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Background: A body of literature has arisen analyzing and legitimating the emerging field of engineering education research (EER). Using concepts from the sociology of knowledge, EER can be described as a region because it has relationships both to other academic fields and to its field of practice. Of interest is the strength of boundaries between these fields, described by the sociologist Bernstein's concept of classification. Purpose/Hypothesis: This study addresses the research questions: (1) How, when and by whom are arguments made to strengthen or weaken the boundaries, first between EER and other academic fields and second between EER and engineering teaching? (2) How do these arguments change across time and national contexts? Design/Method: Drawing on a survey of 21 EER experts, this sociological discourse analysis focuses on a purposive dataset of 17 papers from 2000 to 2020. Results: The study identified three main arguments in this literature, favoring: (1) strong classification (a singular in sociological terms); (2a) a region linked outward to teaching practice; and (2b) a region linked inward to other social science disciplines. Conclusions: The argument for EER as a strongly classified field has served value in establishing legitimacy and associated resources in some contexts but has not yet delivered a unique knowledge base for such legitimation. An alternative framing holds together the productive tension between two directions in which EER as a region can face: Looking inward to parent disciplines for theoretical and methodological direction and looking outward to the world of practice for meaningful problems to guide its studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary Motivated by existing works on the ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ state‐feedback controller for nonlinear systems, in which the ℒ∞$$ {\mathcal{L}}_{\infty } $$ norm of the output for the worst disturbance with a unit magnitude is required to be bounded by 1, this paper considers an extension of those works to an output‐feedback form. More precisely, the existence of an ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ output‐feedback controller for nonlinear systems is characterized by developing output regulation map and output controlled invariance domain, which are extended versions of the conventional regulation map and controlled invariance domain in the previous works. We first lead to a sufficient condition for the existence of an ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ output‐feedback controller by ensuring the lower‐semicontinuity of the corresponding output regulation map. It is also shown in this paper that there exists an ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ output‐feedback controller only if there exists an output controlled invariance domain. Based on these conditions, we further introduce algorithmic guidelines for verifying the existence of ℒ1$$ {\mathcal{L}}_1 $$ output‐feedback controller. Finally, a numerical example is provided to verify the validity of the overall arguments developed in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Phenomenology questions the centrality that Kant attributes to the “I think.” It claims that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless as unity is given. I call this the “unity argument.” The paper explores the significance of this claim by focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl. What interests me is that although the unity argument claims that we can account for the unity of experience without appealing to the an “I think,” Husserl agrees with Kant that experience must be owned. Moreover, he endorses Kant's dictum that ‘the “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my presentations’. The aim of the paper is to explore how Husserl can consistently appeal to Kant's account of the “I think” and at the same time contend that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless. The thesis I wish to advance is that although the unity argument acknowledges that experience is necessarily mine, it reveals that it is a necessary feature of self‐reference that I have never taken absolute ownership over my experience. This may explain why our sense of self can often be out of tune with the way we live our lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes a case for treating the boundary between what counts as practical reasoning and what does not as essentially indeterminate. The idea that there is an “essential indeterminacy in what can be counted as a rational deliberative process” was put forward by Bernard Williams in his well‐known discussion of statements about an agent's reasons for action. But in contrast to the more familiar argument of that paper, the idea has received almost no attention. To understand and defend the idea, I first offer a somewhat novel reconstruction of the more familiar argument against making statements about a person's reasons intended on an “external” interpretation. On my reading, the argument shows how making such statements runs afoul of ideals of honesty in our interpersonal dealings. I then argue for countenancing an essential indeterminacy in what counts as practical reasoning, in a manner that involves a re‐application of these same ideals of honesty, albeit at a higher level of abstraction. One advantage of understanding the entire discussion of reasons statements and reasoning along these lines is that it highlights the deeply anti‐rationalistic flavor of Williams' own