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This paper examines the state of the art of the Brexit negotiations in the area of financial services. It uses a two‐level game model to first explain the positions of UK and EU negotiators on the basis of the domestic constraints they face, and second, to consider the scope for final agreement based on the 'win‐set' of both sides. The paper analyses the preferences and power of three main groups of players within the UK and EU: the political authorities, financial regulators, and the financial industry. We argue that the scope for agreement on financial services has been severely hampered by political and regulatory constraints which forced UK and EU negotiators to adopt early hawkish negotiating positions, and by the absence of a unified position from the financial industry. After the 2017 general election, the position of the UK government and UK financial industry briefly converged, thereby narrowing the domestic win‐set, but also increasing the scope for agreement. However, the July 2018 'Chequers' deal represents a hardening of the UK government's position on financial services. We argue that this reflects the fact that the twin pressures facing UK negotiators—acute political constraints at home and bargaining weakness in Brussels—has become more, not less, acute over time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Marmara: Journal of European Studies / Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Marmara University, European Union Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Marmara: Journal of European Studies / Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Marmara University, European Union Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The issue of the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union (the so-called Brexit) means a turning point both in the history of the European integration and also of the United Kingdom. The 51% of the British electorate voted in favour of leaving the EU, which raised up uncountable legal, political and economic questions to be answered. The legal questions raised by the Brexit could be categorized into some groups. According to Takis Tridimas, there are open procedural, institutional and administrative issues of the withdrawal, which organize the 'know how' of the process; but we could talk about the future relationship forms between the United Kingdom and European Union; and the future of the European integration paradigm; or about the development and changes of the European Union's and United Kingdom's legal system due to the Brexit. In this paper - after presenting the historical background of a member state's withdrawal-I focus on the summary of the main public law questions opened to be answered by the Brexit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Marmara: Journal of European Studies / Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi is the property of Marmara University, European Union Institute and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In June 2016, the UK voted to leave the European Union (EU). Although many issues shaped the Brexit campaign, the question of Turkey's quest for EU membership emerged as an unexpectedly strong factor. This article examines how this happened and how the debate evolved. It shows that those who advocated leaving the EU not only distorted the prospect of Turkish membership, they also misrepresented British support for the country's accession. While the UK had indeed been a strong advocate of Turkey's EU integration in the past, support for enlargement in general had declined in recent years due to increasing voter concerns over immigration. However, the policy of supporting Turkish membership could not be wholly repudiated by the government, even in the name of campaigning to stay in the EU, as this would have damaged Britain's strategic relationship with Turkey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the United Kingdom’s approach to the question of European Union enlargement in the Western Balkans. It shows that while Britain had no traditional attachment to the region, it championed expansion as part of its long-standing aim to widen EU membership to prevent deeper political union. However, as immigration from the EU increased after the 2004 enlargement and a Eurosceptic Conservative-led government took charge in 2010, official support for enlargement began to decline. Britain ceded its place to Germany as the strongest supporter of EU expansion. Meanwhile, during the referendum campaign on EU membership, the prospect that future enlargement could further increase the number of migrants emerged as a central point of debate. Although this discussion was primarily focused on Turkey, the Western Balkans also played a part. Therefore, even had the United Kingdom decided to remain in the EU, there is an argument to be made that Britain could well have become more opposed towards future expansion. As it is, the decision to leave the EU (Brexit), has ensured that Britain has now all but lost its say over enlargement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

What should be the position of democrats in response to the Brexit referendum? Many urge a duty to accept the result. This article argues the contrary. If someone is a UK citizen, has a belief that leaving the European Union will be damaging to the common good of the UK and is a convinced democrat, then that person has a duty to oppose Brexit. Neither of the two principal reasons for accepting the result-a claim of popular sovereignty or of parliamentary sovereignty-imply a duty not to continue to oppose. Arguments from political equality for simple majority rule do not apply when the alternatives are ill defined. More generally, popular sovereignty presupposes and does not replace constitutional democracy, and in a parliamentary democracy there is always a continuing right to oppose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]