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This paper links China's pattern of infrastructure lending to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) with China's own development experience in this regard. It raises the question whether Chinese infrastructure investments in LAC have the potential to promote sustainable development in the region. The paper consists of four parts. Part 1 outlines China's massive domestic infrastructure construction projects as a specific development strategy which has contributed considerably to the country's rapid internal development, but has simultaneously given rise to complex dynamics of social and environmental risk. Part 2 assesses the strategies involved in China's infrastructure investment in LAC. Part 3 identifies key actors involved in China-LAC infrastructure cooperation and how they relate to different ways of financing infrastructure projects. Part 4 focuses on policy guidelines for managing the social and environmental risks of infrastructure projects. The paper concludes that more research, more capacity-building, and new forms of multinational development cooperation are needed to strengthen the social and environmental policies associated with China's infrastructure investment in LAC countries, to help uphold existing social and environmental standards, and to extend project benefits more effectively to local communities and people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tries to analyse the roles played by three categories of Chinese actors (the state, enterprises and quasi-government organizations) involved in China's engagement in Latin America to develop economic ties with the region. The first section focuses on the role of the state (the Chinese government) which has maintained a strong focus on the 'top-down-design' in Sino-Latin American economic cooperation by issuing a set of policies and undertaking a number of practical measures. The second part of the paper analyses the role of Chinese enterprises including both state-owned and private ones by analysing two cases of Chinese enterprises which on the one hand, implement government policies and on the other sometimes act as pioneers. In the last section, through the case study on the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) which is one of the few quasi-government organizations involved in China's foreign economic cooperation and also, without doubt, one of the most influential. Its role as platform for economic cooperation has been acknowledged by the 'top' (Chinese goverenment) and the 'bottom' (enterprises) in China and by Chinese enterprises and their counterparts in Latin America. The paper shows that none of the Chinese actors can take the place of the other in the economic cooperation between China and Latin America; instead, the roles of the three different categories of Chinese actors are complementary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin America is a critical region for analyzing China's economic statecraft. Following the Monroe doctrine, Latin America has long been seen as part of the sphere of U.S. influence. For the purpose of studying the effectiveness of China's economic statecraft I will focus on two countries that stand on opposite extremes: Brazil and Mexico. Both countries happened to be important target states (strategic partners) of China's economic statecraft in the region, albeit for different political and strategic goals. In this paper I will compare the different domestic political and economic conditions, interests and institutions in these two countries to explain why China has made greater progress in projecting its economic power through trade and investment to pursue its political goals with Brazil, but has not succeeded in Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's embrace of a comprehensive and aggressive economic statecraft as part of its grand strategy indicates a paradigm change in its foreign policy. This change has captured scholarly attention – a growing body of research on China's economic statecraft has emerged in recent years. This special topic presents a fresh selection of four research essays examining China's economic statecraft practiced in a wide range of countries and regions in the world, including Latin America, Africa, Europe, Canada, and New Zealand. Collectively, these essays explore two important questions: (1) How successful has China's economic statecraft been? (2) How do domestic variables (e.g., domestic politics, political institutions, interests, and public opinion) of the target states (in which China practices economic statecraft) affect the outcome of the Chinese strategies? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various topics within the issue which includes relationship between China and Latin American countries, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and China's foreign relations.

There are three positions about the impact of outward foreign direct investment (FDI) from China on the policies of Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries: the "Wealth is Power" camp, which associates political power with Chinese economic lures; the "Conditionalist" camp, which contends the international and domestic economic and political context determines the specific political effect of Chinese outward FDI (OFDI); and the "Politics is Power" camp, which believes no dramatic political changes have resulted from the economic stimuli of Chinese OFDI (COFDI) and associated economic lures. Case studies herein on Brazil and China, Argentina and China, Ecuador and China, and the Caribbean and China support the Conditionalist camp, albeit to differing degrees and for different reasons. Case studies herein on COFDI in Argentina and in Colombia also deepen our knowledge about the drivers of COFDI. They challenge those asserting that COFDI in LAC is driven purely by political motives. This piece also reviews and critiques the state of the literature on COFDI in LAC and suggests a pathway for moving to the next level. It specifically recommends researchers work to cumulate knowledge by asking similar kinds of questions across cases, exploit theory, and work on variable conceptualization and operationalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]