interest in these topics. Unsurprisingly, Williams' treatment displays a deep affinity with the anti‐rationalistic ethics advanced by Hume. It also turns out to be at cross purposes with the far more rationalistic ethical vision that animates more recent attempts to advance a “Humean Theory of Reasons,” which is sometimes mistakenly seen as following in Williams' and Hume's footsteps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tackles the issue of whether syntactic head movement exists in Japanese. Sato & Hayashi (2018) and Sato & Maeda (2021) propose that Verb‐Echo Answers (VEAs), an instance of fragment answers, in Japanese are derived via the so‐called Verb‐stranding TP‐Ellipsis (VTPE; i.e., TP‐ellipsis accompanied by verb‐raising to C), thereby claiming that head movement exists in Japanese as a syntactic operation. In response, this paper argues that pro and Argument Ellipsis (AE) in Japanese sufficiently account for the key observations presented in their works. Specifically, a careful examination of the discourse in each question‐answer pair reveals that the seemingly problematic scope patterns in VEAs do not call for the VTPE analysis. We also show that the unacceptability of voice mismatches in VEAs can be explained by a discourse‐based analysis within the Question Under Discussion framework. Further, we provide an extensive discussion on the alleged evidence against the pro/AE analysis concerning adjunct‐inclusive readings. We show that negative scope reversal effects, which Sato & Maeda (2021) argue occur in VTPE, do not occur between adjuncts and negation in the novel data. Given this, we discuss possible ways to account for the availability of adjunct‐inclusive readings in VEAs with no recourse to VTPE, and suggest avenues for future research. The proposed analyses of VEAs shed new light on intriguing aspects of ellipsis phenomena, which involve complex interactions between syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes an interpretation of Aristotle's understanding of tyche (τύχη), a Greek term that can be alternatively translated as luck, fortune, or fate. The paper disentangles various threads of argument in the primary sources to argue for a realist understanding of what we moderns call "luck." In short, it contends that Aristotle's account of these issues is mostly correct and merits close attention when canvassing recent philosophical debates about luckology. Aristotle argues that science pertains to the general rule; it is not about the particular. Particular events have contingent content that exceeds the scope of science. Even if we could predict all future events with ultimate accuracy, we would still be left wondering why good or bad things happen to specific people. Although luck is not a scientific category, it has an existential reality that leaves momentous events open to metaphysical and even religious interpretation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses lines of argument drawn from Amartya Sen's Idea of Justice to support the notion that NGO efforts, far from being oppressive, are helpful and progressive. It cites the work of Lairap‐Fonderson and Chen, and alludes to specific projects. Contrast is made with Rawls, and the paper suggests that more formal theories of justice may not enable us to grapple with our intuitive sense that justice for the poverty stricken involves, at a minimum, both financial progress and forward movement with respect to internal growth. Examples of work done by NGOs in Bangladesh and other places help us to realize that women in these areas often have their own sense of what a more just situation would require—and NGOs and others can work from these conceptions as a point of departure. Part of the conclusion here is that Sen's concept of the just is a step in the right direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reassesses the Cooper‐Hadot debate surrounding how students are converted to philosophy as a way of life (section 1) through engagement with philosophical protreptics. In section 2, the paper identifies the core "argument from finality" in philosophical protreptics seeking to convert non‐philosophers to philosophy, starting from the universal human interest in securing eudaimonia. In line with Cooper, this argument seeks to persuade prospective students on rational grounds, so that their choice to philosophise would be rationally motivated. In section 3.1, the paper illustrates how in Plato's Euthydemus (a) the choice to undertake philosophy is rationally justified by Socrates, using the eudaimonistic argument from finality. In section 3.2, by recourse to Aristotle's Protrepticus, the paper shows how the protreptic texts also compared philosophy to other intellectual pursuits, notably rhetoric, so as to recommend philosophy specifically for delivering a directive wisdom concerning how to live. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ethnophilosophy debate in African philosophy has been primarily concerned with the nature and future direction of African philosophy, but this paper approaches the debate in search of lessons about philosophy in general. The paper shows how this ongoing debate has been obscured by varying understandings of "ethnophilosophy" and that a de facto victory has long since transpired, since "ethnophilosophy," in the sense recommended here, is flourishing. The paper argues that the political arguments with which Hountondji and Wiredu initiated the debate in the 1970s supervene on the metaphilosophical view that ethnophilosophy, if philosophy at all, is of a poor standard. Showing that ethnophilosophy must indeed be philosophy, it argues that the critics' low opinions of it depend on unrealistic assumptions about how philosophy makes progress. The paper concludes that Africa is lucky to have ethnophilosophies and that the rest of the world should hope to develop some. