interest-based vote trading arrangement than with a coherent set of ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the issues of agency merger and managerial flexibility in the Department of Homeland Security. The mission of DHS is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur (Bush 2002b, 8). The creation of DHS reflects the confluence of two strains of thought: the key issues and strategies of homeland security and the values of strategic management, especially strategic human resources management. The remainder of the paper identifies the critical questions in each area that impact the future success or failure of DHS, evaluates the passage and implementation of the new Department, and makes recommendations for future action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My study examines the conditions under which middle power states, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and Norway, may exercise effective leadership in the realm of human security. I hypothesize that a middle power-led human security initiative is more likely to be successful if the initiative does not threaten the fundamental principles of the superpower. My paper demonstrates that although it is possible for a human security initiative to overcome American opposition that is based on political or military interests, an initiative will be less likely to succeed if it challenges the core principles of the United States. I test the hypothesis by conducting a qualitative analysis of four cases of human security initiatives where the middle powers have played leadership roles. The cases include the endeavor to create a United Nations rapid deployment peacekeeping force, which led to the formation of the Standby High Readiness Brigade for United Nations Operations (SHIRBRIG) in 1996; the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, which resulted in the 1997 Ottawa Convention; the struggle to establish the International Criminal Court, which came into existence in 2002; and the unsuccessful attempt to regulate the legal trade in small arms and light weapons. The United States has taken different positions on these issues. The U.S. approved of the idea of a standby UN rapid response force, but did not participate in the establishment of SHIRBRIG. Washington objected to the Ottawa Convention on the basis of a conflict with U.S. military interests, and opposed the International Criminal Court due to the influence of certain groups in the American foreign policy establishment. Finally, the U.S. rejected the adoption of restrictions on the licit small arms trade due to a clash with an American principle protected by the U.S. Constitution: the right to bear arms. By illustrating that smaller states can assume leadership on global security, my paper counters the trend in international security studies of focusing almost exclusively on great power leadership, a tendency which has been reinforced by the decades-long predominance of the realist approach to international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how uncertainty sharply declined during the period of the missile gap fear (1957-1961), yet public fear of a possible "missile gap" remained high and greatly helped Senator Kennedy gain the White House in 1960. While insufficient information helped create great "uncertainty" at the beginning of this period (1957-1958), "uncertainty" does not adequately explain why the "misssile gap" fear remained strong. This paper discusses the mishandling of worst-case analyses during the later part of the period, and "smoking gun" evidence of intentional exaggeration of the threat by Senator Stuart Symington--a central figure in the promotion of the fear of the missile gap. Overall, this paper argues that insufficient information does not adequately explain the exaggerated public fears (national misperceptions) of this period. Further, popular explanations of "blowback" or "strategic culture" that argue leaders already believed exaggerated estimations of the threat, also do not adequately explain this large national misperception. Intentional elite exaggerations for electoral, bureaucratic and/or organizational purposes explain the widespread overestimations of the threat in this period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During World War II tensions between commitments to rights and the desire to represent accurately the voices and needs of all Americans ran up against national policies emphasizing unity and national security. While state capacity had already grown tremendously in the New Deal era, U.S. governmental activity and internal organizational development expanded during wartime. To plan and implement domestic policies, existing offices studying public opinion were enhanced and new ones were created. These included Program Surveys in the Department of Agriculture as well as the Office of War Information, which grew out of the Office of Facts and Figures. Research regarding African-Americans' views included emphases on groups such as shipyard workers, farmers and draftees, as well as commitments to the war. Archival research reveals that those studying black Americans' views during World War II often expressed sympathy and an understanding that their opinions were based in their unequal rights, status and conditions. Yet the suggested means of improving "Negro morale" frequently focused on public relations alone. Earlier efforts related to the views of and policies affecting southern tenant farmers were dismantled in response to conservative legislators and agricultural interests. Moreover, public opinion researchers recognized that post-Pearl Harbor responses to west coast Japanese-Americans were driven by not just national security concerns, but also bias, hysteria, and economic jealousy. Data on public opinion in both cases were incorporated into policy decisions, which were themselves influenced by internal and external political pressures. This paper contributes to literatures on race and public policy, American political development and the roots of public opinion research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

