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This document is a collection of papers and presentations from a symposium on the decolonial turn and the future of psychology education. The symposium discusses the problems with Western-centric psychology and the harm it causes to marginalized communities. It calls for the inclusion of locally grounded knowledge and the dismantling of colonial hegemony in psychology. The papers cover topics such as the criminalization of LGBTQ+ identities, the construction of knowledge in textbooks, teaching decolonially in India, and the impact of colonialism on psychology education in the Caribbean. The symposium emphasizes the importance of inclusivity, critical thinking, and pluralism in the future of psychology. Another paper explores the relationship between dietary choices, justice sensitivity, and aggression permissiveness. It suggests that individuals who follow a plant-based diet and have a high sensitivity to justice are less likely to tolerate aggression. The study highlights the need to consider both dietary choices and justice sensitivity in understanding aggression. Additionally, a study examines the decision-making process of forced Ukrainian migrants in choosing temporary asylum. It defines implicit competence as the ability to solve problems under uncertainty and sheds light on the factors influencing migrants' choices. Lastly, a study analyzes how the Philippine government communicates about the COVID-19 pandemic. It finds that the government uses anchoring, objectification, and metaphors to convey the seriousness of the situation and encourage compliance with protocols. The study emphasizes how those in power shape discourses to support their interests. [Extracted from the article]

Political accountability requires that voters understand the distribution of policy outcome responsibility among their vote choice options. Research on partisan‐motivated reasoning suggests that voters do not meet this requirement. The problem is that voters condition their attributions of responsibility to the government on their party identification. Government identifiers credit the government for desirable outcomes and blame external forces such as the global economy for undesirable outcomes. This paper draws a more optimistic conclusion. It argues that focusing on the perceived responsibility of the government and external forces is not sufficient for understanding whether voters meet the responsibility attribution requirement. It is also necessary to compare the perceived responsibility of government parties to the perceived responsibility of opposition parties because those are the options that voters get to choose from. This party distribution of perceived responsibility is analyzed with original survey data from Denmark and the United Kingdom. The results demonstrate that while party identification does indeed condition voters' responsibility attributions, both government identifiers and independents attribute systematically more responsibility to the government than to the opposition regardless of the desirability of the outcome. This suggests that voters tend to meet the responsibility attribution requirement of accountability despite the presence of partisan‐motivated reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Various research have been directed towards investigating the behaviour of political parties engaging in attacks. However, this topic has predominantly been studied in campaigning venues while focusing only on the attacker (parties that are attacking). This study contributes to the existing literature by (i) studying attack behaviour in the parliamentary venue, and (ii) analysing the interactions between both the attacker and the target. To this end, this paper uses longitudinal data on attacks during question time sessions in the parliaments (2010 to 2020) of Belgium, Croatia and the United Kingdom. More specifically, I investigate the conditions that make parties engage in mutual attacks. These conditions can be characterised along three dimensions: time (proximity to elections), status (government vs. opposition), and ideology (close vs. distant). The results confirm the overarching argument that: (i) more attacks in parliaments happen closer to election day; (ii) opposing parties are more likely to attack the government rather than vice‐versa; (iii) governing parties equally attack the opposition and themselves; and finally, (iv) the larger the ideological distance between parties, the more likely attacks happen (with mainstream parties engaging equally in attack behaviour compared to radical parties). As such, these findings contribute to our understanding of attack strategies between parties in regular day‐to‐day politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In January of 2015 Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at the newly built extravagant and highly controversial presidential palace. Sixteen warriors representing all of the former Turkic empires in full costume were present at the welcoming ceremony. This paper uses Volkan's psycho‐political framework to understand state‐led efforts of historical revisionism which manifest itself in historical glories and nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire. The central argument posits that grandiose or mega projects strategically serve historical revisionism in Turkey, amplifying selected glories of Turkish society to bolster support for authentic and national narrative, known as "yerli ve milli (domestic and national)" [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the ongoing challenges to academic freedom in Turkey, site of the 2011 ISPP meeting and a then‐burgeoning cadre of political psychologists working to build the discipline in Turkey. In January 2016, the Academics for Peace signed a petition challenging the government's policies towards the Kurds, following which the government began to purge both signatories and other academics. The purge gained traction after the July 2016 attempted coup, which the government put down. Academics and others were dismissed by decree (KHK) and barred from working in any occupation. This paper, a revised version of the 2019 ISPP Presidential Address, discusses the scope of the attack on academic freedom in Turkey and reports on a survey of both dismissed and nondismissed academics in Turkey to discuss the implications of being unexpectedly torn from a position that is as much a calling as it is a job. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses articles in the issue on topics including neoliberalism in the economy and politics of western democracies, anti‐immigration and anti‐Islamic right, and failure of capitalism to sustain equal and sustainable societies.

