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Korean Reunification will transform overall military structure in Northeast Asia. Reduction of tension around the Korean Peninsula will impact on major countries' military presence as well as their national security strategy. Especially, termination of nuclear danger by North Korea will reorganize nuclear policy of Six Party Talks countries which have challenged security environment in Northeast Asia. This paper researches what is new military architecture in Northeast Asia after Korean Reunification and major countries' security policy. First of all, Russia and China have to rebuild their national security strategy to cut down military expansion and Japan will finally repress its national ambition as a nuclear country. Then the unified Korea will lead new security environment in Northeast Asia and U.S. military presence will be remained for regional security and peace. Therefore, this paper argues how Korean Reunification works out as the main key to reorganize military structure in Northeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent scholarship analyzing Japanese defense policy has been sensationalistic. Challenging the constructivist argument that an antimilitarism norm has constrained Japanese militarization, realists have called attention to Japan's technologically advanced military, procurement of sophisticated weaponry, increased public support for the Japan Self-Defense Force, and a strategy of buck-passing as evidence of "normalization," "militarization," and the emergence of a "great power." However, is this really the case? Has Japan embarked on a new aggressive path, negating decades of pacifism? In this paper, I propose a cross-paradigmatic approach for analyzing Japan's military strength by combining constructivist, liberal, and realist arguments. First, this paper provides a systematic comparison of militaries in East Asia to measure relative power. In context of a rapidly militarizing East Asia and the emergence of new threats, Japan's military policy has been moderate modernization, not militarization. Second, this paper offers a typology of constraints on the Japanese military. Social, technical, normative, and political factors limit Japanese power projection capabilities in the present, and will become more debilitating in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is an analysis and assessment of the changes in the national security and defense policies of the republic of Serbia since the end of the Milosevic era to the present time. It will analyze the changes in the global security system, EU and NATO have impacted the policy process and outcomes for defense and national security policy in Serbia. The paper will rely heavily on an analysis of the policy documents of the civil and military authorities in Serbia, as well as interviews with Serbian officials from the legislature, executive, ministry of defense, military and non-governmental organizations. The basic thesis is that the Serbian government and military have successfully aligned their national defense structure and policies very closely with North Atlantic security institutions and that the level of functional and doctrinal integration is now so high that Serbia's admission to NATO will just be a matter of time. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will critically analyse the varied ways in which the mainstreaming of the concept of human security has influenced post-Cold War policy on the control of military technology. The paper will note that apparently progressive campaigns such as tho ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines how the precautionary principle has been interpreted in foreign and defence policy. By focusing on the burden of proof, the paper argues that current interpretations of the precautionary principle are not helpful, but that a more nuanced interpretation of the precautionary principle is feasible ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advocates of a related series of ideas termed as "network centric warfare," "rapid decisive operations," and "effects based operations," see the combination of long-range precision strike, information dominance, and networked information technologies as elements changing the nature of war, from a series of sequenced battles and campaigns towards a continuous battle of shock and dislocation. However, this emphasis on the importance of time and speediness ignores the reality that time is a culturally dependent conception that has differing implications for different cultures. This paper explores cultural interpretations of time and their influence on military strategy. Analyzing national security strategy and military doctrine, this paper suggests that the U.S. conception of time leads to an overly offensive national strategy. This paper offers a vignette from the Cuban Missile Crisis to demonstrate how to escape the offensively oriented time conception. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops four main arguments designed to clarify the nature and purpose of ESDP. First, it engages specifically with the American IR literature which detects in ESDP signs of balancing against US power. The paper argues that such an analysis is flawed. Secondly, it argues that the true drivers behind ESDP have been the recent shifts in the tectonic plates both of history and of geo-politics. Thirdly, it analyses the recent European Security Strategy document, which it presents as a new normative approach to security policy. Finally, it argues that the distinctiveness of ESDP also derives from the peculiarities of institutional interplay within the European Union - that the policy has been generated by years of complex negotiations and compromise between and within EU institutions. Given this institutional labyrinth, any form of "heroic" strategic ambition vis-à-vis the United States would be impossible to articulate. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that the institutional design of security forces—defined as those armed groups sanctioned by the state to maintain internal order, including the army and police—plays a crucial role in explaining regime stability over the long term. In particular, choices about the locus of control over security forces—whether centralized in the hands of soldiers or decentralized in the hands of politicians—impact both the frequency of armed insurrection and the ability of the state to respond. The case of Colombia between 1886 and 1958 serves as a point of entry into understanding these dynamics. While the political processes the paper examines are historical in nature, recent events in Iraq and Haiti suggest that the choices elites make today with respect to the locus of control over security forces continue to be relevant for regime stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been some contestation as to the nature of security and the causes of insecurity in the post cold war era. In the Caribbean region, it is being argued that threats from non-traditional sources have the potential to create security dilemmas that can destabilize the region. This paper analyzes the role of international and regional organizations in Caribbean security issues, using Ralph Bunche’s work with the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission (AACC) as a point of departure. The paper will examine Caribbean economic, social, and military security issues, and explore the need for the creation of new instruments for addressing the security concerns of the region. CARICOM, arguably a successor organization to the AACC, does not possess the necessary institutional and regulatory mechanisms for maintaining regional security, neither is its mandate oriented toward recognizing emerging security threats, from domestic, regional sources and international and transnational phenomena such as migration, drug trafficking and the effects of globalization, which expose the region to more vulnerabilities and create regional and national security dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As we await a final report from the commission investigating the terrorist attack on the US in September 2001, we know enough now to determine whetehr or not the failure to detect and thwart the surprise was the fault of America’s multi-billion dollar intelligence system or something else. The purpose of this paper will be to evaluate the intelligence activities surrounding 9/11, determine what failed and why, and draw lessons for the future from this extraordinary event. The paper will comment as well on the steps that have already been taken to prevent such surprises in the future and the laws that have been passed to protect national security, perhaps at a great cost to human rights and personal freedoms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Provisional Title: ‘Theoretical Perspectives on Coalition Warfare.’ (September 11 & the changing nature of IR / the relationship between theory and practice) Theorising coalition warfare to date has failed to provide comprehensive or convincingly definitive explanations for why military coalitions are formed, how common agendas are set, and through what means multinational capabilities are realised. This paper intends to contribute to filling the gaps in our current understanding of the phenomenon. Based upon ongoing doctoral research, it will examine three competing perspectives or ‘images’ of coalition warfare utilising international relations ‘levels of analysis’. It regards the phenomenon at the system, state, and ‘organisational’ levels while concurrently providing structural, procedural and ‘organisational’ explanations for coalition behaviour. In evaluating existing theories pertaining to alliances and exploring alternative explanations it aims to contribute to a more complete interpretation of why and how nations join together in combination against threats and an identification of the factors crucial to optimum coalition performance. The paper will contain a strong empirical base, drawing on thoroughly researched cases of coalition warfare during the Second World War and the 1956 Suez War. It emphasises throughout the importance of working with allies to attain national security goals and the serious consequences that may result from coalition failure. By considering this highly pertinent topic with reference to a post 9/11 environment, it aims to contribute to our wider understanding of the current practice of international affairs and to reappraise IR theories that date from the Cold War to explain politico-military alignments between states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the preferences of major political factions are likely to influence policy choice on security issues, the origins of these preferences remains unclear compared to those on foreign economic policy. This paper examines efforts to explain preferences on security issues using data on congressional roll call voting. A large body of quantitative research in this area concludes that ideology drives these preferences, and that constituency economic interests have little or no effect. Unfortunately, this literature conceives of economic interests in an unrealistically narrow way, and does not consider the possibility that these interests may shape the ideology of members of congress. Using data on Senate voting on foreign policy from 1947 through 2000, this paper presents evidence that Senators’ home states’ stake in the international economic order, as well as their stake in military spending, played an important role in shaping foreign and defense policy. Although liberal-conservative "ideology" also matters, its effects are more consistent with an interest-based vote trading arrangement than with a coherent set of ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last 15 years, Japan's security policy has undergone important qualitative and quantitative changes. No longer the idle pacifist, Japan has increased operations overseas, acquired impressive new defense technologies, and displayed more assertive security rhetoric. Realists posit that the erosion of Japan's antimilitarism norm can be attributed to regional security threats, and more generally a changing international security environment. However, all too often Japan scholars analyze the reasons why Japan should militarize without considering how the Japanese government and public conceptualize militarization. Even though Japan's current policies seem to suggest a "normalizing" defense posture, it may be possible that this is not what the government and public intends. Moreover, how do they conceptualize "normal"? In this paper, I examine government speeches and polling data to answer the question, how has the Japanese government and public conceptualized Japan's changing military policy? I conclude that Japan