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta‐regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study applies quasi‐experimental designs to assess how successful the special economic zones (SEZs) have been in offering a better investment climate than what is available to firms outside of them in three South Asian countries: India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. The World Bank Enterprise Surveys' data for 2013–2014 on multiple investment climate factors have been organised into 48 onsite and offsite investment climate variables for the assessment. The study is the first to provide causal evidence based on the matching and weighting methods. The key argument is that what sets SEZs apart from other economic zones is their ability to overcome growth impeding institutions. The results however show that the SEZs could not be insulated from the wider institutional contexts in which they are embedded. There are gaps between promises and implementation on the one hand and perceived and actual improvement on the other. The paper has important implications for policymakers who seem to be in a rush to set up SEZs as a development panacea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws a distinction between the existential quantifier and the symbol '∃' used to express it, on the one hand, and existence and 'exists', on the other. It argues that some popular arguments in metaphysics, including arguments against vague existence and arguments against deflationary metaontology (which views ontological disputes as lacking substance), are guilty of fudging this distinction. The paper draws some lessons for metaphysical debate about existence and highlights some heretofore ignored and attractive positions in logical space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the usefulness of the concept of philosophical progress and the common assumption that philosophy and science aim to make the same, or a comparable, kind of progress. It does so by responding to Yafeng Shan's (2022) arguments that the wealth of research on scientific progress is not applicable or useful to philosophy, and that philosophy doesn't need a concept of progress at all. It is ultimately argued that while Shan's arguments are not successful, they reveal the way forward in developing accounts of philosophical progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent Metaphilosophy article, Moti Mizrahi and Michael Dickinson argue against characterizing the divide between analytical and continental philosophy as a divide in the use of arguments. This hypothesis is rejected on the basis of a text‐mining approach. The present paper argues that the results they extracted do not answer the questions they set out to answer as well as would have been possible. This is due to Mizrahi and Dickinson's choice to disregard duplicate occurrences of argument word pairs, their main indicator for the occurrence of arguments in articles. This paper reconstructs their method by now also counting duplicates. A small corpus (n = 436) of recent (2015–2021) analytical and continental articles is used to rerun the experiment; the results oppose Mizrahi and Dickinson's and suggest that arguments (as operationalized by Mizrahi and Dickinson) occur more in analytical articles. The paper argues that part of the discrepancy derives from the specific methodological choices they made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution is written in response to Helen Morgan's paper 'Whiteness: A problem for our times'. A distinctive feature of her writing and thinking in this essay, and her new book, is how she moves easily and freely between psychoanalytic, sociological, political and psychological frameworks of understanding. In doing so her work exemplifies something that the psychoanalytic community has mostly been poor at achieving – a recognition of both its distinctive and unique potential to illuminate social and political processes, and a parallel acknowledgement of its need to enter into equilateral dialogue with other intellectual paradigms. Social and political life is historical, specific, local and complex, and not amenable to reductionist or universalizing modes of analysis and engagement. Through some examples I aim to add to Helen's very thoughtful and well researched paper, to show how psychoanalysis needs to respect other languages and methodologies for engaging with the world, render its own more accessible to non‐specialists, and relinquish its tendency to assume the status of a 'master discourse'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do visual methods, particularly the practice of photography, help us to visualise and understand absence in deathscapes? In this paper I will argue that photographs, with their ability to freeze moments, are able to capture what I term points of praxis – moments in which practices by individuals inscribe meaning onto deathscapes, and in that intense and captured presence, evoke the feeling of absent individuals. Such points of praxis can exist in two ways – the praxis of the body and the praxis of objects – both of which I will illuminate with the use of visual ethnographic methods. To support my argument, I present work taken from a three‐year visual ethnographic study of