This article traces the presence and absence of Frantz Fanon in the field of social and political psychology. Our work is guided by an assemblage of methods— a critical analysis of mainstream scholarship, a collective interrogation with a transnational gathering of colleagues and friends, and a deep reading of Fanon's texts on struggle, internalized oppression, violence and a new humanism. Through this, our paper is a call for radical disciplinary reflection on why Fanon has been ruthlessly exiled from social/political psychology, the potential his writings hold for courses, scholarship, and struggle, and how we might more boldly theorize, as he did, from within the fire of struggles for justice and liberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of political polarization, in both its ideological and its affective expressions, has garnered significantly more interest over the last years. But despite recent research on the conceptualization, measurement, causes, and consequences of this socio‐political phenomenon, and some tentative interventions to mitigate it, relevant new avenues remain surprisingly underdeveloped. Indeed, scholarship in the field of political polarization, mainly in the case of affective polarization, frequently uses cognitivist approaches to make sense of the growing antipathy between different social and political groups. However, the bulk of this work seems to overlook valuable insights into the psychology of intergroup conflict, stereotyping, prejudice reduction, and discourse studies. The aim of this paper is to underline the main gaps in the political polarization literature, to subsequently argue how knowledge linked to the tradition of critical social psychology can help in filling them. Ultimately, the article aims to contribute to the psychosocial study of political polarization and to the design, if necessary, of interventions to counter its detrimental consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When advocating for policy change, coalitions rely on various elements and strategies of policy narratives, including emotions. However, past research on the Narrative Policy Framework, and more broadly on the policy process, has largely ignored the role of emotions. This paper argues that emotions, such as anger and fear, are central to how coalitions advocate for policy change. It explores the role of anger and fear in policy narratives by examining the oral testimony (n = 474) given over four legislative committee hearings in March 2019 concerning Colorado Senate Bill 19‐181. This bill changed the mission of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to prioritize protecting the environment and public health over oil and gas development. This research finds the coalition that successfully supported the bill used anger towards the oil and gas industry, while those that opposed the bill relied more on fear of the uncertain consequences of the bill. It also finds the coalition that opposed the bill relied on self‐characterization as heroes and victims, which was a failed strategy. The implications for this research on the Narrative Policy Framework and, more broadly, for the policy process and advocacy are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we examined the psychometric properties of cross‐cultural validation and replicability (i.e. measurement invariance) of the Belief in a Zero‐Sum Game (BZSG) scale, measuring antagonistic belief about interpersonal relations over scarce resources. The factorial structure of the BZSG scale was investigated in student samples from 36 countries (N = 9907), using separate confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) for each country. The cross‐cultural validation of the scale was based on multigroup confirmatory factor analyses (MGCFA). The results confirmed that the scale had a one‐factor structure in all countries, in which configural and metric invariance between countries was confirmed. As a zero‐sum belief about social relations perceived as antagonistic, BZSG is an important factor related to, for example, social and international relations, attitudes toward immigrants, or well‐being. The paper proposes different uses of the BZSG scale for cross‐cultural studies in different fields of psychology: social, political, or economic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we develop a conceptual and methodological approach that psychologists and other social scientists can employ to study emergence. We consider relevant social psychological approaches and conclude that, for the most part, social psychology has tended to focus on processes of normalisation following disruptions, rather than examining emergence in itself. An exception to this is G. H. Mead, whose work we draw on to theorise emergence with a focus on contemporary "affective politics." In the second part of the paper, we use focus group data on the European Union referendum in the UK to empirically illustrate our theoretical points. We discuss in particular three axes for exploring the emergent politics of Brexit: political values, political authority, and the authority of affect. We conclude our discussion by reflecting on some of the theoretical and political implications of our analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivated reasoning occurs when judgements subserve motives that go beyond accuracy seeking. Substantial evidence indicates that motivated political reasoning is ubiquitous. This is hard to reconcile with computational theories (following Marr's terminology, theories describing the fundamental principles underlying a cognitive process) like Bayesian inference, because these rely on accuracy maximization. Hence, motivated political reasoning is often interpreted as violating computational principles. Here we propose a different view by offering a computational account of motivated political reasoning which relies on the notion of Bayesian decision (instead of Bayesian inference). The key idea is that utility maximization, and not accuracy maximization, drives political thinking. This implies that agents will tend to endorse judgements that serve their instrumental goals even when evidence in support is poor (though agents will still believe their judgements are the most accurate). In this framework, motivated political reasoning is not interpreted as violating computational principles, although its nature is now conceived as pragmatic (i.e., serving instrumental goals) rather than epistemic (i.e., seeking understanding). The paper presents a mathematical description of the theory and shows how this can help interpreting important phenomena in political psychology such contextual priming, stereotyping, and displaced aggression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While attention has been given to understanding support for the far‐right, there is a lack of focus on the way in which a threat of the far‐right can be used for political ends. This paper addresses this using the UK Brexit debate as an illustration. The question therefore is: What is talk about the far‐right used to do in discussions about Brexit? A discursive psychological approach addresses a sample of newspaper reports containing both 'Far‐Right' and 'Brexit', from