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This paper examines the state of the art of the Brexit negotiations in the area of financial services. It uses a two‐level game model to first explain the positions of UK and EU negotiators on the basis of the domestic constraints they face, and second, to consider the scope for final agreement based on the 'win‐set' of both sides. The paper analyses the preferences and power of three main groups of players within the UK and EU: the political authorities, financial regulators, and the financial industry. We argue that the scope for agreement on financial services has been severely hampered by political and regulatory constraints which forced UK and EU negotiators to adopt early hawkish negotiating positions, and by the absence of a unified position from the financial industry. After the 2017 general election, the position of the UK government and UK financial industry briefly converged, thereby narrowing the domestic win‐set, but also increasing the scope for agreement. However, the July 2018 'Chequers' deal represents a hardening of the UK government's position on financial services. We argue that this reflects the fact that the twin pressures facing UK negotiators—acute political constraints at home and bargaining weakness in Brussels—has become more, not less, acute over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Brexit referendum of 2016 brought a new concept to British politics, namely the 'people's will', one that is seemingly at odds with conventional notions of parliamentary sovereignty, even a threat to its very existence. This article argues that although the device of the referendum is relatively new, the kind of popular control over Parliament and the executive that it invokes has long been a part of British politics. Ranging over 200 years, examples are drawn from the recall and deselection of MPs, mass petitioning campaigns, the role of the Speaker, and the flourishing of independent parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Scottish and European Questions have become intertwined over time. A European turn in Scottish politics became evident from the late 1980s when public opinion moved in favour of the European Communities/Union. The Scottish National Party (SNP) became a leading advocate of EC/EU membership with Europe's four freedoms allowing it to dismiss accusations of separatism. Scotland voted in favour of Remain in the Brexit referendum, adding to existing tensions in UK‐Scottish government relations. The institutions and procedures of intergovernmental relations which were designed to cope with tensions are being tested as never before under devolution. The assertion of UK power in these relations has undermined claims made by David Cameron to pursue a 'respect agenda' and commitments made immediately after the independence referendum. But while this evidence of divergent views on such a significant matter creates potential challenges for the UK union, it also creates new challenges for the SNP. The prospect of a hard Brexit raises the issue of separatism once more, with a choice of either remaining in the EU but separate from the rest of the UK (rUK), or remain in a separatist UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides a preliminary assessment of the impact of the Brexit process—from the June 2016 referendum to June 2018—on the British political system. Drawing on the classic work of Arend Lijphart and the ensuing scholarship applying the Westminster model to Britain, it seeks to understand whether and to what extent Brexit has impacted on the majoritarian features of the system. Adapting Lijphart's criteria, it focuses on the electoral‐party dimension, the executive–legislative relations and the territorial power‐sharing arrangements. It argues that Brexit has brought to light several intertwined tensions that had been brewing inside British politics over the course of a number of years, and which are likely to continue unfolding for several years to come. Even if emerging trends tend to be fragile, complex, even contradictory, and the current uncertainty makes any long(er)‐term assessment futile, recent developments appear to signal a possible strengthening of the executive over the legislature and of the central over the devolved administrations, thus consolidating the majoritarian traits of the British political system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on result of British referendum's membership decision with European Union and its impact on single European financial market. Topics discussed include implications of Brexit for Great Britain and its financial industry, safeguards security given by the British government for European Union (EU), and responsiveness on international financial crisis. It further discusses British influence on EU financial regulation, support from Brexit campaign, and integration of the single market.

The article provides information on Eurozone Governance in 2016 and its association with Italian Banking Crisis, Fiscal Flexibility and Brexit. Topics discussed include considerable uncertainties aroused due to Great Britain's referendum vote to leave the European Union (EU), political developments in Greece and Italy, and conciliatory approach of international creditors. It further presents information on establishment of privatization fund for selling state assets, debt relief, and political agreement.

What should be the position of democrats in response to the Brexit referendum? Many urge a duty to accept the result. This article argues the contrary. If someone is a UK citizen, has a belief that leaving the European Union will be damaging to the common good of the UK and is a convinced democrat, then that person has a duty to oppose Brexit. Neither of the two principal reasons for accepting the result-a claim of popular sovereignty or of parliamentary sovereignty-imply a duty not to continue to oppose. Arguments from political equality for simple majority rule do not apply when the alternatives are ill defined. More generally, popular sovereignty presupposes and does not replace constitutional democracy, and in a parliamentary democracy there is always a continuing right to oppose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the EU referendum we've been obsessed with the 'new fault lines' in British politics - at the expense, Sarah Birch suggests, of the mobilisational aspect of the vote. Turnout was high, young people were engaged and energised - and if these new voters return to the ballot box, they may change the complexion of UK politics for a generation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

John Curtice sketches out the polling data on the EU referendum question, and finds a nation divided. With the prime minister's negotiation demands now in the open, he asks, has Cameron set the bar too low to secure the support of his own party and his voters? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the inter-related debates over Britain's relationship with the EU and that over the future of the UK. It argues that euroscepticism and Scottish independence are based on exceptionalist identities that now revolve around economic policy. Elite euroscepticism cleaves to a neoliberal vision of minimalist regulation, while advocates of Scottish independence claim Westminster's austerity policies make the British Union incompatible with social democracy. However, this presentation of the choice facing British voters ignores the serious contradictions that overhauling the current order entails. Both forms of exceptionalism fail to recognize the significant limitations of self-government outside and within the EU. If Conservatives can contain their neoliberal flirtation with EU withdrawal they are very well placed to prosper electorally. The dilemma of which union(s) to choose might thus constitute the prelude to the entrenchment of the economic and political order that gave rise to such contestation in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]