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Since its emergence in the first half of the twentieth century, there has been considerable discussion of the viability and value of analytic induction (AI) as a conceptualisation of social scientific method; one which challenges the correlational approach to causal analysis characteristic of much quantitative work. However, less attention has been given to the philosophical sources on which Znaniecki, Lindesmith, and other exponents of AI relied. This paper explores some of these, and focuses in particular upon the use made of Lewin's distinction between Aristotelian and Galileian forms of science. The status of AI is ambiguous in relation to this; and it is a distinction that raises some fundamental issues more generally about the methodology of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explicates the argument of The Origins of American Science. Starting from my own historical premises and the origin of the social sciences in both historicism and science, I compare the divergent historical orientations of the sociologies of Robert Par and Max Weber. I argue that the inclination of American social science toward scientism and liberalism derives from the national ideology of American exceptionalism. Since this structural feature of American political culture was itself a part of history. I indicate how changes in historical consciousness and politics led American social scientists to reformulate exceptionalism and their disciplines. By the 1920s, their hope of establishing scientific control over, and maintaining the liberal direction of, the fast-changing national history was embodied in scientism. I close with some thoughts about the continuing power of scientism and exceptionalism since the 1920s, and the possibility that an historical. Weberian model of social science could bridge the widening gap between scientistic and hermeneutic wings of the social science disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]