This paper examines comparative jurisprudence and minority rights through the broader lens Aquinas' ethics enunciated in the Summa Theologiae. In the notion of the first principles, basic moral precepts are self-evident. While some of these are accessible only to the educated, the most basic are accessible to all human beings. Among those accessible to all is "to dwell in society" (I, II, 94, 2). All that pertains to this inclination also belongs to natural law: among these things is the need to shun ignorance and to avoid offending those among whom one has to live. In this vein, I assert that legal or institutional discrimination constitutes a violation of natural law. Toward this end, I proceed in a graduated manner, working through each of the three country cases, paying special attention to the explicit content, as well as the legal implications, of the various jurisprudence. The guide in the conduct of this study is Alexander George's method of structured, focused comparison. First, why compare the three countries? South Africa, Germany, and the United States are all federal systems. They all have supreme courts of constitutional review, that also possess the power to render void aspects of legislation. They have also all in the past ten years been compelled to confront questions either related to homosexual rights of private conduct or the right to civil union/marriage access, or both. The consideration of this issue occurs at multiple levels of government in the case of the United States. At the federal judicial level, the Supreme Court has considered the issue of homosexual conduct, and ruled in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) that its prior decision, in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), which sustained a Georgia sodomy statute, be overruled. At the federal legislative level, in 1996 the Congress and the President signed the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) into law, which prohibited the federal government from granting legal recognition to either same-sex or polygamous unions. It also provided that no state could be compelled to acknowledge (under the full faith and credit clause) a same-sex union performed in another state. For this reason, brief consideration of various state-level legal regulations, including the recent spate of marriage amendments and the Massachusetts decision to permit same-sex marriage, ought to be considered. However, they should not be considered on the same level that is afforded to Bowers, Lawrence, or the DOMA. In Germany, two seminal cases will be considered, depicting Germany's evolving body of jurisprudence and legal guidelines. In the 1957 Homosexuality case (6 BVerfGE 389), the Court ruled, as the US Supreme Court did in Bowers, the criminalizing of homosexual conduct did not constitute a violation of the Basic Law. Similar to the passage of the DOMA (which has thus far been rejected for review by the US Supreme Court), the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1979 in 53 BVerfGE 224 that marital union consists of one man and one woman (and that only this form of union was accorded protection under the marriage article (6. 1) in the German Basic Law. However, the Court subsequently ruled in 1990 in 82 BVerfGE 6 that lawmakers were free to grant legal recognition to same-sex couples, so long as this recognition occurred within the boundaries defined by Article 6. In 105 BVerfGE 313 (2002), the Civil Partnership case, the Court ruled that the law in question was, indeed, such a permissible means, not violating the spirit, intent or content of the "special protection" granted the marriage institution under the terms of Article 6. In South Africa, in CCT 11/98, National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and another v. Minister of Justice, the Constitutional Court ruled that the inclusion of sodomy as a common law offense was unconstitutional... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]