the first quarter of 2019 (n = 45). The analysis identifies a range of uses of talk about the far‐right: (1) An opponent of Brexit is called a Nazi by pro‐Brexit protesters, who are labelled far‐right; (2) A lack of Brexit is presented as fuel for the far‐right; (3) Remain supporters reject the idea that a lack of Brexit fuels the far‐right; (4) A link with the far‐right is rejected by a prominent Brexit supporter; and (5) Support for Brexit is again linked with the far‐right. The far‐right can be used as a strategic tool by opposing sides of the Brexit debate and – significantly – the supposed threat of the far‐right can be used to placate far‐right ideas, rather than to genuinely challenge them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: The C19PRC study aims to assess the impact of the COVID‐19 pandemic in the adult population of the UK, Republic of Ireland, and Spain. This paper describes the conduct of the first two waves of the UK survey (the "parent" strand of the Consortium) during March–April 2020. Methods: A longitudinal, internet panel survey was designed to assess: (1) COVID‐19 related knowledge, attitudes, and behaviors; (2) the occurrence of common mental health disorders as well as the role of (3) psychological factors and (4) social and political attitudes, in influencing the public's response to the pandemic. Quota sampling (age, sex, and household income) was used to recruit a nationally representative sample of adults. Results: Two thousand and twenty five adults were recruited at baseline, and 1406 were followed‐up one‐month later (69.4% retention rate). The baseline sample was representative of the UK population in relation to economic activity, ethnicity, and household composition. Attrition was predicted by key socio‐demographic characteristics, and an inverse probability weighting procedure was employed to ensure the follow‐up sample was representative of the baseline sample. Conclusion: The C19PRC study data has strong generalizability to facilitate and stimulate interdisciplinary research on important public health questions relating to the COVID‐19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued that far‐right (FR) populism in the West is fuelled by inequality. In this paper, we argue that three social psychological processes are central to explaining these phenomena. We suggest that these processes are recursive although we do not specify their temporal order. Drawing on the social identity tradition, we first examine how inequality is linked to reduced social trust and cohesion, which has consequences for both low‐ and high‐income groups. We examine the known effects of perceived threat in amplifying tensions between groups and consolidating identity positions. Second, we argue that national identity consolidation is a particularly likely response to inequality, which, in turn, reduces tolerance of cultural diversity as an associated consequence. Finally, we consider the value of these strengthened national identities to those who harness them effectively to gain political ground. In this way, those who offer FR populist rhetoric aligned with nationalism can blame immigrants, "foreign" powers, and mainstream politics for both the lack of social cohesion and reduced economic circumstances of many. We conclude that FR populist leaders not only tap into the negative social consequences of inequality, their policy positions also fail to address and may even compound the situation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we propose a culturalist interpretation of the outcome of the Brexit referendum. This interpretation is grounded on the analysis of the U.K.'s cultural milieu, which is part of a more general study of the cultural milieus of several European countries. Specific to the United Kingdom, our analysis is based on a questionnaire carried out on a representative sample of U.K. respondents stratified by sociodemographic variables and geographic region (NUTS1). Responses to the questionnaire were subjected to multidimensional analysis—a combination of multiple correspondence analysis and cluster analysis. Findings about the multicountry analysis show how cultural milieus are characterized by five basic, embodied, affect‐laden, generalized worldviews (defined as "Symbolic Universes"). Four out of five symbolic universes consist of a way of interpreting reality by a specific anchorage (i.e., the ethical norm, the institutional order, the emotional experience interpersonal bond, and the belongingness). One symbolic universe can be viewed as the anomic reaction to the failure of those anchorages. Focusing on Brexit, by means of a discriminant analysis, it is showed how the incidence of the symbolic universes (and of the underpinning basic dimensions of meaning within the 12 U.K. macroregions') enables to identify differentially the macroregions with high proportion of "leave" at the Brexit referendum against those with low proportion. More specifically, the high "leave" macroregion are characterized by higher relevance of cultural forms anchored on local identity/belongingness. Findings are discussed within the wider aims of the project and its implications for a cultural psychology informed policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we look at the relationship between European identification and political support for (or opposition to) EU membership. First, we argue that conceptualizing political attitudes towards the EU as a direct product of European identification (a) neglects the distinction between the social reality of Europe and the political reality of the EU and (b) leads to psychological reductionism. We propose that the relationship should instead be conceptualized as mediated by legitimacy perceptions and as moderated by social‐level variables. Second, we look at three spheres of European integration and propose that their perceived legitimacy is appraised through the following principles: (a) normative solidarity for wealth sharing, (b) political authority for sharing political decisions, and (c) collective self‐realization for the sharing of practices. We illustrate the key mediating role of those principles by drawing on data from a survey ran across five European countries. Third, we argue that these meditational relationships are in turn moderated by social, political, and ideological realities and illustrate this point by looking at the case of United Kingdom in the context of the EU membership referendum. We point to an ideological assumption in the U.K. political landscape about the illegitimacy of EU supranational decision making and argue that this contributed to shape both the debate of the referendum campaign and its result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disruptions and transformations wrought by globalization have been momentous for political psychology, requiring more than ever a global outlook that integrates across disciplines and connects local understandings from regions and different states. Our vision is to build on the success of I Political Psychology i in providing a platform for high-impact research that spans the disciplines of psychology and political science, with innovative theories that have worthwhile applications. We look forward to working together with our editors, editorial board, and executive committee and getting feedback on our ideas from authors, readers, and ISPP members. [Extracted from the article]

