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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the applicability of the democratic peace (DP) thesis to a rapidly changing global security environment and, more specifically, to examine the motivation of the United States, the most prominent democratic power, to use force for the promotion of peace through the spread of democracy. In this paper, we distinguish between traditionally accepted instrumental, normative, and institutional use-of-force motivators that apply to democracies and non-democracies alike, but we also add a discussion of contextual use-of-force motivators which are unique to democracies. The basic assumption underlying the DP argument is that democratic states are less prone to wage wars than non-democratic states. But, if democracy makes states more peaceful, why do democratic states still use force? Illustrating each motivator in light of contemporary U.S. national security decisions shows that the DP thesis can provide valuable insight into the reasons why democracies may continue to use force and, in the extreme, wage war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While almost a decade old, Ted Hopf's observation that the democratic peace is an observation in search of a theory still has some validity. In particular, the mechanisms behind the observed lack of war between democracies are poorly understood, making it difficult for scholars to provide a compelling explanation. While there has been some innovative work, particularly with respect to learning and the ability of an increasing number of democracies to cement democratic norms, Müller and Wolff note that normative and structural explanations are monadic explanations for a dyadic phenomenon. Underappreciated in the existing work is the role of identity and the importance this has for driving the democratic peace. With a focus on developing a dyadic democratic peace mechanism and using a case study approach, this paper utilizes the Copenhagen School's securitization framework to examine how identity plays out in the U.S. response to the Indian and Iranian nuclear programs. It finds that in fact identity does play a significant role in how security policy is constructed. The potential implications of this finding, particularly on policy, are significant. If the democratic peace does rely on identity to trigger the constraining norms that limit the escalation of conflict to violence, it is unlikely the democratic peace can be spread by force and it is possible that states nominally democratic can be excluded from the community of democracies if their behavior or significant other aspects of their perceived identity are at variance with the accepted democratic identity standard. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional multilateral regimes have become important instruments for promoting and defending democracy around the world. The novel nature of these regional instruments has generated a cottage industry in social science scholarship. Yet, none of these works examine how the actors and processes that gave birth to the regimes have influenced their performance and future challenges. In order to fill this gap, this paper compares the democracy promotion and defense regimes of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU). We argue that the unique constellation of actors that are members of each respective organization have reinforced two distinct democracy promotion and defense paths. The state-driven regime evolution characteristic of the Americas contrasts with Africa's expert-driven process of regime construction. The state-centric process of the OAS regime has bolstered a narrow interstate multilateralism that upholds traditional sovereign state prerogatives and minimizes the role for non-state actors in the promotion and defense of democracy in the Americas. The expert-driven process of AU's regime construction has fostered a legalistic approach to democratic promotion and defense in Africa and opened up space for non-state actors to play a central role in the development of regional democracy promotion and defense norms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the words of human rights scholar David Forsythe, George H.W. Bush’s foreign policy incorporated “moral impulses as long as they did not prove inconvenient to expediential concerns,” (1995:126). In short, analysts have argued that human rights was approached pragmatically during the first Bush presidency, subordinated in realist fashion to broader strategic concerns and the considerations of post-Cold War power politics. But what of the son? By contrast, the presidency of George W. Bush has seemed to feature a shifting stance on the question of balancing human rights concerns and national security interests. As a candidate and in the first months of his presidency, George W. Bush largely echoed his father’s realist and pragmatic approach. For example, while committed to the promotion of political openness and economic growth abroad, on the question of humanitarian interventions, the initial position of the Bush team was to shun such operations unless larger regional or strategic interests were at stake. Yet by 2006 the Bush administration had embraced an apparent liberal interventionist stance toward the promotion of human rights, declaring in National Security Strategy 2006 that “… the United States seeks to extend freedom across the globe by leading an international effort to end tyranny and to promote effective democracy,” (2006:2). In this paper I will compare the approach to human rights and national security policy during the two Bush presidencies, identifying and accounting for key areas of similarity and difference. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which brought into being the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the path of European integration has meant the difference between a strong and secure Europe and the disintegration of a grand, idealistic experiment. In this post-9/11 world, with recent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, and several attempted terrorist plots foiled, Europe now faces a critical juncture when it comes to dealing with the problem of security. Sovereignty is the key obstacle to security integration because security has traditionally been the prerogative of individual member-states. Are strongly held beliefs about sovereignty ceding ground to an untested supranational order? I argue that key epistemic communities of military strategists, technology experts, and diplomats are already breaking down this resistance because they are in a unique position to persuade others of certain shared norms.These knowledge-based networks, or "epistemic communities", are comprised of non-governmental professionals who share policy relevant expertise, and have actually gained acceptance for the beginnings of a European homeland security. I seek to explain why they are succeeding in pushing forward security integration despite the strong inclination for national governments to hold onto this authority. In this paper, I compare three epistemic communities - military strategists, technology experts, and diplomats - to shed light on the interaction of competing epistemic communities with different motivations and norms. A shortcoming of the current epistemic community literature is that it tends to assume that each epistemic community is operating in a transnational vacuum. Even though I demonstrate that all three epistemic communities support further security integration, their motivations, preferences, processes of socialization, and shared norms vary immensely.I engage in process-tracing and comparative case-studies for each of these epistemic communities to determine the origins of their allegiance, the social background of their membership, the creation and evolution of norms, their overlap with other epistemic communities, and the subsequent success or failure of their efforts to persuade and socialize others. In particular, I seek to determine the degree of impact these norms have had on the general political will for security integration. In this regard, I focus primarily on elite-level acceptance, and whether this has led to particular policy outcomes that support the gradual development of a kind of homeland security in Europe. The implications for sovereignty, democracy, and the limits of integration cannot be ignored. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy After the Post-Cold War: Making Sense of It All" presented at the "Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It provides a synthesis on various issues such as continuity and change, president's ability to govern and the tensions between the demands of national security and democracy in creating U.S. foreign policy. The conceptual models which will help to explain the overall system of the policy are accounted.

With the Bush Administration’s National Security Strategy and the war in Iraq, the common argument that democracies do not fight preventive wars against rising adversaries loses much of its plausibility, and the more important question is the conditions under which democracies do and do not initiate such wars. This paper proposes a number of hypotheses to explain such outcomes, and explores these hypotheses through a series of mini-case studies of situations in which democracies faced with military rising adversaries 1) take military action (Israel vs Egypt in 1956, Israel vs. Iraq in 1981, U.S. vs. Iraq in 1991 and 2003), 2) seriously consider but do not take military action (U.S. vs. North Korea in 1994), and 3) do not seriously consider taking military action (France vs. Germany in the 1930s). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will address the enduring paradox of balancing liberty and order in the pursuit of justice faced by constitutional democratic republics. The emphasis of the paper will examine privacy and national security from an historic view to present day. The major question addressed will be, how does government balance civil liberties and the obligation to maintain national security? The topics will include: President Lincoln's executive actions during the Civil War, the creation and development of the National Security Agency (NSA) by the Truman Administration in 1952, the "Church Committee" investigation in 1975, the creation and development of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 and the FISA Court, the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, satellite surveillance, and data mining techniques and telecoms. The power of the executive branch, the role of Congress, and relevant U.S. Supreme Court and state Supreme Court decisions will also be examined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States and other democratic polities are in the midst of a sustained expansion of domestic and global electronic and human surveillance projects, ostensibly in order to detect the presence and activities of terrorist cells and networks, and espionage and sabotage activities of enemy states. The mobilization of the surveillance apparatus of democratic polities has not been without controversy and concern, which has voiced by human rights, civil