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Habitat ecology of lichens (lichen-forming fungi) involves diverse adaptations to stressful environments where lichens use specific habitat conditions. Field observations confirm that such habitat 'preferences' can vary significantly across species' distribution ranges, sometimes revealing abrupt changes over short distances. We critically review and generalize such empirical evidence as broad ecological patterns, link these with the likely physiological mechanisms and evolutionary processes involved, and outline the implications for lichen conservation. Non-replicated correlative studies remain only suggestive because the data are frequently compromised by sampling bias and pervasive random errors; further noise is related to unrecognized cryptic species. Replicated evidence exists for three macroecological patterns: (a) regional limiting factors excluding a species from a part of its microhabitat range in suboptimal areas; (b) microhabitat shifts to buffer regionally adverse macroclimates; (c) substrate suitability changed by the chemical environment, notably air pollution. All these appear to be primarily buffering physiological challenges of the adverse conditions at the macrohabitat scale or, in favorable environments, coping with competition or predation. The roles of plasticity, adaptation, dispersal, and population-level stochasticity remain to be studied. Although lichens can inhabit various novel microhabitats, there is no evidence for a related adaptive change. A precautionary approach to lichen conservation is to maintain long-term structural heterogeneity in lichen habitats, and consider lichen ecotypes as potential evolutionarily significant units and a bet-hedging strategy for addressing the climate change-related challenges to biodiversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is generating sufficient risk for nation-states and citizens throughout the Arctic to warrant potentially radical geoengineering solutions. Currently, geoengineering solutions such as surface albedo modification or aerosol deployment are in the early stages of testing and development. Due to the scale of deployments necessary to enact change, and their preliminary nature, these methods are likely to result in unforeseen consequences. These consequences may range in severity from local ecosystem impacts to large scale changes in available solar energy. The Arctic is an area that is experiencing rapid change, increased development, and exploratory interest, and proposed solutions have the potential to produce new risks to both natural and human systems. This article examines potential security and ethical considerations of geoengineering solutions in the Arctic from the perspectives of securitization, consequentialism, and risk governance approaches, and argues that proactive and preemptive frameworks at the international level, and especially the application of risk governance approaches, will be needed to prevent or limit negative consequences resulting from geoengineering efforts. Utilizing the unique structures already present in Arctic governance provides novel options for addressing these concerns from both the perspective of inclusive governance and through advancing the understanding of uncertainty analysis and precautionary principles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the precautionary principle may have offered a sound basis for managing environmental risk in the Holocene, the depth and width of the Anthropocene have made precaution increasingly untenable. Not only have many ecosystems already been damaged beyond natural recovery, achieving a sustainable long-term global trajectory now seem to require ever greater measures of proactionary risk-taking, in particular in relation to the growing need for climate engineering. At the same time, different optical illusions, arising from temporary emissions reductions due to the COVID-19 epidemic and the local deployment of seemingly "green" small-scale renewable energy sources, tend to obscure worsening global trends and reinforce political disinterest in developing high-energy technologies that would be more compatible with universal human development and worldwide ecological restoration. Yet, given the lack of feedback between the global and the local level, not to mention the role of culture and values in shaping perceptions of "sustainability", the necessary learning may end up being both epistemologically and politically difficult. This paper explores the problem of finding indicators suitable for measuring progress towards meaningful climate action and the restoration of an ecologically vibrant planet. It is suggested that such indicators are essentially political as they reflect, not only different assessments of technological feasibility, but orientations towards the Enlightenment project. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]