Abstract: When there are politically polarizing events taking place in the world, can it be useful for a therapist to disclose his or her political views within the context of a psychotherapeutic dyad? This paper examines this question through the example of a Marxist therapist working with a politically conservative patient in the polarized political atmosphere following Donald Trump's election to the Presidency of the United States. Also explored are the patient's dynamics that might have made it particularly salient for the therapist to eschew a more neutral stance. The theoretical and technical bases for this disclosure are examined via the Affect Theory of Silvan S. Tomkins as well as the Person‐Centered Therapy of Carl Rogers. The family history of the patient is examined to further understand the context in which the political/therapeutic interactions take place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Popular accounts of populist movements often point to negative emotions as a key motivating factor underlying their support. However, little systematic research has been devoted to examining differences in how distinct negative emotions affect levels of populism among voters. This paper attempts to fill this gap by focusing on the influence of the two emotions most frequently connected to populism in political commentary: fear and anger. Informed by appraisal theories of emotions, we hypothesize that populist attitudes are driven by feelings of anger, rather than fear. Using a three-wave online panel survey of Spanish citizens between 2014 and 2016, we find that anger expressed over the economic crisis is consistently associated with variations in support for populism both between individuals and over time, whereas no significant effects emerge for expressions of fear. We discuss the implications of these findings for understanding the nature of populist support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Positioned within the multidisciplinary scholarly fields of political psychology, our analysis follows an interdisciplinary approach, linking the study of EU images (from international relations (IR), political science and EU Studies) to the notion of conceptual metaphors (cognitive linguistics). Our research uses a novel empirical tool - a four-tiered model of conceptual metaphors (Zhabotynska, 2011) to assess how meanings are formed in the construction of EU images in third countries. Using a case-study of Australian and New Zealand elites, the paper contributes to EU foreign policy scholarship through the description of a systematic algorithm for tracing the 'mapping of emotions' towards the EU from beyond its borders. Metaphors are understood as a cognitive device for translating emotions, but empirical analysis of emotions is nascent in IR studies. Assessing EU external images over time in an empirically-informed and systematic way is a further novel contribution from this body of research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wealthy countries[1] have emitted over 50 percent of the global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that cause climate change.[2] The United States alone has contributed 25 percent of the world's emissions since 1751.[3] These wealthy nations continue to be major contributors to the climate change problem despite their capacity to reduce emissions and despite knowledge of the widespread - potentially catastrophic - impacts of climate change.[4] Given their wealth and ability to curb emissions, I assume that wealthy high emitters do wrong by their emitting. Importantly, there is no direct and horizontal relation between any citizen and the victims of climate change (V).[86] Rather, each citizen has an obligation to underwrite the expenses of their nation and are only indirectly related to the victims of climate change to whom their nation owes reparations. Indeed, I will argue below that citizens of high-emitting nations are in a vertical moral relationship with their nation in the form of a duty to underwrite the costs their nations incur. II THE FAIRNESS OBJECTION The FO charges that holding a nation responsible for climate change is unfair to individual members of the nation on the grounds that individuals will be held responsible for the misdeeds of others.[17] The argument is familiar from broader criticisms of collective responsibility. Like most climate change ethicists who defend national responsibility for climate change, proponents of the FO assume - usually without argument - that a nation's responsibility is simply the sum of the responsibility of its members and that holding nations responsible just is to hold their members responsible. [Extracted from the article]

The paper analyzes the link between personality traits and attitudes of Swiss citizens toward equal opportunities for immigrants. In particular, we examine the extent to which this relationship is moderated by the socio-structural context. We test the assumption that the direct links between personality traits and attitudes toward equal opportunities are strengthened by perceived ethnic diversity. Based on our empirical analyses, we are able to replicate central findings of the research on personality traits and attitudes toward immigrants for the Swiss context. While openness toward experience and agreeableness are positively related to a preference for equal opportunities, conscientiousness is negatively linked to these attitudes. Furthermore, our results reveal that the link between conscientiousness and attitudes toward equal opportunities is significantly moderated by the perceived share of foreigners in the neighborhood. This finding is especially relevant for future research on the effects of personality traits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we show how discursive psychology can be used to show how 'facts' are used rhetorically by politicians. That is, they are more than neutral reflections of an objective reality—these 'facts' are highly attuned to the local context of political argumentation. We draw upon examples from two studies that used discursive psychology to analyse two different political contexts: (1) Islamophobia in the wake of the Charlie Hebdo attack and (2) debates over Great Britain and the European Union. In both contexts, the analysis uncovers how politicians challenge both the context and the relevance of a fact. The context of 'facts' is reconstructed to undermine their original argumentative strength, whereas questioning the relevance of a 'fact' undermines it both as fact and as a rhetorical tool to be used in a debate. These findings show how discursive psychology can contribute to knowledge about political communication, as well as the benefits of applying discursive psychology to political discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses articles in the issue on topics including relationship between analytical psychology and the political world; and role of sacralisation and de-sacralisation and introduces the concept of a feeling-level politics.