Bukit Brown Cemetery, specifically drawing on the social and cultural documentation of the Hungry Ghost Festival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we will introduce a novel argument (the “Region Argument”) that objects do not have frame‐independent shapes in special relativity. The Region Argument lacks vulnerabilities present in David Chalmers' argument for that conclusion based on length contraction. We then examine how views on persistence interact with the Region Argument. We argue that this argument and standard four‐dimensionalist assumptions entail that nothing in a relativistic world has any shape, not even stages or the regions occupied by them. We also argue that endurantists have viable ways of preserving shape despite the Region Argument. The upshot of these arguments is that contrary to conventional wisdom, considerations about shape in relativity support endurantism rather than four‐dimensionalism. We conclude by examining the implications of our discussion for the debate over Edenic shapes, noting that endurantists have a satisfying response to skeptical arguments about Edenic shapes similar to the one they have against the Region Argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we investigate to the existence and uniqueness of periodic solutions for the parabolic–elliptic Keller–Segel system on whole spaces detailized by Euclidean space Rn(wheren⩾4)$\mathbb {R}^n\,\,(\hbox{ where }n \geqslant 4)$ and real hyperbolic space Hn(wheren⩾2)$\mathbb {H}^n\,\, (\hbox{where }n \geqslant 2)$. We work in framework of critical spaces such as on weak‐Lorentz space Ln2,∞(Rn)$L^{\frac{n}{2},\infty }(\mathbb {R}^n)$ to obtain the results for the Keller–Segel system on Rn$\mathbb {R}^n$ and on Lp2(Hn)$L^{\frac{p}{2}}(\mathbb {H}^n)$ for n

This paper argues for the occurrence of movement that is not the by‐product of an Agree relation in which a probe searches for a goal. The hypothesis that not all instances of movement might be feature‐driven was entertained in early Minimalism, but it has nevertheless become widely assumed that all instances of syntactic movement should be attributed to the operation of Agree. Here, using complex patterns of DP‐internal movement in Bangla, we argue that certain instances of syntactic movement may indeed take place without Agree. Taking the Phase Impenetrability Condition/PIC as the signature property of phases, and sensitivity to the PIC to be indicative of Agree‐related movement, we show that some occurrences of movement within a single domain are constrained by the PIC, while others are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the so‐called ‘paradox’ of dehumanization is a mirage arising from misplaced abstraction. The alleged ‘paradox’ is taken as a challenge that arises from a skeptical stance. After reviewing the history of that skeptical stance, it is reconstructed as an argument with two premises. With the help of an epistemologically structured but pluralistic frame it is then shown how the two premises of the Skeptic's argument can both be debunked. As part of that it emerges that there are a couple of ways how dehumanization can be realized, and one such realization can be sufficient for affirming the reality of dehumanization for a specific case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most empirical work in economics has considered only a narrow set of measures as meaningful and useful to characterize individual behavior, a restriction justified by the difficulties in collecting a wider set. However, this approach often forces the use of strong assumptions to estimate the parameters that inform individual behavior and identify causal links. In this paper, we argue that a more flexible and broader approach to measurement could be extremely useful and allow the estimation of richer and more realistic models that rest on weaker identifying assumptions. We argue that the design of measurement tools should interact with, and depend on, the models economists use. Measurement is not a substitute for rigorous theory, it is an important complement to it, and should be developed in parallel to it. We illustrate these arguments with a model of parental behavior estimated on pilot data that combines conventional measures with novel ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the critical p$$ p $$‐Laplacian equation of Kirchhoff type −M∫ℝN|∇u|pdxΔpu+V(x)|u|p−2u=λK(x)f(u)+|u|p∗−2u,x∈ℝN,$$ -M\left({\int}_{{\mathrm{\mathbb{R}}}^N}{\left|\nabla u\right|}^p dx\right){\Delta}_pu+V(x){\left|u\right|}^{p-2}u=\lambda K(x)f(u)+{\left|u\right|}^{p^{\ast }-2}u,x\in {\mathrm{\mathbb{R}}}^N, $$ where M$$ M $$ is the Kirchhoff function, Δpu=div(|∇u|p−2∇u)$$ {\Delta}_pu=\operatorname{div}\left({\left|\nabla u\right|}^{p-2}\nabla u\right) $$ with N20$$ N\ge 2,\lambda >0 $$ is a parameter, p∗=Np/(N−p)$$ {p}^{\ast }= Np/\left(N-p\right) $$, and the potentials V$$ V $$ and K$$ K $$ vanish at infinity. Under some suitable assumptions on f$$ f $$, by using the constraint minimization approach, we obtain a least energy sign‐changing solution uλ$$ {u}_{\lambda } $$ to this problem if λ$$ \lambda $$ is large enough and show the energy of uλ$$ {u}_{\lambda } $$ is strictly larger than twice that of the ground state solutions. Moreover, by considering a wider class of M$$ M $$ and f$$ f $$, we exploit the truncation argument to find a nontrivial solution if λ$$ \lambda $$ is sufficiently large via some analytic skills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Linguistic interventions aim to change our linguistic practices. A commonly discussed type of linguistic intervention is meaning revision, which seeks to associate existing words with new or revised meanings. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express the newly defined meanings? Drawing on relevant psycholinguistic research, this paper develops an empirically motivated, general, and practically useful pro tanto reason to retain rather than replace the original word during the process of conceptual improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the dissipative structure for the system of Moore–Gibson–Thompson (MGT) thermoelasticity in the whole space. To analyze the dissipative structure, it is very useful to rewrite the equations into a symmetric hyperbolic system and apply the so‐called stability condition. When we rewrite our system into the symmetric hyperbolic form in the multidimensional case, it is important to take the constraint conditions into account. Indeed, the stability condition with the constraint conditions guarantees the dissipative property for our system in some cases. In this paper, we introduce the stability condition with constraints for the general problem and apply this argument to the system of MGT thermoelasticity. Furthermore, we discuss the optimality of the decay estimates we obtain, together with the no regularity‐loss phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Roche and Sober (2013; 2014; 2017; 2019) have offered an important new argument that explanatoriness lacks confirmatory significance. My aim in this paper is not only to contend that their argument fails to show that in confirmation 'there is nothing special about explanatoriness' (Roche & Sober, 2017: 589), but also to reveal what is special confirmationwise about explanatoriness. I will argue that much of the heavy work in Roche and Sober's argument is done by the dichotomy into which they carve up the philosophical options: either explanatory considerations per se are confirmatorily relevant or they acquire whatever confirmatory significance they may possess only by way of background beliefs and so no differently from non‐explanatory considerations. I will argue that this is a false dichotomy: Explanatoriness per se can have confirmatory relevance even while explanatory considerations acquire their confirmatory relevance only through background opinions. Furthermore, there is 'something special' about the background opinions concerning explanations that allow explanatoriness in itself to have confirmatory impact. Unlike other sorts of background, having some background opinions expressly about explanations is indispensable to being an observer at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the existence of horrendous evils has generally been taken to be evidence against the existence of God, some philosophers have suggested that it may be evidence for the existence of God. This paper introduces three main kinds of theistic arguments from horrendous evils: the argument from objectively horrifying evils, the pragmatic argument from evil, and an argument from reasonable responses. For each of these arguments, I will first reconstruct a standard version of the argument, before suggesting ways the argument may be challenged, or further developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the use of imaginary cases in normative theorizing. Imaginary cases are used as a part of an argument and should be assessed in terms of the role they play within arguments. The paper identifies five ways in which they are used and then uses some of the best examples to bring out how they contribute to debates. While not directly akin to empirical experiments, criticisms of imaginary cases can be represented in terms of the well‐known distinction between internal and external validity in social science experiments. While imaginary cases can suffer from internal and external validity problems, these do not constitute a decisive critique of their use as a method of analysis. Criticisms of imaginary cases should detail the precise form in which they are used, and why any particular use is invalid, internally or externally, in the context of the argument for which the case is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents and defends a novel meta‐epistemological thesis, epistemic isomorphism, according to which our relations to others and to ourselves have the same pattern of relevance to our rationality. This means that correct epistemological theorizing will give formal parity to interpersonal and intrapersonal epistemic norms, such that what holds interpersonally also holds, mutatis mutandis, intrapersonally. In addition to arguing for epistemic isomorphism, the paper presents some epistemological case studies in which it is shown that the methodological and argumentative strategies used by epistemologists in these case studies give expression to the idea of epistemic isomorphism as well as the argument presented here for its truth. Finally, the paper considers a possible counterexample to epistemic isomorphism based on an agent‐centered theory of justification, but it shows how to reconcile this theory with epistemic isomorphism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Since it was formalized by Kane, the argument‐based approach to validation has been promoted as the preferred method for validating interpretations and uses of test scores. Because validation is discussed in terms of arguments, and arguments are both interactive and social, the present review systematically examines the scholarly arguments which appear in 83 papers on argument‐based validation