has adopted an "assertive peacemaker" international role. This role is shaped by the nation's long antimilitarism history, relationship with the United States, and international environment. I propose the concept of "multiple militarisms," which is the argument that security policy does not need to be rigidly bound by the militarization/pacifism dichotomy. Militarizing states can adopt very similar strategies, policies, and technology and arrive at drastically different ends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terrorism becomes a fatal factor to annihilate global security in danger and the U.S. requires strategic responsibili ty and policy as a global leader which takes charge of international security. Especially, national stage of terrorism c an challenge overall U.S. security policy so that it would cause war to eradicate terrorism like the Afghanistan War a nd the Iraq War. After two wars, the U.S. seriously highlights North Korea's military attacks influencing overall regi onal security in Northeast Asia. Even after the U.S. removed North Korea from the terror list, its military attacks have become more aggressive an d tricky. North Korea indignantly declared "Sacred War" based on its nuclear deterrent against military drills of the U.S. and South Korea after the sinking of South Korean warship, Cheonan. North Korea is likely to expose itself to further attacks. I will discuss two ways in this paper to defeat North Korea's military attacks which will be the Obama Administra tion's heavy duty in 2011. One is direct military policy to abolish North Korea's military terrors. The other is tension policy through variable routes. North Korea has shown two cards of military provocations and dialogue gestures. I will find out the fundamental winning policy to terminate North Korea's military attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing scholarship on the relationship between candidate gender and voter perceptions of candidate competence suggests that women candidates are perceived to be less qualified in traditionally masculine policy issues. In this paper, I question this fundamental assumption by examining whether women candidates are able to counteract gender stereotypes by embracing hawkish policy positions. I use an experimental design to explore the effect of hawkishness on voter evaluations of candidate competence. While past research implies that women candidates cannot compete on men's policy issues, I find that hawkish women candidates are perceived to be as competent in national security and military policy as their hawkish male counterparts. Moreover, voters deem hawkish women candidates to be more competent in these issues than candidates of either sex who do not adopt hawkish positions. Yet, the utility of being a hawk is likely to vary across partisan lines, with Republican voters more supportive of hawkish candidates and Democratic voters more supportive of dovish candidates. The findings suggest that political candidates have a certain amount of agency over how they are perceived by voters. Women candidates can be deemed to be competent in men's policy issues; which position they adopt is likely to depend on constituency preferences, personal ideals, and political ambitions [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States maintains two distinct armies: an active duty, or force under federal control, and a National Guard nominally under state control with the option of being federalized. This bifurcation of the American military remains largely unchanged since the nation's founding. Given the inclination of policymakers to centralize power under conditions of existential threat or disaster, this continued division of the armed forces is puzzling. What explains the durability of the two armies and their ability to adapt to new or qualitatively different roles over time? This paper develops a conceptual framework that seeks to explain agency adaptation and durability. I theorize that when faced with new or qualitatively different demands from policymakers, agencies bargain with their overseers for resources and institutional changes that facilitate adaptation and mitigate stressors. The agency's political environment, particularly institutional arrangements and ideational factors, mediates agency adaptation by expanding or curtailing an agency's range of response, further influencing the nature of the principal-agent bargain. I briefly consider cases that illustrate this conceptual framework as it relates to the durability of the two armies and propose avenues for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores current possibilities for the evolving Russiaâ€"Europe security relationships. It attempts to define what critical issues are most likely to shape security environment on the European part of the Eurasian continent in the midterm future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the relationship between the capability of posing limits on war, the reciprocity among combatants and the historic as well as geographic borders of international society. The conventional wisdom usually overlooks the relationship betw ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines elite and public discourses on neutrality and theEuropean Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/CommonEuropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in Ireland since the end of the Cold War. In parallel with security and de ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An enduring pressure for U.S. foreign policy makers has been upholding and promoting the values of the United States while often necessarily working with dictators and authoritarian regimes for national security concerns. This paper examines the ways in w ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A recurrent criticism of the EU's efforts in the field of security and defence is related to the overlapping and inefficiency of member states defence capabilities. This has usually been justified by the securitisation of national defence industries, an essential feature for the survival of the European nation-states. Nonetheless, recent steps in both the economic (large number of mergers and acquisitions within the European defence industry sector) and the political (security and defence integration measures within the EU) arenas have contributed to changes in that discourse. The