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This paper evaluates the case Paul Horwich makes in his book Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy against so‐called T‐philosophy—the traditional conception of philosophy as a theoretical enterprise that seeks to analyse concepts, solve problems, and explain phenomena in a unified and systematic way. Different forms of T‐philosophy are identified in the paper, but it is argued that Horwich's multi‐pronged critique has no force against any of them. The paper also assesses, as a case study, Horwich's contention that the problem of our knowledge of mathematical objects can be dissolved on the grounds that the problem is based on a misguided analogy with our knowledge of physical objects. The paper shows that Horwich's contention is mistaken and that the problem can be established without drawing any analogy with our knowledge of physical objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human Resource (HR) algorithms are now widely used for decision making in the field of HR. In this paper, we examine how biases may become entrenched in HR algorithms, which are often designed without consultation with HR specialists, assumed to operate with scientific objectivity and often viewed as instruments beyond scrutiny. Using three orienting concepts such as scientism, illusio and rationales, we demonstrate why and how biases of HR algorithms go unchecked and in turn may perpetuate the biases in HR systems and consequent HR decisions. Based on a narrative review, we examine bias in HR algorithms; provide a methodology for algorithmic hygiene for HR professionals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper sheds light on the role of evolutionary ideas in the making of Turkish nationalism during the Kemalist era (1923–1938). By so doing, it aims to challenge some of the dominant historiographical viewpoints as to the nature of Turkish nationalism. One is related to the Kemalist elites' predisposition towards the so‐called "scientism" seen as one of the bases for nationalism. We intend to turn upside–down the relation between the Kemalists' use of science and Turkish nationalism. Second, we problematize the "culturalist" origins of Turkish nationalism arguing that the seemingly "culturalist" reflections of the time were, indeed, materialist formulations based on the science of the times. We discuss in this respect the Kemalist elites' use of evolutionary ideas. By synthesizing the ways in which these elites employed evolutionary ideas in the fields of history, language, geography, anthropology, biology, eugenics, and pedagogy, we aim to understand the specific nature of Turkish nationalism before 1945. This secular nationalism conceived culture as having materialist bases and differed fundamentally from the culturalist varieties of Turkish nationalism coloured by Islam in the post‐1945 era. Furthermore, the paper empirically enriches the complex and entangled story of evolutionary ideas in the early Turkish Republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages with Troth and Guest (2019) on psychology in HRM. I argue they misframe the central issue in debate. The real problem is not psychology per se but psychologisation—the drive to reduce explanation of macro‐level HRM outcomes to individual‐level psychological‐behavioural factors and individual differences. Accordingly, the most visible and harmful effects of psychologisation are in strategic HRM and the HRM‐performance literature but Troth and Guest's defence of psychology does not cover them. I use this response to re‐establish that it is psychologisation, not psychology per se, that is the critics' focal concern and describe how the three‐decade advance of psychologisation, along with scholastic scientism and normative promotionalism, have created severe theoretical and empirical problems in the high‐performance research programme and taken the strategic HRM field down a 30‐year dead‐end. Suggestions for a turn‐around are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the Chicago sociologist William F. Ogburn's (1886–1959) views about technological unemployment, which were intimately connected to his analysis of the social impacts of technological developments and resulting social problems due to cultural lag. We trace the development of his views as seen through his well‐known 1922 book, Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature, his important contributions to the President's Research Committee on Social Trends (1933), and his lesser‐known pamphlets designed for a broader audience—Living with Machines (1933), You and Machines (1934), and Machines and Tomorrow's World (1938). He used these pamphlets to educate the public about the dangers of new machines and technological unemployment. In doing so, he drew upon sociological analysis in his professional scholarly writings and his long‐standing personal interests in social betterment and social reform. Our analysis also calls into question the adequacy of existing scholarship on Ogburn that has emphasized his commitment to a statistical, dispassionate, and "objectivist" approach to social science research. We call for a revised, richer, and more complex view of Ogburn's work and legacy as one of the nation's leading social scientists during the first half of the 20th century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses an implicit presupposition in research-supported psychological treatments and evidence-based practice in psychology. It argues that the notion of research-supported psychological treatments is based on a reductive conceptualisation of psychotherapy. Research-supported psychological treatments hinge upon an empirical reduction where psychotherapy schools become conceptualized as mere collections of empirical propositions. However, this paper argues that the different psychotherapy schools have distinct ethoses that are constituted by normative claims. Consequently, the evaluation of the different psychotherapy schools and the practice of psychotherapy should include the underlying normative claims of these ethoses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and self‐referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The core of this essay is a review of Alexander Bogner's book "The Epistemization of Politics" (2021). It fits into the ongoing discussion about the role of scientism in science education. Bogner makes the provocative case that science denialism inadvertently points to contemporary scientism in the public sphere, and he observes that many science deniers mobilize (counter)experts and (counter)expertise because better knowledge seems to be "the harder currency" than softer values and interests, emotions, fears, or epistemological dissent. In this way, Bogner explains, the struggle for political hegemony has turned into a struggle for better knowledge. He calls this the epistemization of politics—a new form of political scientism. In this essay, I describe why reading this book was so valuable to me as a teaching professional and why I decided to share some important points with other science educators and scholars. I pose four important questions that I asked myself after reading Bogner's book—about scientism in school science paving the way for scientism in policy, about Science Studies positions in science education as a possible backdoor to science denial, about the role of the naturalistic fallacy in science education (do we always distinguish between facts and values?), and about how scientism in school science threatens the agency of our students. I discuss these points in light of recent publications in the science education literature. The essay is concluded with a number of original quotes from the last chapter of Bogner's book, which revisits his main points and can serve as a stimulus for further reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a previous article, I examined the nature of