methods published in peer‐reviewed journals. Findings suggest that scholars generally agree on the nature and importance of argument‐based validation but disagree on whether validation should be structured or unstructured, formal or informal. Implications are discussed, including promotion of the Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (AERA, APA, and NCME) as a foundation for consensus in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a novel numerical scheme is proposed to numerically solve the fractional activator–inhibitor system, which is a coupled two‐dimensional nonlinear model. In the temporal direction, we employ the Grünwald–Letnikov formula, in spatial direction, the Legendre spectral method is used. In terms of the error splitting argument technique, an optimal error estimate of the numerical scheme is obtained without any time‐step size conditions, while the usual analysis for high‐dimensional nonlinear fractional problems always required certain time‐step restrictions dependent on the spatial mesh size. Some numerical results are given to justify the theoretical analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For a hypergraph H$H$, define its intersection spectrum I(H)$I(H)$ as the set of all intersection sizes |E∩F|$|E\cap F|$ of distinct edges E,F∈E(H)$E,F\in E(H)$. In their seminal paper from 1973 which introduced the local lemma, Erdős and Lovász asked: how large must the intersection spectrum of a k$k$‐uniform 3‐chromatic intersecting hypergraph be? They showed that such a hypergraph must have at least three intersection sizes, and conjectured that the size of the intersection spectrum tends to infinity with k$k$. Despite the problem being reiterated several times over the years by Erdős and other researchers, the lower bound of three intersection sizes has remarkably withstood any improvement until now. In this paper, we prove the Erdős–Lovász conjecture in a strong form by showing that there are at least k1/2−o(1)$k^{1/2-o(1)}$ intersection sizes. Our proof consists of a delicate interplay between Ramsey‐type arguments and a density increment approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a long‐standing debate about whether poetry can make a substantive contribution to philosophy with compelling arguments to show that poetry and philosophy involve distinct modes of thought and aims, albeit with similar concerns. This paper argues that reading lyric poetry can play a substantive role in philosophy by helping the philosopher understand how to forge connections with the perspectives of others. The paper takes the view that poetry is not directly philosophical but can play an important role in developing the philosopher's awareness of how perspective shapes beliefs and thought processes. Following Robert Nozick, David Lewis, and Helen Beebee, it argues for the need to broaden our conception of the aims of philosophy beyond aiming for conclusive proof, at the least where philosophical inquiry is focused on questions of value. It then shows how poetry cultivates an intellectual virtue essential to philosophy aimed at uncovering equilibria and collective understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper distinguishes three major themes in the philosophy of death of the Zhuangzi. It shows that, while these themes are often intertwined in the text, they offer different outlooks on the nature of death and, correspondingly, different arguments about the significance of death and strategies for coping with death. The first sees death as a natural and inevitable part of the process of cosmic transformation that we have to accept or embrace. The second emphasizes the unity, continuity and interdependence of life and death, and advises us to appreciate death from this holistic perspective. The last strand of thought challenges our ability to know about death's nature and value. In addition, the paper reviews a few competing interpretations of the Zhuangzi in recent Anglophone literature and suggests that, first, they can be seen as attempts to articulate and develop different themes in the text, and second, they fail to offer a strong rational ground for the Zhuangist attitudes toward death, in part because they all rely on critical assumptions that are questionable or at least insufficiently defended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Priority Monism—the position that what is fundamental is one object, the Cosmos—has recently been brought to the fore by Jonathan Schaffer, who has put forward a variety of arguments in its favour. However, Priority Monism has been criticised on the grounds that junk—where for some structure to be junky is for every object in it to be a proper part of another object in the structure—is metaphysically possible. The aim of this paper is to investigate how the monist can deal with this problem. I argue they can successfully argue against junk's possibility, but their response leaves a new problem for monism (the problem of the possibility of weak junk). To address this problem, they need to develop a new version of Priority Monism, on which the Cosmos is identical to all its parts taken collectively. I denote this version of monism as Weak Priority Monism. Contra Schaffer, I think a Priority Monist can and should hold to the thesis that Composition is Identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

