1. Long-Run Effects of Temporary Incentives on Medical Care Productivity
- Author
-
Celhay, Pablo, Gertler, Paul, Giovagnoli, Paula, and Vermeersch, Christel
- Subjects
SYMPTOMS ,CHILDREN ,HEALTH INSURANCE ,CHILD HEALTH ,DISEASE ,MEASUREMENT ,PHYSICIANS ,WEIGHT LOSS ,PRIMARY CARE ,FINANCING ,ADOLESCENTS ,LOW BIRTH WEIGHT ,IMPLEMENTATION ,QUALITY OF HEALTH ,PHYSICIAN ,PREMATURE BIRTH ,HEALTH CONDITIONS ,POPULATION ,HEALTH PROGRAMS ,PERSONALITY ,INCOME ,MEDICAL OFFICER ,WORKERS ,INCENTIVES ,PUBLIC HOSPITALS ,PILL ,HEALTH OUTCOMES ,MEDICAID ,HEALTH ,SMOKING ,MEDICAL RECORDS ,INTERVENTION ,HEALTH ORGANIZATION ,CLINICAL TRIALS ,REHABILITATION ,CLINICAL PRACTICE ,HOSPITAL PERSONNEL ,HEALTH ECONOMICS ,EXERCISE ,PATIENT ,EVALUATION ,PATIENTS ,COUNSELING ,HEALTH FACILITIES ,GENERAL PRACTITIONERS ,RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIALS ,COMMUNITY HEALTH ,BIRTH CONTROL ,HYPERTENSION ,MEDICINE ,MORTALITY ,MEDICAL EDUCATION ,HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ,HEALTH CLINICS ,PREVENTION ,SCREENING ,RISKS ,CLINICS ,INTERVIEW ,HOSPITALS ,PHARMACISTS ,HEALTH SECTOR ,WORKPLACE ,COSTS ,MARKETING ,PREGNANT WOMEN ,PNEUMONIA ,HIV TESTING ,FEES ,DEMAND ,QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE ,VACCINE ,ANTENATAL CARE ,PREVENTIVE MEDICINE ,OLDER CHILDREN ,EPIDEMIOLOGY ,DIABETES ,GENERAL PRACTICE ,PHARMACY ,MEDICAL PERSONNEL ,HEALTH POLICY ,PAIN ,TREATMENT ,CHOICE ,CANCER ,MEDICAL SCIENCE ,HEALTH WORKERS ,PROBABILITY ,PUBLIC HEALTH CARE ,ADDICTION ,PREGNANCY ,HEALTH CARE ,INFECTIONS ,OBESITY ,EFFECTS ,INSURANCE ,PRENATAL CARE ,NUTRITION ,PUBLIC HEALTH ,EQUITY ,HYGIENE ,MEDICAL SCHOOLS ,SMOKERS ,BIRTH ,MEDICAL CARE ,DOCTORS ,HOSPITAL RECORDS ,ILLNESS ,FIXED COSTS ,PSYCHOLOGY ,NEWBORN HEALTH ,MORBIDITY ,SMOKING CESSATION ,PEDIATRICS ,KNOWLEDGE ,CHILD HEALTH SERVICES ,ANEMIA ,PRIMARY HEALTH CARE ,HEALTH RESULTS ,SEROLOGY ,WELLNESS ,HIV ,MEDICAL TREATMENT ,CARE ,SLEEP ,DIARRHEA ,MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH ,LIFE ,PREGNANT WOMAN ,BIRTH WEIGHT ,HEALTH SERVICES ,OBSERVATION ,HEALTH CARE FACILITIES ,NURSES ,WEIGHT ,HEALTH TARGETS ,ALL ,TETANUS - Abstract
The adoption of new clinical practice patterns by medical care providers is often challenging, even when the patterns are believed to be efficacious and profitable. This paper uses a randomized field experiment to examine the effects of temporary financial incentives paid to medical care clinics for the initiation of prenatal care in the first trimester of pregnancy. The rate of early initiation of prenatal care was 34 percent higher in the treatment group than in the control group while the incentives were being paid, and this effect persisted at least 15 months and likely 24 months or more after the incentives ended. These results are consistent with a model where the incentives enable providers to address the fixed costs of overcoming organizational inertia in innovation, and suggest that temporary incentives may be effective at motivating improvements in long-run provider performance at a substantially lower cost than permanent incentives.
- Published
- 2015