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This paper aims to evaluate Marx's conception of alienated labour from the point of view of Alasdair MacIntyre's conception of practice. I will argue that Marx's conception of alienation in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (and elsewhere) is too abstract, and therefore needs to be revised to reflect the reality of the 21st century. It presupposes that, in capitalism, all salaried and waged labour is alienated (a claim recently reiterated by Amy Wendling in her otherwise outstanding Karl Marx on Technology and Alienation). Clearly, this is not the case. The key characteristics of alienation as spelled out by Marx may not be present in a great variety of contemporary jobs dominated by services, especially if they are (or can be seen as) MacIntyrean practices (for example, practicing medicine in a public hospital or working as an engineer in a private company). Drawing on some of the most notable literature on the forms of alienation and reification, I will aim to theorise the conception of meaningful non-alienated labour. Given that practices, as meaningful non-alienated activities, are small islands of human excellence and resistance against the economic pressures of institutional profit maximisation and the self-valorisation of capital, I will conclude the paper by considering the political importance of this conception of labour for anti-capitalist struggles in the 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the standard view, the function of the unlimited dunamis argument (Physics VIII.10, Metaphysics Λ.7 1073a5–11) is to introduce a new property of the first immovable mover, namely its lack of magnitude. The paper challenges this view and argues that the argument at issue serves to prove that the eternal motion of the first heavenly sphere is caused by an immovable mover rather than by a moved mover. Further, the paper shows that, at least in Phys. VIII, the unlimited dunamis argument is the main argument for the immobility of the Prime Mover. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bo Burnham's Inside, promoted as a musical comedy special by its platform Netflix, released in June 2021 to almost unquestioning praise, and has now won 3 Emmys. The work is an evocative retrospective of Burnham's fictionalized experience during the Covid-19 quarantine. Written, performed, filmed, and edited by Burnham himself, the piece reflects his career as a musical comedy performance artist, and also provides an intimate look into his struggles with mental health, internet culture, and artistic ego. Of particular appeal in this piece is the complex pairing of comedy with pathos. Its songs have become ironic backgrounds to TikTok videos and popular sea shanty renditions. Critics remark: 'What he's describing is the near-universal feeling of despair in 2020. And that feels good' (Herman 2021); 'A tricky work that for all its boundary-crossing remains in the end a comedy in the spirit of neurotic, self-loathing stand-up' (Zinoman 2021); 'A claustrophobic masterclass in comedy and introspection, Inside is a beautifully bleak, hilariously hopeful special' (Rotten Tomatoes). It is this complexity which I seek to investigate. I assert that Bo Burnham's Inside achieves its poignancy not through its comedic stylings, but through its implementation of a traditional Aristotelian tragic structure. This paper will discuss the ways in which Burnham follows the tragic structure and the monomyth while engaging with, and subverting, benign violation theory to provide a postmodern catharsis in its audience that feels like comedy, but ultimately provides a shared expression of, and outlet for, the audience's grief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For many, striving to attain first place in an athletic competition is explicable. Less explicable is striving to attain first place in a virtue (aretē) competition. Yet this latter dynamic appears in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. There is 4.3's magnanimity, the crown of the virtues, which seemingly manifests itself in outdoing one's peers in virtue. Such one-upmanship also seems operant with 9.8's praiseworthy self-lover, who seeks to get as much of the fine (to kalon) as possible for herself. Contrary to many interpreters, this paper argues that praiseworthy self-love and magnanimity involve one-upmanship. The relevant exemplars are not simply striving to be the best that they can be in respect to virtue (in virtuous activity), but to be better than others. The paper argues that Aristotle's axiology, which sets activity (energeia) above state (hexis) and potentiality (dunamis), engenders one-upmanship. For only the level of activity substantially differentiates individuals, settling for inferiority is obviously objectionable, and equal achievement for Aristotle is not static but involves matching and surpassing the achievements of others. The paper concludes that modern discomfort with these dynamics is due to an axiology Nietzsche attributes to Christianity, one that bases human value fundamentally on non-differentiating potentiality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At APr 2.4 57a36–13, Aristotle presents a notorious reductio argument in which he derives the claim 'If B is not large, B is large' and calls that result impossible. Aristotle is thus committed to some form of connexivity and this paper argues that his commitment is to a strong form of connexivity which excludes even cases in which 'B is large' is necessary. It is further argued that Aristotle's view of connexivity is best understood as arising from his analysis of affirmation and negation in terms of combination and separation: a proposition that separates two terms cannot entail a proposition that combines the same two terms. In order to motivate this account of connexivity, this paper interprets Aristotle as emphasising the predicative structure, especially the copulae, of the argument's component propositions. The arguments for this are based on a consideration of the larger context of APr 2.2–4. A reconstruction of the argument using propositional variables does not fully capture Aristotle's intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle devotes Nicomachean Ethics IX.6 to the notion of homonoia. Commonly translated as ‘concord’ or ‘like-mindedness’, homonoia is a central concept in Aristotle’s account of political friendship. I argue in this paper that Aristotle’s concept of homonoia cannot be perspicuously rendered as ‘like-mindedness’ or its cognates. For homonoia does not just involve the sameness of belief or opinion: it involves both shared commitments to the same goals and collective action