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The paper builds on earlier research that demonstrates a strong relationship between local level electoral structures and Latino bureaucratic representation. This research suggests that over time, descriptive minority legislative representation leads to a greater minority presence in the bureaucracy, but that the type of election determines the magnitude and scope of bureaucratic representation. A question remains however, concerning the direction of influence. Do minority legislators delegate top-level bureaucratic responsibilities to minority agents, who in turn appoint more minorities to lower level positions (a top-down process)? Or, do minorities enter the bureaucracy at the lower levels and move their way up the organization through time, finally gaining access to legislative positions as they acquire organizational influence (a bottom-up process)? I present a research proposal that is designed to disentangle the causal direction of this process by looking at school board, administrative, and teacher representation of Latinos in school districts of two states -- Texas and California -- across a ten-year period. The cross-sectional time series approach would allow for preliminary causality tests, and provide more leverage than previous studies concerning the direction (and magnitude of effects) of minority access to the bureaucracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the biased interest group system to determine if it is one of the main reasons minority candidates encounter multiple disadvantages when running for elective office. Bias is demonstrated by inequality of interest groups (which are heavy on the affluent business types) that lead to unequal support through campaign funding and unequal representation in the political system. I argue a candidateÂ’s ethnicity or race, like gender, can affect the likelihood that he or she will have a disadvantage at receiving campaign contributions. I examine the state legislators that were elected to the 2005 session to determine the possible inequities in campaign contributions. I hypothesize minority candidates, men and women, raise less money on average than other candidates. To test this hypothesis, I focus on the states which have a substantial minority population (Texas, California, and Florida). The independent variables include the race or ethnicity and gender of each major party legislative candidate. The dependent variable is the total amount of campaign contributions received by the elected legislator. I find that the data is not consistent with previous literature since there are few significant relationships between ethnicity of the candidate and their total amount of campaign contributions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]