DEMOCRACY AND THE DIGITAL PUBLIC SPHERE The public sphere performs three important functions in democracy.[3] The first function - opinion formation - is to facilitate the circulation of information used by citizens to form their political opinions and take positions on public matters. By new authoritarian forces we mean groups, leaders, or parties that seek to promote authoritarian, autocratic, or patrimonial regimes "within" the framework of constitutional democracy (Hanson & Kopstein, [30]). But this has also been a deliberate strategy of Trump and other populist authoritarians within electoral democracies. The dangers of false information for democracy are doubled when the substance of that information are false claims about democratic procedures themselves, for example, the belief voter fraud is rampant or the claim that Trump really won the election. [Extracted from the article]

This article brings, for the first time, two of the most pivotal distinctions in nationalism studies into extended dialogue: the civic–ethnic distinction (CED) and the nationalism–patriotism distinction (NPD). By reviewing both the evolution of those distinctions over the previous decades and the ways in which they have been used in quantitative empirical research, we argue that the CED's evolution has been a partial success story, whereas discourse around the NPD has not seen substantial development. Despite lingering inconsistencies, researchers drawing on the CED have been successful in addressing different lines of critique and in using the CED as a heuristic for investigating notions of nationhood as expressed in public perceptions. In contrast, there has been only limited dialogue between theoretical and empirical approaches to the NPD. The article illustrates how research drawing on the NPD could profit from the CED's evolution. We close by providing a conceptual roadmap to guide the path towards more terminological clarity and to construct more theoretically robust measures for nationalism and patriotism. We specifically suggest that nationalism and patriotism should be consistently understood as ideal types that citizens can simultaneously hold to varying degrees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does exposure to conflict events shape social trust? Research in political psychology predicts that conflict exacerbates group divisions, enhancing ingroup solidarities while simultaneously reducing outgroup trust. Experimental research has found support for these predictions, and yet measuring the impact of conflict on trust beyond the laboratory is difficult. For example, questions about the lasting salience of experimental treatments remain a challenge in the study of conflict. We develop an empirical strategy using geo-coded individual-level survey data from the Afrobarometer project and geo-coded conflict-event data. We draw spatial and temporal buffers around each survey respondent that allow us to test whether proximate exposure to conflict events correlates with lower social trust, as well as how far and long that salience lasts. We find that exposure to conflict reduces generalized and outgroup trust, as predicted. Contrary to our expectations, we find that it reduces ingroup trust. We investigate further and find that ingroup trust suffers most when respondents live in homogenous ethnic enclaves. Furthermore, we advance an argument that the effects of exposure to conflict are mitigated over distance and time. Our results indicate that the effect diminishes over both time and space. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People are motivated to maintain consistency between importantly held identities, preferences, and judgments. In political contexts, motivated reasoning can help explain a wide range of political phenomena, including extremism, polarization, and misperceptions. However, recent findings in psychology have challenged this account. These perspectives emphasize the role of cognitive sophistication (e.g., analytical reasoning, numerical literacy) in political attitudes, but differ in terms of whether it is expected to attenuate or exacerbate politically motivated reasoning and belief in conspiracy theories. Yet prior investigations have not examined the relative and independent effects of both political and cognitive sophistication. Using data from two samples, including one sampled to approximate representativeness in the U.S., we demonstrate that both types of sophistication have independent and (at times) countervailing effects on belief in COVID‐19 conspiracy theories and other political attitudes. Our results are critical for theories of cognitive sophistication, political cognition, and attitudes, and the psychology of conspiracy theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Forms of religious fundamentalism, which are taken to include religious groups as diverse as the Christian Right in the USA, Salafi Islam in the Middle East, Africa and Europe, and Haredi Judaism in Israel and North America, are considered responsible for a litany of problems in the world. This alone, though, is not sufficient for Christian fundamentalist belief, although these beliefs may make one a I traditional i Christian.[5] One must also believe that these propositions put one in good relationship with God, that the "fundamentals" of Christianity should be the basis for Christian practice, and most distinctively for fundamentalist belief, that people and forces that disagree with the "fundamentals" are to be opposed. Since fundamentalism holds that certain propositions ought to be believed, and since the more certainly they are believed the more secure fundamentalists will feel believing them, then an aim of fundamentalism is to engage in forms of credence manipulation that strengthen one's fundamentalist beliefs. Since religious fundamentalism arises in relation to religious systems, then one cannot hold religious fundamentalist beliefs about just any matter - the propositional content of fundamentalist beliefs must be salient to a religious system. As such, believing particular propositions is at the core of what it is to be a fundamentalist, and since such beliefs are formed through trusting the testimony of others, especially leaders within the group, then fundamentalist belief is inherently social.[7] I want to suggest three components to the social environment in which fundamentalist beliefs are acquired and retained. [Extracted from the article]