aimed at realizing those goals, and cognates of ‘like-mindedness’ do not bring this activity-involving component of homonoia clearly into relief. I attempt to capture this activity-involving component by presenting a novel interpretation of Aristotelian homonoia as joint commitment. My interpretation of homonoia as joint commitment offers solutions to two puzzles associated with NE IX.6. First, it establishes the function of NE IX.6 within Aristotle’s broader theory of friendship. Second, it clarifies the proper relationship between homonoia and political friendship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper offers an account of luck, fate, and fortune. It begins by showing that extant accounts of luck are deficient because they do not identify the genus of which luck is a species. That genus of properties, the tychic, alert an agent to occasions on which the external world cooperates with or frustrates their goal-achievement. An agent's sphere of competence is the set of goals that it is possible for them to reliably achieve. Luck concerns occasions on which there is a mismatch between attempt and result; in bad luck the external world thwarts goal-achievement within the agent's sphere of competence, in good luck the external world assists goal-achievement beyond the agent's sphere of competence. Fateful events are those where, more passively, the agent finds the external world achieving or frustrating their goals. Fortune concerns the contraction and expansion of the agent's sphere of competence. Eight reasons are given for accepting the account; its theoretical virtues and various things it explains. Lastly, three objections are answered; that the tychic properties relate to well-being rather than agency, that there are alternative theories of fortune available in the contemporary literature, that the account draws arbitrary distinctions between synonyms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most challenging issues with the sources of ancient medicine is to be able to identify the correspondence between the diseases we know today and those reported in ancient medical texts. Ancient diseases' definitions rarely help us, and the symptoms described often correspond to more than one disease. This is especially true about tuberculosis, a disease that historians of medicine habitually associates with the Greek words phthi(n)o (φθίνω), verb, phthisis/phthoe (φθίσις/φθόη), noun, phthinodes/phthisikos (φθινώδης/φθισικός), adjective, all etymologically linked to an Indo-European root that expresses the idea of consumption in a broad sense. This article aims to analyze a group of Greek words, branchos/branchia (βράγχος/βράγχια), krauros/kraurao (κραῦρος/κραυράω), and katarreo (καταρρέω), that appear in nosological contexts very close to the infectious disease that today we call tuberculosis. Moreover, the paper aims to focus on the transmission pathways of TB being via animal-human contact and some ancient strategies to cure it. The symptoms, transmission pathways and therapeutic approach of tuberculosis belong to a homogeneous pathological picture that emerges from a set of texts that date back to the period between the fifth century BC and the second century AD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests the hypothesis that the prime matter of classical Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics is numerically identical to energy. Is P = E? After outlining the classical Aristotelian concept of prime matter, I provide the master argument for it, based on the phenomenon of substantial change. I then outline what we know about energy as a scientific concept, including its role and application in some key fields. Next, I consider the arguments in favour of prime matter being identical to energy, followed by the arguments against this. The method used is that of ontological profile comparison: does the profile of prime matter match, in key features, that of energy? An affirmative answer, that P = E, would be a momentous discovery: it would show that one of the most neglected and derided ideas of pre-modern metaphysics—a contributor to its downfall in the wake of the Scientific Revolution—was correct all along. From a negative answer, we would still learn much about the interaction of science and metaphysics. It turns out, however, given what we currently know, that the answer is not quite as simple as one might hope. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spinoza's views on friendship have been a relatively overlooked aspect of his ethical thought. Even though commentators such as Andrew Youpa and Steven Nadler shed significant light on the significance of Spinoza's views, they do not provide a detailed examination of the possibility of friendship between people who are not similar to one another. In considering to what extent (if at all) a virtuous person can join ordinary people who are dissimilar to her in friendship, my paper attempts to reach a better understanding of the limits, as well as the power, of friendship for Spinoza. First, I show that we can make a meaningful distinction between two kinds of friendship, which I call active friendship and coincidental friendship. Then, I argue that in Spinoza besides these two kinds of friendships, there is also a group of social interactions wherein the virtuous wants to bring the non-virtuous to enlightenment. In examining the nature of these interactions, I conclude that in Spinoza in addition to what we can call the Socratic quest of bringing people to enlightenment, we also find a strategy of insulation, which consists in taking measures so that ordinary people do not pose a threat to the virtuous. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As neo-Aristotelian character education approaches have become more popular, the list of objections has increased too. This paper focuses on the objection that while character education proponents claim to be 'progressive' and 'reformative' they seem to maintain the educational status quo. This paper examines what happens to neo-Aristotelian character education approaches when they are implemented in schools. First, a range of authors is consulted that has critically followed character education approaches, in particular the one advocated by the Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues. Second, the Bildung tradition is discussed, which was also intended as a progressive and cosmopolitan project, but was used by German governments in the 19th century to fashion the nation state. Finally, a comparison between the two approaches is made, raising the question whether it is possible for states to run an education system that does not distort ideals of what it means to be human. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Journal of Social Work is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Do famous athletes have special obligations to act virtuously? A number of philosophers have investigated this question by examining whether famous athletes are subject to special role model obligations. In this paper, we will take a different approach and give a positive response to this question by arguing for the position that sport and gaming celebrities are 'ambassadors of the game': moral agents whose vocations as rule-followers have unique implications for their non-lusory lives. According to this idea, the actions of a game's players and other stakeholders – especially the actions of its stars – directly affect the value of the game itself, a fact which generates additional moral reasons to behave in a virtuous manner. We will begin by explaining the three main positions one may take with respect to the question: moral exceptionalism, moral generalism, and moral exemplarism. We will argue that no convincing case for moral exemplarism has thus far been made, which gives us reason to look for new ways to defend this position. We then provide our own 'ambassadors of the game' account and argue that it gives us good reason to think that sport and game celebrities are subject to special obligations to act virtuously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When Aristotle praises pentathletes' beauty at Rhetoric 1361b, it is not the idle observation of a sports fan. In fact, the balanced and harmonious beauty of athletes' bodies reflects Aristotle's ideal of a virtuous soul in the Nicomachean Ethics: one which discerns noble ends and means, then acts accordingly. At Eudemian Ethics 1248b, he takes it a step further, characterizing kalokagathia as 'the virtue (aretē) that arises from a combination' of virtues (aretai). These passages raise important questions about the relationship between ethics, athletics, and aesthetics. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle's ideal of kalokagathia is compatible not just with athletic training, but also with an ideal of citizenship that rejects traditional ideas about inborn virtue and superficial beauty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aristotle grants perceptible qualities the power to generate sense perception in animals. But it is unclear whether, for him, these qualities can produce any effect other than perception. In this paper, I address this issue through a novel approach. To show that they can produce non-perceptual effects, I explore contexts in his extant works where qualities appear to do causal work in nature without leading to perception in animals. This inquiry aims to demonstrate that Aristotle’s realism about qualities survives a potential threat posed by views that dispute the qualities’ causal efficacy outside perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tensions between character education and citizenship education have existed for a long time. Some argue that character education is harmful to citizenship education; others claim that they are mutually beneficial and that we can and need to organise them synergistically. In this paper, I argue, through an exploration of civic virtue and ethical virtue in Aristotle’s theory, that citizenship education and character education are compatible and mutually supportive within Aristotelian educational frameworks, and that both are beneficial for students’ moral development and overall flourishing. First, the debate between character education and citizenship education is explored. This is followed by identifying the roles of citizenship education and character education in Aristotelian theory. Next, I examine more specifically the role of ethical virtue and civic virtue in Aristotle’s original works, and I argue that they are compatible (and sometimes overlap) to form an ideal educational outcome. In conclusion, synthesising citizenship education and character education based on Aristotle’s theory can effectively guide students toward flourishing lives, both as individuals and members of society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes inspiration from Books III and IV of the Nicomachean Ethics, which discuss the ways in which the student of virtue can go wrong with respect to different vices. It uses this discussion to draw some conclusions about Aristotelian habituation. I will argue that habituation is an appropriate learning strategy for many kinds of students of virtue, not just children; that habituation is multi-faceted and involves habits of emotions, habits of reason and habits of action; and that habituation is messy because it reflects a messy subject matter. I will conclude with some thoughts on how educators can best respond to this messiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For almost 80 years, post-war Japanese moral education has adopted a dual-process structure, which states morality is taught through two processes: one through all aspects of school education and the other through a special moral education class. The necessity and effectiveness of this structure were theorised by Eijiro Inatomi. However, it has been almost neglected that his theory is largely based on Aristotle’s theory of virtue. This paper examines Inatomi’s Aristotle-inspired theory and its significance. After reviewing the social and historical background of his theory, I argue that Inatomi successfully adopted Aristotle’s theory of virtue in three respects: human definition, intellectual virtue, and ethical virtue. Finally, I suggest that post-war Japanese moral education can be understood as a nationwide social implementation experiment on the efficacy of Aristotelian virtue ethics and that Inatomi’s notion of cosmos can serve as a conceptual device to enhance the social feasibility of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper claims that the argument that Aristotle seems to ascribe to Melissus in Physics III.6 about infinity is different from Melissus' original argument. On scrutiny, it turns out that the Aristotelian version of the argument takes Melissus to suppose that being is unlimited because it is not in contact with anything else. I claim that this is not Melissus' notion of unlimitedness for being, and that the Aristotelian version hinges on a reversal of Melissus' own reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper articulates and defends a novel view of the strict distinction that Aristotle makes between human and non-human mental life. We examine two crucially relevant but overlooked arguments that turn on the human capacity for reasoning and inference (syl/logismos) to reconstruct his view of what makes