creation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) is, to a certain extent, resultant from the fusion of developments in these two arenas. Established in July 2004 by the European Union, the EDA was supposed to work on four different areas: defence capabilities development; armaments cooperation; the European defence technological and industrial base and defence equipment market; and research and technology. By looking at how both the creation and evolution of the EDA has been politically justified, it is the goal of this paper to understand how, and to what extent the EDA represents a definitive step in the consolidation of a European discourse on defence industries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this paper is to contribute to filling in the gaps on the knowledge of public opinion on the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and on the facets of support of European citizens for the ESDP. From a logt estimation based on the Eurobarometer survey 54.1, we test three sets of hypotheses to identify the determinants for support the ESDP. We find evidence that some threats, European decision-making architecture, amry percpetions are good estimates for ESDP's public support. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most previous studies using the poliheuristic theory of decision have focused on national security issues wherein decision makers tend to pursue noncompensatory strategies en route to a foreign policy choice. The theory argues that decision makers avoid tradeoffs primarily with respect to the political consequences of their decisions. However, some scholars have questioned whether the same noncompensatory process would work in scenarios where the stakes are not so high, i.e., in non-loss of life situations. Perhaps decision makers would be more willing to engage in compensatory decision making in economic or diplomatic realms. This paper will use two different scenarios, a national security use of force versus an economic scenario to determine the conditions under which decision makers would be more likely to use noncompensatory instead of compensatory decision strategies en route to choice. I will also examine if the two different scenarios lead to other changes in information processing. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most research on congressional consideration of foreign and defense policy concludes that ideology is the most important influence on roll call voting and that constituent economic interests are not very important. This paper challenges this conclusion on two grounds. First, most previous research conceives of constituent economic interests on these issues very narrowly, examining only the benefits constituents obtain from providing military goods and services rather than their economic stakes in the broader goals of national security policy. Second, constituent economic interests can influence the ideology of their representative, something most research does not consider. An examination of key votes on military resource allocation, intervention, and foreign aid from 1947 through 2000 supports these objections. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intense debate regarding the potential of the European Union's Common Security and Defence policy tells a tale of high hopes and severe obstacles. The militarising of the European Union opens the question of what sort of strategic actor the EU will be. The question of strategic culture was a focal point of the first-ever European Security Strategy launched in late 2003. The problem is that the EU persistently fails to display the behaviour ideas and expectations usually associated with great powers. This research paper disputes the notion that the EU is necessarily unfit to develop a strategic culture or that the EU must be changed in order to facilitate such a culture, assumptions commonly held on both sides of the Atlantic. Instead, it posits a counter-intuitive hypothesis: that a EU strategic culture has already emerged and that the tenets of the EU strategic culture are not those of a great power - they are those of a small state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2002 National Security Strategy for the United States focused American strategic policy around the use, or potential use, of preemptive/preventive strikes, particularly as a counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism tool. While preemption and prevention are not new strategies, they have never been highlighted to such a degree as is currently the case. These activities have been studied in the context of international security, using elements such as spiral models and offense-defense theory. This study seeks to examine if other elements, specifically international law and normative issues, such as just war tradition, contribute to our understanding of the use, or non-use, of preventive or preemptive actions by states. The case studies presented in this paper seem to indicate that the legal and normative elements do have some influence on leaders with respect to the use of anticipatory military activities. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the long-term consequences of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq without the support of key allies and the United Nations. It does so by employing a theoretical framework that anchors the analysis in empirical research and historical perspective. Simultaneously, a decision analytic is used to measure how specific U.S. policies did not maximize national security interests. The paper concludes that policymakers have failed to anticipate the impact that a weakened Atlantic Alliance could have on the likely challenge the U.S. will face in mid Century from China and possibly India. It also postulates that fissures in the Atlantic Alliance over Iraq may well exacerbate internal problems within the EU. Further it shows that while deterrence was stable against Iraq, it is not against rising terrorist groups. Analyzing world structures and dynamics, the authors conclude that Iraq should not have been viewed as a threat to the United States or its alliance system. If the U.S. had unified its alliance members before taking action, that fact would have reduced both U.S. and Iraqi casualties and insured that the threat of nuclear war was minimized [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the capacity of the presidency to initiate war or other large-scale