DeRose famously argued that, given that assertability varies with practical context, we cannot combine a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion with classical invariantism. The first aim of this paper is to show that De Rose's argument is ultimately unsuccessful. Second, I develop a view, entitled Assertion Functionalism, which combines the knowledge norm with classical invariantism and at the same time offers an appealing account of the intuitive variability of proper assertion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses a key moment in the development of sociology when its status as a science was criticised from within by ethnomethodologists (Harvey Sacks and Harold Garfinkel), post‐Althusserian Marxists (Barry Hindess) and Michel Foucault. These criticisms seemed to come from different sides, but they converged in arguing their positions from the point of view of a proper conception of science through which mainstream sociology was found wanting. Neither secured its own position and each had a similar legacy of a form of interpretivism hostile both to scientific sociology and its critical project. The paper situates this moment and its legacy where both correspondence and coherence criteria for sociological knowledge claims come to be undermined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents and examines the argument from divine hiddenness as an evidential argument. It argues that a key thought that motivates the argument, namely, that it's surprising that God's existence is not more obvious, does not alone secure the conclusion that divine hiddenness is evidence against God. The evidential problem of divine hiddenness is illustrated using Bayesian models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A common diagnostic for distinguishing between arguments and adjuncts is obligatoriness/optionality: as a rule of thumb, arguments are obligatory and adjuncts are optional. However, there are many examples of optional arguments, which have led researchers to question the usefulness of this diagnostic and sometimes even the very distinction between arguments and adjuncts. This paper aims to show that arguments are not simply optional; they are omissible only under identifiable grammatical and pragmatic conditions. By contrast, there are no conditions on when adjuncts can be omitted. There are instead pragmatic conditions that dictate the inclusion of adjuncts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A queue‐jumping argument concludes that some course of action is impermissible by likening it to the presumptively impermissible act of jumping a queue. Arguments of this sort may be found in a disparate range of contexts and in support of policies favoured by both left and right. Examples include arguments against private education and private health care but also arguments against accommodations for learning disabilities, refugee resettlement, and birthright citizenship. We infer that, although queue‐jumping arguments are strictly analogies, they constitute a sufficiently distinct class of arguments to justify their separate treatment. The paper proposes an argumentation scheme for queue‐jumping arguments and demonstrates its applicability to some existing arguments of this type. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to show that, if moral realism is true, all of our moral beliefs are unjustified. In this paper, I respond to two of the most enduring objections that have been raised against these arguments. The first objection claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are self‐undermining, because they cannot be formulated without invoking epistemic principles, and epistemic principles are just as vulnerable to debunking as our moral beliefs. I argue that this objection suffers from several defects, the most serious of which is that it has the unpalatable consequence that we should never revise our moral beliefs in response to evidence that our capacity for normative cognition is globally impaired. The second objection, which comes to us from Katia Vavova, claims that evolutionary debunking arguments are doomed to fail, because they attempt to show that our moral beliefs are unreliable without making any assumptions about the nature of morality, and this is impossible. I argue, to the contrary, that the etiological higher‐order evidence cited by debunking arguments can give us good reason to think that our moral beliefs are unreliable, even if we make no assumptions about what morality is like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the view that tropes can change, and so are not individuated by their determinate qualitative characters. On the view I have in mind, a trope is at any given time fully determinate, but can change qualitatively within the bounds set by a determinable essence. A charge trope, for example, must at any time have some exact intensity, but can survive changes in intensity. My argument, roughly, is this: Objects can change, and tropes are the parts of objects that change (in a special sense of 'part'), so tropes can change too. After some preliminaries, I present the argument carefully and discuss the operant notions. I then discuss each premise in turn. I respond to the charge that the view isn't realist, and to objections based on identity‐conditions for tropes. I describe both substratum‐ and bundle‐theoretic versions of the view, and finally, show what the view buys us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inner product arguments allow a prover to prove that the inner product of two committed vectors equals a public scalar. They are used to reduce the complexity of many cryptographic primitives, such as range proofs. Range proofs are deployed in numerous applications to prove that a