some cognitive processes rational and how they differ from non-rational counterparts. A creature is rational just in case its occurrent cognitive states exhibit a sequential coherence wherein prior cognitive activity constrains subsequent activity for the sake of attaining truth. Processes are rational, then, in virtue of how constituent states relate to each other, not whether any given state involves some peculiar content or grasps some distinct object. This study aids, but does not exhaust, a systematic examination of the rational soul in Aristotle's writing, based on (a) the human/animal comparisons through which he often elucidates rational cognitive capacities and (b) the distinctions that he draws between elements of rational cognition and non-rational counterparts in terms of what minimally suffices to distinguish between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In NE III.10, 1118b1–3, Aristotle says that the "most shared of the senses is that according to which intemperance [comes about], and it would seem justifiably to be shameful, because it inheres [in us] not insofar as we are human beings, but insofar as we are animals". This statement appears to describe the sense of touch as shameful. This may seem like a strange position for Aristotle to hold, since elsewhere he describes human touch as the most accurate among animal species, which corresponds to our superior intelligence, and as necessary for animal life. In this paper, I argue that Maimonides nevertheless succeeds in showing that Aristotle has a strong theoretical reason for maintaining that the sense of touch is shameful. Maimonides shows that, based on principles of Aristotelian psychology, human touch is indeed shameful because it obstructs intellectual activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Australian Journal of Political Science is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

How many scientific demonstrations can a single phenomenon have? This paper argues that, according to Aristotle's theory of scientific knowledge as laid out in the Posterior Analytics, a single conclusion may be demonstrated via more than one explanatory middle term. I also argue that this model of multiple demonstration is put into practice in the biological writings. This paper thereby accomplishes two related goals: it clarifies certain relatively obscure passages of the Posterior Analytics and uses them to show how Aristotle explains biological phenomena by reference to both final and material causes in the Parts of Animals. The first part of the paper explains the account of multiple demonstration present in the Posterior Analytics and distinguishes it from another kind of plural explanation rejected by Aristotle. The second part of the paper turns to the biological explanation in the Parts of Animals and shows how Aristotle's account of multiple demonstrations works in practice. The paper thus provides evidence for the claim that the 'applied' reasoning on display in the biological works is in harmony with the framework of the logical treatises, and thus may also shed light on questions of the unity of the Aristotelian corpus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues for a version of the Guise of the Good thesis, namely the claim that if someone acts as the result of practical reasoning, then she takes her premises to jointly provide a sufficient and undefeated reason for her action. I argue for this by showing, first, that it is an application of Boghossian's Taking Condition on inference to practical reasoning and, second, that the motivations for the Taking Condition for theoretical reasoning carry over to practical reasoning. I end by arguing that this version of the Guise of the Good withstands standard objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relation between sport and a good life presents a fruitful philosophical challenge and it has been discussed extensively within the philosophy sport literature. This paper will investigate the role of sport in a good life in the philosophical conceptions of Aristotle and Suits. Both authors paid attention to sport and its significance in the context of living well. However, their approaches differ, partly because they emerge in a different historical and cultural context. My aim is to analyse relevant texts of these two authors, presenting their major points, commonalities, and differences. The debate, to a certain extent, highlights instrumental (educational) and autotelic (intrinsic) value of sport. In order to conceptualize properly the role of sport in a good life, we need to take into account both of these aspects. The originality of this contribution can be found in presenting relevant implications of the contrasting positions of Suits and Aristotle to our thinking about modern sport. Finally, I point to the complementarity of their positions and demonstrate their impact on the broader debate concerning good sport and its role in a good life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper problematizes current thinking about education by arguing that the question of educational purpose is not simply a socio-political question concerned with what the ends should be and why, but can also be understood as a structural question, concerned with the way we understand education's directional impetus. We suggest that it is possible to understand education as something other than a curricular instrument designed to facilitate a purpose external to itself. We challenge such an instrumental view by arguing that education is an emergent phenomenon with its own unique aesthetic qualities (like art or music); a phenomenon, moreover, that does not simply serve a purpose, but generates the purpose it serves. In this paper we lay down the groundwork for such a non-instrumental understanding of education by combining the notion of emergence with ideas from Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Aristotle's teleological notion of the 'ideal' as self-generated and the Greek notion of 'paideia.' This provides an opportunity to theorise education's directional impetus as the ongoing and open-ended coordination of three realms of human life: the symbolic, the individual and the political. Given the acute political and social dilemmas that instrumental understandings of education bring forth in multicultural, and so called 'democratic' and 'inclusive' societies, we hope that by opening the possibility to theorise education as a non-instrumental phenomenon, it may become possible to have more fruitful discussion regarding education than endless political debate about what the curricular ends of education should be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely believed