U.S. leaders interpret the attacks on September 11, 2001 as acts of war against western civilization. They find that exceptional security measures are necessary to protect the liberal democratic way of life. In this paper, I develop a theoretical framework that places post-9/11 exceptionalism within a history of governmentality. Governmentality represents a strategy to provide security within a population. This strategy involves people in a war of movement, which determines who belongs in a society and the appropriate actions they can perform. The circulation of knowledge about individuals within and potential threats to society is integral. However, when the normal political, legal and ethical orders prevent leaders from obtaining this information, exceptionalism prevails. U.S. leaders regard the post-9/11 security environment in this light, and they harness legal expertise to redefine the appropriate means for identifying and eradicating dangers. These officials normalize exceptional security practices, by increasing the speed of politics and dissolving barriers to the collection of knowledge. Specifically, they utilize legal discourse to construct an institutional and ethical setting that permits unprecedented intelligence gathering techniques. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past two decades, major strategic reviews have become a mainstay of U.S. national security policy making. In 1996, Congress enacted a law mandating that the Defense Department conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review. Since then, quadrennial reviews have also been instituted by Congress or the executive branch in the intelligence community and at the State Department and Homeland Security Department. This proliferation of quadrennial reviews raises several questions: Why have Congress and the executive branch established these reviews? What, if anything, has resulted from them? What factors have shaped their impact? In this paper I answer these questions by integrating insights from several scholarly disciplines and drawing on interviews of 43 current and former congressional and executive branch officials who are very knowledgeable about the quadrennial reviews. My findings indicate that policymakers establish quadrennial reviews to promote organizational change in the executive branch and to influence the relationship between agencies and Congress - rather than to generate new strategic ideas - and that such reviews tend to have more impact on organizational management than on outward-facing strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States maintains two distinct armies: an active duty, or force under federal control, and a National Guard nominally under state control with the option of being federalized. This bifurcation of the American military remains largely unchanged since the nation's founding. Given the inclination of policymakers to centralize power under conditions of existential threat or disaster, this continued division of the armed forces is puzzling. What explains the durability of the two armies and their ability to adapt to new or qualitatively different roles over time? This paper develops a conceptual framework that seeks to explain agency adaptation and durability. I theorize that when faced with new or qualitatively different demands from policymakers, agencies bargain with their overseers for resources and institutional changes that facilitate adaptation and mitigate stressors. The agency's political environment, particularly institutional arrangements and ideational factors, mediates agency adaptation by expanding or curtailing an agency's range of response, further influencing the nature of the principal-agent bargain. I briefly consider cases that illustrate this conceptual framework as it relates to the durability of the two armies and propose avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various writers have commented on the "global resurgence of religion" and the challenge that it presents to international relations. However, this idea is complicated by the difficulty of defining "religion." This problem becomes evident in this analysis the distinct understanding of religion that apparently informs US foreign policy in the form of the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) and the "War on Terror" (WOT) since 2001. These policies reflect a presumption of religion to be a set of privately held doctrines and beliefs existing outside of specific communities, rather than a view of religion as the virtues and practices of a belief system which are inseparable from the community in which they were embedded and which sustain them. As such, those implementing these policies privilege religion in their analysis of conflict, presuming religion to be the critical dimension of conflict, rather than one of many elements of identity that come into play when tensions develop between groups. This paper is concerned with how this has impacted the causes of the Montagnard ethnic minorities of Vietnam and Uighur ethnic minority in China. As a result of the emphasis on religion in the analysis of these conflicts, the impact of the IRFA and the WOT has been to distort and undermine the specific goals of the ethno-separatist movements in question and the problems facing these ethnic minorities generally. This study raises the question of whether, by characterizing such conflicts as religious in nature, these policies are self-fulfilling towards a "global resurgence of religion" by contributing to the generation of religious identities in place