historical consciousness. In this article, I apply it to three social issues: racism, ecological crisis, and higher education. Since the methods of historical consciousness are already in use, the aim here is not to introduce a new approach. My purpose is to make readers conscious of what they might normally do and why they are doing it. If a society fails to highlight and make explicit the methods it uses to solve the challenges it faces, the transfer of relevant skills will decline over several generations. Modern society has already reached the stage at which scientism has displaced a balance between timeless scientific rationality and historical consciousness in our approach to social issues. Without historical perspective to provide a narrative structure to the findings of science, society is likely to act in ways that are counterproductive. Unless citizens have a personal sense of participation in the stream of historical events, the knowledge they gain from science is not likely to be useful in guiding the direction of society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to reconnect Quine's views to the current debate on scientific realism, I reframe Quine's scientific realism into a semantic, a metaphysical, and an epistemological dimension. With this conceptual background, I review the historical development of Quine's scientific realism from the late 1940s until his death in 2000. I challenge Soames's view that Quine is a phenomenalist at the time of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951) and show that he remains agnostic between a realist and an anti‐realist conceptual scheme instead. I also argue that Quine's early views on regimentation are incompatible with a strong formulation of semantic realism. I proceed in reconstructing how he becomes a metaphysical and epistemological realist in the mid‐1950s and argue against the view of Keskinen and Fogelin that interprets Quine as being a metaphysical anti‐realist. Contrary to Davidson, I defend the view that he never gave up normative epistemology and really is a proper epistemological realist. Finally, I discuss how he tries to reconcile his realism with his thesis of ontological relativity and how this necessitates the switch to a stronger form of semantic realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical issues are structurally present in the design and choice of data; the interaction between problem, model, and intervention; and the scientism that supports data analytics' claims to authority. In this chapter, I argue against three social assumptions behind common implementations of learning analytics: data realism, technological neutrality, and scientism. Recognizing the need to create a mindset of conscious ethical awareness for learning analytics, I challenge institutional researchers to consider learning analytics through three critical lenses: a professional ethics lens, a responsibility lens, and an equity lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights concerning the epistemology of libertarianism. Topics discussed by the author include weak incompatibilism, argument of philosopher Peter van Inwagen against the existence of epistemically justified libertarians, and assessment of arguments from empiricism and scientism.

This is an article on the history of religion and mathematics, which explores the origins and uses of geometric terminology in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century esoteric discourses, and inquires as to whether or not such adaptions are instances of the discursive strategy identified by Olav Hammer as terminological scientism. For the situation regarding spheric terminology, I argue that the context is not scientistic, being rather an example of the decontextualised modern appropriation of antique terminologies. In the case of planar terminology, I conclude that while its origin with Emanuel Swedenborg as an adaption of anatomical vocabulary does indeed fit Hammer's definition of scientism, modern usage stripped the term of Swedenborg's scientistic rationale - making the scientistic designation something of a vestigial atavism. In dealing with dimensional terminology, my conclusion is that from Johann Zöllner's initial formulation to the broader Spiritualistic and Theosophical applications, it exemplifies terminological scientism through and through. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this forum contribution, the planetary boundaries discourse put forward by W. Steffen and colleagues is scrutinized. These boundaries are defined as a 'safe operating space for humanity based on the intrinsic biophysical processes that regulate the stability of the Earth system'. Without reference to specific empirical shortcomings, it is shown that this discourse falls prey to the scientistic fallacy as part of utopian thought. Thus the erroneous belief is propagated that reality, through empirical research, can be penetrated to the full whereby a complete, that is, utopian, grasp of human reality can be translated into said 'operating space'. This discourse is shown to be incoherent and lays waste to any useful research that tries to fathom particular accidents, crises and contingencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts to answer the question why Confucianism, the dominant 'teaching' among the Three Teachings, is not a religion in contemporary China, unlike the other two 'teachings,' Buddhism and Daoism. By examining this phenomenon in the social-historical context, this study finds its origin in Orientalism. The Orientalist conceptualization of religion became part of the New Culture discourse at the turn of the twentieth century. While China has undergone tremendous social changes over the past century, the old discourse remains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the short decades since the introduction of positive psychology instigated broader interdisciplinary research, interest in happiness has been growing in academia, the media and public policy. Numerous critiques of these developments have been forwarded from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary traditions. This article discusses three such criticisms: the culture-bound and normative character of happiness, 'bad science' and scientism, and diminished subjectivity and individualisation. It is argued that criticism, particularly internal criticism, evidences the maturity of the field. However, the depth of some critiques may also indicate that interest in happiness is bound with broader cultural preoccupations and is likely to be superseded. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT In this essay, we explore how sustainability is embodied in the Next Generation Science Standards (NGSS), analyzing how the NGSS explicitly define and implicitly characterize sustainability. We identify three themes (universalism, scientism, and technocentrism) that are common in scientific discourse around sustainability and show how they appear in the NGSS. Taken together, these themes evoke a technology-centered perspective called ecological modernization that defines sustainability as a set of global problems affecting all humans equally and solvable through the application of science and technology. We argue that students who are taught to think about sustainability from this perspective will be less able to see its ethical and political dimensions and less prepared for the political realities of a pluralist, democratic society that must balance the needs of multiple groups and integrate science with other sources of knowledge to develop contextualized responses to sustainability challenges. One compelling alternative is a systematic collaboration between science educators and social studies educators, in which the complementary pedagogical strengths of both fields are combined to provide realistic and powerful preparation for future sustainability challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]