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This paper investigates the layoff behavior, a typical people dimension of corporate social performance (CSP), of family firms from a place-based perspective. We theorize that a place-based culture within family firms ensures that all organizational members share a deep sense of connection with the place of operations which makes them inherently care about their impact on society. Using data on layoffs of 2000 largest US firms between 1994 and 2007, we find that family firms do indeed exhibit a lower tendency to lay off employees in comparison to non-family firms; this relationship is particularly strong in 'places' with low population where the negative social externalities related to layoffs tend to be higher. Further post hoc analyses indicate that family firms have a strong place-based culture which can provide resource-based competitive advantages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sheds light on the incongruent findings concerning the relationship between family involvement and firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). While prior studies have mainly taken the perspective of families’ socioemotional wealth preservation, we approach this relationship from the perspective of behavioral agency theory, highlighting the important role played by CEOs’ family memberships. Specifically, we posit that family firms are more likely to invest in CSR when their CEOs are members of the controlling families. Furthermore, we examine how family firms can employ long-term incentives to encourage non-family CEOs to act in the interests of the controlling families to preserve SEW and thus enhancing family firms’ CSR performance. We tested our hypotheses using hand-collected data of family firms included in the S&P 500 index, in the period of 2003-2010. The empirical findings support our hypotheses that (a) family firms with family members as the CEOs have better CSR performance and (b) family firms tend to provide a high level of long-term incentives to non-family than family CEOs. In addition, long-term incentives strongly motivate CEOs to improve firms’ CSR performance, regardless of their family memberships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the relationship between family control and young entrepreneurial firm's bribing behavior around the globe. Relying on over 2,000 young firms from the World Bank Environment Survey, we find that family control helps to reduce a firm's bribery behavior, but further investigation shows that this effect only exists in countries with weaker macro-governance environment. In countries with more established and transparent governance mechanism, family control does not seem to make any difference. We interpret our findings as the business family's preservation of socioemotional wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study adds to the theory of family business management by exploring the effects of family ownership on the corporate misconduct of small firms in the United States. The empirical findings indicate that small family-owned firms are less likely to commit misconduct than small non-family-owned firms. We interpret this finding as family firms aiming to achieve the trans-generational succession of moral capital. Further investigation shows a nonlinear family-ownership-misconduct relationship. A negative relationship between them only appears in mature firms. We further show that for relatively mature firms, only family firms with older owners are less likely to commit corporate misconduct. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]