that the ancient Greeks thought that Thales was the first philosopher, and that they therefore maintained that philosophy had a Greek origin. This paper challenges these assumptions, arguing that most ancient Greek thinkers who expressed views about the history and development of philosophy rejected both positions. I argue that not even Aristotle presented Thales as the first philosopher, and that doing so would have undermined his philosophical commitments and interests. Beyond Aristotle, the view that Thales was the first philosopher is attested almost nowhere in antiquity. In the classical, Hellenistic, and post-Hellenistic periods, we witness a marked tendency to locate the beginning of philosophy in a time going back further than Thales. Remarkably, ancient Greek thinkers most often traced the origins of philosophy to earlier non-Greek peoples. Contrary to the received view, then, I argue that (1) vanishingly few Greek writers pronounced Thales the first philosopher; and (2) most Greek thinkers did not even advocate a Greek origin of philosophy. Finally, I show that the view that philosophy originated with Thales (along with its misleading attribution to the Greeks in general) has roots in problematic, and in some cases manifestly racist, eighteenth-century historiography of philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores how small tourism firms driven by an ethical approach to tourism narrate their organisational effectiveness. The study frames the ethical approach articulated in the first-person accounts of these firms' owner-managers using Aristotle's notion of phronesis, that is the process of identifying "good" actions consistent with living well and with an ethical telos. The research consists of a narrative approach via unstructured interviews with owner-managers of small Italian tour operators, members of the Italian Association of Responsible Tourism (AITR) and, as such, driven by an ethical approach to tourism. Data analysis combines features of structural and linguistic narrative analysis. The research findings disclose an organisational effectiveness largely rooted in a personal intuitive disposition gained by practical first-hand experience, personal knowledge, and a moral concern for the achievement of public wellbeing. Moreover, the findings challenge a business-centred approach to organisational effectiveness and question the dominant pro-growth, profit-oriented neoliberal discourses. These considerations can be used for setting the ground in tourism studies for a novel theoretical framework revolving around the ancient Aristotelian tradition of prioritising public wellbeing and happiness over capital accumulation, that further contributes to question market-driven capitalism and neoliberal globalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is warranted concern among educationalists about child well-being where a number of school factors have created a system and a society where well-being is at stake. Within this discourse, understanding the impact of social and emotional learning and school-based well-being programs have seen educationalists return to Aristotle to understand the foundational conception of flourishing. Following this trend, we propose that before flourishing can be supported in the areas of teaching and learning, the preconditions to flourishing must be met. This paper examines the provision of structural and policy factors that form the preconditions to flourishing using the lens of Aristotle's eudaimonia, external necessities, and the obligations of the polis. This analysis found that policy intent and purpose are largely aligned with the preconditions; but the differential uptake of policy initiatives along socio-economic lines has created an education system where school capacity to provide the external necessities for student flourishing is supported by schools in an inconsistent way. This, we argue is not what Aristotle proposed for a public education, where all children have an equal chance of building capabilities to flourish. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of why democracy is desirable in terms of a relational theory of democracy. The theory draws on concepts from Aristotelian, critical realist, and psychoanalytic theory. From Aristotle it takes the concepts of human flourishing and human virtues; from critical realism it takes the concepts of relational subjects and relational goods; from psychoanalysis it takes the concept of mutuality. The relational theory argues that democracy, particularly deliberative democracy, is desirable because it requires and facilitates the development of citizens with the relational capacity of mutuality. The theory is developed sequentially in the following four theses. (1) The function of government is to promote the flourishing of its citizens. (2) Human flourishing results from citizens having access to relational goods. (3) Access to relational goods requires that citizens possess the relational capacity of mutuality. (4) Deliberative democracy is desirable because it both requires and facilitates mutuality, [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the work of Barbara Cassin, this paper proposes to examine certain ways of speaking that Aristotle described as not so much human as plant-like [homoioi phutôi] and to consider whether these non-human ways of speaking might yet adduce forms of discourse that serve to model how central principles of justice can be thought. The paper does this by drawing upon Cassin's extensive engagement with Sophistry in the classical world together with her concerted interest in the activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in post-apartheid South Africa. When Aristotle, in book Gamma of the Metaphysics, dismissed the speech of those spoke "otherwise" (for example, those who failed to obey the law of non-contradiction) he formalised a chauvinism that philosophy had, at least since Plato, derided as sophistry. For Cassin, however, this presumed superiority of one way of speaking over another is something that holds true only when the grounds and elemental terms of a discourse have been and remain uncontested. In this way, language in Aristotle is regulated in advance, and determines what is admissible in the court of discourse according to prescribed and recognisable forms. Accordingly, illuminated by Heidegger and yet (like Arendt) departing from his conclusions, Cassin explores the sense in which language is something ontologically constitutive but in a manner that contests rather than secures its speakers' relations to one another. In place of a metaphysics and ethics of belonging and authenticity, Cassin's work is oriented by figures of precarity and exile