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John Hick (1922–2012) was an influential analytical philosopher of religion and liberal Christian philosophical theologian who taught in Britain and the United States. His work on religious epistemology, the theology of religions and, to some extent, eschatology has close links with his understanding of the philosophy of religious experience. This paper offers a detailed analysis and critical evaluation of these significant elements of Hick’s philosophical and theological thought, focusing in particular on his theory of religious knowledge and the role played by religious concepts within religious experience, and the relevance of these reflections for his pluralistic account of the variety of religions and his criterion of religious truth. Hick’s response to the challenges of contemporary neuroscience and the philosophy of mind is also reviewed. The paper reflects on the relevance of these views to accounts of an experience of transcendent reality collected through the empirical psychology of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper offers an overview of contemporary inscriptions of mindfulness, their conditions of possibility, and examples of the braining of mind on which contemporary neuro-meets-contemplative turns are dependent. We examine key nineteenth century events integral to the formation of Biologies Old, in which historic debates over ‘the death of God’ in Western worldviews forge a space of finitude dedicated to fleshy materiality and the relocation of bios. We also examine what emerges in the wake of such debates, including how Biologies New and a transcendence/ immanence horizon continues to reverberate through popular, contemporary recommendations for mindfulness in teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has witnessed a growing awareness of conceptual and methodological hurdles within psychology and neuroscience that must be addressed for taxonomic and explanatory progress in understanding psychological functions to be possible. In this paper, I evaluate several recent knowledge-building initiatives aimed at overcoming these obstacles. I argue that while each initiative offers important insights about how to facilitate taxonomic and explanatory progress in psychology and neuroscience, only a “coordinated pluralism” that incorporates positive aspects of each initiative will have the potential for success. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As advancements in neuroscience increasingly illuminate the traditional understanding of the human mind, many of the new insights are also of relevance to musicians as well as to music pedagogy. Especially the greater understanding of how intersubjective processes are integral to the development of the right brain has shown how, according to the neuropsychoanalyst Allan Schore, right-brain models can bridge the fields of psychiatry, music and trauma. Following a short introduction, the article discusses the development of ego boundaries and their relevance to young aspiring musicians as well as the close relation to self-esteem. This is followed by a short explanation of the psychodynamic processes underlying interpersonal interaction and relation. Right-brain function in development and trauma is discussed and its links to music are highlighted; the issue of fear and learned helplessness in musicians is also considered briefly. A discussion on the impact of fear on musicians’ memory follows. The paper concludes by showing that, while brain pathology can be associated with creativity, creative processes in and of themselves are not pathological. Throughout, special reference is made to aspects that have particular relevance to previously disadvantaged music learners. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper sets out a falsifiable Relational Affective Hypothesis, describing a neurological and relational pathway, through which affect and sensations arising from the interior of the body are translated, in a relational context, into language and a capacity for symbolisation. It describes the role of psychodynamic defences in narcissistic disorder, which can result in collapse in the function of this pathway. The hypothesis arose from clinical psychodynamic work with patients with severe and complex narcissistic disorders. They are characterised as severe, because they are at high risk of completed suicide and so are commonly treated in locked units, and complex because of their anorexic and bulimic eating patterns, tendency towards somatisation and the co-occurrence of autistic difficulties. A more or less profound failure of symbolisation is a feature common to these presentations. This interdisciplinary thinking offers a perspective on brain and psychological development, taking into account the complex interplay between genetic, environmental, relational and dynamic influences. It can be tested empirically and has implications for psychoanalytic thinking, psychiatry and neuroscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a Relational Affective Formulation of severe narcissistic and borderline disorders. The formulation is grounded in psychoanalytic and neuroscientific theory, clinical observation and therapeutic work with hospitalised patients. It provides a conceptual framework for psychodynamic psychiatrists, therapists and psychosocial practitioners working in teams. Paying particular attention to the central place of affect, projective and introjective processes, claustro-agoraphobic phenomena, regression and the place of both deficits and dynamic defences in the failure of symbolisation, the case is made that this framework is suited to therapeutic work with patients who are highly suicidal and complex. The application of this formulation to service design and treatment pathways is described along with a summary of the body of psychoanalytic thinking which contributed to its development. The formulation is the cornerstone of a practice guide currently under development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

David Buller and Valerie Hardcastle have argued that various discoveries about the genetics and nature of brain development show that most “central” psychological mechanisms cannot be adaptations because the nature of the contribution from the environment on which they are based shows they are not heritable. Some philosophers and scientists have argued that a strong role for the environment is compatible with high heritability as long as the environment is highly stable down lineages. In this paper I support this view by arguing that the discoveries Buller and Hardcastle refer to either do not show as strong a role for the environment as they suggest, or these discoveries show that the brain's developmental process depends in many cases on input from the environment that is highly stable across generations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several influential psychologists have attempted to estimate to what extent human happiness levels are directly controlled by genes by comparing the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart. If we discover that the happiness levels of identical twins raised apart tend to be closer than the happiness levels of fraternal twins raised apart, this is taken as evidence that average happiness levels are largely controlled by genes. However, if it turns out that identical twins' happiness levels tend to be substantially different, as different as fraternal twins raised apart, it has been argued that this implies that the environment largely determines happiness levels. I contend that this interpretation of the data rests on a set of questionable, closely related assumptions: a) that pairs of identical twins raised apart are raised in substantially different environments; b) that genetically identical twins aren't identical in other pertinent ways; and c) that average levels of affect that are correlated with certain sets of genes in the environments the twin studies were conducted in will be correlated with those genes in other relevant environments because those genes govern average affect levels. In this paper, I will show that these assumptions are false and explain how to properly go about investigating the contingent causal links between genes and happiness. In the end, I argue that there is no good evidence that our genes delimit our hedonic potential and that the fact that this misinterpretation of the data has been widely disseminated is potentially harmful to human well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]