People with different worldviews may have different interpretations for the same object. Freedom fighters for some are terrorists for others; immigrants can be seen as a threat or being threatened. To incorporate differences in interpretations into quantitative models, I propose the construct of value‐instantiating beliefs, or perceived consequences of actions for basic human values. I hypothesize that these beliefs moderate the relationship between personal values and attitudes. In a preregistered mixed‐methods study (N = 2038) I assess personal value priorities, attitudes, and perceived consequences of four political behaviours. Beliefs about consequences of the behaviours differed with political affiliation: for example, liberals saw voting for Trump in light of negative consequences for universalistic values, while conservatives stressed positive consequences for self‐direction and security. The moderation hypothesis was confirmed. Including value‐instantiating beliefs in the models significantly improved the predictions of attitudes towards and intentions to perform the behaviours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"Conspiracy theory" is widely used as a pejorative term. Moreover, precisely in cases where a conspiracy theory could be the right one there may be no relevant established authority to adjudicate because conspiracy theory is not - at least as things currently stand - a domain with recognized epistemic authorities! 2 Räikkä, for instance, stipulates that "explanations that refer to conspiracies and are official wisdom are not conspiracy theories": "Official explanations can (a) be theories and (b) refer to conspiracies, but they cannot be conspiracy theories - unless they are official explanations of I wrong i authorities. Lance deHaven Smith notes that "the conspiracy-theory label was popularized as a pejorative term by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a propaganda program initiated in 1967.". [Extracted from the article]

The threat of COVID‐19 has triggered nationalism, prejudice and support for anti‐democratic political systems around the world. Authoritarianism—an individual's orientation toward social conformity and individual autonomy—shapes interpretations of and responses to threat. We drew on theories of authoritarianism and threat to propose that authoritarians and libertarians will interpret the threat of COVID‐19 in distinct ways. An online survey of 368 Scottish nationals was administered via the Prolific platform. Original measures of realistic and symbolic threat from COVID‐19 were included, along with an established measure of the authoritarian predisposition. Linear regression analyses showed that COVID‐19 was perceived primarily as a realistic threat to physical and material well‐being; however, authoritarians were more likely than others to interpret the novel coronavirus as a symbolic threat to their prevailing values. Our findings contribute to understanding the psychology of pandemic‐era attitudes and behaviours and provide insight into possible political consequences of the coronavirus threat. The results also demonstrate how considering authoritarians' subjective construal of threats can resolve questions in the authoritarianism and threat literature and advance theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Freud "struggled to understand and explain the fundamental nature of humankind, the biological bases for aggression and war and the psychological roots of destructive and self-destructive behavior and intent in both the individual and the group." Freud's thoughts about the inherent destructiveness of mankind and the inevitability of war are reflected in his writings on the Death Instinct (e.g., Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920), his Thoughts for the Times on War and Death (Freud, 1915), and his correspondence with Einstein (Freud, 1933). In London, Hanna Segal created an organization called the International Psychoanalysts for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Hanna Segal (1988) wrote: The existence of nuclear weapons and the prospect of nuclear war makes impossible either acceptance of death or symbolic survival [as through one's children and subsequent generations]. [Extracted from the article]

The present meta‐analysis summarizes the international basis of evidence regarding links between psychologically meaningful risk factors and political violence outcomes among adolescents and young adults. We synthesized 422 cross‐sectional effect sizes from 95 samples (67 index publications, 23 countries), using robust variance estimation. The results of seven longitudinal studies and one intervention study are discussed in a narrative manner. We detected significant effects for depression (r =.07, k = 10); empathy (r = −.16, k = 7); aggression (r =.24, k = 10); identification (r =.21, k = 30); relative group deprivation (r =.19, k = 11); realistic threat (r =.30, k = 27); symbolic threat (r =.28, k = 10); negative intergroup emotions (r =.25, k = 9); experiences of discrimination (r =.11, k = 12); dissatisfaction with the police, political actors, and institutions (r =.11, k = 32); and negative attitudes toward democracy (r =.17, k = 10). No significant effect was found for self‐esteem, intolerance of uncertainty, narcissism, or exposure to intergroup conflict. The reviewed longitudinal and intervention studies mainly confirm these cross‐sectional results. The script and our data are available in an open online repository. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how middle‐class identity is experienced and employed by traditional and neo‐middle‐class identifiers in India. The economically and socially heterogeneous middle‐class identifiers vote similarly, but we know very little about what they want out of politics. We focus on the subjective experiences of middle‐class identifiers, we theorize the expressive function of middle‐class identities, and we examine the socially and personally focused core values of traditional middle‐class identifiers and neo‐middle aspirers. We introduce the "Class as Social Identity" scale and analyze qualitative interviews with strong middle‐class identifiers (Study 1) and the 2006, 2012, and 2014 World Values Survey India segments (Study 2). The interviews show that upper middle class and lower middle class identifiers express similar socially focused values but different personally focused values. The WVS analyses show convergence of upper‐middle‐class and lower‐middle‐class identifiers on conservation and self‐transcendence in line with dominant political narratives and divergence on materialism, hedonism, and stimulation in line with their rising differences in income and every‐day life pressures. We discuss