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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the applicability of the democratic peace (DP) thesis to a rapidly changing global security environment and, more specifically, to examine the motivation of the United States, the most prominent democratic power, to use force for the promotion of peace through the spread of democracy. In this paper, we distinguish between traditionally accepted instrumental, normative, and institutional use-of-force motivators that apply to democracies and non-democracies alike, but we also add a discussion of contextual use-of-force motivators which are unique to democracies. The basic assumption underlying the DP argument is that democratic states are less prone to wage wars than non-democratic states. But, if democracy makes states more peaceful, why do democratic states still use force? Illustrating each motivator in light of contemporary U.S. national security decisions shows that the DP thesis can provide valuable insight into the reasons why democracies may continue to use force and, in the extreme, wage war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which brought into being the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the path of European integration has meant the difference between a strong and secure Europe and the disintegration of a grand, idealistic experiment. In this post-9/11 world, with recent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, and several attempted terrorist plots foiled, Europe now faces a critical juncture when it comes to dealing with the problem of security. Sovereignty is the key obstacle to security integration because security has traditionally been the prerogative of individual member-states. Are strongly held beliefs about sovereignty ceding ground to an untested supranational order? I argue that key epistemic communities of military strategists, technology experts, and diplomats are already breaking down this resistance because they are in a unique position to persuade others of certain shared norms.These knowledge-based networks, or "epistemic communities", are comprised of non-governmental professionals who share policy relevant expertise, and have actually gained acceptance for the beginnings of a European homeland security. I seek to explain why they are succeeding in pushing forward security integration despite the strong inclination for national governments to hold onto this authority. In this paper, I compare three epistemic communities - military strategists, technology experts, and diplomats - to shed light on the interaction of competing epistemic communities with different motivations and norms. A shortcoming of the current epistemic community literature is that it tends to assume that each epistemic community is operating in a transnational vacuum. Even though I demonstrate that all three epistemic communities support further security integration, their motivations, preferences, processes of socialization, and shared norms vary immensely.I engage in process-tracing and comparative case-studies for each of these epistemic communities to determine the origins of their allegiance, the social background of their membership, the creation and evolution of norms, their overlap with other epistemic communities, and the subsequent success or failure of their efforts to persuade and socialize others. In particular, I seek to determine the degree of impact these norms have had on the general political will for security integration. In this regard, I focus primarily on elite-level acceptance, and whether this has led to particular policy outcomes that support the gradual development of a kind of homeland security in Europe. The implications for sovereignty, democracy, and the limits of integration cannot be ignored. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jean Guilleman (MIT 2007) establishes the Bush Administration's logic of national security for biological weapons as dichotomous between their choice of a self-governed code of "right" behavior and "effective" legal restraints. A compromise system resulted after the cold war that delivered responsibility for the operation of the system to state-based and international scientific academies and organizations. Scientific procedures to create transparency in research for the purpose of preventing applications to bioweaponry and bioterror is a rational activity and should have high utility as implemented by rational actors within rational scientific organizations. However, a major concern is the empirical record of scientists acting in past events as if in a moral vacuum - where research and engineering were achieved for human destruction and state weapons and terror. Guilleman argues that rational methods of codes of behavior must be combined with transparency in open research communities that do not morph into closed enclaves over time. We seek to add to this logic by investigating a further dimension within this particular scientific community. What is the level of ethical knowledge and moral training for the bioscientist in a specific community that is now pursuing an open policy of transparent biosecurity? The International Gene Synthesis Consortium announced in November 2009 is now engaged in the implementation of a gene sequencing screening protocol toward the prevention of doing work that would aid and abet biological weapons developers and/or terrorists. Using survey instruments and in-depth interviews - we seek to utilize the openness of these companies to elucidate the level of ethical knowledge within their scientific ranks and to provide an analysis as to whether or not this adds value to the code of behavior model of biosecurity that Guilleman puts forth as best effort at the end of the Bush Administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States—a liberal democracy—responded to the communist regimes' transition to market economies but not necessarily democratic politics by separating trade from security policy: opening trade to reforming economies but maintaining military superiority over non-democratizing military powers. Congressional attempts to use trade sanctions against market opening economies accused of human rights violations or weapons proliferation failed, while heavy investment continued in developing weapons to deter such countries. In Congress, this "liberal-realist" foreign policy emerged by "ends-meet-the-center" voting, in which bipartisan centrists prevail over extremists of both parties, or by "ideological bipartisan" voting, in which lawmakers on the same ideological side of both parties coalesce. Such patterns persisted in spite of majority party changes, divided governments, or economic downturns. The requirements for such voting patterns: an exogenous agenda setter, issue compartmentalization, inter-party politics, and ideological overlap between the two parties, strongly suggest the existence of a bipartisan, centrist, and pro-business group of lawmakers who serve as the domestic anchors of U.S. trade and security policy. Empirical evidence corroborates this claim, implying that to further understand foreign policymaking, it is necessary to tailor the standard models of Congressional lawmaking, incorporate empirically established policy preferences, and to go beyond the unitary actor-single preference models. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If, as proponents of "national security liberalism" claim, promoting democracy serves America’s security interests, then why does the United States sometimes support authoritarian regimes? I argue that during the Cold War, the prevalence of nationalism and of socialism (communist and democratic) in the Third World led Third World democratic elites to be open to cooperation with communists for the sake of national development. Washington’s top priority being containment of communism, however, meant that it could not tolerate such cooperation. Thus Washington and social democrats were at loggerheads, and Washington cooperated instead with anti-communist authoritarians. This situation changed in the 1980s as both varieties of socialism had failed vis-a-vis capitalism in country after country. Third World democrats abandoned both socialism and their communist countrymen; Washington was now willing to support them over its old tyrannical friends as a way to contain communism. The striking case of Reagan’s abandonment of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 illustrates this process. I conclude with implications for U.S. support of authoritarianism in the Muslim world today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]