Search

This paper examines the various impacts of contemporary globalization on national security, with special reference to the migration of the Taiwanese semiconductor industry to China and its security challenges to the United States, Taiwan and China. The paper adheres to a sectoral approach to the study of globalization-security interconnections and adopts a broadly based definition of security pertaining to the case study in question that encompasses economic, technological and defense security. The analysis of the subject matter is grounded in evidence collected in more than 140 interviews with chip industry, defense sector and government insiders in the US and Asia, as well as English-language and Chinese-language secondary data. On sectoral migration, the paper argues that the scope of the migration is extensive, the direction complicated, the cause multiple, and the outcome significant in boosting the development of the indigenous Chinese chip industry. It has been discovered that some Taiwanese non-state chip actors have violated government regulations in the process of spearheading the migration, and some have even forged business ties with their PRC counterparts associated with the PLA. As for the ensuing security ramifications, it is argued that there is no immediate security risk involved, although long-term strategic repercussions are paramount. The depth and scope of the continuous sectoral migration in years to come will determine the level of economic security risks faced by the US and Taiwan. Long-term technological and defense security repercussions need to take into account two important elements at play: technological change in the sector (increasing commercial-to-military spin-on and dual-use nature of the chip technology), and the PRC dual-track (economic and defense) grand strategy behind its resolve to upgrade its indigenous chip capability. Four pertinent aspects are analyzed: (a) concerns over the PRC chip industrial base, its contribution to the PLA modernization and the ensuing shift in the balance of power in Beijing's favour; (b) technology-related misgivings over the trustworthy supplies of chips for the US and Taiwanese military end uses, as well as the shrinking "chip gap"; (c) fear of denial of chip supply due to foreign dependency; (d) dubious implementation of export control policies at the unilateral and the multilateral level that exacerbate some of the above security repercussions. The concluding section elucidates how the case study helps to show the impact of globalization on security as far as the agency and scope of security, the autonomy and capacity of the state, as well as the balance of power are concerned. To sum up, the study offers a fresh look at the complex security repercussions of the globalization of a strategic industry that occurs in a politically sensitive region in world politics today. It not only helps us disentangle an important policy issue, but also advances our theoretical understanding of the globalization-security interconnections in international relations today. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on to use one of the theoretical frameworks of international relations theory-security dilemma to analyze the U.S. strategic rebalancing and its impact on U.S.-China relations. Security dilemma arises when the means a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others. Throughout the Cold War there was no security dilemma in the U.S.-China relations, since the U.S. strategy was containment against China.

The United States—a liberal democracy—responded to the communist regimes' transition to market economies but not necessarily democratic politics by separating trade from security policy: opening trade to reforming economies but maintaining military superiority over non-democratizing military powers. Congressional attempts to use trade sanctions against market opening economies accused of human rights violations or weapons proliferation failed, while heavy investment continued in developing weapons to deter such countries. In Congress, this "liberal-realist" foreign policy emerged by "ends-meet-the-center" voting, in which bipartisan centrists prevail over extremists of both parties, or by "ideological bipartisan" voting, in which lawmakers on the same ideological side of both parties coalesce. Such patterns persisted in spite of majority party changes, divided governments, or economic downturns. The requirements for such voting patterns: an exogenous agenda setter, issue compartmentalization, inter-party politics, and ideological overlap between the two parties, strongly suggest the existence of a bipartisan, centrist, and pro-business group of lawmakers who serve as the domestic anchors of U.S. trade and security policy. Empirical evidence corroborates this claim, implying that to further understand foreign policymaking, it is necessary to tailor the standard models of Congressional lawmaking, incorporate empirically established policy preferences, and to go beyond the unitary actor-single preference models. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today everyone knows that in the coming century India, like the Medici, has the intention and potential to enhance its wealth, prestige, and power.In this context, observers of world politics are wondering: How will India pursue those intentions? What will it do to realize its potential and assure its security? In the last year and half since the proposed Indo-US nuclear deal was announced, numerous experts have tried to induce answers to these questions from what is still a small universe of cases including India's attitude toward Iranian nuclear policy and energy (particularly pipeline) policy, toward US missile defense initiatives, toward the enlargement of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, toward Chinese activity in South Asia (particularly vis-à-vis Pakistan and Nepal). But, above all, observers have focused on a proposed deal between the US and India on nuclear cooperation.The dimensions and general features of the arena in which India will act are clear. It is a triangular space with China, India, and the US at the corners. The view that a rising India will be the fulcrum of balance in Asia is now increasingly common. A 2004 editorial in the Chinese People's Daily is a good example. "Steadily warming India-US relations have resulted in widespread attention to the geopolitics of Asia. It is difficult to predict whether or not India will become a strategic ally of the US or of China, but the sudden attractiveness of India will sooner or later alter the regional balance of power between the three countries" (Joseph, 2004). The 2005 Indo-US deal was interpreted by many observers to be an obvious American effort to draw India onto the US bandwagon.In the real world, of course, actors are motivated and constrained by power, wealth, and prestige. Syncretic approaches such as the currently fashionable "analytic eclecticism" draw selectively on all three international relations traditions in rendering "explanatory sketches" of important international security questions such as the durability of US-South Korean alliance, the possible revisionist aspiration of a rising China, or whether it is international institutions rather than balance of power dynamics that are shaping strategy in South East Asia. Explaining the future direction of Indian strategy within the China-India-US triangle is as analytically demanding a problem as one is likely to find in contemporary international relations.The conclusion I draw from what follows is that India is very unlikely to balance or to get on the bandwagon. Equipoise is the policy dictated by India's geography, power capabilities, identity, and potential to be a robust actor in global and regional politics. Like the old and now discredited Indian grand strategy of nonalignment, equipoise shuns formal alliances. The term draws on the realist balance of power idiom to identify an alternative stance - neither balancing nor bandwagoning - that is in dynamic equilibrium. That equilibrium is struck between domestic and international dynamics; balancing contradictory domestic cultural and political forces (such as nationalism/cosmopolitanism, anti-Americanism/pro-Americanism, self-sufficiency/trade-optimism) and international appeals and threats (such as American democratic/technological/commercial affinity, American unilateral neo-Imperialism, Chinese commercial appeal, and Chinese threatening intrusion/pressure). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shift of US strategy toward China from Clinton’s strategic partner to Bush’s strategic competitor has had negative impacts on relations between the two nations. Since George Bush took office, America’s diplomacy has transformed from multilateralism to unilateralism. US image has further transformed from benign to predatory hegemony after conducting the war against Iraq without consulting the UN Security Council. The change is significant because it increases the discontents, globally in general and Asia in particular. The article explains why China is one of the most dangerous discontents based on the Power Transition Theory. The theory is chosen because it has an established empirical record when applied to past periods of war and peace, and because the elements required for long-term forecasts can be roughly approximated (Kugler, Tammen, and Swaminathan, 2001, p.2). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the friction between Washington and Beijing has increased because United States has become as the sole superpower on the one hand, and China has emerged as a regional power on the other. It is consistent with power transition theory: conflict occurred because of the divergent views on status quo between the global and regional hegemonies. One of power transition theory’s hypotheses is that great powers are most likely to wage the war for control of the international status quo when a power transition occurs between the dominant state and a discontent challenger. Lemke’s empirical study (2002) finds the theory is generalizable to regional interactions, and thus relative power and the status quo do not constrain behavior only among the very strongest of states. China has dissatisfied with the status quo for two reasons, as Lemke suggested. First, it had little or no say in the construction of the existing status quo and enjoyed no direct or indirect benefits from it. Second, it employs different domestic institutions for the allocation of values in its society from those used by the dominant power. Because Lemke finds strong statistical relationships between parity, dissatisfaction, and war within local hierarchies, China’s discontent becomes significant. Worse, US war on terrorism further raise the specter of unconstrained American interventionism abroad and enhanced American domination of the international system in ways that Beijing feared could have grave long-term implications for China itself (Miller, 2002). Beijing sees China’s security threatened both in terms of the precedents it sets and in terms of the expansion of the American military and political presence around China’s periphery. Given the size of China’s stake in a stable bilateral relationship the United States, Beijing was naturally not convinced by the so-called Bush Doctrine. Clear evidence showed that China’s commitment to the status quo is declining. Politically, in addition to refuse to renounce the use of force, Beijing’s irrational rejection to Taipei’s entry to WHO exemplifies China’s discontent with US supports for Taiwan. Beijing’s enthusiasm about establishment of a free trade area between China and ASEAN is a clear sign of dissatisfying with global economic status quo. Deploying more missiles along the Taiwan Strait shows Beijing discontent with Washington’s continued arms sales to Taipei. The more America insists on constructing a unipolar world, the more resistance it is likely to generate, from China and others(Harry Harding, 2003). Thus, there are at least three implications for American diplomacy. First, Washington can accommodate Beijing by sharing with China opportunities for setting international agenda. Second, do not despise China’s role on the Korean Peninsula. For Beijing, it is unacceptable if America to extend the same logic in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq to justify intervening in North Korea. Third, Washington should not push Taipei too hard because Taiwan may eventually find its interest better served by switching its diplomacy from leaning only on Washington to keeping equal distance from China and the United States. Thus, for Washington, it will be a better way to stabilize the relation across the Taiwan Strait by helping establish the Confidence-Building Measures (CBM). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the growth in China's investment and economic assitance to Africa and examines African Western reaction to that investment. Also examined are US some national security issues and activities Africa. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese foreign policy is changing to reflect the realities of a new world order, an order in which the United States is a hegemon with unsurpassed power and China seeks to successfully continue its “communism with capitalist characteristics”. In this world, China has wisely chosen not to compete directly with the United States, but to use the development of regional multilateral institutions to spread its influence while diluting that of the global hegemon. One poignant example of this policy is the ASEAN+3 forum and the ongoing development of an East Asian Security Community (EASC). Considering that China is a key member of ASEAN+3, it can serve as a powerful catalyst or obstacle to the development of an EASC. To what extent will China support such a security community? Why would it support a security community at all? To answer these two questions, this paper will present an overview of Chinese engagement with ASEAN+3 and the recent East Asian Summit, as well as explore what may be driving this increased multilateral engagement. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper overviews sophisticated triangular relations among Taipei, Beijing and Washington after 2000. Then, it scrutinizes the development of US mediation as a form of third-party intervention in such complicated dynamics in the Taiwan Strait. The pattern of contemporary US mediation is studied in an analytical way. Then, it analyzes the role and approaches (strategies) of the US in mediating between the ROC and the PRC, as well as evaluates preliminarily the future of US mediation. Some key findings include, for example: the US is gradually moving towards the role of real mediator in the cross-strait dispute, the characteristics of the US itself and the environment are positive forces driving further effective US mediation, as well as the US will continue to play a mediating role throughout the George W. BushÂ’s presidency but has to be cautious of the effectiveness of its mediation and the differences between Taipei and Beijing in order to find a useful way to enhance the understandability and acceptability of its official position on the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait sovereignty dispute. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the evolution of domestic Taiwanese politics came a corresponding internationalization of the Taiwanese independence movement. The importance of Taiwanese independence not only impinges on the lives of 21 million or so Taiwanese living on the island, but also affects the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region as China has declared that it would not hesitate to resort to force should circumstances dictate that it becomes necessary to do so. Taiwan is often cited to be one of the two potential flashpoints in the Asia Pacific, and a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan may more worrying for many countries evolve into one between PRC and the United States. While Taiwan’s role in Sino-US relations have been widely studied, the importance of Taiwan in affecting Chinese bilateral relations beyond its relations with US is a relatively unexplored field. This paper attempts an exploratory study of the evolving role Taiwan plays in Sino-Japanese relations. It attempts to under how the historical role of Taiwan in Sino-Japanese relations affect the island’s contemporary diplomatic dynamics with China and Japan. The role of Taiwan in Chinese and Japanese national security strategy will also be scrutinized to understand the possible divergence or convergence of China and Japan over the Taiwan issue. This is crucial as Japan’s stance is important as Japan is considered one of US allies within region but may not necessarily deem it in its best interests to go along with the US against China. This difficulty presents it with an extremely tricky choice. A slip either way will affect the regional stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers and analysts in many nations have long taken 'energy security' to mean reliable access to affordable oil and gas resources. In recent years, however, the concept of 'energy security' has been explicitly broadened in some policymaking contexts ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores what happens to politics and foreign policy when historical hatred, past humiliation, and feelings of national insecurity come to the center of political discourse. In particular, it examines how the Chinese people's collective historical consciousness about the country's traumatic national experience, combined with the state's political use of the past, have become powerful forces in the way China conceptualizes, manages, and resolves the Sino-U.S. crisis over the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 8, 1999. The place of history and memory in the conduct and understanding of foreign policymaking remains a much under-studied field. This research contributes a detailed case study exploring how history and memory manifest themselves in a group of people's approaches to external conflict. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If China, aware of U.S. conventional military supremacy, is seeking advantage on other fronts such as economic diplomacy, how should the United States respond? One instrument should be Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) with countries such as Japan and others in the region that share democratic and open-market values. CEPAs stand on four pillars: trade liberalization, regulatory convergence, economic precedents for the international system, and trade security. A CEPA with Japan would raise the U.S. profile in East Asian economic integration and stimulate high-quality growth. An informal grouping of CEPA participants, which could include China when it is ready, would help nudge China toward transparency and accountability. In the meantime, CEPAs could blunt China's effort to use economic diplomacy to isolate the United States in East Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The U.S.-China relationship is among the most important relationships in the Asia-Pacific region and in international relations. This article examines the Wen Ho Lee espionage case of 1999 in the context of U.S.-China relations. While the case has received much attention in the public and academic spheres, it has not in International Relations (IR), despite its implications for US-China relations, American identity, and security practices involving high technology. I argue that the case came to mean what it did by recontextualizing Cold War narratives and metaphors. In addition, the Chinagate discourse drew on discourses of racial othering and atomic espionage. Using a broad range of materials including congressional reports and other governmental texts, media, political cartoons, and websites, I reconstruct the discourses and narratives that dominated the prosecution of Lee. I make the case for a discourse analytic approach to IR and then apply specific techniques borrowed from linguistics and literary theory, including discursive juxtaposition, narrative analysis and metaphor analysis, to delineate the lineage of racially charged understandings of the Chinese in America and their role in U.S. national security policy. Special attention is paid to the antecedent, dominant and counter-discourses involved in representations of China and the Chinese, and the political possibilities elided in the process of Chinagate?s achieving discursive hegemony are discussed. In the conclusion, I examine the implications of the discursive practices of Chinagate for US security policy, scientific communication, US-PRC relations, and for IR theory more broadly. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]