the significance of these findings for the understanding of the political function of middle‐class identities in India in the context of heightened Hindu nationalism and recent socioeconomic challenges aggravated by the COVID‐19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on public accountability is extensive but overwhelmingly focuses on accountability of organizations. Yet, accountability mechanisms can function properly only when individuals believe that they will be held accountable in the future. This article bridges that gap by translating and extending the psychological concept of "felt accountability" to the public administration scholarship. The particular context of accountability in public organizations requires us to integrate knowledge about (1) the diverse professional roles of public sector employees, (2) the saliency and authority of various and multiple account holders, and (3) the substance of the accountability demands. The current article integrates this contextual knowledge with an individual perspective on accountability. This effort represents an important contribution to public accountability literature, as it allows scholars to properly understand the consequences of psychological insights about accountability for the public sector, and to adequately translate psychological insights and recommendations to a public accountability context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few years, especially after the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. elections, there has been a surge in academic interest for misinformation and disinformation. Social, cognitive, and political scientists' work on these phenomena has focused on two main aspects: Individuals' (and by extension societies') vulnerability to misinformation;Factors and interventions that can increase individuals' (and societies') resistance to misinformation. In this article, we offer a critical review of the psychological research pertaining to these two aspects. Drawing on this review, we highlight an emerging tension in the relevant literature. Indeed, the current state of the art of the political misinformation literature reflects the combined operation of two opposing psychological constructs: excess gullibility on the one hand and excess vigilance on the other. We argue that this conceptualization is important in both advancing theories of individuals' and societies' vulnerability to misinformation and in designing prospective research programs. We conclude with proposing what, in our view, are the most promising avenues for future research in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of ethnocentrism was introduced by Gumplowicz in the 1870s, popularized by Sumner in the 1900s, and first investigated psychometrically by Adorno and colleagues in the 1940s. It has become a fundamental concept in the social sciences, but over the last several decades, its popularity and usage in political and social psychology have decreased. Recent events, such as the growing popularity of ethno‐nationalist and populist leaders and policies, show that ethnocentrism as a phenomenon has been resurging around the world. In addition, given its important explanatory power, an increasing number of political psychologists have started again to use the concept. This article presents an analysis of ethnocentrism reconceptualized as a hierarchical construct emanating from a strong sense of ethnic group self‐centeredness and self‐importance. It discusses the prevalence of ethnocentrism around the world, its conceptualization and measurement, and its theoretical underpinnings, supporting them with novel empirical research conducted with two abbreviated measures of ethnocentrism. The article argues that ethnocentrism ultimately stems from the need to strengthen one's own ethnic group at the expense of anyone who and anything that can weaken it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For instance, the reason Tea Party or Occupy protesters might be speaking inchoately is precisely that their I attitudes i are vague, patchy, or inconsistent. First, since objective standards about what makes a view good can float free from citizens' opinions about what meets these standards, might not rational reconstructions become I too i independent of citizens' self-understandings? Such outsourcing helps citizens engage in "democratic deliberation within", the "internal-reflective" aspect of deliberation in which individual citizens reflect on issues from the perspectives of other citizens. You might worry that even if reconstruction facilitates I rational i understanding and influence, it might nevertheless objectionably inhibit other kinds of understanding and influence, for instance by thwarting the persuasive power of certain kinds of inchoate political expression. Moreover, this points to an important interconnection among citizens' interests in influence, understanding, and respectful address: the kind of informal influence citizen deliberators have a legitimate interest in exercising is one that proceeds from an understanding of their perspective, and the relevant kind of "understanding" is one that is inflected with a moralized conception of them as interlocutors, as persons whose views are to be addressed, not merely explained. [Extracted from the article]

The critique of depoliticization is a central theme in agonistic political theory. Mouffe's second reply would be that certain instances of politicization can be justifiably excluded from the legitimate domain of politics on the grounds that they do not belong to the common symbolic space of the community (Mouffe, 2000, p. 13). Moreover, the depoliticization of the social has pejorative implications in Mouffe's political thinking because it allegedly leads to the artificial restriction of "other possibilities that have been repressed and that can be reactivated" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 18). THE POLITICAL AND MOUFFE'S CRITIQUE OF DEPOLITICIZATION Mouffe's political theory employs two fundamental notions which refer to different modes of human interactions: "the political" and "politics." As discussed in the work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau (2001), any principled distinction between legitimate political contestations and indisputable requirements of rationality is deemed problematic (Mouffe, 2000, pp. 135-136). [Extracted from the article]