such that truth is not so much something to be discovered, once and for all, but to be contested, negotiated, and re-worked each and every time. Key to this form of discourse, the paper will claim, is the uniquely non-juridical approach to justice undertaken by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Here, as Cassin explains, rather than a logic of individual rights and wrongs, there is a performative role for those involved. This "politics via discourse" dislocates the identity of received (rational) subjects and allows for narrative testimony itself not only to bear witness to a past but to signal a future – one based not on the apportionment or allocation of justice but on its ongoing struggle (an eristics or agonistics) for a humanity to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to argue that social science is an inherently moral enterprise. There are four reasons to see science as a moral endeavor based on the neo-Aristotelian recognition that morality is centered on human goods (e.g., justice and knowledge), not just right action. First, science is guided by epistemic values (e.g., accuracy, transparency) and underwritten by pro-science traits (e.g., honesty, patience). Second, the outcomes of applied science (e.g., disease cures, pedagogy improvements) are valued by scientists and others. Third, attempting to eliminate values from science is counterproductive because it leads to smuggling in moral commitments that are very difficult to critically evaluate, particularly in the social sciences. Finally, the goal of science is knowledge, which is a vital human good. Therefore, science is a thoroughly moral enterprise because human goods are moral aims. I conclude with three implications of this argument for science education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the interplay between intuition and reason in Aristotle's moral psychology. After discussing briefly some other uses of 'intuition' in Aristotle's texts, I look closely at (a) Aristotle's notion of virtue and emotion (Section 2); (b) affinities, or lack thereof, between Aristotle's view and the Two-System (dual-process) model of moral judgement that has made headlines in contemporary moral psychology (Section 3); and some complications of the Aristotelian picture related to the specifics of moral functioning at different developmental levels (Section 4). The lesson drawn is that, despite recent attempts to co-opt Aristotle to the Two-System camp, he was, for all intents and purposes, a One-System theorist with respect to the relationship between intuitive emotion and reason. In that sense, his theories are in line with recent findings in neuroscience which show how emotion stimulates reflection rather than directly driving action. Even the motivational make-up of the 'incontinent' does not (as might perhaps be urged) provide a persuasive counter-example to a One-System interpretation of Aristotle. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The important role played by Aristotle in Martin Heidegger's path towards Being and Time during the 1920's is now well documented. Yet an important chapter of this story remains mostly unexplored: Heidegger's early attempt to develop an ontology of life in dialogue with Aristotle. This is because the early seminars in which Heidegger developed his important and highly original interpretation of Aristotle's De Anima remain unpublished (apart from one very inadequate transcript): one seminar from the summer of 1921 and one spanning the winter semester of 1922/23 and the summer semester of 1923. In the present paper, I reconstruct Heidegger's key interpretative moves in the latter seminar on the basis of a detailed handwritten transcript preserved among the papers of his student Helene Weiss held at Stanford University. What emerges is a dialogue between Aristotle and Heidegger that enables us better to understand and to question the thought of both philosophers on the phenomenon of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the complex debt of Machiavelli's moral and political thought to Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, especially in its Scholastic variant. My claim is that Machiavelli's attitude vis-à-vis Aristotle is twofold because it reflects two different aspects of Aristotle's moral and political theory that are closely intertwined and that were selectively developed by subsequent Aristotelian Scholastic commentators: a teleological and a realist aspect. On one hand, Machiavelli provides a model that dramatically breaks with Aristotle on, for example, the question of the origin of human society and the moral prudence of rulers. On the other hand, Machiavelli's engagement with Aristotle amounts to something more complex than a simple rejection. The Florentine appears to read Aristotle rather selectively, and emphasizes the realist dimension of certain Aristotelian ideas that suit his own original overturning of classical moral and political ideas. I use two paradigmatic themes in which the Aristotelian teleological-realist divide is most evident, i.e. the account of the origin of human society and the case of prudence, in order to prove the dual relationship of Machiavelli's thought with Aristotelianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now commonplace for political discourse, news reports, and popular fictions to draw on themes of political violence and threats to national and individual security as mechanisms for the perpetuation of fear. Stories (whether fictive or factual) of terrorism, crisis, surveillance, racial stereotyping, and the fallibility of law have become a very real part of the mediatedexperience of fearfor the public, and they provoke a number of questions surrounding complex issues of protectionism, identity, trust, and the conflation of law and justice. It has been argued that such stories are constructed and utilized by key decision-makers as effective politicking in order to promote protectionist policies and activities. In recognizing that this “politics of fear” rests upon public assumptions and beliefs concerning safety and risk, it is important to understand how a public experience of fear is actually expressed and constituted in the public imaginary. Using social media as an interesting lens through which we can understand how fear is defined and realized in everyday social interaction, the paper will demonstrate that in times of high alert Twitter provides access to an articulated experience of fear. This paper will qualitatively explore the co-production and (re)circulation of these assumptions and beliefs through one particular story: the “Sydney Siege” hostage event of December 2014. By focusing on the Twitter response to