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In this paper, the authors analyze the empirical process of securitization of the US–Canada border and then reflect on the model proposed by the Copenhagen School. We argue that securitization theory oversimplifies the political process of securitizing moves and audience acceptance. Rather than attributing securitization to a singular speaker addressing a specific audience, we present overlapping and ongoing language security games performed by varying relevant actors during the key period between the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) in December 2004 and the signing of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) in June 2005, showing how multiple speakers participate in the continuing construction of a context in which this issue is increasingly treated as a matter of security. We also explore the language adopted by participants in the field, focusing on an expert panel convened by the Homeland Security Institute. We conclude that in the securitization of the US–Canada border there are inconsistencies between truth and discourse, as well as significant distinctions between official and bureaucratic discourses, further emphasizing the importance of a comprehensive model of securitization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Besieged by insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq and gripped by mounting pressure to enhance security and public safety at home, officials in Washington and Ottawa are now confronted with a serious homeland security dilemma: the greater the financial costs, public sacrifice and political capital invested in security, the higher the public's expectations and corresponding standards for measuring performance, the more significant the public's sense of insecurity after each failure, and, paradoxically, the higher the pressure on governments and citizens to sacrifice even more to achieve perfect security. The paradox of security dilemmas at the international level (Jervis, 1976, 1978) explains why perfectly rational decisions to enhance power actually diminish security by promoting unstable spirals in competitive defence spending--a common account of escalating military budgets throughout much of the Cold War. The homeland security dilemma represents the post-9/l I equivalent for domestic politics in the war on terrorism. The paper's central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need, not because enhancing security makes terrorism more likely (although the incentive for terrorists to attack may increase as extremists feel duty bound to demonstrate their ongoing relevance), but because enormous investments in security inevitably raise public expectations and amplify public out-rage after subsequent failures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]