of ethnic ones which are simultaneously the targets of the assimilationist policies of the host states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The White House Office is so large and complex that a systematic process of policy evaluation is essential in order to provide the president with a range of options on all important policy decisions. Some of the most important decisions that President Bush has made have been taken without the benefit of broad deliberation within the White House or cabinet. This paper will take up four cases of policy decisions to illustrate the lack of a regular policy process and consultation that characterized many important decisions of the Bush administration -- two on detainee policy: the military commissions order of Nov. 13, 2001, and the decision to suspend the Geneva Conventions on February 7, 2002; and two about the war in Iraq: the initial decision to go to war, and the decision to disband the Iraqi army. The pattern that emerges from an examination of these four decisions is one of secrecy, top-down control, tightly held information, disregard for the judgments of career professionals, and the exclusion from deliberation of qualified executive branch experts who might have disagreed with those who initially framed the decisions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we will argue that presidential foreign policy and security considerations—in the context of the federal system— have been a determinative factor in understanding the development of immigration policies in the United States. When presidents have pursued a geostrategic course of engagement, they have tried to work with congressional factions that have favored a more liberal immigration regime. On the other hand, when they have interpreted the security environment as threatening and necessitating closure, they have tended to side with congressional nativist factions.We argue that Presidents have frequently regarded immigration policy as an effective subset of security policy complicated by electoral considerations. On one hand, for electoral reasons, presidents have often favored a liberal immigration regime. Yet, when they consider that the security threat poses too great a risk, executives have been willing to converge with Congressional nativist and restrictionist impulses. As the perception of the threat therefore changes, so does the prominent orientation of immigration policy - with significant, and sometimes draconian, implications for nascent and existent (both legal and illegal) refugees and asylum seekers. Thus, presidential support for immigration restriction has largely been a subset of an isolationist (1920-38) or a unilateralist (post-9/11) vision of foreign policy. Periods of dread of the unregulated large scale influx of immigrants who are likely to stay in the US as a result of the collapse of their own states, saboteurs infiltrating its borders or terrorists plotting to exploit the opportunities afforded to them by 'the open society' has often found its way into the rhetoric and policy prescriptions of presidents sensing that threat. The notion of 'them' or 'the other' tends to predominate in these situations. Conversely, when presidents have had a broader vision of US global leadership and a corresponding definition of security built around engagement, they have tended towards a far more limited fear of the unregulated invasion of immigrants. As a consequence, they have tended to revert to what is regarded as a default position of favoring a less restrictive approach to immigration. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conventional wisdom suggests that, rather than adopting a one-size-fits all approach to nonproliferation, the strategies employed to dissuade states from obtaining nuclear weapons should vary depending upon the particular reasons why the target country is pursuing a nuclear program. This appears perfectly logical: we need to tailor our strategies to the unique circumstances of each case. States may seek a nuclear capability, after all, for a variety of reasons, including to: (1) enhance national security against a regional or international threat, (2) coerce or blackmail rivals in order to make gains, or (3) shore up domestic support or pursue great-power status by pursuing a high-profile foreign policy goal. Thus, for example, the best strategy to deal with states seeking nuclear weapons for purposes of blackmail might be a policy based on credible deterrence.Embracing this widely accepted view of nonproliferation might be self-defeating, however, due to what I term the proliferation paradox. By adopting a differentiated approach to nonproliferation, there is considerable potential for unintended and pernicious demonstration effects. A strategy to dissuade certain states motivated by X from developing nuclear weapons may subsequently heighten the desire for a nuclear capability among other states motivated by Y. One of the clearest examples of this phenomenon occurs when a threat of preemptive action against an aggressive proliferation exacerbates a security concerns for other states in the region, which respond by proliferating. Indeed, states eager to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons may unwittingly set off a dangerous spiral of proliferation. Although each non-proliferation strategy is tailored to each case, and works quite effectively in local terms, the overall result, paradoxically, is to encourage system wide proliferation.The solution is not to fall back on a one-size-fits all nonproliferation strategy but instead recognize that each proliferator is not an island, apart from the main, but instead forms part of a complex system. The United States needs to consider both the effectiveness of nonproliferation strategies in each individual case and the likely ways in which they will