In pursuing paths to methodological reform, many have drawn on the prolific work of American psychologist‐philosopher Paul Meehl. In 1996, the APA awarded both Meehl and controversial German‐British psychologist Hans Eysenck with Clinical Psychologists of the Century Awards. Two years earlier, they had both signed the "Mainstream Science on Intelligence" statement published in reaction to controversy over research on intelligence and race. To better understand Meehl's decision to include his name in that public statement, this article first explores the philosophy and politics of Karl Popper as it relates to the incompatible views of Meehl and Eysenck on the value of psychoanalysis. Despite their stark differences of opinion on psychoanalysis and psychometrics, Meehl and Eysenck shared a vision of scientific psychology with overlapping political values that, consequently, included a commitment to the liberties of race science. This article suggests that interrogating the politics and ethics of research is a crucial aspect of doing human science well, including improving its methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Analytical Psychology is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Research has identified variability in the way people see and understand privilege and their desire to address inequality. Generational and political ideological differences may be factors that shape such variability. Despite considerable inequality and a growing class system, to date, little research has been conducted in Australia to consider how people conceptualize these issues. Given this, the aim of this research was to explore how millennial Australian conservative voters conceptualize privilege. 10 semi‐structured interviews were conducted with millennial conservative party voters, and transcripts were analyzed thematically. Four themes were identified: (1) defining privilege (an advantage over others without effort); (2) comparisons: self to others (empathic downward comparisons saw participants identify qualities of their life that were privileged); (3) value tensions (tensions between participants political ideology and personal views) (4) disadvantage: individual or collective responsibility? (who and how inequality should be addressed). Combined, these themes revealed a highly contextual and nuanced conceptualization of privilege and how at times participants contested the conservative belief in meritocracy when empathically engaging in downward comparison of other's circumstances, recognizing some positions of disadvantage could not be remedied by individual effort. Findings contribute to understandings in political psychology regarding downward comparisons and meritocracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it mean to search for trust—the constitutive element of feeling ontologically secure—in the context of protracted conflict, trauma, and forced migration? This article addresses this key question in ontological security (OS) studies in International Relations (IR) by analyzing an unrecognized consequence of the Israeli‐Lebanese conflict: a Lebanese community of forced migrants created overnight on Israeli premises due to Israel's unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000. Relying on 60 in‐depth interviews with Lebanese migrants in Israel, the article demonstrates how forced migrants engage in various OS‐seeking strategies in relentless efforts to reconstitute trust. These strategies range from self‐justification and securitizing identity through religious and communal practices, to a search for recognition from statist institutions and boundary‐work vis‐à‐vis "sibling" disempowered "others" in the host state. However, the article shows how under political circumstances of protracted conflict and repeated perceived betrayal by the state, forced migrants are unable to reconstitute the routinized relations of trust on which OS is based. By exposing the particularistic, dynamic, and highly political character of the migrants' quest for trust, the article sheds new light on the political psychology of an "old" conflict and on the multiple meanings of ontological (in)security in migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stemming from Max Weber (1946 [1919]), many sociologists understand legitimate violence as monopolized by the state. The literature has established that for the state to maintain legitimacy it must either demonstrate sustained efficacy or have its legitimacy based on the values of its citizens (Lipset 1963a). The statistics on gun control in the United States (Giffords Law Center 2020) and sociological literature (e.g., Hill et al. 2020a, 2020b) demonstrate the sustained inefficacies of gun rights. Thus, this article investigates the legitimacy of these rights in terms of voters' political values. I use a case set (Small 2009) of 120 voters interviewed in Arizona from 2013 to 2015. My analysis is an example of qualitative secondary analysis (Duchesne 2017; Belot and Van Ingelgom 2017; Davidson et al. 2019). My findings confirm and extend the literature on the bases of legitimate violence in the United States (e.g., Shapira and Simon 2018; Carlson 2019). Furthermore, my findings provide evidence of voter socialization into a political culture that uses public, declarative, and non‐declarative forms of culture in conjunction (e.g., Lizardo 2017). These findings also bridge the sociological literature on values (Wuthnow 2008), political sociology (Lipset 1963a), the sociology of culture (Miles 2015), and moral psychology (Haidt 2012). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Swiss Political Science Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

With the publication of Henk van Houtum's and Ton van Naerssen's (2002) essay on Bordering, Othering and Ordering, border studies received innovative and liberating inspiration. Partly as a result of the essay contemporary border studies recognise the fluid and changing nature of borders, their increasing sophistication, and the complexity of border‐making processes by different agents. In this brief intervention I suggest that perspectives on bordering, ordering and othering can be advanced through exploration of cognitive and psychological processes. By linking borders to cognition we can widen understandings of space‐society relations, gleaning insights from a number of seemingly eclectic sources, such as architecture and cultural and political psychology. Moreover, I will argue that the cognitive nature of bordering is manifested in framings of urban spaces, places and neighbourhoods that create categories of distinction and relationality. Examples that link borders and place to cognition are provided from various sources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]