liberties, and privacy NGOs, and investigative reporting in both mainstream and alternative media. While the current wave of expansion, and concern about, surveillance projects, is at times presented as a unique problem created by the various “wars on terror” of the early 21st century, the legacy of previous waves of surveillance mobilization and opposition inform the contemporary debate about the need for, and danger of, massive domesticand global surveillance projects.This paper examines the current mobilization of the surveillance apparatus, and concern about this mobilization, in the United States, United Kingdom, and the European Union, in a comparative historical context. The first section of the paper examines quantitative indicators of the waxing and waning of wiretapping in the United States and the United Kingdom from the immediate pre-World War II period to the present, and utilizes analytic statistics (time series analysis) to examine the correlates of domestic surveillance mobilization. This analysis is designed to answer the following questions: is domestic surveillance mobilization provoked more by external or internal threats, and which types of external or internal threats is surveillance activity most sensitive to (global levels of terrorist events, power differentials between peer competitors, internal disorders and/or criminality)?After discussing the patterns of expansion and contraction of internal surveillance activity of the United States and United Kingdom in historical and global context in the mid-20th to early 21st centuries, the paper moves on to a series of case studies examining specific electronic and human intelligence based surveillance projects in the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union from the 1990s to the present. In particular this paper examines the open source literature on the internal surveillance operations, and enabling legislation, of surveillance programs carried out by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation and National Security Agency, UK GCHQ and MI5, and the European Community’s reaction to the Echelon surveillance project, and attempts to integrate the surveillance activities of the member states of the European Union, which was accelerated by the Madrid and London terrorist attacks of 2004 and 2005.These case studies will examine the: 1) debate surrounding the enabling legislation for surveillance projects; 2) open source evidence of the range and intensity of these various surveillance projects; and 3) how NGOs, and mainstream and alternative media, become aware of these surveillance projects, and begin to mobilize against, and draw attention to, the possible threat to human rights, privacy rights, and civil liberties presented by these projects.The goals of these case studies are fourfold. These cases investigate: 1) the rationale for electronic and human surveillance enabling legislation and projects; 2) the origins of concern with, and opposition to, the legislation and projects; 3) the application of political movement literature to examine the mobilization of opposition to these pieces of legislation and projects; and, 4) locating this specific debate in the broader discussion about the domestic impact of the "global war on terror" and other "emergent threats". ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the words of Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the common foreign and security policy, the EU-style form of promoting and safeguarding democracy is ?voluntary, cost-effective and extraordinarily successful?. On a less business-like note, the United States Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, claims that ?[i]n time, the blessings of democracy come to everyone who keeps the faith with the principles of democracy.? This paper will compare and contrast the approaches to democracy as a foreign policy concern pursued by the European Union on the one hand and the United States on the other. The overarching theme of the paper is the drive for democracy promotion on the part of the EU and the US in their respective ?neighbourhoods?. The concept of neighbourhood in international relations will first be elaborated upon thereby emphasising an important international dimension of democratisation. The second part of this paper will examine EU enlargement and its role in the processes of democratization first in southern Europe and then in Central Europe. This will be contrasted with US projects of ?democracy assistance? in Latin America and their role in the processes of democratisation in that region. This paper will argue against the view that the EU and the US projects of democracy promotion represent distinctly different models. Rather, the adoption of democracy as a foreign policy goal whether as pursued by the EU or the US reflects a deliberate projection of power in an international order that is characterised by its inherent power asymmetries. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jean Guilleman (MIT 2007) establishes the Bush Administration's logic of national security for biological weapons as dichotomous between their choice of a self-governed code of "right" behavior and "effective" legal restraints. A compromise system resulted after the cold war that delivered responsibility for the operation of the system to state-based and international scientific academies and organizations. Scientific procedures to create transparency in research for the purpose of preventing applications to bioweaponry and bioterror is a rational activity and should have high utility as implemented by rational actors within rational scientific organizations. However, a major concern is the empirical record of scientists acting in past events as if in a moral vacuum - where research and engineering were achieved for human destruction and state weapons and terror. Guilleman argues that rational methods of codes of behavior must be combined with transparency in open research communities that do not morph into closed enclaves over time. We seek to add to this logic by investigating a further dimension within this particular scientific community. What is the level of ethical knowledge and moral training for the bioscientist in a specific community that is now pursuing an open policy of transparent biosecurity? The International Gene Synthesis Consortium announced in November 2009 is now engaged in the implementation of a gene sequencing screening protocol toward the prevention of doing work that would aid and abet biological weapons developers and/or terrorists. Using survey instruments and in-depth interviews - we seek to utilize the openness of these companies to elucidate the level of ethical knowledge within their scientific ranks and to provide an analysis as to whether or not this adds value to the code of behavior model of biosecurity that Guilleman puts forth as best effort at the end of the Bush Administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his second inaugural address, President Bush boldly put democracy promotion at the center of U.S. foreign policy. Subsequently, however, setbacks in Iraq, Palestinian elections, Egypt, Central and Southeast Asia have damaged democracy promotion’s reput ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constitutions of democratic countries are built on liberal ethics. While neorealists and rationalists do not expect these norms to infect foreign and security policy, constructivists hypothesize that democracies develop a logic of appropriateness which am ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States—a liberal democracy—responded to the communist regimes' transition to market economies but not necessarily democratic politics by separating trade from security policy: opening trade to reforming economies but maintaining military superiority over non-democratizing military powers. Congressional attempts to use trade sanctions against market opening economies accused of human rights violations or weapons proliferation failed, while heavy investment continued in developing weapons to deter such countries. In Congress, this "liberal-realist" foreign policy emerged by "ends-meet-the-center" voting, in which bipartisan centrists prevail over extremists of both parties, or by "ideological bipartisan" voting, in which lawmakers on the same ideological side of both parties coalesce. Such patterns persisted in spite of majority party changes, divided governments, or economic downturns. The requirements for such voting patterns: an exogenous agenda setter, issue compartmentalization, inter-party politics, and ideological overlap between the two parties, strongly suggest the existence of a bipartisan, centrist, and pro-business group of lawmakers who serve as the domestic anchors of U.S. trade and security policy. Empirical evidence corroborates this claim, implying that to further understand foreign policymaking, it is necessary to tailor the standard models of Congressional lawmaking, incorporate empirically established policy preferences, and to go beyond the unitary actor-single preference models. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers frequently make sweeping generalizations about the positive relationship between the democracy agenda and U.S. national security. These generalizations are buttressed by important assumptions about the effects the spread of democracy has on national security priorities. This study examines the degree to which political science research to date substantiates these assumptions. A content analysis of each official White House National Security Strategy from 1986-2001 reveals four primary assumptions: the spread of democracy decreases interstate conflict and increases stability, human rights, and economic development. A review of the literature finds that several of these assumptions are only justified by mature democracies that have passed through the gray zone of transition to democratic consolidation. In contrast, those democracies that occupy the intermediate or gray zone actually pose a threat to U.S. national security. It is consequently recommended that the democracy agenda prioritize democratic consolidation of the gray zone above all else. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on preventing tension in the Taiwan Strait. It cites that an outbreak of military conflict in the channel would have consequences for regional stability and the global economy. The first security priority for the second term of U.S. President George W. Bush will be preventing the conflict due to changing status quo as well as increasing urgency. One of the reasons why Taiwan is of considerable significance to the U.S. is that U.S. support for Taiwan is closely tied to U.S. interests in fostering newly established democracies.

The article focuses on the impact of the U.S. War on Terror campaign on global democracy. It notes that the global war on terror resulted to security decisions made privately by states and not to consensual decisions made in open and inclusive global political processes. It discusses how the country's unilateral exercise of power resulted to a legitimacy crisis. It stresses the potential of deliberative democracy to legitimize the country's foreign policy.

