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This paper criticises the traditional realist distinction between high politics (sovereignty and security matters) and low politics (economics and other less important state activities) on several grounds. First, it ignores the economic underpinnings of military power and national security. Second, it overestimates the independence states have both from the international economy and from domestic political opposition when mobilizing economic resources in support of security objectives. Finally, it glosses over the potential for states to achieve national security objectives in an interdependent world economy by using economic instruments, such as economic sanctions and economic incentives. This article, therefore, makes the case for treating the political economy of national security as a distinct subfield of security studies for both teaching and research purposes. It identifies a unique set of political economy issues that have a direct bearing on national security calculations. It reviews both the classical geopolitics literature and a growing literature by contemporary international relations scholars that address these issues in an effort to bridge the chasm between political economy and security. Finally, it suggests avenues of further research to flesh out the conditions under which domestic and international economic factors affect the pursuit of national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, policy makers have shown renewed interest in the effect of declaring a national security doctrine. Conventional analysis holds that establishing the Bush Doctrine against global terrorism or a promise to retaliate against WMD attacks with nuclear weapons engages audience costs. Should US leaders not possess the reslove to follow through on these doctrines in Afghanistan or elsewhere, they supposedly will pay in terms of lost votes at home or in terms of more demanding challenges from abroad. This does not explain why leaders sometimes violate their doctrine, nor does it explain their capacity for spinning the circumstances of a crisis to escape damage to their credibility. Alternatively, special observable conditions relating to limited war capability occasionally enable declared doctrine to serve as a powerful coordinating device, almost like a traffic light, for states involved in a series of crises. The coordinating function of doctrine may be tested empirically. It also supports a more cautious declaratory policy for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous work on two level security, we have analyzed the consequences of the strategies states pursue when faced with multiple threats in light of resource and other constraints. To deal with the problems created by substitutability, we have conceptualized those strategies in a general way as either a [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years controversy has surrounded analyses of foreign threat due to three principal deficiencies: (1) regarding threat identification, major distortions exist in the framing of the existence or nonexistence of threat; (2) regarding threat coverage, a mismatch exists between diversified real-world post-Cold War dangers and prevailing notions of threat; and (3) regarding threat assessment, significant conceptual problems exist in the gauging of threat severity. In response to these problems, this study introduces a target-centered conceptual framework for analyzing foreign threat that aims to enhance its analytical coherence and explanatory value and ultimately to increase the chances of coping with it successfully. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To anchor an evaluation of the recent Republican party-dominated Congress requires a longer lens, looking back to other periods like it. On a scale of political cynicism, how does the Congress of 2001 to 2006 stack up against these prior wartime Congresses? The most appropriate prior periods are both to be found in the Cold War period up to 1968, as this covers wartime responsibilities assumed by both wings of the political establishment. This includes the last elected branch monopoly the Republican party achieved, and the lead-up to it. That monopoly took until 1953 to build, and that quickly burned itself out by 1955. The last wartime Democratic monopoly on elected branches lasted from John Kennedy's inauguration in 1961 up until Lyndon Johnson's decision not to compete in the 1968 election. The low-points are well known - McCarthyism and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution - but the details are worth revisiting with parallels in mind.As to the Bush Congress, most commentary has split between two camps of opinion: Either the current Congress has abdicated on oversight, or Congress is exercising restraint appropriate to wartime. When it comes to answering the question, "How does oversight work?," the critics say, "It doesn't," or, "There isn't a straightforward answer." But a closer look at the pressures that have led to some oversight leadership by Congress during the Bush years suggests a stronger answer to that question: Oversight's path can rarely BE straightforward. Congress has few available means of piercing the veil of bureaucratic secrecy crafted around national security operations, and the oversight issues that legislators can make stick just ARE serendipitous. But as in previous legislative "insurgencies" during single-party dominant eras, there is a pattern to effective oversight: Just as important as the scandal that gives traction to oversight is accumulating over time a public trail of evidence about what oversight jurisdictions are being stonewalled on the President's behalf by fellow members in Congress. The President's party works hand in hand with a number of gatekeepers around Congress, and the legislative opposition has difficulties bringing to the public's attention the record of those responsible within Congress for ongoing stonewalling. That is to say, the opacity of the Presidency is crucial to understanding the limits of legislative oversight of national security matters, but so is the opacity of the oversight process itself. This essay furnishes a short case study from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]