affect system-wide proliferation. This paper explores the extent to which this dynamic operates, by examining through deductive logic how strategies designed to deal with one type of proliferator can backfire with other types of proliferators, followed by detailed case studies of the United States' nonproliferation policy in Asia and the Middle East together with specific recommendations for future U.S. nonproliferation policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) is an increasingly important actor in homeland security in Europe, serving as both a platform for cooperation and as an authoritative actor in its own right. As the role of the EU grows, both scholars and practitioners need to know how the basic features of its policy system enhance or limit the capacity to manage European crises and disasters. This paper takes a "bureaucratic politics" perspective on the question, exploring the degree to which competition between individual units operating within the EU's bureaucracy may influence outcomes during critical situations. We use five dimensions of a policy system that shape bureaucratic politics and measure the EU on each dimension, finding that fundamental tensions exist in the EU that are likely to exacerbate bureaucratic politics. However, we note that the EU is working towards dedicated crisis decision procedures that may change how bureaucratic politics influences outcomes. We also caution against assuming that competition between interest-oriented individuals and organizational units is inherently dysfunctional. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which brought into being the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the path of European integration has meant the difference between a strong and secure Europe and the disintegration of a grand, idealistic experiment. In this post-9/11 world, with recent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, and several attempted terrorist plots foiled, Europe now faces a critical juncture when it comes to dealing with the problem of security. Sovereignty is the key obstacle to security integration because security has traditionally been the prerogative of individual member-states. Are strongly held beliefs about sovereignty ceding ground to an untested supranational order? I argue that key epistemic communities of military strategists, technology experts, and diplomats are already breaking down this resistance because they are in a unique position to persuade others of certain shared norms.These knowledge-based networks, or "epistemic communities", are comprised of non-governmental professionals who share policy relevant expertise, and have actually gained acceptance for the beginnings of a European homeland security. I seek to explain why they are succeeding in pushing forward security integration despite the strong inclination for national governments to hold onto this authority. In this paper, I compare three epistemic communities - military strategists, technology experts, and diplomats - to shed light on the interaction of competing epistemic communities with different motivations and norms. A shortcoming of the current epistemic community literature is that it tends to assume that each epistemic community is operating in a transnational vacuum. Even though I demonstrate that all three epistemic communities support further security integration, their motivations, preferences, processes of socialization, and shared norms vary immensely.I engage in process-tracing and comparative case-studies for each of these epistemic communities to determine the origins of their allegiance, the social background of their membership, the creation and evolution of norms, their overlap with other epistemic communities, and the subsequent success or failure of their efforts to persuade and socialize others. In particular, I seek to determine the degree of impact these norms have had on the general political will for security integration. In this regard, I focus primarily on elite-level acceptance, and whether this has led to particular policy outcomes that support the gradual development of a kind of homeland security in Europe. The implications for sovereignty, democracy, and the limits of integration cannot be ignored. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Paper examines changes in U.S. immigration and border policies post-9/11 ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of what seem to be insurmountable differences on one issue after another such as immigration, global climate change, homeland security, and health care, confidence in conventional categories for capturing what is at stake and processes for negotiating agreement are eroding. Analytical formulations fail to adequately comprehend the entirety of differences that divide opposing parties and strategies for forging agreements fall short. The purpose of this paper is to explore what is meant by "ways of knowing" and how ways of knowing can assist in identifying the roots of contemporary conflict and difficulties in designing public policy that can produce effective action. We join numerous other scholars in moving beyond self interest as the fundamental motivator of political action, and beyond bounded rationality as the primary mode of reasoning. Ways of knowing is an inclusive and flexible concept that embraces many alternative formulations of political motivations and analysis styles. Advantages of this broadened conception include the possibility of more effective mechanisms for avoiding, transcending or bridging disagreements that threaten gridlock or that produce ineffective or damaging policies. To advance this argument, we first provide a practical description of what we mean by "ways of knowing," as it might be applied to analysis of policy issues. We then explore the various attempts to understand the multiple dimensions in ways of knowing, drawing on a broad literature from philosophy, psychology, evolutionary theory, physics, cognitive psychology, and other fields. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the terrorist attacks of 2001, US National Security Strategy was changed to include a recognition that weak and failed states now pose as large of a threat to international security as do powerful, conquering states. While this represents an important rhetoricalstep, have US policies toward state failure really changed? Although relatively few years have passed, this paper offers a preliminary assessment of this question, analyzing patterns of US aid, as well as US policies toward specific recent cases of state failure,including Haiti's 2004 crisis and the Darfur conflict in the Sudan. This analysis finds no evidence of a fundamental change in US policies toward state failure, and suggests that key domestic determinants of such policies, including an aversion to "nation-building", remain strong, maintaining a pattern of limited US involvement in cases of state failure. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Building on earlier quantitative work by Dan Reiter and Curtis Meek (1999), this paper argues that military alliances are a key, but often neglected, factor in the study of national military strategies. Incorporating alliance measures for the United States and Russia, which were two of the leading proponents of maneuver strategies in the post-WWII period, reveals a distinctive pattern between alliances and military strategy. Highly institutionalized alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are strong determinants of a state's choice of maneuver over alternative strategies, while other forms of alliances lack the same degree of explanatory power. More highly institutionalized military ties possess this effect because of the relatively greater number and density of channels through which the two leader states can influence the decision making of their respective allies. The findings also call into question some of the arguments put forward in the original Reiter and Meek article. Once alliances are included in the analysis, the linkage between democracy and the superior strategy of maneuver is greatly weakened. An alliance-based approach thus extends beyond the question of military strategy and has implications for issues ranging from the democracy and victory thesis to the consequences of security ties more generally. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Rock and a Hard Place: Public Willingness to Trade Civil Rights and Liberties for Greater Security"Hank C. Jenkins-Smith & Kerry G. HerronTexas A&M University4220 TAMU College-Station, TX 77843Phone: (979) 862-3028hjsmith@tamu.eduAbstract: Using data from a series of nationwide surveys, this paper analyzes the kinds of tradeoffs American citizens are willing to make in the interest of greater security from terrorist attacks. The sources of pubic preferences are analyzed, comparing cultural and partisan explanations for preferences for expansions of government efforts - including surveillance of American citizens and reductions in the scope of privacy in the US. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It may be useful, as a descriptive prelude to analysis, to divide the modern national state in the United States into broad functional categories - social welfare, economic growth/regulation, and national security. Scholars of American political development have proceeded from this point of departure to explore the developmental trajectory of each category. However, although the descriptive move to separate state functions may work for the modern era (that is, from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present), it is more problematic when we turn to the early national period. For the first hundred years after the Constitution, national security and economic development were closely connected. By extension, the executive branch, thru its control of the military, was more involved in economic tasks associated with territorial expansion and consolidation than the standard depiction of the "weak" traditional presidency would suggest. We propose in this paper to reexamine the role played by the national security state during the early national period in promoting economic expansion, focusing in particular on the political mechanisms that linked the military role to expansionist objectives.Both historians and APD scholars have puzzled over military-political linkages in the 1789-1900 period. Among the former, Robert G. Angevine recently has argued that the army played an important role in the development of public infrastructure from the earliest days of the republic. But military leaders often found themselves at odds with political leaders because each group was driven by different calculations. Where the former understood infrastructure investment as a solution to the collective goods challenge of national security - transportation was necessary to allow the army to move its very modest resources to a point of danger - the latter construed expenditures on public works as a distributive benefit that could be exploited for partisan gain. Among political scientists, Christopher McGrory Klyza has described a number of roles played by specialized branches of the army (such as the engineers and the topographical engineers) to promote economic development where private wherewithal proved insufficient. Put another way, his account reveals a military that could be used to solve classic collective goods problems.We seek to build upon this literature to explore our working hypotheses: (1) The army played a pivotal role in national economic development in the early republic by meeting a succession of collective goods shortages. (2) Recognizing the economic importance of the army, politicians sought to subordinate it to their partisan political imperatives. (3) The executive branch served as the key conduit between politicians and the army, translating the priorities of the former into the orders for the latter. (4) The War Department, and in particular the Secretary of War, became a key actor in economic development because the chief executive lacked the political and institutional capacity to manage routine peacetime army operations. (5) Features of the early partisan executive branch, notably limited presidential control over cabinet appointments, facilitated the integration of elite interests and military policy into what might be termed "the cavalry-railroad complex." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the purported rationales and justifications--legal and otherwise--for presidential domination of American foreign policy. It also examines the impact on the nation of executive abuse of power. It is argued here that the Machiavellian trajectory of presidential power jeapordizes American constitutionalism and undermines national security interests. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolution of the Canada-U.S, continental security relationship since September 2001. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolution of Canada-U.S. continental security relations since September 2001. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars and practitioners alike agree that homeland security policy implementation is contingent upon a strong system of intergovernmental relations. The responsibilities associated with the homeland security mission, often mandated, cut across federal, state, and local boundaries. Local governments play an especially important role in the policy implementation process. Local governments must manage many critical duties associated with emergency preparedness while the nation?s first responders?emergency personnel, fire fighters, law enforcement officials, and local health care workers?provide the first line of defense in the event of a terrorist attack. This paper evaluates the degree to which 414 Florida county and city officials (generalists and specialists) evaluate changes in intergovernmental relations as a consequence of the implementation of homeland security policies. Data from a mail survey in July 2004 show that a majority of local officials judge intergovernmental cooperation to have improved, irrespective of jurisdiction size or type (county or city) or type of position held by the respondent. Where the quality and quantity of intergovernmental networks have improved, so, too, have intergovernmental cooperation and readiness ratings. Overall, local officials rated their horizontal networks more positively than their vertical networks. The results also show that the biggest impacts of federal and state homeland security mandates on local government have been financial and administrative, rather than political or legal. Homeland security appears to be a rather unique policy area?one in which mandated cooperation and coordination?in a time and place of urgency?has actually strengthened the intergovernmental system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I make two related claims in this paper. First, current debates about the nature of American primacy largely neglect how weak states can nonetheless frustrate American designs even under conditions of sharp material asymmetry. Second, these debates also sidestep the question of why states vary in their degree of sensitivity to American strategies. I argue that we need to view the security dilemma as a social process if we are to capture how actor identities and interests can become more conflictual over time. The content of a regime?s legitimating identity project, coupled with its prior rhetoric, determine (1) its sensitivity to American policies and (2) its probability of becoming entrapped on a path that leads to escalating challenges of American primacy. Russia?s response to the introduction and use of American forces in Central Asia after 11 September 2001 is used to test the proposition that security dilemmas can shift actor identities and create incentives to challenge, if quietly, American power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses two important questions about the nature of psychological value trade-offs. First, I examine the impact of perceptions of threat on the American public?s support of civil liberties. Unlike other studies, I explore support for civil liberties both as abstract principles and in the context of national security. Second, this study analyzes the role of trade-offs between civil liberties and national security in shaping public policy preferences. To examine these issues empirically, I use data from two national public opinion surveys conducted in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attack. I find that, while perceptions of national and personal threat were associated with an increased willingness to trade off civil liberties for greater national security, they had no impact on abstract notions of civil liberties. Moreover, perceptions of threat were weak predictors of the public?s preferences for increased defense spending, anti-terrorism packages, and more restrictive immigration policies. Once a trade-off between values of civil liberties and national security was introduced, the impact of perceptions of threat was channeled through these values. The implications of these findings on the study of value trade-offs in public opinion are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The premise on which this paper is based is that cyber security in CIP has two aspects: a national security issue, yet at the same time it is a global issue. Regarding the first aspect, there is a trend that cyber security in CIP is considered in the