military operations. The Constitution provides a framework that, to use the market metaphor, invites presidents as the leading national security policy "suppliers" to expand their share of the market during times of war or international crisis at the expense of other institutional actors. Beyond that, over time presidents have acquired the means to engage in military action on their own initiative, including control over large, standing military forces. Other resources associated with the modern presidency, such as its ability to "go public", augment presidential war making capacity. On the other side, institutional, political, and international factors that might have constrained a president in the past have weakened. Enhanced means to make war, however, do not address the core problem of the commander in chief -- how to reconcile national political objectives and military strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nearly five years after coming out of the nuclear closet and openly declaring itself as a nuclear weapon state, India finalized its nuclear command structure and formalized its nuclear doctrine in January 2003. The broad framework of India?s nuclear doctrine was drafted by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) that was established by the government of India after the nuclear tests of May 1998. This draft nuclear doctrine of the NSAB had been in the public domain since August 1999. However, till January 2003, India?s nuclear weapons doctrine remained just that, a draft. This ambivalence was removed by an official announcement from the Indian government in January 2003 that not only adopted the essence of that draft as official policy but also announced a formal nuclear command structure under civilian control. This is a significant development as India is probably the only nation that has come up with a nuclear doctrine after an extensive debate and discussion within the country and abroad. Despite this, however, the Indian doctrine, like any doctrine, is not free of problems and tensions. This paper argues that while a clear enunciation of its nuclear doctrine and command structure will definitely go a long way in enhancing regional stability and assuring the international community, it is at the operational level that India continues to and will have to work harder to achieve the goals that it has set out for its nuclear policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper purports to offer a formal model that unifies deterrence and the security dilemma (or the spiral model) in a way different from the current literature’s. The two models, deterrence and the security dilemma, have been regarded as an alternative to each other. There are some formal works to unify the two, but even in such models, deterrence and the security dilemma are still treated as different worlds in the sense that actors do not know which world they are in and therefore act based on the probability for each. In my model, the world actors are in can change from one to the other as a crisis proceeds. More precisely, in one’s efforts to deter its adversary by building arms or mobilizing its force, one may well succeed in dissuading the other until some point. However, once its deterrent act exceeds that point (without recognizing it), the world is transformed to that of the security dilemma in which its deterrence backfires by (unnecessarily) provoking its opponent. This is the security dilemma in the sense that even if one’s opponent is greedy, its deterrence failure is not due to the adversary’s greed but rather because of the latter’s fear, aroused by one’s excessive deterrence, that the latter may be attacked in any event by the former. The logic behind it pertains to two types of credibility in deterrence, namely, the credibility of one’s threats and that of one’s assurances. As Schelling and others argue, a deterrent threat needs to be accompanied by the assurance that as long as the opponent stays there, one will not, the opponent believes, intend to hurt the other. This point has been argued by non-formal works. The existing formal models, however, are mainly concerned with how to make sure of the credibility of one’s threat without modeling to what extent it undermines the other type of credibility of an assurance. My model, by showing the inherent interconnectedness of deterrence and the security dilemma, illuminates the delicateness of deterrence. With the United States being at present the only superpower in the international system, policy implications of the model would be of vital significance. Jervis argues that state leaders tend to think that their benign intention is known to others even though it is not the case in actuality. If neorealists are right, the unmatched power of this country is ineluctably a threat to the others. Hence, unawareness of the security-dilemma side of deterrence could engender unintended consequences, ultimately undermining the US power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper criticises the traditional realist distinction between high politics (sovereignty and security matters) and low politics (economics and other less important state activities) on several grounds. First, it ignores the economic underpinnings of military power and national security. Second, it overestimates the independence states have both from the international economy and from domestic political opposition when mobilizing economic resources in support of security objectives. Finally, it glosses over the potential for states to achieve national security objectives in an interdependent world economy by using economic instruments, such as economic sanctions and economic incentives. This article, therefore, makes the case for treating the political economy of national security as a distinct subfield of security studies for both teaching and research purposes. It identifies a unique set of political economy issues that have a direct bearing on national security calculations. It reviews both the classical geopolitics literature and a growing literature by contemporary international relations scholars that address these issues in an effort to bridge the chasm between political economy and security. Finally, it suggests avenues of further research to flesh out the conditions under which domestic and international economic factors affect the pursuit of national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]