The consequences of violent conflict permeate countless aspects of a society and are not limited to the political and economic institutions of a state. I examine the effect of militarized conflict on the populations of states by evaluating the relationship between war and public health, taking into account relevant political and economic factors, including democracy and wealth. I argue that interstate and intrastate conflict negatively influence the health achievement of states and, therefore, the human security of their populations. I assess this relationship by analyzing data on summary measures of public health in all states between 1999 and 2001. My analysis suggests that the negative effect of war on health is closely linked to the levels of income, trade, and democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If, as proponents of "national security liberalism" claim, promoting democracy serves America’s security interests, then why does the United States sometimes support authoritarian regimes? I argue that during the Cold War, the prevalence of nationalism and of socialism (communist and democratic) in the Third World led Third World democratic elites to be open to cooperation with communists for the sake of national development. Washington’s top priority being containment of communism, however, meant that it could not tolerate such cooperation. Thus Washington and social democrats were at loggerheads, and Washington cooperated instead with anti-communist authoritarians. This situation changed in the 1980s as both varieties of socialism had failed vis-a-vis capitalism in country after country. Third World democrats abandoned both socialism and their communist countrymen; Washington was now willing to support them over its old tyrannical friends as a way to contain communism. The striking case of Reagan’s abandonment of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 illustrates this process. I conclude with implications for U.S. support of authoritarianism in the Muslim world today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was established in 1961 as an autonomous organization independent of US political and military functions. Until the G.W. Bush Administration's 2001 declaration of a Global War on Terror, USAID had maintained its autonomy for nearly forty years. This paper examines USAID's loss of autonomy that occurred as a result of the Bush Administration's Global War on Terror and the Administration's newly established goals of US foreign assistance programs that emphasize national security and democracy rather than humanitarian aid. This shift in policy has resulted in coordinated efforts between the State Department and USAID with umbrella oversight from the newly created position of Director of Foreign Assistance. The coordinated effort between the two agencies has eliminated USAID's autonomy by transforming the agency's leadership, mission, organizational culture, and foreign aid appropriations to reflect the objectives of the Bush administration's Global War on Terror. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Post-9/11 security concerns and the US-led invasion of Iraq have renewed scholarly interest in nation-building as a form of externally-fostered democratization. Recen works have assessed Iraq and its precursors to find general lessons for establishing new democracies. They have principally concluded that successful nation-building depends on sustained commitments of time, materiel, and manpower. Although this thesis improves upon earlier studies of democracy promotion, which often treated intentions as determinative, it does not fully reckon with the effect of antecedent conditions on external intervention. As this paper addresses, American efforts at nation-building have historically been enabled or constrained by local political institutions. Rather than autonomously reengineering the target society, nation-builders have buttressed bureaucracies and parliaments where they were available (Germany, Japan) and foundered in countries that lacked such institutions (Somalia, Haiti). In sum, nation-building has been most effective when pursued least ambitiously, amid functioning states with prior experience in constitutional government. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the conditions under which the United States employs large-scale military power to build democratic institutions abroad. Despite its centrality to US security policy, there is very little rigorous research scholarship on the causes of American democracy promotion, or forcible regime imposition more generally. I argue that US policies attempting to re-order the national political structures of other states through coercive force can be attributed to the confluence of expanding material power and changes in domestic political culture, which create expectations about the viability of liberal change and the efficacy of American power in achieving it. These arguments will be assessed against evidence from two twentieth-century cases studies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an era in which the Bush administration?s plea for spreading democracy has been a cornerstone of American security strategy, the security repercussions of democratic consolidation in general and its impact on regional security dynamics in particular have been regrettably understudied. Numerous politicians, including President George W. Bush, have simply touted the East Asian experiences in democracy as a model for a democratic Middle East. Upon closer observation, the story is not only far more complicated but also alarmingly dangerous: Contrary to the ?democratic peace? thesis, democratic consolidation has recently become a source of instability in East Asia. The East Asian case is also interesting because contrary to Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder?s thesis that democratizing countries are prone to instability, it is not the early transition period but the consolidation of democratization that appears to be fodder for regional tension. Based on a comparative analysis of recent developments in Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, this paper examines the impact of the deepening of democratization in East Asia on regional security dynamics. More specifically, democratic consolidation in East Asia has opened up a dynamic, interactive process in which foreign policy orientation in each country becomes more conflictual, as manifest in Taiwan?s aggressive push for de jure independence, South Korea?s increasing anti-American and anti-Japanese sentiments, and Japan?s growing assertiveness in its regional diplomacy. As such, instead of unproblematically accepting democratization as a panacea for regional stability, we need to explore the regional context in which democratic processes affect domestic security dynamics in ways that may worsen patterns of regional interaction. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses fear as a driving force behind post-Sept 11 international relations. The most powerful nation on earth is also the most fearful nation. American security policy is driven by new kinds of fear, fear of the terorrist, fear of Islam, even fear of the UN. This in turn creates fears in the international community about the hegemon’s intentions and capabilities, manifested in a new interventionism. The main casualities of hegemonic fear and the global fear politics are multilateratilism and democracy which are increasingly challenged by unilateralism, coalitions of the willing and the ascendancy of the homeland security state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is homeland security spending determined by public interest (terrorism risk), pork politics, or both? There is lively debate right now on whether our democracy has defended itself rationally or irresponsibly against future attacks. Building upon literature in strategic congressional management and intergovernmental politics, I develop and test a state-level model of homeland security allocations from 2004-07 to answer this question. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers in the US, Japan, and elsewhere have recently taken limited steps toward the realization of a quadrilateral strategic alliance between the US, India, Australia, and Japan. The development of such an 'Asia Democracy Partnership,' supported in ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines films and documentaries that treat the National Security State as a threat to democracy in America. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pax Americana, based on a global cooperative and multilateralist hegemony of the United States, was cemented during the Cold War and consolidated as the Cold War ended with the dissolution of the Soviet state and its system of international control and influence. Upon the ending of the Cold War crisis system, the U. S. had the option to strengthen the global institutions of governance and moving toward an integrative world policy framework, especially in the global commons of security, economics, and human rights and democracy. After the political realignment which followed the 1994 elections, the dominant American political establishment opted for pursuing an increasingly unilateral agenda, one in the first place determined by growing objections to the organized international system.The difficulties to deal promptly and effectively with the Balkan crisis and the apparent incapacity for managing in a just and effective way the Middle East conflicts, compounded with the reemergence of global crisis patterns, first over the Kosovo conflict, then and more ominously with the terror attacks of September 11 2001 on the United States.The response of the U. S. government to these serious breakdowns of international security obtained different, problematic and even antagonistic, if not outright hostile responses from large segments of the international community and world public opinion. As the Bushadministration moved to escalate the initial framework of measures to combat international terrorism â€"the war on terrorâ€" and the military intervention in Afghanistan with the invasion and occupation of Iraq in the Spring of 2003, the divide in the international community also widened and deepened. For the first time with such an intensity, the divide affected the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: the basic collective military security alliance of the United States broke functionally down into two opposite fields concerning, not simply tactical issues, but fundamental questions pertaining to the essence of international security policy and the nature of world order.From an American national security perspective, the key questions with which the country is confronted are whether the conditions of international terrorism have been actually worsened by these decisions, and whether they have compounded with a stance of relative yet acute isolation and leadership erosion, thus making much more difficult for the U. S. to deal effectively, under the present conditions, with a seriously impaired international security situation.After a critical discussion of these concepts framework I identify the sources and the characteristics of America’s contemporary crossroads in terms of two tentative historical intervals: the interval of the first post-Cold War years, 1992-2000, which I provisionally define as expectations, hesitations, reservations; and the interval of the years 2001 to the present, which again I propose to be conceptualized on a preliminary basis as mutations and unraveling: the crisis of Pax Americana.Applying historical, political, and foreign policy concepts, the characteristics, foreign policy directions, and international projections of these two intervals are examined respectively through seven and four pivotal cases. Shaping the direction of the first interval: Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and the second Persian Gulf War, the UN question and the roads to and from the 1992 UNSC Summit, the Balkans Wars and the Dayton Accords, the Kosovo crisis, the national missile defense question I, the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the question of the International Criminal Court... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Policymakers frequently make sweeping generalizations about the positive relationship between the democracy agenda and U.S. national security. These generalizations are buttressed by important assumptions about the affects the spread of democracy has on national security priorities. This study examines the degree to which political science research to date substantiates these assumptions. A content analysis of each official White House National Security Strategy from 1986-2001 reveals four primary assumptions: the spread of democracy decreases interstate conflict and increases stability, human rights, and economic development. A review of the literature finds that several of these assumptions are only justified by mature democracies that have passed through the gray zone of transition to democratic consolidation. In contrast, those democracies that occupy the intermediate or gray zone actually pose a threat to U.S. national security. It is consequently recommended that the democracy agenda prioritize democratic consolidation of the gray zone above all else. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on anti-terror laws in the third world. It notes that the goals of promoting democracy and fighting terrorism are at odds with one another as the government uses anti-terrorist rhetoric to restrict civil liberties and strengthen security measures. It cites the concerns raised by the U.S. Patriot Act about its provision for enhanced surveillance, information sharing and indefinite detention. It examines the involvement of the U.S. in the development of anti-terror legislation in the third world.