committed value lies in a certain range. As core building blocks, their complexity largely determines the performance of corresponding applications. In this paper, we have optimised the inner product argument with statement including two vector commitments (IPAtvc) and range proof of Daza et al. (PKC'20), the inner product argument with statement including only one vector commitment (IPAovc) of Bünz et al. (S&P′18). For IPAtvc, we reduce the concrete communication complexity by 2 log2n field elements, where n is the vector dimension. For range proofs, we reduce the concrete communication and prover complexities by about 2 log2m field elements and 11m field multiplications, respectively, where m is the bit length of range. For IPAovc, we exponentially reduce the asymptotic verifier complexity from linear to logarithmic. Due to the asymptotic characteristics, our protocols are highly competitive when the vector dimension or bit length of range is large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

However, while the existence of horrendous evils has generally been taken to be evidence against the existence of God, some philosophers have suggested that it may be evidence I for i the existence of God. I Horrendous i evils constitute a unique class of evils which presumably poses a stronger objection to the existence of omni-God than other classes of evils. In recent years, much of the debate within the philosophy of religion has focused on the problem of I horrendous i evils. Relatedly, supposing that you think that the arguments do I not i point towards an omni-God, how could a proponent of the omni-God thesis revise or develop the arguments such that the arguments would point towards an omni-God?. [Extracted from the article]

In this paper, a number of lines of argument buttress and support the contention that Dirty Hands is a comparatively undervalued part of the Sartrean oeuvre. Using commentary from Bell and Pellauer, and employing categories relevant also to the work of Beauvoir and Camus, the paper comes to the conclusion that Hugo, as the central character of the play, is an exemplary Sartrean protagonist, and that the play is worthy of more attention than it has received. An important part of the central assertion is that the play is as critical a part of the Sartrean dramatic canon as The Flies and No Exit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While many have argued that moral disagreement poses a challenge to moral knowledge, the precise nature of this challenge is controversial. Indeed, in the moral epistemology literature, there are many different versions of 'the' argument from moral disagreement to moral scepticism. This paper contributes to this vast literature on moral disagreement by arguing for two theses: 1. All (or nearly all) moral disagreement arguments share an underlying structure; and, 2. All moral disagreement arguments that satisfy this underlying structure cannot establish moral scepticism because this underlying structure leads to a previously unrecognized reductio ad absurdum. In short, I argue that this reductio argument (very likely) refutes all versions of the moral disagreement to moral scepticism argument in one fell swoop. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the evolution of evaluation of advocacy and its alignment with different parties' interests in rigor, participation, and usefulness. We then explore responses to our paper, No Royal Road: Finding and Following the Natural Pathways of Advocacy Evaluation, which sought to reframe advocacy evaluation concepts and analytic frames in ways that take into account the complex contexts in which advocacy takes place. We suggest that a narrow conception of power is acting as a fundamental barrier to evaluation approaches that enable and support transformative advocacy. The article concludes with an argument to fully embrace complexity and power issues, noting that this points to radically different implications for future evaluation practices. This argument is, in many ways, anti‐paradigmatic to the current evaluation field, but it draws on a thread of thinking going back to the pioneers in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the agent concerned to have accurate (outright) beliefs will have a consistent and multi‐premise closed belief set, and not a (merely) single‐premise closed and (merely) pairwise consistent belief set, as has often been thought. This argument rests on the fact that we need a notion of accuracy coherence for belief that is belief‐sensitive; sensitive to one's perspective, in a way that the standard belief‐insensitive notion of accuracy coherence is not. The choice of the belief‐sensitive over belief‐insensitive notion is defended, as is the choice of this particular belief‐sensitive kind of accuracy coherence over other belief‐sensitive rivals. Our conclusion is that accurate believers are deductively cogent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the Timing Argument, death is not bad for the individual who dies, because there is no time at which it could be bad for her. Defenders of the badness of death have objected to this influential argument, typically by arguing that there are times at which death is bad for its victim. In this paper, I argue that a number of these writers have been concerned with quite different formulations of the Timing Argument. Further, and more importantly, I show that their objections to the Timing Argument fail as attempts to refute the argument in its most challenging form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]