context of national security especially after the 9 /11 terrorist attack. Especially within the United States, the Bush Administration has tried to strengthen cyber security in CIP. As regards the second aspect, although some countries have identified their own CIP measures, including policies, laws, and institutions in terms of national security issue, few scholars and policymakers have viewed this as a global issue. Indeed, there is no comprehensive international/global framework for CIP that includes either different countries, or different players, or one which covers more broad-based areas of this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States focused American strategic policy around the use, or potential use, of preemptive/preventive strikes, particularly as a counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism tool. While preemption and prevention are not new strategies, they have never been highlighted to such a degree as is currently the case. These activities have been studied in the context of international security, using elements such as spiral models and offense-defense theory. This paper seeks to examine if other elements, specifically international law and normative issues, such as just war tradition, contribute to our understanding of the use, or non-use, of preventive or preemptive actions by states. The results indicate that the limitations on the use of anticipatory military activities found in international law and the just war tradition do not have a significant impact on the likelihood that these actions will be used by states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deploying the right type of force to post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) environments proves vital not only for those countries the US intends to help, but also for US national security. With more US soldiers? deaths in Iraq to ?win the peace? than occurred during the war, the question of matching force to mission becomes increasingly urgent. US participation in PCR operations spans presidencies, from George H. Bush to George W. Bush, and will continue past the 2004 election. Since PCR missions show no sign of abating, a pressing question faces the world?s sole superpower: Why has the US been so slow to develop intermediary forces when the country continues to engage in missions that require these types of capabilities? This paper investigates why the United States has not developed intermediary forces more appropriate to the peace and PCR missions undertaken by the superpower for the past decade. In examining support for the creation of US constabulary units in 1990s, the study lays the foundation to test five current theories of military force innovation (and allows for unique theories to emerge) to identify past obstacles to innovation. This new information will aid policymakers attempting force structure innovation today, as well as building on the current PCR literature by examining why force structure innovations have not occurred. Although the field is awash with recommendations for improving military involvement in post-conflict environments, the matter of implementing military reform remains understudied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the institutionalization of the national security staff in the period 1949-2001 is largely driven by an increase in presidential bargaining uncertainty linked to changes in the presidential bargaining environment. As such, the growth of the NSC staff is driven by many of the same factors that explain the institutionalization of the White House staff more generally. After laying out a theory of staff growth derived from Neustadt’s model of presidential power, the theory is tested utilizing regression analysis and fractionally differenced variables designed to capture both short and long term influences on staff growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

President Bush scored an important political victory with regard to the bureaucratic reorganization that led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, but considerable leadership from the president is needed if the Department is to succeed at the mission the administration has defined for it. President Bush’s goals for the new Department include: centralizing the homeland security function, improving coordination and communication among agencies responsible for domestic security, developing new technologies capable of detecting nuclear, chemical and biological threats, and preparing state and local first responders to cope with any future terrorist attack. This paper addresses three significant challenges to the success of the Department of Homeland Security and the president’s management of it. The challenge of improving coordination and communication between agencies responsible for domestic security. The challenge of structuring a workforce capable of carrying out the domestic security function. And, the challenge of providing the necessary resources for an endeavor of such magnitude. The conclusion of the author is that while the administration excelled at articulating a vision for the new Department, its present choices regarding the operations of the Department are less convincing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay reviews the principal events and trends affecting American federalism from 2001 to mid-2002. The first part of the essay details intergovernmental efforts to provide homeland security. The second section describes the interplay betwen federal policy makers and state and local government officials in education, welfare reform, and health care policy areas. The third section of the paper reviews the current state government fiscal crisis as well as state government policy actions taken independently of Washington, DC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]