this event, the paper provides an empirical account of public critique of law's justice narrative through the emotional experience and expression of fear. Drawing on critical content analysis and the Aristotelian discourse analysis method, the paper illustrates the complicity of social media, emotion and a prevalent rhetoric of fear in the reinforcement of law's justice narrative during times of high alert or crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Drawing upon the Drucker's ([2006]. The effective executive. Harper Paperbacks.) definition of effectiveness as 'doing the right thing', this paper explores how small tourism firms driven by an ethical approach to tourism, here named as 'values-based', understand their organizational effectiveness. This study is guided by Aristotle's notion of phronesis (practical wisdom) aimed at developing and exercising an attitude towards 'good' actions. Using a narrative approach via unstructured interviews with owner-managers of small values-based Italian firms, these explorative research findings disclose an organizational effectiveness rooted in a personal intuitive disposition for 'doing the right thing', gained by practical first-hand experience, personal knowledge, and moral rectitude. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a discussion of Aristotle's account of actions that come about because of ignorance as found in his Nicomachean Ethics 3.1. I argue that such actions do not originate in the agent, but can rather be seen as a subclass of lucky events. Aristotle makes a distinction between two types of actions that come about because of ignorance: those that are painful or regretted (involuntary actions) and those that are not (non-voluntary actions). I argue that involuntary actions that come about because of ignorance are painful for basically the same reason as forced actions. They include the mismatch between the person's capacity as the agent and the fact that it happened to her that she did something even though, qua agent, she contributed nothing, so that she is reduced, as it were, to the mere vehicle of luck. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the first Critique, Kant raises two objections against Aristotle’s categories. Kant’s concern, in the first instance, is whether Aristotle generated all categories that there are and if he did not generate any spurious categories. However, for Kant, this is only a symptom of the second – deeper – flaw in Aristotle’s thinking. According to Kant, Aristotle generated his categories ‘on no common principle.’ This paper develops the two Kantian objections, offers an overview of Brentano's (1862. Von der Mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles. Freiburg im Brisgau: Herder’sche Verlagshandlung.) reconstruction of Aristotle’s categories (which claims to have addressed them), develops three objections to this reconstruction, and recommends (Trendelenburg, A. 1846. Geschichte der Kategorienlehre. Berlin: Verlag von G. Bethge.) as a better – albeit still flawed – Aristotelian reply to Kant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent social theory has begun to reconsider how theactivityof work can contribute to well-being or autonomy under the right conditions. However, there is no consensus on what this contribution consists in, and so on precisely which normative principles should be marshalled to critique harmful or repressive forms of workplace organisation. This paper argues that Richard Sennett’s concept of work ascraftprovides a normative standard against which the organisation of work can be assessed, especially when explained within a broadly Aristotelian account of the conditions of human flourishing. More precisely, the paper argues that a craft norm can meet the standards of social critique within the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory, as this tradition has been interpreted by Axel Honneth. Honneth himself now rejects craft norms as too utopian and parochial to inform Critical Theory under contemporary economic conditions. In reply, this paper uses sociological studies of call centre workers to illustrate how work motivated by craft ideals can be sustainable rather than utopian, and how craftsmanship can inform social critique across a wide variety of industries and management practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the use of classical quotations in the third pamphlet of the Weiße Rose. Looking in detail at their references to Cicero's On Laws and Aristotle's Politics, I show their careful selective citational practices and situate those in turn within some of the developments and priorities of the reception of antiquity in early twentieth century Germany. Finally, I use the case of the evaluations of the pamphlets that were commissioned from the classicist Richard Harder shortly before the arrest of the Weiße Rose members to raise questions about philological reading and responsibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Nicomachean Ethics, one of Aristotle's most frequent characterizations of the virtuous agent is that she acts for the sake of the fine (to kalon). In IX.8, this pursuit of the fine receives a more specific description; virtuous agents maximally assign the fine to themselves. In this paper, I answer the question of how we are to understand the fine as individually and maximally acquirable. I analyze Nicomachean Ethics IX.7, where Aristotle highlights virtuous activity (energeia) as central to the fine, and argue that when virtuous agents pursue the fine, what they are pursuing is virtuous activity. I then address various problems, like how virtuous people can maximize virtuous activity yet sacrifice their lives, which would seem to amount to sacrificing future opportunities to virtuous activity and therefore not maximizing it. I also eliminate alternative interpretations that do not take virtuous activity as necessary to the fine, for example the common good interpretation, whereby virtuous agents pursuing the fine amounts to their pursuing the common good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent critics have suggested that character education (either in and of itself or certain instantiations of it) is overly individualised and, as a result, fails to engage adequately with the political. In this paper, I offer an account of character education which takes issue with such criticisms, and seeks to make clear connections between the moral and the political necessary for character formation and expression. Drawing on an Aristotelian understanding of the political, I argue that individuals are intimately connected with their social associations, which in contemporary plural, westernised democracies include the sort of engagement with the political advocated by critics of character education. Through a focus on civic virtue and deliberative engagement, it is argued that an Aristotelian-inspired account of character addresses the precise concerns, including recognising and challenging social injustices and deliberative engagement with difference, which critics suggest are lacking from character education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current "exemplarist turn" within virtue ethics is increasingly shedding light on the importance of exemplars both as enabling one to identify the virtues and for the importance they bear for orienting one's conduct, as well as for educating the novice. However, even if categorizations of exemplars have already been proposed, there seems to be a lack of discussion on the kind of imitation different exemplars are supposed to elicit. In order to offer a preliminary answer to this question, in this paper I present three paths to flourishing via imitation of exemplary individuals: The Platonic (§1), the Stoic (§2), and the Aristotelian (§3). Then, I sketch an attempt to reconcile these models (§4). In conclusion, I suggest that, when it comes to education, this reconciliation becomes necessary. Along these lines, I recommend that a multi-step educational program is elaborated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the scrutiny, as found in the Discussiones Peripateticae 1, 2–4, to which Francesco Patrizi da Cherso subjected the works of the transmitted corpus Aristotelicum, and those attributed to Aristotle outside the corpus. It explains why Patrizi rejected most of the transmitted œuvre as spurious, and shows what would have been the most radical consequence of his hyper-critical stance, had it carried the day. Particular attention is paid to contemporary (i.e. sixteenth-century) scholarship available to, and used by, Patrizi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Pomponazzi's arguments against Averroes in his De Immortalitate Animae, focusing on the question whether thought is possible without a body. The first part of the paper will sketch the history of the problem, namely the interpretation of Aristotle's remarks about the intellect in De Anima 3.4-5, touching on Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. The second part will focus on Pomponazzi's response to Averroes, including his use of arguments by Aquinas. It will conclude by suggesting that Pomponazzi's discussion stands as the first properly modern account of Aristotle's psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly interested in a Hegelian approach to Aristotelian non-reductive naturalism. This paper points out a challenge faced by naturalist readings of Hegel's conception of spirit. For Hegel, spirit and nature are essentially distinct and even related in an antagonistic way. It is difficult to do full justice to this thought while at the same time reading Hegel as a naturalist. The paper also seeks to suggest a response to this challenge. Drawing on Hegel's account of mechanism in his philosophy of spirit, it shows that processes which can count as natural – such as mechanical processes – constitute for Hegel an integral and indispensable part of spiritual activity. Against this background, it is possible to develop a form of Hegelian naturalism which does not lose sight of the essential distinction, even opposition of spirit and nature. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In trying to develop their respective theories of generation, Jean Fernel and William Harvey both drew repeatedly on Aristotle's suggestion that something "analogous to the element of the stars" was involved. The analogy with the stars suggested something celestial or divine, and both thinkers subscribed to the dominant assumption that God is the primary cause of generation, but, as natural philosophers, they were expected to develop theories based on secondary causes. Fernel simply defined "divine" as "hidden" or "occult", and developed a sophisticated occult explanation of how generation takes place. Harvey, by contrast, rejected occult explanations, and, although offering tentative alternatives, ultimately failed to discover any convincing naturalistic account. It is the contention of this paper that Harvey resorted, therefore, to the direct intervention of God in the process of generation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confucius and Aristotle both put a primacy on the task of ethical self-cultivation. Unlike Aristotle, who emphasizes the instrumental value of legal punishment for cultivation's sake, Confucius raises worries about the practice of punishment. Punishment, and the threat of punishment, Confucius suggests, actually threatens to warp human motivation and impede our ethical development. In this paper, I examine Confucius' worries about legal punishment, and consider how a dialogue on punishment between Confucius and Aristotle might proceed. I explore how far apart these thinkers actually stand, and examine the possibilities for a rapprochement between them. Doing so brings to light the self-cultivation perspective's range of resources for thinking about punishment's justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Self-Constitution, I argue that the principles governing action are "constitutive standards" of agency, standards that arise from the nature of agency itself. To be an agent is to be autonomously efficacious, and the categorical and hypothetical imperatives arise from those two attributes. These principles are also "constitutive" of agency in two more specific ways. First, they meet the "constitution requirement": the object must meet the standard in question, at least to some extent, in order to be the kind of object that it is. Second, they meet the "self-constitution requirement": the object makes itself into the kind of object that it is by conforming to the standard. That is, the agent makes herself into an agent, and into the particular agent who she is, by conforming to those standards. Some neo-Aristotelians believe that Aristotelian virtues are constitutive standards. In this paper, I first ask why moral philosophers should focus on the virtues at all, considering the views of David Hume, Philippa Foot, and Aristotle. I then ask whether Aristotelian virtues meet the constitution requirement, and suggest that there are grounds for this view in the Nicomachean Ethics. But Aristotelian virtues do not meet the self-constitution requirement, which leaves Aristotle unable to explain moral responsibility. I end by examining the role that Aristotelian virtues could play in a Kantian ethic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]